r/econmonitor • • Jun 08 '23

Announcement Early Warning: r/econmonitor will be strongly impacted by Reddit’s upcoming API changes.

157 Upvotes

It is unlikely the current frequency of posts is sustainable should the Reddit API changes go through as they have been communicated thus far. If you are out of the loop on the changes, you can catch up here and also check here.

Our ability to moderate will be considerably impacted.

We have hit some roadblocks regarding automation of posts. It’s close, but not reliable.

In light of all this users should expect regular postings to enter a hiatus within a month or two, likely concurrent with implementation of API changes by Reddit (expected ~July 1st but Reddit might delay).

Community members are welcome to post as has always been the case. If you have been a part of EM for long enough you should have a good idea which sources are allowable. If not, you can look at the sidebar for some suggestions.

If there are any users willing and able to assist with automation efforts (python) please send us a modmail.


r/econmonitor • • Oct 28 '20

Sticky Post Modifications to Subreddit Enforcement Action

141 Upvotes

Due to the recent uptick in low effort, casual, and substance devoid comments in the community, we will be more liberally applying bans and ban lengths for the foreseeable future.

Effective immediately, and retroactive for the past 24 hours, we will be issuing minimum 4 day bans to all comments found to be of low effort and minimal substance.

This subreddit aims to provide the professional financial community a place where they can read and discuss, at a high level, the latest in industry material. Forays into casual discussion, jokes, puns, jabs, reddit meta, etc. detract from that experience and therefore will be dealt with harshly and swiftly.

Thank you for your cooperation,

The EM BoG


r/econmonitor • • May 19 '20

Commentary Global recovery to take years

135 Upvotes
  • The global economy is in the midst of the worst downturn since the 1930s. China's real GDP plunged a record annual rate of 33.8% quarter on quarter (q/q) in the first quarter of 2020. On a comparable basis, IHS Markit estimates that US real GDP will plummet a record 36.5% or more in the second quarter. Modest recoveries are expected in subsequent quarters. For calendar year 2020, we project real global GDP to fall 5.5%. This is more than three times the contraction in the 2009 aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. Given the unrelentingly bad news and data on the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) virus and the economic carnage, there is high likelihood that the near-term outlook will get worse before it gets better.

  • Nevertheless, attention is now beginning to shift from the depth of the recession to the shape and strength of the recovery. The massive uncertainty about the path of the virus makes any assessment about the economic outlook especially challenging. The current IHS Markit baseline forecast is predicated on three working assumptions: 1) that new global infections will peak by the late summer (with localized recurrences likely); 2) that an effective and widely offered vaccine will be not be available until late 2021 or early 2022; and 3) that the lockdowns will continue to be eased gradually throughout the summer and autumn. These imply that the world will be inching toward "normalcy" over the coming year.

  • The recent experience in China is instructive. In Wuhan, while most factories are up and running, restaurants are mostly empty. More broadly, the Caixin China General Services Purchasing Managers' Index™ (PMI™), compiled by IHS Markit, remains in contraction territory. The pattern in other economies, which are opening early, is similar—consumers remain ultra-cautious. Thus, while growth in the hardest hit economies may snap back briefly, the momentum will soon fade. This is sometimes called a "square-root-sign recovery."

  • A combination of factors will make the post-crisis recovery unusually slow. A tidal wave of bankruptcies among small and large industries will make restarting the manufacturing sector more challenging than in typical recoveries. Moreover, the damage to the finances of households and businesses will substantially delay any return to old spending levels. Last, but by no means least, the fear of crowds will postpone any return to "normal" in the travel and leisure industries. Even massive stimulus will only offset a small part of plunging growth (roughly 0.4 percentage point in 2020 for the US economy). Crucially, any resurgence in the number of infections will only worsen these trends. The recent flare up of cases and re-imposition of restrictions in South Korea and parts of China are worrisome.

  • Bottom line: The fastest we can expect output in key economies to return to pre-pandemic levels is early 2022 (the exception is China, where the infections occurred earlier and recovery is now under way)—in many economies the recovery could be even more prolonged.

IHS Markit Blog.


r/econmonitor • • Mar 04 '21

Research Americans Born after 1985 Bear the Brunt of Lower Employment

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stlouisfed.org
132 Upvotes

r/econmonitor • • Apr 16 '21

Commentary Dallas Fed: Cost of Texas’ 2021 Deep Freeze Justifies Weatherization

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dallasfed.org
125 Upvotes

r/econmonitor • • Sep 13 '25

Commentary Corporate profits rest on labor’s shrinking share

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123 Upvotes

Labor share and corporate profits are two sides of the same distribution. In the national accounts, if labor’s claim on value added falls, profits rise mechanically. The past few decades, especially after the new millennium, have been defined by a margin structure where labor share is compressed by globalization, technology and weaker bargaining power.

That, in turn, leaves profits structurally high relative to output.

The current configuration is unusual because profits remain elevated even with higher rates and slowing growth, which means margins are being defended at the expense of wage gains!

The tension is rather obvious: if policy or inflation pressure shifts more income toward labor, it comes directly out of earnings capacity and resets the level of sustainable profits.


r/econmonitor • • Jul 28 '20

Commentary Inflation: This time it really is different!

122 Upvotes

Source: Brian McConville, HSBC. Date: July 2020.

  • We all know that for the last 40 years, inflation has been stable to trending lower. This has been due to a variety of factors, but I would argue that Fed policy and globalization have been primary drivers of this move, along with constraints on the bargaining power of labor.

  • The market mindset on inflation (or more accurately disinflation) reminds me of its view on housing in 2007. Just like the market believed housing could never drop in price, most equally believe that inflation will never go meaningfully higher. With global economic activity contracting, and continuing pressure on labor from automation, this only adds further conviction to an already well-established view. And headline inflation YOY has ticked down to 0.6%.

  • However, I would argue that we are at an inflection point in US inflation dynamics, and that the risk is for substantially higher prints as we move forward into 2021. There are three main reasons for my view, which I will list and then further explain below.

  • (1) The globalization trend has ended and is now reversing. Globalization was already under attack from populists who effectively argued that it was negative for the working class and it was hollowing out domestic industries. Now add in COVID, which revealed our dependence on foreign sources for critical supplies, and you have a powerful argument for bringing production home for both political and security reasons. As this occurs, competitive advantage will be discarded, and relative prices should go higher

  • (2) The Fed is now monetizing Federal spending explicitly. In previous episodes of monetary easing, even in the prior QE rounds starting in 2008, the Fed was not meaningfully growing broad money supply that was feeding through into the real economy. In 2009-2012, asset prices rose along with reserves, but broad money growth stayed on a relatively steady upward trajectory. Furthermore, the money sat on bank balance sheets and did not find its way into the real economy. In this newest round of QE, some of the money from the Fed is being injected directly into the real economy through PPP. In the chart at right, you can see the growth in M2 money supply since the Fed went into overdrive in March. The change in trajectory is significant! As Milton Friedman so famously proclaimed, “Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.”

  • (3) Labor costs in the near term are rising faster than recent trend. In the current environment, labor is gaining some pricing power. Minimum wages are being pushed up towards $15 per hour in many states, with additional moves by companies such as Amazon to provide a living wage. Furthermore, in the short term with unemployment insurance being bumped up to $600 a week by the Federal government, workers are getting more money in their pockets. While the Republicans recognize the potentially adverse incentives from this plan, the pressure to continue it forward, and the precedent set will allow workers to demand more going forward in my view.

  • Also, while the market seems to believe inflation will continue to trend down, University of Michigan 5-10 year inflation expectations have ticked up to 2.7%. Admittedly this is not a robust metric, but it does show that the general public is primed for increases in prices. In many essential services such as education and medical care, the public accepts price rises of 3-4% annually. If supply chain changes and import restrictions force goods prices up by a similar amount, I believe those increases will be accepted also. I think the tail risk as we move forward is inflation rates ticking up towards 4% within the next 12 months.

  • Further, the USD has been on a steady downtrend since May, and is now making near 1 year lows in an orderly decline. Despite our house view of a relatively strong USD, I believe that with interest rate differentials at levels that are unattractive to fund the USD deficit, and with greater QE in the US than abroad, we have the potential for another 5-10% move lower over the balance of the year. This would add further impetus to upward pressure on prices.

Since this analysis is longer term in nature, it is not necessarily immediately actionable. Nevertheless, here are the trades I see playing out over the next year or so:

  • Sell the USD against the currency of your choice. I look for EUR and GBP to gain 5% vs. the USD into the end of the year.

  • Look for opportunities to sell US debt in maturities of 10 years and longer. With 10 year yields at .58% and 30 year at 1.25%, there is lots of room for yields to rise if the inflation view changes.

  • Equities will be ok with some inflation and seem to be the last to react to changes in underlying macro conditions. However, if longer US rates go up substantially, relative value will dictate that equities eventually re-price lower.


r/econmonitor • • Oct 26 '20

Announcement Federal Reserve Board fines the Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. $154 million for failure to maintain appropriate oversight, internal controls, and risk management with respect to 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB)

117 Upvotes

Source: Federal Reserve

  • The Federal Reserve Board on Thursday announced it has fined the Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. $154 million for the firm's failure to maintain appropriate oversight, internal controls, and risk management with respect to Goldman's involvement in a far-reaching scheme to defraud a Malaysian state-owned investment and development company, 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB).

  • In 2012 and 2013, Goldman arranged and underwrote three bond offerings that raised $6.5 billion for 1MDB. Certain former Goldman bankers in Asia participated in a scheme with Malaysian businessman Low Taek Jho and others to divert substantial portions of the proceeds from the 1MDB offerings for their personal benefit and to pay bribes to certain foreign government officials. Goldman's transaction approval processes and internal controls failed to detect or prevent the scheme or to address obvious red flags around the 1MDB offerings. The Board is requiring Goldman to improve its risk management and oversight of significant and complex transactions, enhance its due diligence related to these transactions, and improve its anti-bribery compliance program.

  • The Board's action is being taken in conjunction with actions by other authorities including the U.S. Department of Justice, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the New York Department of Financial Services, the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority, and the Bank of England Prudential Regulation Authority, and other foreign authorities. The penalties and disgorgement announced by all of the agencies total approximately $2.9 billion.

  • The Board has previously prohibited from banking three former Goldman employees in connection with the 1MDB offerings. In March 2019, the Board prohibited former Goldman employees Tim Leissner and Roger Ng for their roles in the scheme to divert bond proceeds. Leissner was also fined $1.42 million. In January 2020, the Board also prohibited former Goldman employee Andrea Vella for unsafe and unsound practices in connection with the bond offerings.

Attachment


r/econmonitor • • Oct 27 '20

Commentary It Truly IS Different This Time

111 Upvotes

BMO

Douglas Porter , CFA, Chief Economist and Managing Director

October 23rd, 2020

How is this recession different... let us count the ways. While financial markets were busy handicapping the odds of the next U.S. stimulus package and the November 3rd election, evidence continued to roll in on the highly unusual nature of this cycle. There was more outsized strength in housing, the ongoing resiliency of equities, the rapid V-shaped recovery in China, and reports of labour shortages amid high jobless rates, to name but a few. Events have unfolded at such a fast and furious pace this year—and November awaits—that it’s sometimes difficult to see the weirdness of the economic forest in 2020 for the data trees. Let’s do some amateur arborist work, and look at 12 of this year’s strangest rings:

  1. Personal incomes are up, not down: While markets breathlessly await any news on a potential stimulus package from Washington, the reality is that U.S. personal incomes are still on track to rise by more than 5% this year, an upswing from the 3.9% advance in 2019. Suffice it to say that it’s not normal for incomes to rise in an economic downturn: they fell 3% in 2009. With consumers heavily supported and, at the same time, blocked from buying some services, savings rates have soared this year—on pace to average 16% in both the U.S. and Canada.

  2. Housing has strengthened, not weakened: In a “normal” recession, housing is typically clobbered by its status as a big-ticket, interest-sensitive purchase. The 2008/09 U.S. downturn took that trend to extremes. But because this recession was not preceded by rising interest rates, housing has not suffered its usual “recession victim” fate. Instead, home sales, prices and starts have all come roaring back in both the U.S. and Canada. And, the sector is poised to be a rare source of growth for both economies this year. This week saw U.S. single-family housing starts rise to their highest level since 2007 in September.

  3. Bankruptcies have dropped, not risen: In staggering contrast to every prior recession, insolvency tallies have fallen this year, and fallen hard, for both businesses and consumers. For example, Canadian consumer filings have plunged almost 40% y/y in the past six months to the lowest levels in at least 15 years (September figures are likely to be released next week). Loan deferrals, even lower interest rates, and massive government income supports have explained this odd development.

  4. The fiscal response was immediate and overwhelming: Of course, a big explanation for the prior curiosity on bankruptcies, as well as the rise in personal incomes, was the rapid-fire and heavy-duty government spending measures. Loaded on top of the usual automatic stabilizers, fiscal policy around much of the world went into hyper-drive as economies were shut down in the spring. The IMF estimates that the worldwide fiscal response was equal to $11.7 trillion, or 12% of global GDP, in a mere six months. In a more normal recession, fiscal policy often doesn’t respond until the downturn is over.

  5. The monetary policy response was immediate and overwhelming: While monetary policy has a much better track record for responding to a downturn in a timely manner, this episode set a new standard for a rapid response—especially by the Fed. Learning important lessons from the 2008 crisis, the Fed wasted no time in the heart of the emergency in March, wheeling out all the guns (and some new ones) within weeks of the shutdowns. Recall that in 2008, the Fed did not get rates down to the lower boundary until December, a full year after the recession started. The Bank of Canada also nearly emptied its toolbox by the end of March this year, while it wasn’t until April 2009 that it delivered its final rate cut in the prior cycle.

  6. Stocks regained their losses in weeks, not years: The overwhelming and rapid response by policymakers helps explain how and why financial markets were able to stabilize and repair after the March turmoil. After plunging by more than 33% in a matter of weeks, the MSCI World index had fully recouped those losses by the end of summer. While it has stepped back in recent weeks, the index is still up 7% from year-ago levels, even with the clear second wave building in many major economies.

  7. It was the deepest downdraft in the post-war era: Third-quarter GDP stats are beginning to roll in, with the U.S. expected to report record growth of roughly 30% next week. We’re looking for even gaudier results in Europe and Canada, albeit after deeper drops in Q2. But, even with these massive bounces, almost all major economies will still be well below pre-pandemic levels, owing to the record setbacks during the spring. To pick but one example, Canadian GDP plunged 18.1% in March and April, and even with a spirited rebound since then, it was still almost 5% below pre-pandemic levels by August. In the deep 2008/09 recession, the economy was down by less than 5% at the point of maximum weakness.

  8. It was the shortest recession ever: What this downturn had in depth, it gave up in longevity. In the post-war period, the average U.S. recession has persisted for roughly 12 months. We suspect when the final determination is made, this one lasted two months (there may be some debate over whether the economy was still in recession in May). At this point we would reiterate that this is the economist definition of recession—that is, the period in which the economy is contracting. While technically well shy of the normal two-quarter standard for a recession, the depth and dispersion of the downturn leaves zero doubt on whether this episode qualifies.

  9. Sector differences were extreme: Almost all sectors of the economy were hammered shut by the lockdowns. However, as conditions gradually reopened, the differences among industrial sectors were sometimes extreme. It’s not unusual for some industries to be harder hit during downturns—with cyclical sectors, such as manufacturing and construction, living up to their name. However, this cycle saw some industries devastated, while others actually benefitted on balance. While housing, tech and some retail sectors have thrived, arts and entertainment are down more than 50% y/y and hotels & restaurants are off more than 30% y/y.

  10. Services suffered, not goods: The pronounced weakness in the aforementioned high-touch service sectors runs almost completely counter to past downturns. In a typical recession, stability in the service sector helps to offset deep weakness in the big-ticket durables industries. It’s almost as if the world has been turned on its head this cycle, with goods holding up relatively well and services still struggling massively. Winners and losers among economies have been sorted along these lines, with tourism-dependent nations suffering heavily, while manufacturing-led economies have recovered quickly. Case in point, Germany’s composite PMI stayed strong in October at 54.5, while France flagged to 47.3. Meantime, the world’s largest goods exporter—China—saw industrial production pop 6.9% y/y last month, and the 4.9% y/y rise for Q3 GDP puts that economy on track for 2% growth this year.

  11. Commodity prices held up remarkably well (aside from that little nasty bout of negative oil prices): Let’s just say that amid the deepest decline in the global economy in the post-war era, it is passing strange that many key commodity prices have not only held up, but in some cases thrived. The Bank of Canada’s commodity price index, which is burdened by a heavy energy weighting, has still managed to rise 4% from year-ago levels. To put this in perspective, the index was down more than 40% y/y seven months into the downturn in 2008/09. Strong gains in copper, gold, natural gas, lumber and some agricultural prices have all provided important offsets to still-soggy oil prices. While each of the strong commodities has its own particular story, the key driver is that underlying strength in the demand for goods.

  12. The US$ has weakened, not strengthened: We noted earlier this year that, compared to other financial markets, exchange rates had been a relative wallflower at the 2020 market rave. That’s not to say there was no drama in FX, but this year’s swings have been far from unusual. But what has been unusual is that the U.S. dollar is now on track to weaken this year, versus its usual recession behaviour of rising on safe-haven demand. There was a brief bout of dollar strength in the depths of the turmoil, but it passed quickly, and we suspect it is more likely to weaken further over the next year, almost regardless of what transpires on November 3rd. On the flip side, the Canadian dollar—after briefly showing in March that it never met a crisis it didn’t want to join—is now basically unchanged on net over the past year.


r/econmonitor • • Mar 11 '20

Commentary Coronavirus will push the Italian economy into a recession

111 Upvotes
  • With the rapid surge of confirmed COVID-19 cases on Italian soil since 21 February and the subsequent emergency measures taken by the government, downward risks to the Italian economy have significiantly increased. We expect the coronavirus to push the Italian economy into a recession this year. We think that it will mainly suppress growth in the first half of the year and that there is room for a slight rebound late this and early next year. All in all, we think that the virus will shave off a bit less than 1 percentage point of GDP growth this year.

  • In first instance, the corona outbreak in China mainly had an impact on the Italian economy via trade with China (figure 1 and 2). Mainly manufacturing industries that are substantially exposed via exports and/ or imports- such as the car sector - were expected to take a hit. With the outbreak in Northern Italy itself, albeit still relatively contained when compared to several Asian countries, the hospitality sector has now also fallen victim. Activity in the quarantined towns in Northern Italy has come to a halt and Italy’s economic capital Milan has essentially turned into a ghost town. Although the city has not been quarantined, its restaurants and bars are empty and schools and tourist attractions are closed. In fact, the decision on 4 March to close all schools around the country for two weeks will have an impact on the ability of employees with children to come to work all over the country.

  • It goes without saying that estimates are still surrounded by many uncertainties. In our basecase scenario, China’s economy will severely contract in the first quarter of the year and partially recover losses in the second half of the year. In Italy we expect that quarantine measures will not be extended to other Italian regions. The latter is why, for now, we do not expect large supply chain dispruptions caused by Italy’s manufacturing sector. While production in the broader Lombardy and Veneto region could be affected – which together create about one-third of total Italian value added -, the factories that are currently actually closed create less then 0.1% of Italy’s value added.

  • The outbreak of the coronavirus adds to the many headwinds the Italian economy was already facing. The Italian economy contracted substantially in the final quarter of last year (-0.3% q/q). While the nearly two-year decline in overall sentiment has been bottoming out recently (figure 4), most sentiment indicators still point to muted growth in the overall services sector and even to a contraction in the manufacturing sector in the current quarter: the respective PMIs stood at 52.1 and 48.7 in February (figure 5). A figure below 50 suggests activity is shrinking. With production in the manufacturing sector falling at a very fast rate and the workforce at an accelerating pace when compared to January. Moreover, all of these surveys were held prior to the rapid increase of cases in Italy and subsequent quarantine measures. Surveys held since then are very likely to paint a gloomier picture. We forecast growth to contract in the first half of this year and only foresee a slight rebound in the final quarter of this year.

Rabo Bank


r/econmonitor • • Aug 12 '20

Other Addressing misconceptions about the Consumer Price Index

110 Upvotes

FAQ:

Long form explanations here with selected excerpts in comments.

Has the BLS removed food or energy prices in its official measure of inflation?

No. The BLS publishes thousands of CPI indexes each month, including the headline All Items CPI for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) and the CPI-U for All Items Less Food and Energy. The latter series, widely referred to as the "core" CPI, is closely watched by many economic analysts and policymakers under the belief that food and energy prices are volatile and are subject to price shocks that cannot be damped through monetary policy. However, all consumer goods and services, including food and energy, are represented in the headline CPI.

Most importantly, none of the prominent legislated uses of the CPI excludes food and energy. Social security and federal retirement benefits are updated each year for inflation by the All Items CPI for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W). Individual income tax parameters and Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) returns are based on the All Items CPI-U.

The CPI used to include the value of a house in calculating inflation and now they use an estimate of what each house would rent for -- doesn't this switch simply lower the official inflation rate?

No. Until 1983, the CPI measure of homeowner cost was based largely on house prices. The long-recognized flaw of that approach was that owner-occupied housing combines both consumption and investment elements, and the CPI is designed to exclude investment items. The approach now used in the CPI, called rental equivalence, measures the value of shelter to owner-occupants as the amount they forgo by not renting out their homes.

The rental equivalence approach is grounded in economic theory, receives broad support from academic economists and each of the prominent panels, and agencies that have reviewed the CPI, and is the most commonly used method by countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Critics often assume that the BLS adopted rental equivalence in order to lower the measured rate of inflation. It is certainly true that an index based on home prices would be more volatile, and might move differently from other CPI indexes over any given time period. However, when it was first introduced, rental equivalence actually increased the rate of change of the CPI shelter index, and in the long run there is no evidence that the CPI method yields lower inflation rates than some other alternatives. For example, according to the National Association of Realtors, between 1983 and 2007 the monthly principal and interest payment required to purchase a median-priced existing home in the United States rose by 79 percent, much less than the rental equivalence increase of 140 percent over that same period.

When the cost of food rises, does the CPI assume that consumers switch to less desired foods, such as substituting hamburger for steak?

No. In January 1999, the BLS began using a geometric mean formula in the CPI that reflects the fact that consumers shift their purchases toward products that have fallen in relative price. Some critics charge that by reflecting consumer substitution the BLS is subtracting from the CPI a certain amount of inflation that consumers can "live with" by reducing their standard of living. This is incorrect: the CPI's objective is to calculate the change in the amount consumers need to spend to maintain a constant level of satisfaction.

Specifically, in constructing the "headline" CPI-U and CPI-W, the BLS is not assuming that consumers substitute hamburgers for steak. Substitution is only assumed to occur within basic CPI index categories, such as among types of ground beef in Chicago. Hamburger and steak are in different CPI item categories, so no substitution between them is built into the CPI-U or CPI-W.

Furthermore, the CPI doesn't implicitly assume that consumers always substitute toward the less desirable good. Within the beef steaks item category, for example, the assumption is that consumers on average would move up from flank steak to filet mignon if the price of flank steak rose by a greater amount (or fell by less) than filet mignon prices. If both types of beef steak rose in price by the same amount, the geometric mean would assume no substitution.

In using the geometric mean the BLS is following a recognized best practice for statistical agencies. The formula is widely used by statistical agencies around the world and is recommended by, for example, the International Monetary Fund and the Statistical Office of the European Communities.

Is the use of "hedonic quality adjustment" in the CPI simply a way of lowering the inflation rate?

No. The International Labour Office refers to the hedonic approach as "powerful, objective and scientific". Hedonic modeling is just one of many methods that the BLS uses to determine what portion of a price difference is viewed by consumers as reflecting quality differences. It refers to a statistical procedure in which the market valuation of a feature is estimated by comparing the prices of items with and without that feature. Then, for example, if a television in the CPI is replaced by one with a larger screen and higher price, the BLS can make an adjustment to the price difference by estimating what the old television would have cost had it had the larger screen size.

Many of the challenges in producing a CPI arise because the number and types of goods and services found in the market are constantly changing. If the CPI tried to maintain a fixed sample of products, that sample quickly would shrink and become unrepresentative of what consumers were purchasing. Each time that an item in the CPI sample permanently disappears from the shelves, the BLS has to choose another, and then has to make some determination about the relative qualities of the old and replacement item. If it did not--for example, if it treated all new items as identical to those they replaced -- significant upward or downward CPI biases would result.

Critics often incorrectly assume that BLS only adjusts for quality increases, not for decreases, and that hedonic adjustments have a large downward impact on the CPI. On the contrary, BLS has used hedonic models in the CPI shelter and apparel components for roughly two decades, and on average hedonic adjustments usually increase the rate of change of those indexes. Since 1998, hedonic models have been introduced in several other components, mostly consumer durables such as personal computers and televisions, but these newer areas have a combined weight of only about one percent in the CPI. A recent article by BLS economists estimated that the hedonic models currently used in the CPI outside of the shelter and apparel areas have increased the annual rate of change of the All Items CPI, but by only about 0.005 percent per year.

Has the BLS selected the methodological changes to the CPI over the last 30 years with the intent of lowering the reported rate of inflation?

No. The improvements chosen by the BLS that some critics construe to be a response to short term political pressure were, in fact, the result of analysis and recommendations made over a period of decades, and those changes are consistent with international standards for statistics. The methods continue to be reviewed by outside commissions and advisory panels, and they are widely used by statistical agencies of other nations.

Moreover, the sizes and effects of the changes implemented by the BLS are often over-estimated by critics. Some have argued that if the CPI were computed using the methods in place in the late 1970s, the index would now be growing at a rates as high as 11 or 12 percent per year. Those estimates are based on the belief that the use of a geometric mean index lowered the annual rate of change of the CPI by three percentage points per year, and a belief that other BLS changes, such as the use of hedonic models and rental equivalence, have lowered the growth rate of the CPI by four percentage points per year.

Neither belief is supported by evidence. BLS calculations have shown that the geometric mean formula has reduced the annual growth rate of the CPI by less than 0.3 percentage points. Hedonic quality adjustments for shelter regularly increase the rate of change of the CPI, and those for apparel have had both upward and downward impacts at different points in time and for different types of clothing. The BLS estimates that the overall impact of hedonic quality adjustments in use in other categories has been extremely small. Furthermore, if the CPI were using the pre-1983 asset-based method instead of rental equivalence to measure homeowner shelter cost it would yield a sharply lower current measure of shelter inflation, given that house prices are now declining in many parts of the country.

Does the Bureau of Labor Statistics calculate the CPI the same way as other nations? Do any differences in method keep the US CPI lower than the CPIs of those other nations?

Yes, the methods described above are used widely by nations in the OECD and the European Union. A recent report shows that rental equivalence is the most common method used to measure changes in the cost of shelter by the OECD -- with 13 of 30 nations employing it. The next most common method is for a nation to omit shelter from the CPI. The hedonic method of quality adjustment is used by at least 11 of the 29 other OECD nations, and five of the G-7 nations. Eurostat reports that the geometric mean is used by 20 of 30 countries for its Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices.

Each nation's inflation experience is the result of its unique economic circumstances, so comparing the change in the U.S. CPI-U with inflation rates in other countries does not gauge the accuracy of U.S. inflation measures. Nevertheless, over the 1997-2007 period the U.S. CPI-U increased faster than the CPIs of 16 of the other 29 OECD nations, and faster than the CPIs of all of the other G-7 nations, including Canada, the United States' largest trading partner. Similarly, between the first quarters of 2007 and 2008 the U.S. CPI rose by more than the CPIs of 20 of the other 29 OECD nations and by more than any of the other G-7 nations, including Canada.

https://www.bls.gov/cpi/factsheets/common-misconceptions-about-cpi.htm


r/econmonitor • • Jul 31 '20

Data Release GDP down by 12.1% in the euro area and by 11.9% in the EU

108 Upvotes

Eurostat

In the second quarter 2020, still marked by COVID-19 containment measures in most Member States, seasonally adjusted GDP decreased by 12.1% in the euro area and by 11.9% in the EU, compared with the previous quarter, according to a preliminary flash estimate published by Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union. These were by far the sharpest declines observed since time series started in 1995. In the first quarter of 2020, GDP had decreased by 3.6% in the euro area and by 3.2% in the EU.

Compared with the same quarter of the previous year, seasonally adjusted GDP decreased by 15.0% in the euro area and by 14.4% in the EU in the second quarter of 2020, after -3.1% and -2.5% respectively in the previous quarter. These were also by far the sharpest declines since time series started in 1995. Among the Member States, for which data are available for the second quarter 2020, Spain (-18.5%) recorded the highest decline compared to the previous quarter, followed by Portugal (-14.1%) and France (-13.8%). Lithuania (-5.1%) recorded the lowest decline.

Seasonally adjusted GDP


r/econmonitor • • May 01 '21

Data Release 62.7 percent of 2020 high school graduates enrolled in college, down from 66.2 percent in 2019

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bls.gov
107 Upvotes

r/econmonitor • • Sep 07 '22

BoC Bank of Canada increases policy interest rate by 75 basis points, continues quantitative tightening

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bankofcanada.ca
106 Upvotes

r/econmonitor • • Feb 01 '21

Data Release Older Workers Accounted for All Net Employment Growth in Past 20 Years

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stlouisfed.org
105 Upvotes

r/econmonitor • • Mar 22 '21

Research Tax Evasion at the Top of the Income Distribution: Theory and Evidence

104 Upvotes

Source: https://www.nber.org/papers/w28542

Full Article PDF Direct Link 1

Full Article PDF Direct Link 2

Abstract

This paper studies tax evasion at the top of the U.S. income distribution using IRS micro-data from (i) random audits, (ii) targeted enforcement activities, and (iii) operational audits. Drawing on this unique combination of data, we demonstrate empirically that random audits underestimate tax evasion at the top of the income distribution. Specifically, random audits do not capture most tax evasion through offshore accounts and pass-through businesses, both of which are quantitatively important at the top. We provide a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon, and we construct new estimates of the size and distribution of tax noncompliance in the United States. In our model, individuals can adopt a technology that would better conceal evasion at some fixed cost. Risk preferences and relatively high audit rates at the top drive the adoption of such sophisticated evasion technologies by high-income individuals. Consequently, random audits, which do not detect most sophisticated evasion, underestimate top tax evasion. After correcting for this bias, we find that unreported income as a fraction of true income rises from 7% in the bottom 50% to more than 20% in the top 1%, of which 6 percentage points correspond to undetected sophisticated evasion. Accounting for tax evasion increases the top 1% fiscal income share significantly.


r/econmonitor • • Dec 29 '21

Commentary “Excess” Retirements during the COVID-19 Pandemic

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103 Upvotes

r/econmonitor • • Mar 09 '20

Commentary Entire US Treasury curve below 1%

103 Upvotes
  • The entire US Treasury curve is now below 1% as global market turmoil has pushed the US 30Y Treasury yield to just 0.92%, having traded as low as 0.70% overnight. While coronavirus fears only continue to escalate, a new oil price war has added a new layer of uncertainty, causing oil prices to crash nearly 25% since last Friday.

  • Markets are now fully-priced for a return to 0% interest rates, the only question is when. The Fed’s March 18 meeting is only 10 days away, but can the Fed even afford to wait that long in an environment like this? The more important thing at this stage than simply cutting rates is ensuring that they have a fully-fledged plan in place.

  • Elsewhere, on Friday the Fed’s Rosengren was already talking about the option of the Fed buying other assets in a Quantitative Easing program beyond just Treasuries.

  • Munis rallied Friday gaining 10bps across the yield curve as coronavirus fears mount, driving investors to safety.

  • U.S. hiring posted the largest gain since May 2018 as payrolls rose 273k, trouncing estimates. The unemployment rate dropped back to a half century low of 3.5% while average hourly earnings ticked up 0.3%. The data suggests that the labor market was on very solid footing prior to the intensified spread of the coronavirus. [...] the bond market did not seem to care. Following the release, the 10Y remained <0.80% and the 30Y sat at about 1.30%. It seems apparent that the bond market is deaf to any economic data, albeit strong data, before the outbreak intensified.

RBC


r/econmonitor • • Jun 26 '21

Sticky Post New weekend shutdown subreddit policy

101 Upvotes

Hello r/Econmonitor subscribers,

After weeks of careful debate and planning, the Econmonitor Board of Governors has decided to implement a weekend shutdown policy. This new policy will be effective next Friday July 2nd, 2021 and will continue indefinitely until modified or canceled.

Our shutdown policy will be as follows:

  • Posting and commenting will be restricted to approved users only, every weekend from Friday 8pm ET (12am GMT) to Monday 6am ET (10am GMT).

This policy has been implemented due to post material not being released by primary sources over the weekend, a substantial fall-off in comment quality during this time frame, and limited moderator availability.

Thank you for your understanding and feel free to voice any questions or concerns you may have in the comments below. We'll be sure to respond to each serious concern.

Best,

The EM BoG


r/econmonitor • • Jan 12 '26

Fed Statement from Federal Reserve Chair Jerome H. Powell

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100 Upvotes

r/econmonitor • • Jan 28 '22

GDP 6.9% GDP Is Not Screaming Growth, It's Screeching Brakes (Wells Fargo)

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wellsfargo.bluematrix.com
99 Upvotes

r/econmonitor • • Jun 15 '21

Commentary The U.S. Economy Is Heating Up. So Is Inflation. (Wells Fargo)

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wellsfargo.bluematrix.com
99 Upvotes

r/econmonitor • • Dec 16 '19

Other Math behind the US-China trade agreement is fishy to say the least

99 Upvotes
  • Guidance from the USTR (here and here) stipulates that China has agreed to raise imports of goods and services from the US by “no less than US$200 billion” from the level that existed at the end of 2017 and to do so over a two year period by the end of 2021 with no agreement or target thereafter. Of this amount, China is to increase its total purchases of agricultural products to US$40-$50 billion over each of the next two years. The USTR has stated that no further breakdown of the quotas will be provided.

  • The US exported $188 billion of goods and services to China in 2017 which is the benchmark year for the agreement. Raising that amount by at least $200 billion would target US$388 billion in exports of goods and services by the end of 2021 or a 2.1 fold increase. If instead we started from the present level of exports to China which was roughly US$175 billion, then getting to the target would mean a roughly 2¼ fold increase. That’s extraordinarily ambitious notwithstanding the fact that the USTR’s Lighthizer emphasized that both countries agreed to do so. The accompanying chart vividly portrays what would have to happen to US exports of goods and services to China by the end of 2021 using linear interpolation of the target off the 2017 benchmark year. It may not be a linear path – it could ramp up more quickly before the US election, or more slowly given lags in making trade adjustments – but this approach makes the point about the enormity of the task that lies ahead.

  • The agricultural targets are even more ambitious. The US exported about US$9.2 billion in total agricultural products to the US in 2018 (here) and is tracking less than that this year. To achieve US$40-50 billion in agricultural exports to China in each of the next two years would require expanding the total by 4-5 times by the end of 2021. The aggregate export targets are ambitious as noted above, but I’ve run out of superlatives that aren’t profanities when it comes to describing the goal for agricultural exports.

  • The following points are offered on the feasibility of this aggregate export target path and the agricultural exports path, and ways in which they could be manipulated.

  • (1) One obvious possibility is that China will simply fail to hit these amounts. It may make some front-loaded progress on the path to the US election next November by loading up boatloads of soybeans and hogs, but ultimately fail thereafter and gamble that the political tone in Washington may become less combative. (2) Another possibility is that China could stockpile goods by over purchasing and placing them in inventory for future needs. After the two year period, imports from the US could plunge (3) China could import more from the US and re-export it elsewhere. Other countries imports of US goods could simply wind up in transit through Chinese ports (4) China could reallocate purchases away from other countries in order to meet the quotas for US goods. This is a dangerous scenario for the world economy (5) Since the purchase targets are in nominal US$ terms, one way of contributing toward their achievement could be through prices and exchange rate effects. China might simply pay a lot more for US exports in the short run instead of achieving the quotas in volume terms. Recall that while China has somewhat clamped down on the practice, it’s history of fake invoicing problems with exporters is well known.

Scotia Bank


r/econmonitor • • Apr 01 '21

Data Release All states had unemployment rates below 10.0 percent in February 2021

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bls.gov
98 Upvotes

r/econmonitor • • May 31 '22

Europe The French economy is in recession and inflation has not yet peaked (ING)

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think.ing.com
97 Upvotes