r/freewill • u/Dry_Journalist_7001 • 43m ago
Impossibilism Is Self-Defeating
Impossibilism states that true moral responsibility is impossible because an agent cannot be causa sui (the self-creator of their own mental nature). According to Impossibilism, every intentional action is determined by pre-existing principles of choice (an agent's desires, values, and preferences).
To be truly responsible for an action, an agent must have chosen those foundational principles of choice using prior principles of choice, creating an infinite regress. Because an agent's starting principles of choice are unchosen, impossibilism concludes that ultimate moral desert is impossible.
This identical regress also applies to the impossibilist's epistemic justification. When evaluating a proposition, an agent forms beliefs based on pre-existing principles of reasoning (foundational standards of logic, inference rules, and evidential weights). While logical truths themselves may be objective, an agent's cognitive disposition to recognize, weigh and apply valid inference rules rather than fallacies is a contingent feature of their mental architecture.
Under impossibilism’s framework, an agent does not choose their foundational principles of reasoning, nor could they choose them without relying on prior, unchosen principles of reasoning. Therefore, concluding that impossibilism is true is strictly the output of unchosen cognitive dispositions.
A defender of impossibilism might attempt to bypass this by retreating to externalist reliabilism (arguing that a belief only needs to be causally truth-tracking like a calculator outputting correct sums) or by appealing to doxastic involuntarism to claim that epistemic justification never requires control because belief is passively compelled by evidence. However, asserting a contested philosophical thesis is a normative speech act, not a passive perception or a causal emission. Evaluating complex arguments, resisting cognitive bias and judging when evidence suffices to warrant assertion requires active epistemic agency, weighing reasons in a manner structurally identical to practical deliberation.
Nor can the impossibilist escape by retreating to a purely evaluative "ought" (claiming only that rational beliefs ought to track truth, like a working clock ought to keep time) while abandoning genuine prescription. Prescription presupposes rational accountability and "ought implies can", it puts an agent on the hook for weighing reasons and responding appropriately. If an impossibilist prescribes that others ought to accept their conclusion, they secretly assume agents possess rational control and normative ownership over their beliefs without causa sui. Conversely, if they refuse to prescribe and treat persuasion merely as causal nudging or psychological conditioning, they collapse the distinction between logical validity and epistemic justification, reducing philosophical argument to a broken clock versus a working clock, neither of which holds rational authority.
Furthermore, biting the bullet to embrace global epistemic impossibilism (conceding that no one is ever epistemically justified in holding any belief) destroys the dialectical standing of Impossibilism, reducing philosophical persuasion to competing, unjustified causal events.
This establishes a major dilemma for asserting impossibilism:
If a belief in impossibilism is strictly the output of unchosen principles of reasoning, the agent has no epistemic justification or rational standing to assert or prescribe it. And if the impossibilist maintains that their conclusion is epistemically justified and binding through the reflective evaluation and endorsement of logical validity, they assert normative ownership over their mental states again, without requiring causa sui.
Impossibilism denies true moral accountability for actions resulting from unchosen principles of choice, while affirming epistemic accountability for beliefs resulting from unchosen principles of reasoning. Unless the impossibilist can identify a non-arbitrary criterion explaining why normative ownership requires causa sui in the practical domain (choice) while permitting unchosen reflective endorsement in the theoretical domain (reason), Impossibilism undermines the very rational authority needed to assert it.