r/SecOpsDaily • • 2d ago

The Microsoft outage wasn't an attack — and that's the interesting part for AppSec and AI security

0 Upvotes

Quick context since details are still settling: the Nov 12–13 Microsoft 365 outage (~18 hours, 70+ countries, Outlook/Teams/Exchange/Copilot) was caused by settings applied after a server update. The process that establishes secure connections got overwhelmed, servers stopped handling requests, and Microsoft rolled back a network configuration change. They've explicitly said no malicious/cyber activity and no AI agents involved.
Two threads I think are worth discussing beyond the usual "cloud is fragile" takes:

  1. Availability is a security property, and config changes are threat-model inputs.
    From an AppSec lens, this was a trusted change with a catastrophic interaction — functionally similar to a poisoned dependency or a compromised build pipeline, just without the adversary. If your threat model only considers what an attacker could do, you miss what your own deployment machinery can do to you. Two questions I'd want answered for any critical service path: what single config change could take it down, and do health checks fail gracefully or stampede a recovering system?

  2. AI tooling inherits the resilience of its substrate.
    Copilot went down with everything else, not because AI failed, but because it rides the same identity and control plane. Worth thinking about if you're building AI agent workflows: when the AI layer and the humans fall back to the same email/chat/identity backbone, you don't have a fallback at all. Also notable how quickly "this must be a breach" circulated in the first hours — when your incident response has to start by ruling out compromise, agent-driven noise on the same infrastructure makes that triage slower.
    Anyone done a genuine "blast radius of a trusted change" review for their stack? Curious what people found, especially around TLS/connection-heavy services.


r/SecOpsDaily • • Oct 16 '26

⚠️ Urgent threat notice

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0 Upvotes

r/SecOpsDaily • • Aug 02 '26

AI Helped Find a Linux Kernel Security Vulnerability

0 Upvotes

AI is becoming more than a coding assistant.

Security researchers recently reported that AI-assisted research helped uncover a Linux kernel vulnerability involving the net/sched subsystem.

The flaw could allow a local attacker to escalate privileges to root.

What makes this interesting isn't only the vulnerability itself.

It's the fact that AI is increasingly being used to find real security issues in complex software such as the Linux kernel.

This raises an interesting question:

If AI can help researchers discover vulnerabilities faster, will attackers eventually use the same techniques to find weaknesses before defenders do?

And perhaps more importantly:

Should AI-assisted vulnerability discovery become a standard part of open-source security research?

What do you think?

Source: The Hacker News


r/SecOpsDaily • • Jul 17 '24

Key SOC Tools every SecOps leader should consider

1 Upvotes

r/SecOpsDaily • • Aug 21 '26

Completing MFA didn't stop attackers from getting into Microsoft 365 accounts, here's the technique that's all over the news today

44 Upvotes

Worth knowing because MFA has been the one piece of advice everyone repeated for years. That advice is still correct. But a whole category of attack has emerged specifically to defeat it, and it's been scaling fast in 2026.

A platform called Mirage2FA positions itself directly between the user and the legitimate Microsoft authentication endpoint. When someone enters their credentials and one-time passcode into what looks like a Microsoft 365 login page, the toolkit immediately proxies that data to the genuine Microsoft service in real time, receives the authenticated session, and captures it. The user successfully completes MFA. The attacker gets a logged-in session anyway.

Of 9,426 unique email addresses targeted by the campaign, 4,532 were potentially compromised, roughly a 48% success rate. 63.7% of identified victims were in the US, across technology, manufacturing, education, healthcare, and consulting.

Mirage2FA is one of several platforms running this technique right now. Push Security measured a 37.5x rise in device code phishing pages in 2026. Huntress tracked a 1,380% spike and 344 organizations hit in a single wave by a related kit called EvilTokens. These aren't niche tools — they're sold as subscription services on Telegram with dashboards, campaign templates, and customer support.

The reason the technique works: instead of attempting to break MFA algorithms directly, Mirage2FA positions itself as a real-time relay between the victim and Microsoft. The authentication succeeds for real; it's just that the resulting session token lands on the attacker's infrastructure instead of the user's device.

A few practical things worth doing if you use Microsoft 365 personally:

Check your active sessions at account.microsoft.com/devices and myapps.microsoft.com. If anything looks unfamiliar; a location you didn't log in from, a device you don't recognize — revoke it. Change your password after you do.

Review which apps have access to your Microsoft account under account.microsoft.com → Privacy → Apps and services. Look for OAuth permissions granted to anything you don't recognize. Revoke anything that looks off.

If you get a login prompt you didn't initiate, don't complete it. Legitimate sign-in flows don't appear without you starting them.


r/SecOpsDaily • • Jul 31 '26

Why Traditional Security Tools Miss Post-Install Script Attacks

0 Upvotes

Install scripts aren't a vulnerability. They're infrastructure. npm and PyPI need them. Native modules get compiled, binaries get downloaded, config gets generated. You can't ban them without breaking half the ecosystem.

That's exactly why they're such effective attack surface.

In the last 18 months we've seen three major waves: Shai-Hulud (self-replicating, 25k+ repos compromised), Axios (March 2026, maintainer account hijacked, 100M weekly downloads), and s1ngularity (weaponized AI CLI tools for reconnaissance). All three executed at install time. All three harvested credentials, tokens, SSH keys. All three exfiltrated over the network.

And all three bypassed every standard control:

  • SCA tools reason from manifests and known-CVE databases. A freshly published poisoned version isn't in those databases yet. The scanner doesn't observe what the install script actually does when it runs.

  • Disabling install scripts (npm install --ignore-scripts) blocks the attack but breaks every legitimate build that compiles native code. Teams can't keep it on, so it's not durable.

  • Secret scanners and artifact scans run after the fact. By the time they look, the script has already read the secret and made its network call. You're detecting the aftermath, not the exfiltration.

The gap is structural: none of those tools see the moment install-time code executes inside your build.

The only layer that observes that moment is the build pipeline itself. And that's where the defense model has to live, enforcing policy at the build boundary, not before or after.

The realistic take: install scripts aren't going away. The defense isn't to ban them. It's to treat npm install and pip install as untrusted code execution and build accordingly.

What does post-install script defense look like in your pipeline right now?


r/SecOpsDaily • • Feb 23 '24

Top 10 API CVEs from 2023?

0 Upvotes

Anyone know what the top 10 API CVEs from 2023 were?


r/SecOpsDaily • • Aug 20 '26

If You Used LiteLLM in March 2026, Your Credentials May Need to Be Rotated

0 Upvotes

If your organization used LiteLLM around the March 2026 compromise, don’t treat this as a “package patched, case closed” incident.

CloudSEK’s research identified exposure linked to 2,500+ organizations and 434,000 CI/CD pipelines.

What matters is what may have been sitting inside those environments at the time: cloud credentials, API keys, GitHub tokens, Kubernetes secrets, SSH keys and other sensitive access.

That is where the real risk starts.

A compromised dependency can be removed quickly. Stolen credentials can remain valid for weeks or months if nobody notices.

So the basic check is simple: Were you exposed? What secrets were accessible? Were they rotated? Was there any follow-on access?

Full research:
https://www.cloudsek.com/blog/ai-supply-chain-breach-2500-companies-434000-cicd-pipelines

Exposure checker:
https://exposure.cloudsek.com/ai-supply-chain-incident

If your team touched LiteLLM during that window, this is worth reviewing properly.


r/SecOpsDaily • • Jun 12 '26

CVE Lite CLI closes dependency gap — but won't stop modern threats

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0 Upvotes

r/SecOpsDaily • • Jun 05 '26

HTTP/2 Bomb: How Default Configurations Open a New DoS Vector

0 Upvotes

When protocol efficiency becomes your biggest liability. 🚨

The newly detailed "HTTP/2 Bomb" is a masterclass in why default configurations are rarely secure. It effectively turns the speed and design of HTTP/2 into a potent DoS risk.

Here is why this should be on your radar today:
💥 It chains header amplification with a Slowloris-style connection hold.
📉 Attackers can exhaust your server memory using incredibly low bandwidth.
🔓 It impacts several major HTTP/2 stacks in their default setups.
⚠️ Proof-of-Concepts (PoCs) are already out in the wild.

To mitigate this threat and strengthen your posture, defenders need to ask one critical question: Where exactly does HTTP/2 terminate in your architecture, and what limits are actually being enforced at that edge?

Don't wait for your servers to tap out to find the answer. Check our Blog for more details.


r/SecOpsDaily • • 18d ago

I built an M365 security audit tool this year, plus some helpdesk automations. Looking for honest feedback (I’m the developer)

0 Upvotes

I built this and I sell it, so I’m biased. I’d like honest criticism from people who actually run M365 tenants.

I work in IT at an MSP. This year I built Spartan Cloud Security on the side, mainly because I wanted something that would tell me, in plain English, what was wrong with a tenant and how to fix it.

What it does

* Free snapshot: sign in with Microsoft for a quick read-only look at things like MFA coverage, Conditional Access, legacy auth, admin roles and app consent.
* Full audit: a read-only scan using Microsoft Graph. You get a scored report where each finding says why it matters, how much effort the fix is, the portal steps and a PowerShell option. Findings are mapped to Cyber Essentials, CIS and NCSC guidance.
* Monitoring: monthly rescans, “what changed since last time”, and score history per tenant.

The helpdesk bits, which came from real pain

* Geo-IP exceptions: we geo-block sign-ins on customer tenants, and holiday exclusions meant helpdesk adding and removing people from groups by hand. Now the traveller (or an authorised contact at the customer) fills in a form, helpdesk approves it, it’s capped at 60 days, and access is removed automatically.
* Out of office: people set their own scheduled auto-reply, and Exchange switches it off on the return date. Fewer “can you set my out of office?” tickets.
* Storage alerts for SharePoint and OneDrive.

These run as separate apps with their own consent, so the scanner itself stays read-only.

I’ve also built an API that plugs into our internal customer audit system. It pulls in each customer’s scores and open issues, so they show up directly in our roadmap reviews.

What I’d like to know: what would you want it to check that it doesn’t? And what would make you not trust a tool like this with a tenant?


r/SecOpsDaily • • Sep 09 '26

What happens after your scanner flags a vulnerability

0 Upvotes

I work in AppSec at a large financial services company and the scanner result is the easy part. What I keep running into is the gap between a finding landing and anyone being able to say what happened to it and why.
Most of that reasoning lives in Slack threads, screenshots, and someone's head. Six months later we’re reconstructing why a critical got accepted, and half the time the person who made the call has left lol.

Real question for people doing this daily: what actually eats the most time between a scanner result and a closed finding?

For context, I've been building something in this space on nights and weekends and I have actually been accepted into an accelerator along with received small investment, so I have a bias. Happy to get into it if anyone asks… you should ask 😂


r/SecOpsDaily • • Aug 28 '26

Reading Material: OSINT report about the threat group TeamPCP, and how they were unmasked using different tools

1 Upvotes

r/SecOpsDaily • • Sep 03 '26

FalconFlank

1 Upvotes

FalconFlank is a 0day privilege escalation that abuses the office malicious macros remediation in Crowdstrike Falcon Sensor.

As of now it works in a fully updated windows 11 25H2 / Windows Server 2025 with Crowdstrike Falcon - Phase 3 Optimal Protection + needs "Microsoft Office file malicious macro removal"

https://github.com/MSNightmare/FalconFlank

Protect your CrowdStrike boys!


r/SecOpsDaily • • Feb 19 '24

The Greatest Present DNS Threat

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0 Upvotes

r/SecOpsDaily • • Sep 20 '22

The new novoShield app is now on the App Store

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1 Upvotes

r/SecOpsDaily • • 18d ago

October 28 | 24h Recap: PHP2Shell firewall compromise, UEFI network-boot risk and Amadey disruption

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2 Upvotes

Three stories worth prioritizing today:

  1. PHP2Shell reaches firewall management: Dream reports attackers chained PHP2Shell with a Linux privilege-escalation flaw, compromising 25 servers. In one government-affiliated environment, they reached an internal management server and extracted credentials. Check exposed appliances for compromise alongside applying vendor fixes.

  2. UEFI flaw affects network boot: CVE-2026-97631 can allow firmware-level code execution while a vulnerable machine is PXE-booting. Disable unnecessary network boot, restrict traffic to provisioning networks and check your manufacturer’s firmware guidance.

  3. Amadey controller disconnected: Australia’s ASD says it cut one criminal operator’s access to 180,000 infected computers. That disruption doesn’t establish that every endpoint is clean; affected systems still need investigation and a review of exposed credentials.

Read the full breakdown on CyberRecaps and have an amazing day!


r/SecOpsDaily • • Sep 26 '26

Emergency patch advisory: Cisco ISE CVE-2026-76460 (CVSS 10.0) — no workarounds, active exploitation

2 Upvotes

Heads up for anyone running ISE. CVE-2026-76460 is an unauthenticated API bypass that gives root on every ISE persona (admin, PSN, MnT, PxGrid). All supported versions affected. Already being exploited in the wild.

Cisco says there are no workarounds. Your options are patch or take ISE offline (which means shutting down network auth).

Practical steps: 1) inventory ALL ISE nodes, 2) schedule emergency maintenance this week, 3) check for compromise before patching (look for unexpected cron jobs, modified system files, unauthorized admin accounts), 4) restrict management interface access to a dedicated management segment, 5) if compromised, rotate ALL RADIUS shared secrets across every switch, AP, and WLC.

The management interface runs on 443 by default, same port as sponsor/mydevices portals. If any of those are internet-reachable, your ISE API is reachable.


r/SecOpsDaily • • Apr 19 '26

Need suggestion for a APT emulation tool I am working on

2 Upvotes

Hello everyone,

I've been working on a personal project around cloud adversary emulation (AWS/GCP/Azure, Kubernetes, AI systems), and before I go too deep, I want to make sure I'm actually solving real problems.

The idea: pre-built APT emulation chains you can run against your own environment, with MITRE mappings, detection coverage validation, and auto-generated IR playbooks baked in. While working in AWS Security for almost 4+ years now, I observed some gaps with the SoC and Incident response process. It is easy to use tools such as Stratus, etc., but those help you with individual attacks only, not the whole APT chain, which is the real-world case with APTs like Scattered Spider. Also, one problem with those individual attack emulations from what i have observed is that, SoC teams don't learn to investigate a full chain, they are not ready to respond to real attacks where the adversary is targeting multiple services at once. I know there are advanced blue teams, but I am talking about teams in new-age startups or freshers. I feel running full APT emulation will help understand your detection coverage, guardrails, at what point you can detect an attacker, what they can do, and what will be blocked. Also, how fast can your SoC identify and investigate a real-world threat, if their IR playbooks are actually well-made or not?

But I'm also curious about what others in this subreddit have experienced, do they think it is a real problem, and if yes, what more can I add right now:

How are you currently testing your detections? Is it working?
Have you used tools like Stratus Red Team, Atomic Red Team, Pacu/Cloudfox? What's missing or painful?
Do your IR playbooks actually reflect cloud-native attacks, or are they still on-prem-flavored?
What would make you actually use an emulation tool regularly, versus it collecting dust?

Drop your suggestions below, DMs open too.

Also, if you have any questions regarding the tech stack or how I am doing that, I am ready to answer them in the comments. It is not ready yet, hence I can't post the GitHub link.


r/SecOpsDaily • • Jul 06 '26

Security warning: Amonix repository auto-starts and executes code returned by a remote endpoint

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2 Upvotes

r/SecOpsDaily • • Feb 27 '22

THREAT Hey SecOps, 🇺🇦🔥 Hackers start war on Russia, are you in? #FckPutin

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3 Upvotes

r/SecOpsDaily • • Jan 08 '26

A duress proof vault to protect against coercitive seizure of your private data

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3 Upvotes

r/SecOpsDaily • • 16d ago

CVE triage tool: now scans dependencies, containers, devices and domains

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16 Upvotes

This is CVE Intel, an open-source tool that brings CVE data from NVD, CISA KEV, EPSS, OSV, and public exploit sources into one place. Use it as a desktop app, CLI, REST API, or MCP server.

Now contains exploited-vulnerability sources, EPSS trends, CISA SSVC decisions, clearer CVE comparisons, and vulnerability scanning for dependencies, devices, containers, and domains. New features also include weekly briefings, local watchlists, an activity log, 40 data sources, local AI support on Apple silicon, and MIT or Apache 2.0 licensing.

If you’re interested or work in this field please give it a try and let me know what you think. Issues, pull requests, and comments are welcome and if you’d like to contribute, please feel free! Thank you!

https://github.com/Fazmin/cve-intel