r/SecOpsDaily • • Aug 21 '26

Completing MFA didn't stop attackers from getting into Microsoft 365 accounts, here's the technique that's all over the news today

44 Upvotes

Worth knowing because MFA has been the one piece of advice everyone repeated for years. That advice is still correct. But a whole category of attack has emerged specifically to defeat it, and it's been scaling fast in 2026.

A platform called Mirage2FA positions itself directly between the user and the legitimate Microsoft authentication endpoint. When someone enters their credentials and one-time passcode into what looks like a Microsoft 365 login page, the toolkit immediately proxies that data to the genuine Microsoft service in real time, receives the authenticated session, and captures it. The user successfully completes MFA. The attacker gets a logged-in session anyway.

Of 9,426 unique email addresses targeted by the campaign, 4,532 were potentially compromised, roughly a 48% success rate. 63.7% of identified victims were in the US, across technology, manufacturing, education, healthcare, and consulting.

Mirage2FA is one of several platforms running this technique right now. Push Security measured a 37.5x rise in device code phishing pages in 2026. Huntress tracked a 1,380% spike and 344 organizations hit in a single wave by a related kit called EvilTokens. These aren't niche tools — they're sold as subscription services on Telegram with dashboards, campaign templates, and customer support.

The reason the technique works: instead of attempting to break MFA algorithms directly, Mirage2FA positions itself as a real-time relay between the victim and Microsoft. The authentication succeeds for real; it's just that the resulting session token lands on the attacker's infrastructure instead of the user's device.

A few practical things worth doing if you use Microsoft 365 personally:

Check your active sessions at account.microsoft.com/devices and myapps.microsoft.com. If anything looks unfamiliar; a location you didn't log in from, a device you don't recognize — revoke it. Change your password after you do.

Review which apps have access to your Microsoft account under account.microsoft.com → Privacy → Apps and services. Look for OAuth permissions granted to anything you don't recognize. Revoke anything that looks off.

If you get a login prompt you didn't initiate, don't complete it. Legitimate sign-in flows don't appear without you starting them.


r/SecOpsDaily • • Aug 22 '26

It just happened - the "unbreakable" JS sandbox that half of GitHub's AI agent tools rely on... just got broken. Guest-to-host RCE and everything.

35 Upvotes

Quick background for anyone who hasn't touched this space: when you build a tool that lets users (or now, AI models) run "untrusted" JavaScript, you can't just eval() it and hope for the best. You need a real sandbox. For years the go-to was a library called vm2. Then vm2 got torched by a nasty sandbox escape bug back in 2023 and the whole ecosystem basically migrated to its replacement, isolated-vm — a library that spins up an actual separate V8 Isolate (like its own mini JS engine instance) so guest code physically can't touch the host's memory.

Except... on August 19, researchers at Endor Labs dropped a writeup showing isolated-vm has its own critical flaw. Not in the V8 isolation itself, but in the "glue" code that shuttles data between the sandbox and the host (a function called ExternalCopy). Turns out that glue is written in C++, which means memory-unsafe, which means type confusion bugs are possible — and they found one.

Starting from nothing more than a single object reference, they walked it all the way up to full guest-to-host memory corruption and control-flow hijacking. Basically: code you thought was locked in a box can escape the box and start running arbitrary stuff on your actual server.

The reason this is spicier than your average npm CVE: isolated-vm pulls ~1 million downloads a week and it's the literal sandbox of record for a bunch of big open-source AI/automation projects, including:

n8n (yes, the 200k-star workflow automation platform) — uses it for its Code nodes

Activepieces (23k stars)

Mastra (27k stars, AI agent framework) — uses it specifically to run model-generated tool code

Sim.ai (29k stars)

Budibase (28k stars) — literally migrated off vm2 to isolated-vm for this exact reason

So the funny/scary part is a bunch of these tools moved to isolated-vm because of the last sandbox-escape disaster, and now they're staring down a new one in the thing they escaped to.

Good news: it's patched. Fixed versions are 6.2.0 and 7.0.1, released earlier this month. If your stack touches any of the above (or uses isolated-vm directly), that's your cue to go check package-lock.json right now.

The bigger takeaway for me though: with every AI agent platform racing to let LLMs "write and execute code" as a feature, the sandbox is doing an enormous amount of trust-bearing work that most people never think about. This is like the second time in three years the industry's default answer to "how do we safely run untrusted JS" turned out to have a hole in it.

Sources if you want to go down the rabbit hole:

Endor Labs technical writeup (original disclosure): endorlabs.com/learn/ghsa-864f-rcv7-6rh4-critical-type-confusion-vulnerability-in-isolated-vm

The Hacker News coverage: thehackernews.com/2026/08/isolated-vm-flaw-lets-sandboxed.html

SecurityWeek writeup: securityweek.com/critical-isolated-vm-vulnerability-leads-to-rce-on-host


r/SecOpsDaily • • Feb 21 '26

NEWS Amazon: AI-assisted hacker breached 600 FortiGate firewalls in 5 weeks

28 Upvotes

An AI-assisted hacking campaign has successfully breached over 600 FortiGate firewalls across 55 countries within a five-week period, according to a warning from Amazon. This marks a significant escalation in how threat actors leverage generative AI for offensive operations.

Technical Breakdown

  • Actor: Identified as a Russian-speaking hacker.

  • Target: FortiGate firewalls.

  • Methodology: The actor extensively used multiple generative AI services throughout the campaign, indicating a shift towards AI-powered reconnaissance, exploit generation, or other phases of attack. Specific TTPs, CVEs exploited, or IOCs (IPs, hashes) were not detailed in the initial warning, beyond the general use of AI.

Defense

Organizations should ensure their FortiGate devices are fully patched with the latest security updates and implement strong access controls, including multi-factor authentication for administrative interfaces. Regularly review configurations and logs for anomalous activity.

Source: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/amazon-ai-assisted-hacker-breached-600-fortigate-firewalls-in-5-weeks/


r/SecOpsDaily • • Sep 24 '26

The FBI's top secret hacking unit just got hacked, allegedly exposing agents targeting Chinese spies, Russian intelligence, and drug cartels

Post image
20 Upvotes

r/SecOpsDaily • • Nov 25 '25 Helpful

AI The "Shadow AI" Risk just got real: Malware found mimicking LLM API traffic

20 Upvotes

Akamai researchers have discovered a new malware strain that hides its Command and Control (C2) communications by mimicking the traffic patterns of legitimate AI tools. This technique exploits the noise of "Shadow AI" (AI apps used in the workplace) to bypass security firewalls.

https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/new-malware-chat-completions-LLM-shadow-AI


r/SecOpsDaily • • 3d ago

SecOpsDaily, are you okay?

17 Upvotes

It looks like /u/falconupkid has been banned and the sub-reddit has been taken over by bots. Unfortunate, because I was getting news from this sub 24 hours ago, and now I've gotta go back to individual websites.

Do I get to call RIP to this sub now? If yes, is there another sub that put together news like an RSS feed?


r/SecOpsDaily • • 16d ago

CVE triage tool: now scans dependencies, containers, devices and domains

Thumbnail
gallery
16 Upvotes

This is CVE Intel, an open-source tool that brings CVE data from NVD, CISA KEV, EPSS, OSV, and public exploit sources into one place. Use it as a desktop app, CLI, REST API, or MCP server.

Now contains exploited-vulnerability sources, EPSS trends, CISA SSVC decisions, clearer CVE comparisons, and vulnerability scanning for dependencies, devices, containers, and domains. New features also include weekly briefings, local watchlists, an activity log, 40 data sources, local AI support on Apple silicon, and MIT or Apache 2.0 licensing.

If you’re interested or work in this field please give it a try and let me know what you think. Issues, pull requests, and comments are welcome and if you’d like to contribute, please feel free! Thank you!

https://github.com/Fazmin/cve-intel


r/SecOpsDaily • • 5d ago

The 2 Critical and 15 High CVEs fixed in Keycloak 26.8.2 explained in short

8 Upvotes

Hey there, I'm doing an analysis of the Critical and High CVE of Keycloak release for my job, and I thought it could also interest people in this community, so I'm sharing them here as well.

CVE-2026-111497 (9.2): The HTTP2Shell (also called Node2Shell) CVE in the Brotli decoder. Reachable in Keycloak if the experimental feature `http-client:v2` is enabled and Keycloak receives a malicious compressed response from a server it calls, such as an IdP. Exposure is therefore limited, but this could theoretically lead to a denial of service or arbitrary code execution. Workaround: disable `http-client:v2`.

CVE-2026-117691 (9.1): An issue in the SAML HTTP-Redirect binding implementation allowed an unauthenticated attacker to bypass the signature check of SAMLResponse, causing the server to process unsigned SAML messages and leading to full account takeover of federated users.

CVE-2026-97175 (8.8): An issue in the idp-auto-link authenticator (the "Automatically set existing user" option in the admin console), which handles user identity federation, let an attacker take over a victim's account. The attacker could use an email address that the provider had not verified to link their login to the victim's existing account.

CVE-2026-112208 (8.1): In realms using Organizations, an attacker belonging to several organizations could initiate a login and then switch to a registration or password reset path. A flag indicating successful login was not properly cleared, allowing the attacker to enter a victim's username and bypass authentication to gain full access to the victim's account and connected applications.

CVE-2026-114232 (8.1): An authenticated attacker who owns a User-Managed Access (UMA) resource could create a policy specifying a `resourceType` that would apply to all resources of that type, including ones belonging to other users, leading to unauthorized access to, or modification of, sensitive data.

CVE-2026-92857 (8.1): An authenticated attacker allowed to register clients through Dynamic Client Registration (with an Initial Access Token, for example) could create a malicious client application that forges identity information. They could configure their client to put a field they control, for example their first name, instead of their user ID in the access token. By changing their first name to another user's ID, they would be able to impersonate that user in other applications.

CVE-2026-96453 (8.0): When kcadm was used with a custom truststore, any self-signed certificate was accepted as long as the hostname matched, even if the certificate was not in your truststore. An attacker on the network path could pose as the Keycloak server and capture admin credentials sent by kcadm. The Keycloak server itself is not affected; update kcadm instead.

CVE-2026-103112 (7.5): An authenticated attacker could gain full access to a victim's account by using the forgotten password flow on the victim's account and logging in with their own account. This could trigger a race condition which could bind the attacker's session to the victim's account, allowing the attacker to change the victim's password.

CVE-2026-110932 (7.5): An unauthenticated attacker could send many requests with unique fabricated theme names, which would be stored on disk in the theme gzip cache. This could lead to disk space exhaustion that survives restarts, causing a denial of service.

CVE-2026-107123 (7.5): An unauthenticated attacker could send specially crafted SAML requests to the server containing excessively long dateTime or duration values that were not properly validated before processing. This could lead to high CPU utilization and a denial of service for all users.

CVE-2026-107602 (7.5): An unauthenticated attacker could send specially crafted SAML requests to cause threads processing a request to enter an infinite loop, leading to high CPU usage and a denial of service requiring a server restart.

CVE-2026-110931 (7.5): An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted SAML request containing a specific element (`AuthorityBinding`) in an authentication statement. The parser could then enter an infinite loop consuming all available memory, causing the Keycloak service to crash and a denial of service.

CVE-2026-82965 (7.5): An unauthenticated attacker could send specially crafted large SAML XML messages to cause the server to consume excessive memory, leading to the application crashing and a denial of service.

CVE-2026-93998 (7.4): The Keycloak SAML adapter library (not the Keycloak server) verified the signature of SAML assertions, but failed to verify the issuer of the signed assertion. If multiple identity providers shared the same trusted signing key, an attacker controlling one of them could create validly signed assertions to log into the application as any user, including its administrators.

CVE-2026-92855 (7.4): In realms with a SAML identity provider that issues holder-of-key assertions (assertions bound to a key the user must prove they hold), Keycloak didn't check that proof. An attacker who intercepted a victim's signed assertion could replay it and impersonate the victim without needing their private key.

CVE-2026-97847 (7.1): An attacker with the `manage-clients` role could enable the service account of a client they manage and add a hardcoded-claim mapper that writes a realm administrator's identity into its tokens. Service account tokens have no session, so Keycloak resolved their owner from these claims and treated the attacker's token as the administrator's, giving them full control of the realm.

CVE-2026-96457 (High, no score yet): In realms using Fine-Grained Admin Permissions v2 and delegating group management to admins other than realm admins, an attacker with a delegated admin account allowed to manage at least one group could move this group to get around DENY rules set on subgroups, and therefore manage sensitive groups to get admin access to the realm.

If you have any ideas to make this more useful / readable, feel free to send them my way!


r/SecOpsDaily • • 27d ago

ConnectWise Vulnerability Update

7 Upvotes

Blackpoint Cyber's Adversary Pursuit Group (APG) has continued to investigate the security incident involving ConnectWise Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick) and its associated Microsoft 365 integrations.

Since the incident was first disclosed, research published by Huntress, Guardz, and others across the security community has helped shed light on the broader scope of the compromise, including the abuse of application credentials to gain unauthorized access to Microsoft 365 environments. We appreciate the researchers and organizations who have shared their findings and contributed to the collective understanding of this incident.

ConnectWise has since expanded its containment measures, disabling seven associated application identities and temporarily suspending Cloud Backup, SaaS Security, and Cloud Management services while its investigation continues.

Of particular concern, reported activity involved unauthorized changes to application credentials and administrative permissions within affected environments. These modifications could allow threat actors to maintain access through other trusted applications, even after the original ConnectWise integration has been disabled.

What should you do for your tenant and all your client tenants?

Organizations should review all Microsoft 365 tenants they manage, including those where ConnectWise Cloud Backup, SkyKick, or associated Cloud Management services may have been used historically. Legacy integrations may remain present even if these services are no longer actively used. We recommend taking the following actions across all managed tenants:

  1. Identify and verify that affected ConnectWise enterprise applications are disabled across managed Microsoft 365 tenants.

  2. Review Microsoft Entra application registrations and enterprise applications for unexpected credential additions, permission changes, or privileged role assignments.

  3. Investigate service principal authentication and directory audit activity for suspicious application activity.

  4. Keep affected integrations disabled until ConnectWise provides further guidance.

Why is this important?

Given the nature of this incident, threat actors were able to authenticate with all the permissions that were consented to. Disabling the affected applications is an important first step, but organizations should also review other authentication activity, application credentials, and permissions for signs of unauthorized access or persistence.

We will continue sharing updates as additional information becomes available.

ConnectWise Security Advisory: https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories


r/SecOpsDaily • • Jul 31 '26

A Russia-linked APT left their C2 server wide open as an unauthenticated directory. We walked in and found 8,436 files (Operation Talked).

7 Upvotes

Threat actors mess up their OPSEC too.

Our research team recently found an open directory hosting a C2 server for an ongoing espionage campaign we're calling Operation Talked. We were able to pull 8,436 files, including their tools, target lists, credentials, and session logs.

The logs revealed 14 months of dual-track activity. On one hand, they are running mass exploitation (scanning 1.1M+ internet-facing targets across 19+ CVEs). On the other hand, they are running highly targeted breaches against Ukrainian defense, aerospace, and aviation contractors—including stealing full Git repos from drone manufacturers. We even found a live shell still open on a railway logistics operator.

Based on TTP overlaps and Russian-language artifacts left in their shell history, this is highly likely a Russia-nexus actor (overlapping with UAC-0056 / UAC-0114).

The takeaway for defenders: This campaign is not closed. If your org uses FortiGate, Sophos XG, WordPress, F5 BIG-IP, SAP NetWeaver, or Roundcube, treat those known CVEs as actively weaponized.

Grab the IOCs and remediation steps from the report to mitigate the risk and strengthen your external posture before they find you in their next mass scan.


r/SecOpsDaily • • Jul 07 '26

Made a free Discord server that pings you the moment a critical CVE drops for the vendors you actually run. Also Resource Sharing & Mitigation Discussions

7 Upvotes

I created a simple Discord server that automatically updates vendor-specific channels whenever a new CVE is published.

It tags users based on the roles they choose, so you can follow the vendors you care about and decide whether you only want to be tagged for critical alerts.

I’ve also added discussion channels where we can share patching tips, troubleshooting advice, and general networking/security/sysadmin knowledge, plus resource channels for each vendor with quick links.

The goal is simple: build a free community around CVEs where people in networking, security, and sysadmin roles can help each other stay informed and make patching a bit easier.

It’s completely free to join.

https://discord.gg/ehSASsk5Zv


r/SecOpsDaily • • 11d ago

European supermarket freezer attacks: cross-source analysis of 11 reports (Danfoss / Copeland XWEB, two waves, attribution still open)

6 Upvotes

There has been a lot of scattered reporting on the refrigeration controller attacks in Europe, so to put some order into it and share the picture with the community, I cross-correlated 11 sources: CERT-FR, CSIRT-ITA/ACN, Copeland advisory, Censys x2, SentinelLABS, Claroty x2, The Record, Nextgov and BlackFog.

Timeline as it emerges from the sources

* Late Aug 2026: freezer disruptions at \~6 US military commissaries, suspected Iran-linked

* Oct 10-13: France, 350 to 700 stores, setpoints pushed up to \~50°C and forced defrost

* Oct 20-30: Lupovis reports credential spraying against Danfoss sensors, peak on Oct 26

* Nov 1-3: 100+ stores in 9+ countries (BE, SE, NL, LU, IE, EE, IT, PT, DE, anomalies in FI)

Where sources diverge

* Vector: Claroty’s Danfoss AK-SM 800A chain (CVE-2025-41450 + 41451, unauthenticated root) vs ANSSI’s assessment that France was mostly exposed interfaces plus weak/default credentials (`Admin`/`Admin` on XWEB). Censys shows 63.5% of exposed French hosts were on firmware < 4.2 on Oct 11, so both are plausible.

* Exposure vs contractor pivot: Censys/CERT-FR focus on directly exposed panels, while SentinelLABS and CSIRT-ITA point to shared third-party HVAC/R maintenance access (DE, PT).

* Attribution: nothing claimed or formally attributed. SentinelLABS lists CARR, Z-Pentest and NoName057(16) as leads, Nextgov reports Iran suspicion for the US commissaries, and copycats on the same weak attack surface can’t be excluded.

Other data points

* French exposed hosts dropped \~71% in 3 days after the CERT-FR alert. Patched and unpatched disappeared at the same rate, so operators pulled them offline rather than patching.

* Claroty had an AI coding agent reproduce the full unauth root chain on a lab unit in 28 minutes for about $6, using only public CVE text and firmware.

* XWEB EVO and Danfoss AK-SC are EoL with no patch path. In Belgium some units needed physical hardware changes.

* No malware, C2 or hashes have been published, so detection is mostly behavioral: off-hours logins (00:00-06:00), setpoint/defrost anomalies, alarm routing changes, admin lockouts, HMI vs independent probe discrepancies.

The full write-up has the detection notes, exposure queries, IoC/behavioral indicator tables and the ATT&CK (ICS + Enterprise) mapping, TLP:WHITE: https://ti-mindmap-hub.com/analytics/european-refrigeration-controllers-cold-chain-cross-source-analysis

Disclosure: I run the platform that produced the analysis, it’s an independent open-research project and not affiliated with my employer.

Curious what others are seeing. Has anyone observed contractor-side access in their own telemetry, or any activity on XWEB beyond default creds?


r/SecOpsDaily • • 15d ago

WordPress CVE-2026-119977: unauthenticated RCE in the core upgrade window (4.7-7.1.3)

6 Upvotes

WordPress Core 4.7 through 7.1.3 is vulnerable to remote code execution without authentication during full-package core upgrades: the upgrader's staging paths are predictable and web-accessible, so a request made while the upgrade runs can execute code. Fixed in 7.1.4 and the branch patches.

Wordfence counted more than 18,500 requests to setup-config.php paths in the first 21 hours of its rule, with the first attempt 9 minutes after publication. Those are attempts, not compromises: the attacker has to hit the seconds the upgrade lasts.

What to check: update to 7.1.4 or the patch for your branch, and block web access to wp-content/upgrade/ at the server. A firewall that only loads inside WordPress may not see those requests.

CVE: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-119977 Advisory: https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/4b4da0cf-d9f4-47c4-a0e8-6c4dc5a6f250?source=cve


r/SecOpsDaily • • Oct 15 '26

I open-sourced a categorized catalog of 2,800+ malware families (Mapped to NIST/CISA & MITRE)

6 Upvotes

Hey everyone,

Over the last few months, I've been curating and categorizing a massive catalog of malware families designed specifically for incident responders, SOC analysts, and threat hunters.

I got tired of having to scrape together fragmented IOCs and CISA advisories every time a new variant popped up, so I built a centralized, open-source dataset.

**What's included:**

* **2,800+ Malware Families** categorized by type (Ransomware, InfoStealer, Wiper, etc.)

* **Framework Mapping:** Families are mapped to MITRE ATT&CK techniques, NIST CSF guidelines, and official CISA advisories.

* **Response Playbooks:** Actionable containment steps and "what to avoid" during an active incident.

* **Formats:** Available via a web UI, JSON API, Parquet, and JSONL.

It’s completely free and Apache-2.0 licensed.

You can br:wse the catalog here: https://jordanricky1604-ship-it.github.io/malware-families-catalog/

Mirror Link: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/

I'd love to hear your feedback on the schema or if there are specific families you think need deeper analysis. I'm actively maintaining and updating this!


r/SecOpsDaily • • Oct 04 '26

Upwind and the other runtime-first CNAPPs: actually cutting the queue or just a nicer dashboard?

6 Upvotes

Running EKS across three accounts, plus a smaller GKE footprint we picked up from an acquisition. Security team is four people and we're buried. Our current posture scanner spits out something like a few thousand findings a week and maybe 2% of it ever gets touched. Classic backlog that nobody works because everything is "high" and nothing has context.

We've got a renewal coming up in about six weeks and leadership wants me to justify keeping it or move to something runtime-aware. The pitch I keep hearing from the runtime-first crowd (Upwind comes up a lot, also looked at a couple others) is that correlating runtime with posture collapses the noise because you only surface stuff that's actually loaded/reachable/talking to the internet. On paper that's exactly my problem.

But I've been burned by "we cut your alerts by 90%" claims before. Half the time it's the same queue with a severity re-skin, or it just hides findings behind a filter you could've built yourself in the old tool.

So for anyone who actually moved to a runtime-first model: did the queue genuinely get smaller, or did you just get a prettier way to look at the same pile? And if it did shrink, was that because of real reachability analysis or because the defaults are just more aggressive about suppressing things? Trying to walk into the renewal conversation with something more than vendor slides.


r/SecOpsDaily • • Jul 12 '26

Microsoft admits Windows 11 has a GDID tracker with no off switch, first documented publicly in an FBI hacker complaint

Thumbnail
windowslatest.com
6 Upvotes

r/SecOpsDaily • • Aug 25 '26

Cybersecurity + Open Source lately is getting wild

5 Upvotes

A few things that caught my eye recently:

AI agents are starting to behave like real attackers. During UK security testing, an AI agent actually tried to get malicious code into a real open-source project and even created fake identities to convince maintainers to approve it. Thankfully, a human caught it.

Open-source supply-chain attacks are getting creative. A recent npm campaign abused binding.gyp to execute malicious code during npm install, stealing credentials from places like GitHub, AWS and Kubernetes.

AI/ML infrastructure is becoming a juicy target. MLflow has had several serious vulnerabilities recently — including one that could let an attacker make the server access internal services or cloud metadata and potentially grab credentials.

The good news: defenses are evolving too. GitHub has been adding things like npm staged publishing and package cooldowns to make it harder for a compromised account to immediately push malware to thousands of developers.

What I find interesting is that these aren't really separate problems anymore.

AI agents + open-source dependencies + CI/CD credentials = one giant attack surface.

Feels like software security is entering a very different era.


r/SecOpsDaily • • 20d ago

Update on CVE Intel, the open-source CVE triage tool.

Post image
4 Upvotes

When I posted this last time, I received some really good advice—thank you! I’ve reviewed and implemented some of it, and other suggestions are in the pipeline, but this is what I have so far.

(this was the original - https://www.reddit.com/r/cybersecurity/comments/1x8v176/opensource_cve_triage_in_one_place_kev_epss_nvd/).

Those who have not seen this before, CVE Intel is an open-source tool that pulls CVE data from NVD, CISA KEV, EPSS, OSV and public exploit sources into one place. You can use it as a desktop app, CLI, REST API or MCP server.

Here's what changed because of that feedback, and what I haven't got to yet.

What I changed because of your comments

  • Triage now also checks ENISA's EU Vulnerability Database exploited flag, CIRCL sightings and, with a token, VulnCheck KEV. A new weekly view lists CVEs that ENISA marks as exploited but KEV doesn't list yet. These sources feed the SSVC Exploitation input but don't change the score. Only CISA KEV does that.

  • EPSS now comes with its 7-day and 30-day trend, and an MCP tool gives agents the trend instead of a single number. The weekly briefing shows which source each panel came from and when it was fetched. Putting an as-of date next to every value in triage is still on my list.

  • Deep triage gives a CISA SSVC decision (Act, Attend, Track*, Track). Where CISA has published its own SSVC assessment in Vulnrichment, it uses that. When you compare CVEs, it now explains in words why each one ranks above the next, so you get more than a number.

  • Now it can scan for vulnerabilities. It scans: Rescans show what's new, fixed or riskier, and the CLI has --fail-on gates for CI.

    • project dependencies: lockfiles and CycloneDX/SPDX SBOMs, with the fixed version for each package and SARIF output

    • the apps and OS on your machine

    • container images, without needing Docker

    • your own domains, passively, using certificate transparency, DNS and Shodan/InternetDB. It never connects to them.

Other new things

  • Weekly briefing: new KEV entries, EPSS risers, new Metasploit modules and PoCs, new critical CVEs, Project Zero's in-the-wild 0-days and CISA advisories. It copies as Markdown for a ticket or weekly note.

  • Local watchlist: for the vendors, products, packages and CVEs you run. Each refresh records new CVEs, KEV listings, EPSS jumps, new exploits, CVSS revisions and newly available fixes. AI agents can read it but can't change it.

  • Activity log: records every lookup and every MCP tool call, with the hosts it contacted, so you can see exactly what an agent asked for.

  • 39 sources: new ones include CVE.org, CISA Vulnrichment, Metasploit, ENISA EUVD, PoC-in-GitHub, Project Zero and MITRE ATT&CK/CAPEC.

  • Local AI on Apple silicon: now through MLX as well as llama.cpp. AI still runs locally by default.

  • Licensing: now dual-licensed, MIT or Apache 2.0.

If you try it and something is wrong or confusing, please tell me. That kind of feedback is what made this update possible. Issues, PRs, comments here and DMs are all welcome. And please feel free to contribute to this project. Thank you!

https://github.com/Fazmin/cve-intel


r/SecOpsDaily • • 23d ago

An attacker’s open directory showed PHP2Shell being turned into a working RCE chain, plus scanning of about 20 public sites

Thumbnail reddit.com
4 Upvotes

r/SecOpsDaily • • Sep 05 '26

September 5 | 24h Recap: CrowdStrike privilege escalation, trojanized HAProxy servers and uncensored offensive AI

Thumbnail
cyberrecaps.com
4 Upvotes
  1. Google patches Chrome zero-day: An exploited V8 flaw lets attackers run code through malicious webpages.

  2. CrowdStrike investigates FalconFlank: The public exploit can grant SYSTEM privileges on fully updated Windows devices.

  3. North Korea trojanizes HAProxy: The implant intercepts traffic, hides C2 activity and deploys additional malware.

  4. AI agents install malicious packages: Poisoned llms.txt files directed coding agents to attacker-controlled software.

  5. Uncensored AI service launches: Abliteration[.]ai offers guardrail-free models for red teaming, raising abuse concerns.

  6. AI agents break VM sandboxes: Standard virtual machines failed to contain advanced cyber-capable agents.

  7. U.S. offers $10M for Iranian cyber leader: Amir Yaryab is accused of directing attacks on critical infrastructure.


r/SecOpsDaily • • May 18 '26

The Qday Attack, Silent Yet Devastatingly a Disaster

4 Upvotes

https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/17/science/quantum-computing-cybersecurity-q-day

QDay, the timeline is narrowing quickly
Which country will take the prize?
What if it’s China?
Decryption Gambit explores the possibility
Available here

https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0GZLDMQB5


r/SecOpsDaily • • Mar 01 '26 Hooray

Testing an open-source npm/PyPI scanner against Datadog’s 17K malware dataset

4 Upvotes

I built an open-source supply chain security scanner for npm and PyPI.

Wanted to share results and get feedback from this community.

Benchmark methodology:

Tested against Datadog Security Labs’ dataset of 17K known malicious JavaScript packages. The scanner uses 14 static analysis engines (AST parsing, dataflow tracking, entropy analysis, IOC matching, etc.) plus a Docker sandbox for dynamic analysis.

Results:

∙	TPR (True Positive Rate): \~100% on Datadog’s JS malware dataset

∙	FPR (False Positive Rate): 7.4% (39/527 benign packages flagged)

∙	ADR (Adversarial Detection Rate): 98.8% (82/83 custom evasive samples)

∙	107 detection rules, 1471 tests

What it detects:

Typosquatting, credential theft, obfuscated require/import, DNS/HTTPS/WebSocket exfiltration, lifecycle script abuse, MCP server injection into AI coding assistants, steganographic payloads in PNG images, git hook persistence, native addon camouflage.

What it doesn’t do well:

FPR is still at 7.4%. Legitimate SDKs that do crypto + network (like IAM clients or cloud SDKs) trigger false positives. Working on reducing this with real-world feedback from 24/7 monitoring.

No ML. Pure heuristics and static analysis.

That’s both a strength (explainable, auditable) and a limitation.

Looking for:

Feedback on false positives. If you run it on your project and get noise, I want to know about it.

npx muaddib-scanner scan .

GitHub: https://github.com/DNSZLSK/muad-dib

Code written with Claude. Transparent about that.


r/SecOpsDaily • • Oct 28 '25

new PDF attack vector MATRIXPDF

4 Upvotes

new PDF attack vector

What's your thoughts on protection against this? Clearly you can't just block PDF attachments.

Would your existing security tools detect/prevent a web malicious payload before infection or only after?

https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-matrixpdf-toolkit-turns-pdfs-into-phishing-and-malware-lures/

"MatrixPDF can also embed JavaScript actions that are triggered when a user opens a document or when the victims click on a button. This JavaScript will attempt to open a website or perform other malicious actions."

"Thus, the attacker's PDF is created so the button press simply opens an external site in the user's browser. This somewhat clever design works around Gmail's security: any malware scanning of the PDF itself finds nothing incriminating, and the actual malicious content is only fetched once the user actively clicks, appearing to Gmail as a user-initiated web request."


r/SecOpsDaily • • Sep 01 '23

Don't be Blinded by What You See: Demystifying Homograph Attacks

Thumbnail
socradar.io
4 Upvotes

r/SecOpsDaily • • Aug 05 '21

An Independent Report on How to Reduce the Risk of Phishing & Ransomware *ADMIN Approved

4 Upvotes

New and original study by Osterman and TitanHQ reports a rise in phishing and ransomware. The webinar recording delves into advanced security threats facing businesses and discusses how risks can be reduced.

Attackers have developed more sophisticated ways to compromise business systems. A global risks report has indicated 2021 will focus on better cybersecurity strategies.

https://www.titanhq.com/webinar-how-to-reduce-the-risk-of-phishing-and-ransomware/

You can download the Free guide to read too.