r/freewill • • 3h ago

Is consequentialism sufficient for justifying anti-criminal action?

2 Upvotes

This is mainly targetted at those hard incompatibilists who say consequentialism is sufficient and nothing else is required for holding criminals accountable or taking action against them.

We know the basic objections to consequentialism: Trolley problem scenarios where we actively take one life to save two etc. Consequentialism fails in such cases (or this is the claim of critics).

So

What would say the other required component is (as consequentialism is insufficient)?

Or would you say that consequentialism is unrefuted in all scenarios including Trolley problems?


r/freewill • • 45m ago

Impossibilism Is Self-Defeating

1 Upvotes

Impossibilism states that true moral responsibility is impossible because an agent cannot be causa sui (the self-creator of their own mental nature). According to Impossibilism, every intentional action is determined by pre-existing principles of choice (an agent's desires, values, and preferences).

To be truly responsible for an action, an agent must have chosen those foundational principles of choice using prior principles of choice, creating an infinite regress. Because an agent's starting principles of choice are unchosen, impossibilism concludes that ultimate moral desert is impossible.

This identical regress also applies to the impossibilist's epistemic justification. When evaluating a proposition, an agent forms beliefs based on pre-existing principles of reasoning (foundational standards of logic, inference rules, and evidential weights). While logical truths themselves may be objective, an agent's cognitive disposition to recognize, weigh and apply valid inference rules rather than fallacies is a contingent feature of their mental architecture.

Under impossibilism’s framework, an agent does not choose their foundational principles of reasoning, nor could they choose them without relying on prior, unchosen principles of reasoning. Therefore, concluding that impossibilism is true is strictly the output of unchosen cognitive dispositions.

A defender of impossibilism might attempt to bypass this by retreating to externalist reliabilism (arguing that a belief only needs to be causally truth-tracking like a calculator outputting correct sums) or by appealing to doxastic involuntarism to claim that epistemic justification never requires control because belief is passively compelled by evidence. However, asserting a contested philosophical thesis is a normative speech act, not a passive perception or a causal emission. Evaluating complex arguments, resisting cognitive bias and judging when evidence suffices to warrant assertion requires active epistemic agency, weighing reasons in a manner structurally identical to practical deliberation.

Nor can the impossibilist escape by retreating to a purely evaluative "ought" (claiming only that rational beliefs ought to track truth, like a working clock ought to keep time) while abandoning genuine prescription. Prescription presupposes rational accountability and "ought implies can", it puts an agent on the hook for weighing reasons and responding appropriately. If an impossibilist prescribes that others ought to accept their conclusion, they secretly assume agents possess rational control and normative ownership over their beliefs without causa sui. Conversely, if they refuse to prescribe and treat persuasion merely as causal nudging or psychological conditioning, they collapse the distinction between logical validity and epistemic justification, reducing philosophical argument to a broken clock versus a working clock, neither of which holds rational authority.

Furthermore, biting the bullet to embrace global epistemic impossibilism (conceding that no one is ever epistemically justified in holding any belief) destroys the dialectical standing of Impossibilism, reducing philosophical persuasion to competing, unjustified causal events.

This establishes a major dilemma for asserting impossibilism:

If a belief in impossibilism is strictly the output of unchosen principles of reasoning, the agent has no epistemic justification or rational standing to assert or prescribe it. And if the impossibilist maintains that their conclusion is epistemically justified and binding through the reflective evaluation and endorsement of logical validity, they assert normative ownership over their mental states again, without requiring causa sui.

Impossibilism denies true moral accountability for actions resulting from unchosen principles of choice, while affirming epistemic accountability for beliefs resulting from unchosen principles of reasoning. Unless the impossibilist can identify a non-arbitrary criterion explaining why normative ownership requires causa sui in the practical domain (choice) while permitting unchosen reflective endorsement in the theoretical domain (reason), Impossibilism undermines the very rational authority needed to assert it.


r/freewill • • 19h ago

Learn what the coherence between Ontological, Theoretical and Operational descriptions entails and stop equivocating about determinism and free will

6 Upvotes

Conceptual clarity emerges from the coherence between the operational, theoretical and ontological description. For example the concept of mass in the Newtonian picture is:

- Ontological: an intrinsic property of a body that is responsible for inertial behavior
- Theoretical: the parameter m in the relation F = ma
- Operational: measurable quantity obtained by comparing accelerations of different bodies by presupposing (a) control of intervening force and (b) viable choice of standard test body as the unit of inverse acceleration under such force.

Lets stay here in the high school picture of mass, and thus avoid talking about symmetries, Lie groups, and the more convoluted mumbo jumbo.

The ontological and theoretical descriptions of mass are not clear on their own, they are only made clear because the operational interpretation licenses them. You cannot talk about the theoretical or ontological mass of bodies that are not operationally conceived as massive in the sense given above - and if you do it often leads to inconsistencies that you have to renormalize in order to force operational licensing somehow (as is the case for QFT electron bare mass).

Likewise you cannot clearly talk about ontological and theoretical determinism without a licensing operational description of what that is supposed to mean.

Theoretical determinism is the formal relationship S(t)=f(t,S(0)) for a given fixed function f and initial state s(0). It makes sense formally. Doesn't mean anything yet about the world. It starts to be something you can coherently say about the world when you find systems whose ontological and operational descriptions license the theoretically deterministic representation. You can grab a massive test body, and connect it to spring, that is attached to the wall. Then the oscillation you observe for a small dislocation from equilibrium follows the Hook's law which is represented by a deterministic differential equation.

That doesn't mean the entire world is deterministic. It only means that the conditional outcome of experiments of this kind you can arbitrarily set by choosing the ingredients and initial conditions within the range that licenses hook's law dynamics is conditionally approximately deterministic in this operational constrained sense.

The claim that the universe is a cosmic rube goldberg machine where dominoes are falling one after the other according to the arbitrary configuration set by the cosmic Rube Goldberg machine maker such that you choose to do this and not do that as the unique consequence of the sequence is a completely opaque and vacuous as a metaphysical ontology. It may have a theoretical description as a language construct, but no operational meaning. It is just a picture that one believes to be able to imagine for something it cannot understand.


r/freewill • • 18h ago

What is the difference between what a deterministic computer can do and what a human with free will can do? You probably thought we can do some things better, basically creative and artistic things. Poetry, pictures. Well you were wrong. Here is a taste of the future.

Thumbnail
youtube.com
0 Upvotes

r/freewill • • 21h ago

A system that models future consequences and inhibits its own impulses is genuinely doing something a stone does not. The question is whether that is enough for moral responsibility.

1 Upvotes

A system that models future consequences and inhibits its own impulses is genuinely doing something a stone does not. The question is whether that is enough for moral responsibility. In the comments, you can say why you think so.

29 votes, 4d left
Yes
No

r/freewill • • 23h ago

is probability in LFW epistemic or ontic?

1 Upvotes

Under my understanding if probability is only epistemic and not a real feature of reality, then it is just an observers confidence in their prediction about what another person will choose. an agent under LFW has a choice between A and B. An outside observer makes a prediction on what that agent will choose and gives a probability to A and B. However, in reality the agent is actually no more likely to choose A or B, they could freely choose either one with zero constraints.

However, if probability is an actual feature of reality and not just epistemic, then the agent actually is more likely to choose A over B and the fact that they are more likely is just a brute fact of nature that they dont control. Their propensity to choose A over B is an actual force of nature. This seems like the ultimate choice is then being made by something other than the agent (the propensity). It seems like a random coin flip that the propensity (whatever that is) decides.


r/freewill • • 1d ago

I have had this argument so many times I used all three AI to arbitrate.

1 Upvotes

The argument generally takes this form is everything just applied physics? Another form is this Does knowing the fundamental laws of physics mean you can derive all higher level sciences from those fundamental laws.

Hopefully we can put this argument to bed for the last time

Here is the prompt I used .

In the philosophy of science, what is the relationship between reductionism (the view that everything obeys fundamental laws) and constructionism (the view that higher-level phenomena can be derived from those laws)? Does the first entail the second?

Gemini replied

No—reductionism does not entail constructionism.

In the philosophy of science, the consensus—most famously articulated by Nobel laureate physicist Philip Anderson in his 1972 essay "More Is Different"—is that while you can reduce everything down to fundamental laws, you cannot reliably reconstruct the universe back up from them.

The Core Distinction

Reductionism (Analysis): The view that all complex systems are composed of fundamental entities governed by fundamental laws (e.g., the Standard Model of particle physics). Everything obeys these rules without exception.

Constructionism (Synthesis): The hypothesis that starting from those fundamental laws, one can derive, predict, and reconstruct the behavior of large, complex aggregates (like molecules, cells, economies, or human psychology).

Why Reductionism Fails to Entail Constructionism

Emergence and Scale: At each new level of complexity (from quarks to atoms, molecules to cells, neurons to consciousness), entirely new properties appear. Knowing the quantum mechanics of a single water molecule does not transparently yield the concepts of "wetness," viscosity, or fluid turbulence. Those properties only make sense at the macroscopic scale.

Broken Symmetry: Fundamental laws of physics are generally symmetrical (e.g., they work the same way forward and backward in time, or regardless of spatial orientation). However, large aggregates of matter spontaneously break these symmetries—giving rise to rigid crystals, magnetism, and biological chirality (handedness)—in ways that cannot be deduced solely from the symmetric equations governing the individual parts.

Computational Intractability: Even if a derivation were theoretically possible in the mind of an omniscient calculator (Laplace’s Demon), it is physically and mathematically impossible in practice. Solving the Schrödinger equation for a single complex protein—let alone an ecosystem—requires more computational resources than exist in the observable universe. Higher-level sciences (chemistry, biology, economics) require their own autonomous laws, concepts, and approximations to be explanatory.

Multiple Realizability: A higher-level phenomenon (like "pain" or "market inflation") can be realized by wildly different lower-level physical states. Because the same macro-behavior emerges from countless distinct micro-configurations, the macro-level patterns are largely independent of the specific micro-level details.

The Verdict

Whoever argued that accepting fundamental physical laws forces you to accept that all higher-level sciences are merely "applied particle physics" lost the argument. You can be a committed reductionist (believing nothing violates the laws of physics) while rejecting constructionism (recognizing that chemistry, biology, and psychology require their own irreducible laws and frameworks to explain how complex systems actually behave).

Claude had this to say to this prompt

In the philosophy of science, what is the relationship between reductionism (the view that everything obeys fundamental laws) and constructionism (the view that higher-level phenomena can be derived from those laws)? Does the first entail the second?

Here is Clause's reply

the first does not entail the second. The distinction comes from P.W. Anderson’s 1972 essay “More Is Different,” and he is right that the inference fails.

The two claims

Reductionism (ontological): Everything in the universe is governed by the same fundamental laws. There are no extra forces or laws that only switch on at the level of cells, minds, or economies.

Constructionism (epistemic/explanatory): Starting from those fundamental laws, you can derive or reconstruct the behavior of higher-level systems.

Why the entailment fails

Complexity and scale. Even when the laws are known and the system is fully governed by them, deriving macroscopic behavior can be computationally intractable. The laws can be true and still be useless as a starting point for derivation. Computational irreducibility is a version of this: some systems can only be “derived” by running them.

Emergence and symmetry breaking. Anderson’s central point is that new qualitative behavior appears at each scale. Superconductivity, crystal rigidity, and the handedness of molecules are examples. These depend on collective, many-body structure and on broken symmetries that are not visible in the equations governing the parts. Each level needs its own concepts, and sometimes its own “fundamental” research.

Multiple realizability. Higher-level patterns (a thermostat, a market, a computation) can be realized by many different lower-level configurations. The higher-level description captures something the micro-description doesn’t single out, so it can’t be uniquely “constructed” from it.

Boundary conditions and contingency. The fundamental laws underdetermine the actual world. You also need initial and boundary conditions, and historical accidents (the specific course of biological evolution) carry information not contained in the laws.

Chatgpt had this to say

My verdict is that reductionism does not logically entail constructionism, although the two positions are closely related and often treated as complementary.

There is an important distinction here that I think gets lost in discussions of emergence and the philosophy of science.

  1. What reductionism actually claims

Reductionism, broadly understood, holds that the behavior of physical systems is ultimately governed by fundamental physical laws. Everything that happens is subject to those laws, including biological, psychological, social, and other higher-level phenomena.

However, this is fundamentally a claim about the underlying rules governing reality. It does not necessarily tell us whether those rules are sufficient to derive, explain, or predict every higher-level phenomenon.

2. What constructionism claims

Constructionism, in this context, is the stronger proposition that higher-level phenomena can be derived from the underlying fundamental laws, given the appropriate initial conditions and organization of the system.

For example, if we understand the fundamental laws governing particles, and we know their initial conditions and interactions, constructionism suggests that we should, in principle, be able to derive the behavior of molecules, cells, organisms, and ultimately more complex systems.

This is a claim about the relationship between levels of explanation and the possibility of deriving higher-level behavior from lower-level principles.

3. Does reductionism entail constructionism?

No. At least, not without additional assumptions.

There are several reasons:

- Computational irreducibility: Even if a system follows fundamental laws, its subsequent behavior may not be derivable through any shortcut. We may have to let the system run to discover what it does.

- Emergence: Higher-level properties can arise from interactions among lower-level components. Those properties may be entirely consistent with fundamental laws while requiring their own explanatory frameworks.

- Epistemic limitations: Knowing the fundamental laws does not necessarily give us the ability to derive or predict the behavior of complex systems. The relevant information may be inaccessible or computationally intractable.

- Explanatory autonomy: Higher-level sciences can develop legitimate explanations and laws of their own without contradicting the fundamental laws governing their constituent parts.


r/freewill • • 22h ago

Imagine believing in a concept without a consensus definition

0 Upvotes

The funniest thing about any free will discussion is how much conceptual confusion and lack of consensus there is on what “free will” means.

Determinism suffers no such lack of conceptual clarity.

Now, don’t get me wrong, no one is more conceptually confused than the compatibilists (pick a lane buddy, this isn’t time to be unparsimonious).

But for all the beliefs I have I don’t have to be pedantic or argue semantics, there is a consensus or field definition that is more or less universally accepted.

If you have to have your own pet definition for something, it’s probably not a very strong belief.

I don’t need to define what my beliefs mean “for me”, you can literally just use a dictionary I don’t need to redefine any of the words unless they are technical terms.

But Free Will is not a scientific theory of behavior (which is another weakness, since we have a good scientific theory of behavior), so why do you believe it anyways?

It’s faith based, which is fine, but why do people keep trying to insist it is based in reason and empiricism?


r/freewill • • 1d ago

Free will proof, hey guys 🤗

0 Upvotes

Proof of free will:

You can choose to not believe in free will. Does this sound silly to no one else?

The end.


r/freewill • • 1d ago

How is Caruso on skepticsm

Thumbnail
youtu.be
2 Upvotes

I saw this video on YouTube called the dark side of free will. It is a talk given by philosopher, Gregg D. Caruso. It reminded me a lot of some of the things people say in this subreddit.

From what I have come across, Caruso argues that free will (defined as the control required for "basic desert" moral responsibility) is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism.

In your opinion, is he getting free will skepticsm right?

This is the video I was talking about:

https://youtu.be/rfOMqehl-ZA?is=kWs6KKsPDYG3y2f5


r/freewill • • 1d ago

Consequentialist compatibilism

4 Upvotes

Consequentialist compatibilism is the view that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism because it is justified by the consequences of the practices of praise, blame, and punishment rather than by desert. To be responsible means that your behavior can be influenced by these practices. The question is not "Do you deserve blame?" but "Will blame change anything going forward?"

If a person's will is free in the relevant sense, that is, it is not coerced by another will and their capacity for self-control is intact, we can hold them responsible. We do this not because of who they are, but to change their future judgments so that they benefit society rather than harm it. The strange thing is that this, too, is the imposition of another's will. But it differs from coercion: punishment and blame work through a person's reasoning by giving them new reasons, rather than bypassing that reasoning, as a gun does. Besides, there is nothing else we can do when we are faced with people who cause harm.

The consequentialist, however, must also answer a deeper objection: "Doesn't it sound absurd to say that a person is free when nature compels them to act in a precisely determined way?"

The compatibilist will say that the absurdity lies in the word "compels." It suggests coercion, a force acting against you. Heredity, character, the imprint left by one's environment, and the ideas that have found fertile ground are not external pressure on some "true self" underneath. They are what the self is made of. To be "compelled" by your own character is like saying a circle is compelled by its roundness. This is why Dennett insists that determinism is not fatalism: your choices do not happen in spite of you but through you.

So for the compatibilist, freedom is a practical concept. It marks the difference between a person who acts on their own reasons and has the capacity for self-control, and a person with a gun to their head. That difference is real even under complete determinism.


r/freewill • • 2d ago

No one is impressive; just lucky

12 Upvotes

People are like the sunset (and that’s if they’re lucky).

Yes, the sunset is beautiful but it didn’t do anything to deserve it.

I can admire its colours, but I have no respect for it.

It deserves as much respect as a caterpillar, a random puddle in Belize or a lost earring.

That’s that.


r/freewill • • 2d ago

Please understand the concept of Causal Decoupling

6 Upvotes

Heinz Pagels' concept of "causal decoupling" suggests that while the rules of a more complex level of reality (like biology or psychology) depend on the material basis of the level below it (like physics or chemistry), those rules can be understood and applied independently without needing to reference the more basic level.

In his view, the natural sciences are divided according to this principle. For example, one does not need to understand the fundamental physics of subatomic particles to study traffic jams or human consciousness. Each level of organization operates with its own distinct rules that are "decoupled" from the intricate details of the layers beneath it.

This is why Determinism is such a red herring when discussing the brain. Determinism is irrelevant to an information processing organ like the brain.


r/freewill • • 2d ago

Compatibilists: What kind of moral responsibility do you defend?

4 Upvotes

Im interested in how compatibilists on this sub understand moral responsibility, particularly whether they defend basic desert or some weaker conception.

Which position best represents your view? Clarification on the options below:

  1. Basic desert: Agents can genuinely deserve praise or blame in the basic-desert sense, and compatibilist control is sufficient to ground this.

  2. Fittingness without basic desert: Blame and reactive attitudes can be appropriate responses to wrongdoing independently of their consequences, but this does not entail that the agent basically deserves blame.

  3. Purely forward-looking responsibility: Praise, blame and accountability are justified by their consequences (eg moral education, deterrence, rehabilitation), not by basic desert or any independent backward-looking fittingness.

  4. Other / Results: My position doesnt fit these categories, or im not a compatibilist

I'd be particularly interested in hearing from people choosing option 2. Ie what makes a blaming response fitting if the agent doesnt basically deserve blame? Is fittingness an independent normative justification, or does it ultimately reduce to forward-looking considerations?

45 votes, 17h ago
9 1) Basic-desert
2 2) Fittingness without basic-desert
13 3) Purely forward-looking responsibility
21 4) Other/Show results

r/freewill • • 3d ago

The only type of free will that matters is libertarian free will

9 Upvotes

Everything else is just redefining it to try to escape the problem.

The important part of free will is the possibility to choose an alternative. If you can’t do that, it destroys epistemology (because your thoughts would also be determined) and it appears to make consciousness impossible, since it would mean all thoughts are being forced on unconscious matter. If the matter itself can’t think, who is experiencing the thoughts?

I am not making the typical argument against determinism you often hear where people think they’re doing an internal critique and going, “if determinism is true, you can’t know determinism is true because you could have been falsely determined to believe in determinism.”

How do you know that? How do you know you weren’t falsely determined to believe it’s possible to be falsely determined? You may think that’s a self-refuting contradiction, but how do you know you weren’t falsely determined to believe that’s a contradiction, and how do you know you weren’t falsely determined to believe in the law of noncontradiction?

It appears you end up in an infinite regress of uncertainty about the implications of determinism (I’m using the word “appears” as a stand-in for an infinite lack of a knowledge claim, but it appears that all speech entails knowledge claims).

But libertarian free will doesn’t work either because of what I label the “will-want” problem.

Any choice you make logically entails you wanted to make that choice. If you chose something you thought you didn’t want, it’s clear that you really did prefer that choice for whatever reason or reasons you found most important. You wanted to pay your taxes because you wanted to avoid jail more than you wanted to keep your money.

Where did that want come from? Did you choose it, or did something external to whatever the agent is that is you impose that want on you?

If you chose the want, why did you choose that want? You must have wanted to choose that want. You wind up with an infinite regress of choosing wants, or at some point in the chain, the want was imposed on you by something external to the agent that is you.

All conscious choice is preceded by thoughts. Can you choose your thoughts? It’s the same problem. Infinite regress where the want dictates the choice.

The thing about libertarian free will is it would require the agent to choose something for no reason. It would require an unconscious choice.

I don’t see a solution here. Reality doesn’t make sense.


r/freewill • • 2d ago

Why is free will so important - for the ego?

Thumbnail reddit.com
0 Upvotes

r/freewill • • 2d ago

Attribution Bias

1 Upvotes

What have you done to check your attribution bias today?

The attribution bias is a cognitive bias in humans in which you misjudge or misinterpret the reasons or causes behind other people’s behavior and your own.

We generally attribute the behavior of others to personality traits and attribute our own behavior to circumstances.

So, under a free will model, how do you account for the attribution bias?


r/freewill • • 2d ago

The Rejection of Free Will is Flawed & Baseless | What's Wrong with Determinism Ep. 1

Thumbnail
youtube.com
0 Upvotes

I posted this, not because I believe this person got everything right. I'm posting it mainly because he seems to see the same danger from free will denial that Saul Smilansky sees.

It is interesting the way that he "apologizes" for compatibilism and I suspect I've exhausted that by now. Besides I think that I've figured out how compatibilism "works".


r/freewill • • 3d ago

Pascals Wager and Free Will?

0 Upvotes

The original version from 1760, so practically yesterday in philosophical terms, is about the existence of god and the benefit of belief (heaven/hell).

| God Exists

| God Does Not Exist

Who’s wager would the free will one be and why?


r/freewill • • 4d ago

Free will is perspective dependent

3 Upvotes

The entire debate about free will is one that people have while taking different positions when making their arguments.

If we are talking about conscious beings, it's important to realize that there are two perspectives that can be taken to answer any particular question.

The first position is the first person perspective, which is the perspective of every experiencer. every observer is a bounded system and experiences reality from inside the boundaries of self.

Philosophy asks questions and generates answers from that first person perspective. However, science does not. Science is about what is mutually observable - and what is mutually observable is deterministic.

From the first person perspective, free will is self-evidently true because it is experienced as choice that is taken. This capacity must be real because predicting choices that you'll make is impossible - it costs more energy to predict your own behavior than it does to simply perform it.

From the external perspective, however, all we see are the results of choices, the results of actions performed by observers in the environment.

And in that environment, there is no free will - there is only a perception of a deterministic universe governed by laws. There is no free will and there is no meaning in the physical deterministic world of the result of action that we all perceive.

There doesn't need to be, because the meaning, and the free will is hidden inside every observer and fundamentally a quality of the first person perspective of the experiencer.

As observers, we create coherence in our environments through the application of action. that action acts as the structuring force in our environments.

Because what happens when you connect multiple oscillators together? They synchronize. They synchronize then develop a capacity for making more coherence, for accepting external chaos and turning it into internal order. For observing.

So observation is something that every synchronizing system does, from the atom to galaxies. And in every case, it is the choice possessed by every observer that drives coherence.

Coherence is fundamentally associated with action. And that means that embodiment is free will. Not in a philosophical or romantic sense but actually equivalent to it.

What seems deterministic is only the results of action, only the shared surface of deterministic past that we observe.

But the meaning, and the action that created it lives behind the boundary that every observer hides behind.


r/freewill • • 4d ago

For Free Will Skeptics, Can you break the Ames Window Illusion?

4 Upvotes

Some illusions cannot be broken through reasoning. You cannot perceive reality even if you know the truth. I've watched multiple demonstrations of the Ames window illusion, and I always see the window swaying back and forth, not rotating like it is in reality. Even if you put a pen, or ruler, (or rubix cube as in Veritasium's video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dBap_Lp-0oc), I will simply see the pen go impossibly through the oscillating Ames window. This means our perception is fundamentally automatic and reasoning can only help guide it, but not overrule our brain's automatic process.

So for the free will skeptics, do you reason that free will doesn't exist, yet still get a feeling or illusion of free will, like the oscillating Ames window? Or are you able to break the illusion, and see the Ames window rotating? (For me personally, sometimes I do get in the zone or flow state, and I feel ego loss, with my actions disconnected and thoughts coming without source, and I truly feel that free will doesn't exist. But it's never reason or logic that brings this about.) Or did you never feel you have free will in the first place? like the 10% of people who don't even see the Ames window illusion at all.


r/freewill • • 4d ago

Sean Carroll Christian List discuss free will

0 Upvotes

An excellent discussion from Christian List and Sean Carroll which really gets down into the details of free will. Christian List is one of the foremost philosophers of free will today. Sean Carroll makes the point that if you are talking about deterministic physics in relation to free will you don't understand the subject. Christian List makes a slight correction while largely agreeing. Christian thinks that there are potentially an infinite number of potential configurations of matter and some are deterministic and some are not so saying the universe is deterministic depends on which level you are describing.


r/freewill • • 3d ago

So weird how no one is talking about free will in the comment section

Post image
0 Upvotes

if you do not choose what you want.. how do you make choices?

like, did you just want more to resist it or did you want more to give in on it

That want is controlling you.

At the end of the day, it's just you anyway.


r/freewill • • 5d ago

Autonomy and stuff

Thumbnail reddit.com
2 Upvotes