r/consciousness • u/Ashamed-Bathroom7803 • 4h ago
The Hard Problem of Consciousness is often misunderstood
I’ve been seeing so many people mistake what is being demanded, criticized, or questioned by the hard problem of consciousness. So I thought I would clear it up, help people learn, and open up a comments section about it :)
For anybody that doesn’t know the basic summary, the hard problem is a philosophical *problem* about the mind that asks, “How and why do physical things or events give rise to, or become, subjective experiences? How or why do subjective experiences exist at all, and what is their relationship to the physical conceptualizations associated with it?”
Subjective experiences are defined as that qualitative, immediate, private, ”what it is to be like” a thing. Examples are anything such as the jumpy sensation of being startled, that smell of ammonia, the imagination of a pink elephant, thoughts, etc.
The hard problem is not new, niche, or silly; its literally just the age old mind-body problem, except more narrowly challenges and is focused on the conceptual frameworks associated with physicalism: the belief that subjective experiences are identical to, or at least necessitated by, the reality that we measure and model in the discipline of physics. Additionally, the framework is committed to that these subjective experiences are only special or arise within specific things or processes, and that there are physical things/events that are completely empty of a “what it is to be like”. Otherwise, what is meant by “physical” becomes meaningless and the theory can collapse to include Russellian monism, panpsychism, and even idealism.
What the hard problem is NOT (below are false statements before the hyphen)
”Accepting it means physicalism is false” - The majority of philosophers, and including physicalists, agree that the hard problem is a serious problem. A problem doesn’t necessarily mean that it damages the theory’s capability of being true.
“It is criticizing token identity” - token identity is the formulation that every particular subjective experience is ontologically identical to a particular physical ontology. In other words, token identity argues that the subjective experience is just actually identical to what the physical stuff is, even if we admit that physical explanations will never account for our understanding of subjective experiences. Yes, most often, physicalism adopts token identity. However, that’s not what physicalism is. Token identity isn’t a theory of mind. Token identity is compatible with just about every theory of mind apart from dualism; even analytic idealism takes on token identity. The hard problem does not necessarily criticize it; it isn‘t central or even required for the criticism. “This particular experience is identical to a particular brain event. Therefore, there is no further problem about why that brain event involves subjective experience.” This is a jump in logic. David Chalmers, the contemporary philosopher who popularized the hard problem 30 years ago, even says that he might be moved away from dualism because of its problems and into Russellian monism, where token identity is central to the theory.
“Science, at least in principle, is expected to provide a solution to the hard problem for physicalism to work” - this is so false. In fact, most physicalist philosophers and neuroscientists, classify themselves as type-B responders to the hard problem, which means that they don’t even think that science in principle will ever account for subjective experiences based on physical formulations. Type-B physicalism is the more popular physicalist approach, which agrees that there is a never bridgeable explanatory gap between our understanding of subjective experiences and physical conceptions/explanations, yet this doesn‘t mean that they are different ontologically (you can still hold to token identity even if you can’t conceptually or analytically account for one with the other).
“Dualism is true if we admit that the hard problem demonstrates that physicalism is false.” This is a false dichotomy. There are plenty other theories of mind and accounts of the mind-body problem.
If you assumed any of this about the hard problem, or had these conceptions about it, then you were unfortunately mistaken.
What is the hard problem then? What’s the challenge or debate? It all comes back to the question. Why and how does this phenomenal stuff exist? Why aren’t we P-zombies? (P-zombie is defined below) Type-B route says that P-zombies are conceivable. So what exactly about reality makes it such that specific physicality is accompanied with a “what it is to be like” instead of none at all? Type-A says they are inconceivable, which necessitates that phenomenal experiences can be eliminated or reduced to physical explanations in principle. But how would it even make sense to say that quantitative models of neurochemistry and physics ever account for the jumpy feeling of being started, or the smell of ammonia? That’s the hard problem.
P-zombie: A P-zombie is the hypothetical concept of a person that behaves identically to a real person according to the regular physics that operates brains, except it is completely devoid of the subjective experiences - the “what it is to be like”. It’s an empty internal world, with all of the physics “running in the dark”. The formal difference between type-A and type-B physicalism is that P-zombies are conceivable according to type-B, but inconceivable according to type-A (like some sort of internal contradiction or misconception like a cube only having 4 sides). To clarify, concievable =/= possible. It just means to say that all of the physics and physical descriptions of brains can be accounted for in explanation, while missing out on realizing the internal subjective character of the process of actual brains.
I hope my explanation was helpful!
edit: people have been asking for the stats about what physicalists believe: https://www.reddit.com/r/consciousness/s/QbzigNkrNz