Hey there, I'm doing an analysis of the Critical and High CVE of Keycloak release for my job, and I thought it could also interest people in this community, so I'm sharing them here as well.
CVE-2026-111497 (9.2): The HTTP2Shell (also called Node2Shell) CVE in the Brotli decoder. Reachable in Keycloak if the experimental feature `http-client:v2` is enabled and Keycloak receives a malicious compressed response from a server it calls, such as an IdP. Exposure is therefore limited, but this could theoretically lead to a denial of service or arbitrary code execution. Workaround: disable `http-client:v2`.
CVE-2026-117691 (9.1): An issue in the SAML HTTP-Redirect binding implementation allowed an unauthenticated attacker to bypass the signature check of SAMLResponse, causing the server to process unsigned SAML messages and leading to full account takeover of federated users.
CVE-2026-97175 (8.8): An issue in the idp-auto-link authenticator (the "Automatically set existing user" option in the admin console), which handles user identity federation, let an attacker take over a victim's account. The attacker could use an email address that the provider had not verified to link their login to the victim's existing account.
CVE-2026-112208 (8.1): In realms using Organizations, an attacker belonging to several organizations could initiate a login and then switch to a registration or password reset path. A flag indicating successful login was not properly cleared, allowing the attacker to enter a victim's username and bypass authentication to gain full access to the victim's account and connected applications.
CVE-2026-114232 (8.1): An authenticated attacker who owns a User-Managed Access (UMA) resource could create a policy specifying a `resourceType` that would apply to all resources of that type, including ones belonging to other users, leading to unauthorized access to, or modification of, sensitive data.
CVE-2026-92857 (8.1): An authenticated attacker allowed to register clients through Dynamic Client Registration (with an Initial Access Token, for example) could create a malicious client application that forges identity information. They could configure their client to put a field they control, for example their first name, instead of their user ID in the access token. By changing their first name to another user's ID, they would be able to impersonate that user in other applications.
CVE-2026-96453 (8.0): When kcadm was used with a custom truststore, any self-signed certificate was accepted as long as the hostname matched, even if the certificate was not in your truststore. An attacker on the network path could pose as the Keycloak server and capture admin credentials sent by kcadm. The Keycloak server itself is not affected; update kcadm instead.
CVE-2026-103112 (7.5): An authenticated attacker could gain full access to a victim's account by using the forgotten password flow on the victim's account and logging in with their own account. This could trigger a race condition which could bind the attacker's session to the victim's account, allowing the attacker to change the victim's password.
CVE-2026-110932 (7.5): An unauthenticated attacker could send many requests with unique fabricated theme names, which would be stored on disk in the theme gzip cache. This could lead to disk space exhaustion that survives restarts, causing a denial of service.
CVE-2026-107123 (7.5): An unauthenticated attacker could send specially crafted SAML requests to the server containing excessively long dateTime or duration values that were not properly validated before processing. This could lead to high CPU utilization and a denial of service for all users.
CVE-2026-107602 (7.5): An unauthenticated attacker could send specially crafted SAML requests to cause threads processing a request to enter an infinite loop, leading to high CPU usage and a denial of service requiring a server restart.
CVE-2026-110931 (7.5): An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted SAML request containing a specific element (`AuthorityBinding`) in an authentication statement. The parser could then enter an infinite loop consuming all available memory, causing the Keycloak service to crash and a denial of service.
CVE-2026-82965 (7.5): An unauthenticated attacker could send specially crafted large SAML XML messages to cause the server to consume excessive memory, leading to the application crashing and a denial of service.
CVE-2026-93998 (7.4): The Keycloak SAML adapter library (not the Keycloak server) verified the signature of SAML assertions, but failed to verify the issuer of the signed assertion. If multiple identity providers shared the same trusted signing key, an attacker controlling one of them could create validly signed assertions to log into the application as any user, including its administrators.
CVE-2026-92855 (7.4): In realms with a SAML identity provider that issues holder-of-key assertions (assertions bound to a key the user must prove they hold), Keycloak didn't check that proof. An attacker who intercepted a victim's signed assertion could replay it and impersonate the victim without needing their private key.
CVE-2026-97847 (7.1): An attacker with the `manage-clients` role could enable the service account of a client they manage and add a hardcoded-claim mapper that writes a realm administrator's identity into its tokens. Service account tokens have no session, so Keycloak resolved their owner from these claims and treated the attacker's token as the administrator's, giving them full control of the realm.
CVE-2026-96457 (High, no score yet): In realms using Fine-Grained Admin Permissions v2 and delegating group management to admins other than realm admins, an attacker with a delegated admin account allowed to manage at least one group could move this group to get around DENY rules set on subgroups, and therefore manage sensitive groups to get admin access to the realm.
If you have any ideas to make this more useful / readable, feel free to send them my way!