r/SSSC • • Sep 19 '19

19-29 Petition Granted Request for Judicial Discipline of Attorney General DeepFriedHookers

5 Upvotes

Relevant Facts

Throughout /u/deepfriedhookers's (hereinafter, "DFH") tenure as Attorney General of this state, he has engaged in a persistent course of aggressive, unprofessional conduct designed to intimidate and humiliate his opponents before this court and his political opponents elsewhere.

A. deepfriedhookers v. Cold B. Coffee

Complainant entered an appearance on behalf of defendant Cold B. Coffee above-mentioned matter. Upon Complainant's filing of a motion to dismiss, DFH immediately launched into a vicious personal attack upon Complainant. DFH began by suggesting that Complainant "has shown . . . an extension of the complete disrespect for this Court." DFH further accused Complainant of "perjury" and a "meaningful intention to mislead this Court, lie about plaintiff" and "insult[ ] this institution."

Furthermore, at no point during the process did DFH comply with requirements of service and provided no notice at all to Complainant regarding any of his filings with the Court.

B. In re: Department of Justice Directive 036

During consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari in In re: Department of Justice Directive 036, Case No. 19-26 (Sept. 2019), DFH made innumerable rude and offensive comments regarding counsel for petitioner, such as:

  • baselessly referring to the action as "yet another frivolous case of targeted harassment from Northern aggressors"

  • repeated and unsupported claims that counsel for Petitioner was making "false claims" to the Court

  • referring to counsel for petitioner as a "tourist litigator from the North" and "our tourist frivolous friend"

  • claiming that counsel for petitioner "unquestionably lacks the ability to cast judgment on the State’s objective, a state he only visits to file cases meant to waste time, effort, and harass his political opponents"

  • asserting that "Petitioner’s entire case is built in spite, assumptions, half-understandings of Dixie protocol, and fairytales" and that the action is a "waste of time"

  • claiming without basis that counsel for petitioner was "using this court as his playground for repeated frivolous cases and targeted harassment of his political opponents"

DFH's abuse continued undeterred once the supposedly "frivolous" petition was granted. DFH continued to insist that counsel for petitioner made "blatant and egregiously false claim[s]" to the court--still with no support. Furthermore, DFH yet again suggested that counsel for petitioner had a "flimsy understanding of precedent and a purposeful ignorance of other Department of Justice policies, procedures, or practices."

Legal Analysis

The Rules of this Court provide that "[a]ll appearing before the Court will be held to the highest degree of decorum." Likewise, Bar Rule 4-8.4(d) provides in relevant part that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers." Violation of this rule can support the suspension of an attorney's ability to practice law. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Norkin, No. SC11-1356 (Fl., Oct. 31, 2013) (suspending license of attorney due to rude and unprofessional behavior). Indeed, the Court has repeatedly ruled that unprofessional behavior is unacceptable. See generally Fla. Bar v. Ratiner, 46 So.3d 35 (Fla.2010); Fla. Bar v. Abramson, 3 So.3d 964 (Fla.2009); Fla. Bar v. Martocci, 791 So.2d 1074 (Fla.2001).

For example, in Florida Bar v. Ratiner, No. SC13-539 (Fl., Feb. 22, 2018) the Florida Supreme Court affirmed suspension of an attorney's license in part based on findings that "during the entire trial [the attorney] had been rude, overly aggressive, unprofessional and at times appeared to try to intimidate the witness" and that the attorney's behavior "had been totally disruptive [and] that he was a 'bully.'" In Ratiner, the sanctions imposed resulted from the attorney's conduct during a single legal case; here, Attorney General DeepFriedHookers has engaged in this conduct across every single case in which he has appeared before this Court.

Requested Sanctions

Complainant requests that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law before this Court for a period of sixty days. This sanction is warranted in light of Respondent's pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his misconduct, and substantial nature of his misconduct. See Norkin, No. SC11-1356 (noting these among aggravating factors in considering severity of sanction).


r/SSSC • • Sep 18 '19

19-27 Petition Dropped In re: B.248: Keep Dixie Police Accountable Act of 2019

1 Upvotes

In re: B.248: Keep Dixie Police Accountable Act of 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF DIXIE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Dixie Department of Justice, et al.

Petitioner,

v.

State of Dixie, et al.

Honorable Justices of the Court, now comes Attorney General Deepfriedhookers, representing the Dixie Department of Justice, submitting the attached request for writ of certiorari.

BACKGROUND

On September 2, 2019, the Dixie Assembly unanimously passed B.248 the “Keep Dixie Police Accountable Act of 2019” (herein the “Law”), amending an existing portion of Dixie statute to establish broad and burdensome requirements on law enforcement agencies within the State of Dixie. Because the law was passed unanimously, it was not signed into law by the Governor.

On its face, the Law is a public records victory, requiring, among other things, the quick and speedy release of police camera footage, the establishment of “civilian boards”, and the hiring of additional “law enforcement officials” who are not permitted to “communicate or interact with the department regularly”.

QUESTIONS FOR THE COURT

  1. Is B.248 preempted by existing legislation that better serves the interests of the Department of Justice?

Section 1(a) of B.248 mandates the “Immediate access by the general public within 72 hours of the filming”, which is contrary to existing law. Statute 119.071(2)d. explicitly mandates that “Any information revealing surveillance techniques or procedures or personnel” of a “law enforcement agency [...] is exempt” from public record sharing laws, including those mandated by s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution.

The Department of Justice argues that 119.071 (2)d. Better serves to protect the surveillance practices and methods of our law enforcement agencies, and the publication of such methods would unreasonably hamper our ability to conduct such surveillance in order to ensure public safety.

2. Does B.248 Section 2(a) place an undue hardship on the Department of Justice?

Section 2(a) of the Law mandates that the Department will “train law enforcement officials to understand general video editing skills in order to release footage to the public” and that “these law enforcement officials are to not communicate or interact with the department regularly.” The Law does not provide any additional funding for the hiring of these officers who are to be segregated from the remainder of the Department, nor does it provide funding for their training.

The Department of Justice maintains that without such additional funding provided by the Law, it is unreasonable and an undue hardship to expect the Department to absorb this burdensome requirement, especially considering the officials mandated by Section 2(a) will not be able to serve any cross-function within the Department. Because of the undue hardship, this section of the Law is unenforceable.

3. Does B.248 Section 3 place an undue hardship on local municipalities?

Section 3 of the Law mandates that “all law enforcement agencies will be expected to establish civilian boards to look over footage of officers for behavior, and to bring attention to law enforcement agencies and to the local municipality officers exhibiting unbecoming behavior.”

The Department of Justice maintains that Section 3 does not adequately take into account municipalities with such a small population, of which there are countless in the State, that a “civilian board” cannot be established without a reasonable expectation of impartiality or conflict of interest. Likewise, no funding or compensation is included for civilian boards, forcing into question the feasibility of such boards if members cannot afford to routinely contribute due to financial burdens.

REMEDY

For the reasons stated above, the Court should grant the petition to review the constitutionality of the Act in question. Petitioner requests the Law be struck in entirety due to a large and insurmountable burden on the State and its citizens, as well as the unreasonable violation of long-standing public records statutes that preempt the Law in question.

REQUEST FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

Because the Petitioner is represented by the Attorney General, who is also the Chief and Sole Legal Representative of the State of Dixie, Petitioner seeks a summary judgement from the Court, and waives the intent to seek a full trial.

Respectfully submitted,

DFH

Attorney General


r/SSSC • • Sep 13 '19

Federal Appeals Court Decision [EVENT] Federal Appeals Court Decision in Secessionland Skating Rink LLC v. Connolly et al.

1 Upvotes

Today, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dixie Circuit released its decision in Secessionland Skating Rink LLC v. Connolly et al., involving a First Amendment defense against the enforcement of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination in public accommodations.

THE DECISION IS AVAILABLE HERE


r/SSSC • • Sep 18 '19

19-28 Petition Granted In re: Florida Code § 826.01 et seq.

1 Upvotes

Your honors,

Comes now /u/dewey-cheatem, a barred attorney of this court in good standing, to petition the Court for relief in relation to Florida Code § 826.01 et seq. in the form of injunctive relief preventing enforcement of such statute and declaratory relief through a declaration by this Court that Florida Code § 826.01 et seq. is in violation of the United States Constitution.

RELEVANT FACTS

Dixie not only declines to recognize polygamous marriages but also criminally prohibits such marriages or attempts at such marriages. See Fl. Code § 826.01 et seq. (criminal sanctions). Violation of this section is deemed a felony in the third degree.

REASONS FOR GRANTING PETITION

A. Florida Code § 826.01 et seq. Violates the Constitutional Right to Marry.

That a fundamental right to marry exists and is protected by the United States Constitution is beyond dispute. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 95 (1987); M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U. S. 102, 116 (1996) ; Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 640 (1974). Under that fundamental right, the ability to marry--and receive state recognition for such marriage--has been extended to interracial couples (Loving), same-sex couples (Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 US _ (2015)), and even prisoners (Turner). In none of these cases has the Supreme Court articulated any coherent limit on the ability of persons to participate in the marriage relationship; to the contrary, the Court has consistently expanded the ability of new groups to participate.

In spite of this tradition, Dixie seeks to prevent multiple persons from entering into this sacred and time-honored union.

B. Florida Code § 826.01 et seq. Does Not Meet The Standard Established in Dixie Inn v. Carey.

Even were this Court to find against Petitioner on all other points, it would still need to apply strict scrutiny to the statutes to the extent they impede upon the ability of persons who are called to participate in polygamous marriage by the teachings of their faith.

The Dixie Religious Freedom Restoration Act, codified at Fl. Statute § 761.01 et seq., provides, in relevant part, as follows:

The government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except that government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person: (a) Is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (b) Is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

Here, the statutes substantially burden the free exercise of religion of those who are called by the tenets of their religion to participate in polygamous marriage. Millions of people throughout the world are called to do so, whether they are Muslim or Mormon, and many of such persons live within the Commonwealth.

Because the statutes so burden the free exercise of religion, they must be subject to strict scrutiny, which they cannot survive. The statutes are not “essential to further a compelling government interest” because the state can provide no explanation as to why the marital relationship must be limited to two persons, let alone any legitimate, constitutional interest in regulating the ability of persons to choose to live together on the basis of their religious belief.

This Court's recent decision in Dixie Inn v. Carey, No. 19-21 (DX Sept. 2019) supports Petitioner's position. There, this Court found that any inquiry to discern whether Petitioner's beliefs are sincere would be inappropriate. Furthermore, the Court found the Dixie Civil Rights Act not to be narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling government interest in eliminating discrimination, despite the harm caused by carving out wholesale exceptions to the act.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, and for whatever other reasons this Court may find good and just, Petitioner requests that the Court grant this petition and agree to review the constitutionality of Florida Code § 826.01 et seq.


r/SSSC • • Sep 16 '19

19-26 Hearing Closed In re: Department of Justice Directive 036

1 Upvotes

Pursuant to the Rule of Court, a majority of the bench has voted to extend review to In re: Department of Justice Directive 036.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has filed a complaint upon which relief may be provided.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Directive violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution


r/SSSC • • Dec 06 '18

Petition Settled In Re: Dixie Department of Justice Directive 18-007

1 Upvotes

Your Honors,

At this link, please find a writ of certiorari seeking review of Dixie Department of Justice Directive 18-007.

Respectfully Submitted,

SHOCKULAR United States Attorney General

TO: Chief Justice /u/FPSLover1, Associate Justice /u/chaosinsignia

CC: Governor /u/furcoatblues , AG /u/deepfriedhookers


r/SSSC • • Jul 01 '20

Marriage Application Accepted In re Marriage Application

1 Upvotes

r/SSSC • • Oct 18 '19

19-34 Petition Denied Application for Inspection Warrant of 4400 NW 87th Ave, Doral, DX 33178

1 Upvotes
IN THE DIXIE SUPREME COURT OF THE

ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR

MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, DIXIE


AFFIDAVIT AND APPLICATION FOR INSPECTION WARRANT

STATE OF DIXIE

COUNTY OF MIAMI-DADE

The undersigned, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

  1. Affiant, Carib, is 18 years of age or older and an inspector with the State of Dixie Department of Environmental Protection Division of Wastewater Management. Affiant's official address is 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399.

2. In affiant's position with the Department, affiant is responsible for the evaluation of evidence regarding possible violations of Chapter 403, Dixie Statutes, Sections 376.30-376.317, Dixie Statutes and Department rules set forth in Dixie Administrative Code Chapter 62.330.350. Affiant conducts systematic routine inspections to determine and ensure that those regulated comply with the statutory and rule provisions, with agency expertise in executing official golf course inspections

3. Affiant has reason to believe that the property Hookers Doral International, owned by Attorney General Deep F. HOOKERS and located at 4400 NW 87th Ave, Doral, DX in Miami-Dade County may not remain in compliance with DDOE permits and are to be revoked by law. The property is listed on the master database to “Trump Endeavor 12 LLC,” a prior contract and bankruptcy litigant in this Court, with a water use permit 120717, golf course development permit number 140115, and on-site waste retention facility permit number 140731, all valid for ten years.

4. The facts tending to establish ground for issuing an inspection warrant are as follows:

a. Hookers Doral is historically a popular luxury golf, hotel, and restaurant venue in the sensitive South Florida Water Region, subject to codified practices to prevent nitrate and phosphate leaching into storm runoff and eventually bodies of water, an important legislative task. Hookers Doral as a joint golf course and luxury resort with pool uses substantial water, necessitating a permit. It is also constructed in part on a landfill according to DDOE mapping in the retention permit materials, and must restrict leachate. Each matter alone produces tangible and predictable environmental damage, and this reason is why the legislature proactively requires permitted owners to mitigate hazards to maintain possession or avoid penalties.

b. DDOE permits attach to the property, but by legislative intent are not vested with it between owners. For this reason, the Trump permits remain in force with the Hookers property (62-4). A DDOE permit is transferable only upon Department approval in accordance with Rules 62-4.120 and 62-730.300, D.A.C., as applicable. The property owner shall be liable for any non-compliance of the permitted activity until the transfer is approved by the Department. While HOOKERS did not transfer the permits, he is liable for adherence until expiry in 2024-25.

c. Suspension or revocation of the use of a general permit shall be in accordance with Chapter 120, D.S. Good cause for the suspension or revocation shall include submission of false or inaccurate information in the notification for use of a general permit or in the required reports; violations of law, DDOE orders, rules or permit conditions; refusal of lawful inspection under Section 403.091, D.S., or any other act on the part of the permittee in the use of the general permit which results or may result in harm or injury to human health or welfare, or which causes harm or injury to animal, plant or aquatic life, or to property.

d. Affiant has been unable to enter the gated property as allowed by the permits or to serve notice or to inspect Hookers Doral on HOOKERS personally. Executing legal procedure, DDOE has neither been able to contact a corporate agent of Hookers Organization in Dixie, and has spent multiple weeks awaiting any out-of-state agent to enter Dixie to serve notice upon. Affiant has conducted surveillance of Hookers Doral and witnessed no employees for service, the last requirement under Dixie law. Using a public record search, Affiant believes at no time did Hookers Organization the property employee more than the president of Hookers Organization, HOOKERS.

e. The presence of permits granted after prior agency action and the nature of the golf-garbage hybrid property shows that the inspection sought is an integral part of a larger scheme of systematic routine inspections along South Florida acquired districts and is necessary to insure compliance and public safety.

5. Inspection of the property is necessary in order to test groundwater, observe storm drain fill during the changing season, map leakage from the golf course, and determine if the on-site retainer from the landfill is secure. This would include a team of DDOE inspectors approximately two days to collect samples and to observe whether employees, if any, are upholding environmental and agricultural protections by rule and law.

a. After laboratory tests, the Department may use the conditions observed for further administrative or judicial enforcement as is necessary for environmental control.


WHEREFORE, pursuant to RPPS/C, Section 403.091, Dixie Statutes, and the DDOE Office of General Counsel Enforcement Manual, the undersigned prays for issuance of an unsealed inspection warrant allowing the above described environmental permitting inspection of the aforementioned property.

Inspector Carib

AFFIANT

 ***

Sworn to and subscribed before me on this 18th day of October, 2019 by the Secretary of the Environment Caribofthedead.


r/SSSC • • Sep 10 '18

Petition Granted In re: EO3, aka Public Property Open Carry

1 Upvotes

Your Honors,

At this link, please find a writ of certiorari requesting review of Governor Dobs' Executive Order 3. Thank you for your consideration.

Respectfully submitted,

SHOCKULAR


r/SSSC • • Aug 29 '19

19-23 Petition Denied deepfriedhookers v. Cold B. Coffee

1 Upvotes

Honorable Justices of the Court,

Now comes u/deepfriedhookers, Barred Attorney in Excellent Standing, respectfully submitting a request for writ of certiorari against u/cold_brew_coffee on the basis of malicious prosecution.

BACKGROUND

On or around 4:47 EST on August 28, 2019, Mr. Cold B. Coffee filed suit against myself, claiming that a clearly satirical article, long understood as immune from such laws, was an act of slander and libel. Plaintiff's article was, clearly to all with even below-average intelligence, a form of satire. Defendant sought $12 million in damages as a result of being featured in a satirical article, which as a public official he is clearly -- and acceptably by long standing precedent -- susceptible to.

Malicious Prosecution

Sometimes people sue for all the wrong reasons, which was admitted as much by Defendant when he dropped his previous case, linked to above. It is long standing precedent in this State that if a Plaintiff brings suit without merit, also known as 'malicious prosecution', the party being sued may have a case against the original Plaintiff.

Duval Jewelry Company v. Smith (1932), spelled out the criteria for bringing such malicious prosecution suits against former plaintiffs turned defendants. In Duval, this Court determined that the requirements for a malicious prosecution case were (1) the commencement or continuation of an original civil or criminal judicial proceeding; (2) its legal causation by the present defendant against a plaintiff who was the defendant in the original proceeding; (3) its bona fide termination in favor of the present plaintiff; (4) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (5) the presence of malice; and, (6) damages to the plaintiff.

On the first (1) point, a malicious prosecution claim can arise from the commencement of a baseless lawsuit. Mr. Cold B. Coffee clearly commenced a baseless and frivolous lawsuit against Mr. DFH.

On the second (2) point, Mr. DFH was a defendant while Mr. CBC was a plaintiff in the original proceeding.

On the third (3) point, the previous lawsuit was settled in favor of the now-Plaintiff, who had charges dropped due to the now-Defendant realizing they were wrongfully bringing suit against now-Plaintiff.

On the fourth (4) point is a lack of probable cause. In Burns v. GCC Beverages, Inc., 502 So.2d 1217 (Fla. 1986), this Court determined probable cause to be “a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.” Plaintiff claims that a reasonable and cautious man would recognize that a satirical article in 'The Onion' is just that, and not the result of malice or subject to libel, slander, or other such laws.

On the fifth (5) point is the presence of malice. This Court ruled in Adams v. Whitfield that "malice need not be proven directly, but can instead be implied or inferred from the lack of probable cause". Plaintiff argues that the lack of probable cause in now-Defendant's original case, and his outrageous misunderstanding of not only law, but also his outlandish demands for compensation clearly determine an act of malice towards now-Plaintiff.

On point six (6), this Court again ruled in Adams v. Whitfield that if now-Defendant had shown a “wanton disregard for the rights” of the now-Plaintiff, punitive damages are appropriate.

As such, determined by well-established and long-standing precedent by this very Court, Plaintiff seeks damages of $12 million, the amount sought by the frivolous lawsuit and the estimated amount in personal damages to Plaintiff in both mental distress, time, and reputation; plus legal fees of $1,500,000.

Respectfully submitted,

DFH, Attorney in Excellent Standing


r/SSSC • • Jun 17 '20

20-6 Petition Granted In Re: B. 385 - theDeath Penalty Abolition Reaffirmation Act of 2019

1 Upvotes

Mr. Chief Justice,

And if it may please this Most Honorable Court, I, Comped, a lawyer you're probably familiar with by this point, have come before you to ask that B.385 - the Death Penalty Abolition Reaffirmation Act of 2019, be declared unconstitutional for a number of reasons. Now, before I begin with that, I should note that the act in question is, unequivocally, the result of two prior cases before this court. In Re: B031, the Death Penalty Abolition Act of 2018, in which the previous ban on the death penalty was struck for vagueness, as well as In re: EO.11: Concerning the Death Penalty (and its hearing), which was struck due to a procedural issue on the plaintiff's side. This case is primarily on the constitutionality of certain sections of the bill.

Oddly enough, Your Honors, I believe that there is a particular section of the law in question, section 3b ("No officer or employee of the State of Dixie shall enable or partake in an execution, nor shall any State officer or employee share any information with a state or foreign government when such information is liable to become evidence for the prosecution in a capital case. Any officer or employee found in violation of this section is, when possible, liable for termination in a manner consistent with and prescribed by applicable civil service laws.") which violates quite a few laws, at both the state and federal levels. Firstly, as per Dixie Statutes Title XLVII, Chapter 914, Subsection 4 - "No person who has been duly served with a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum shall be excused from attending and testifying or producing any book, paper, or other document before any court having felony trial jurisdiction, grand jury, or state attorney upon investigation, proceeding, or trial for a violation of any of the criminal statutes of this state upon the ground or for the reason that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of the person may tend to convict him or her of a crime or to subject him or her to a penalty or forfeiture, but no testimony so given or evidence so produced shall be received against the person upon any criminal investigation or proceeding. Such testimony or evidence, however, may be received against the person upon any criminal investigation or proceeding for perjury committed while giving such testimony or producing such evidence or for any perjury subsequently committed". Section 3b of the act in question clearly and profoundly violates the law as previously set on the inability of witnesses to be fired due to their testimony. Indeed, according to Dixie Statutes Title XLVI, Chapter 876, Subsection 42 "no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which the person may so testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, and no testimony so given or produced shall be received against the person, upon any criminal investigation, proceeding, or trial, except upon a prosecution for perjury or contempt of court, based upon the giving or producing of such testimony." Again, violated.

And under 18 U.S. Code § 241, "If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same" (Conspiracy being defined as "an agreement between two or more people to commit an illegal act, along with an intent to achieve the agreement's goal" - of which the state legislature by passing this act may have been guilty of.) I would be amiss by not mentioning Dixie Statutes Title XLVII, Chapter 914, Subsection 22 (tampering with or harassing a witness, victim, or informant) and 23 (retaliating against a witness, victim, or informant), both of which apply here, as well as 18 U.S. Code § 242 (deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S. Code § 245. Federally protected activities (b)(1)(b), and others.

In addition, the state has clearly breeches its duty under the law's section 2 (c) and (d), section 3 (b) and (c), and section (4), missing the deadline in all cases mentioned (M: according to Flash/the Head Elections Clerk). Nothing has been done - no hearings, no dismantling of the machines of execution, no reports, nothing of the sort. Which in itself breaks more than a few laws - but I'm not here to argue that. In addition to the many laws that this law has already broken, I'd like to argue that section 3 (c) also violates Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution, which gives the states no power over interstate (or international) commerce. Interstate imports are a federal issue, not a state one. See, for example, Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, as well as Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888), and others. The impact should be obvious - the state cannot ban the import or export of a particular good under the clause - only the Congress may do that, as it must either be imported from another state or an international territory (which, again, due to Congress holding the cards in the area of foreign relations, that doesn't swim either). By banning the interstate (and international) import of such chemicals, the government (or at least the legislature in passing this law) has abridged the constitution again. And further still, I would argue that the law is vague and uninacted at best. There have been no removals of the death penalty from the administrative code - meaning that, as of this moment, there are still prisoners on death row, awaiting their re-sentencing hearings that more than likely won't happen before the deadline.

I will quote a section of my brief from the previous case I litigated on this front, "In Franklin v. State, 257 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1971), this Court wrote 'A very serious question is raised as to whether the statute meets the recognized constitutional test that it inform the average person of common intelligence as to what is prohibited so that he need not speculate as to the statutory meaning. If the language does not meet this test, then it must fall" While the law does prohibit the death penalty, an average man of common intelligence would question what exactly is going to happen to the inmates as per the act's Section 3 (d) ("Any individual who was sentenced to death prior to the coming into force of this Act shall as a matter of right be entitled to a new sentencing hearing before a State court on a date on or before June 30, 2020, for the modification of their punishment to comply with this Act"). What will they be sentenced to? There is no law, to my knowledge, that affirms what sentence they are to be given, as the Jury clearly chose for them to die. And as I said previously, in that other case: "A man of average intelligence would not be able to decide what would happen to a death penalty case, be they sentenced to life in prison, or sentenced to die by Old Sparky, hanging, the gas chamber, firing squad, lethal injection, or any other manner of executable methods as allowed in this state before this bill successfully passed its override", given that the State did not amend the sentencing guidelines to reflect the non-capital nature of the formerly capital crimes - the crimes, it should be noted, retaining their capital nature as first sentenced.

Your Honors, if I have not already established, I find this entire law to be both reactionary (against this Court), illegal, and yes, even unconstitutional (not even speaking of the violation of the criminals' 8th amendment right to confront witnesses silenced by the threat of termination, or other issues). It is such a mess of unconstitutionality, that I believe it must be struck from the record in its entirety. It is too much of a mess for the judiciary, who should not continue to play editor with the laws passed by the assembly, to sort out what should happen to these inmates. Restore the laws struck, cancel the law as written, and restore constitutionality to the laws of this Great State of Dixie.

Yours in the Law,

Comped,

Former US Attorney General

Member of the Bar in Good Standing.


r/SSSC • • Sep 24 '19

Opinion 19-26 Decision In Re: 19-26

1 Upvotes

The Court has come to a decision in the case In Re: Department of Justice Directive 036, 19-26.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Junior Associate Justice /u/Reagan0 and joined in full by Chief Justice /u/FPSLover01 and Senior Associate Justice /u/ChaosInsignia.

The opinion can he read here


r/SSSC • • Jul 21 '21

21-5 Opinion Ruling in re: Fair Work Ethic Act

3 Upvotes

The court has reached a unanimous opinion in this case. The opinion is authored by Senior Associate Justice /u/chaosinsignia on behalf of the court.

The opinion is as follows:

In this case, the court is being asked for judgement on the “Fair Work Ethic Act” passed by the Southern State Assembly and signed into law by the Governor of the Southern State. Petitioner is seeking to have certain provisions in the act deemed unconstitutional under the Dixie Constitution.

To begin, the petitioner alleges that the power of the Fair Work Ethic Act Board, known as the Fair Work Treatment Office, to terminate private employees interferes with Article I of the Dixie Constitution. Petitioner states: “The board represents an undue and unauthorized state burden on the right to own and operate an enterprise unencumbered, and to execute employment contracts for benefit without unreasonable state interference.” The court finds this to be true. Title III of the Fair Work Ethic Act, which establishes the Fair Work Treatment Office, does not contain measures for the terminated employee or the employer of the terminated employee to make a case on their behalf to defend themselves such as the right to appeal a firing or to seek intervention for the firing as the petitioner also states. This poses an unreasonable burden on the operations of the businesses of Dixie who would have to watch without any option as their employees are investigated and their employment contracts terminated without the State needing any consultation or involvement from the businesses themselves and as stated in Article I Section 11 of the Dixie State Constitution: “The right to own and operate a business in the State of Dixie, in accordance with reasonable and applicable laws, shall not be infringed.”

This brings the court to the petitioner's next claim. Petitioner alleges that as employment services are contracted for mutual material benefit, the board’s interference in employment agreements violates Article I Section 22 of the Dixie Constitution as well as Article I Section 12 of the Dixie Constitution. This is true. Article I Section 22 of the Dixie Constitution states: “The Assembly shall make no law impairing the obligations stipulated under a binding contract agreed upon by all involved parties that does not violate any provisions of this Constitution or any law made by the Assembly.” In enacting the Fair Work Ethic Act, the Dixie State Assembly violated Article I Section 22 of the Dixie Constitution by giving the Fair Work Treatment Office the power to terminate employees of private businesses. Article I Section 12 of the Dixie Constitution states: “The right to exchange goods and services for monetary profit, in accordance with reasonable and applicable laws, shall not be infringed.” As a result of Title III not containing measures such as the right to appeal a firing or to seek intervention, the right to exchange goods and services for monetary profit is being unreasonably infringed and Article I Section 12 of the Dixie Constitution is violated by the enactment of the Fair Work Ethic Act.

Title III egregiously violates the Dixie Constitution. Title III also fails to clearly outline the inner workings of the office itself. Within Title III there is no mention of the inner workings of the office other than the appointment of a Director of the Fair Work Treatment Office by the Attorney General of the Southern State. Other than stating that: “The director shall be able to appoint members of the office to assist them,” no mention is made of the process used to determine whether an employee will be terminated nor is it mentioned who will be the deciding factor if someone is fired. No outline or criteria is stated for the investigations that are conducted by the Fair Work Treatment Office. The assembly erred in not outlining in detail the operations of the Fair Work Treatment Office and giving the Fair Work Treatment Office the power to terminate employees of private businesses.

In conclusion, Title III of the Fair Work Ethic Act violates Article I Section 11 of the Dixie Constitution, Article I Section 12 of the Dixie Constitution, and Article I Section 22 of the Dixie Constitution. Title III of the Fair Work Ethic Act is struck from the bill.


r/SSSC • • Mar 25 '20

Announcement Letter of Resignation

3 Upvotes

Mr. Chief Justice,

I must now, for the third and final time, tender my resignation from the bench of this wonderful court. I'll keep this short and sweet for the benefit of the court but I would like to graciously thank my colleagues, fellow Justices /u/ChaosInsignia and /u/FPSlover01 for their camaraderie and friendship throughout my time on this bench. This is a bench upon which I've never served without the companionship of the current Chief Justice and the addition of a dear friend like Chaos was the cherry on top. There is not a doubt in my mind that we made Justice shine just a little brighter in Dixie together gentlemen.

I'd also like to thank this state which I've served for years one last time. From your Governor to your Speaker to your Justice, Dixie has always been my love. It will be sad to part but as I've said twice before, I've got a calling elsewhere. And so, for the final time as a public servant of this grand state and in liberty and justice,

God Bless Dixie,

/u/Reagan0 (Dobs)

Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States


r/SSSC • • Sep 19 '19

19-30 Petition Denied Request for Judicial Discipline of Dewey-cheatem

4 Upvotes

Request for Judicial Discipline of Dewey-cheatem

Relevant Facts

Throughout dewey-cheatem’s (hereinafter, "DC") tenure as a visitor of this state, he has engaged in a persistent course of aggressive, unprofessional conduct designed to intimidate and humiliate his opponents before this court and his political opponents elsewhere.

A. Cold B. Coffee v. deepfriedhookers

Complainant entered an appearance on behalf of himself in the above-mentioned matter. Upon Complainant's filing of a motion, DC immediately launched into a vicious personal attack upon Complainant. DC began by suggesting, falsely, that Complainant "re-file[d] the same action over and over to harass the defendant, as Plaintiff so plainly intends to do here,” with no citation, evidence, or reasoning behind this baseless claim". DC further accused Complainant of "publicized a "children's book" dedicated to mocking Defendant,” a complete lie and smear of Complainant and falsely accused Complainant of engaging in “Malicious Prosecution” for defending my good name, which is in Terrific-Standing with this Court, from baseless lawsuits from DC’s client.

B. Egregious “pinging”

During consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari in the above mentioned matter, DC made innumerable offenses of “spamming” the court with unnecessary pings”, during which he received an appropriate warning of sanction by the Chief Justice. Compared to DC’s abusive behavior which resulted in a much deserved warning by the Court, Complainant has never received a warning or complaint by the Justices of this Court, and remains in good standing to this day.

C. Targeted harassment

It has become increasingly clear that DC, an out-of-state judge with no clear ties to Dixie, has targeted the State for repeated lawsuits in order to strain the resources of the Judicial and Executive branches. Just within the last 24-hours, the out-of-state Judge has filed a suit attempting to prescribe his perverted view of marriage, polygymy, on our State. This unnecessary action is just one of many example of egregious litigation used by DC to harass Dixie and our Courts.

Legal Analysis

The Rules of this Court provide that "[a]ll appearing before the Court will be held to the highest degree of decorum." Likewise, Bar Rule 4-8.4(d) provides in relevant part that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers." Violation of this rule can support the suspension of an attorney's ability to practice law. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Norkin, No. SC11-1356 (Fl., Oct. 31, 2013) (suspending license of attorney due to rude and unprofessional behavior). Indeed, the Court has repeatedly ruled that unprofessional behavior is unacceptable. See generally Fla. Bar v. Ratiner, 46 So.3d 35 (Fla.2010); Fla. Bar v. Abramson, 3 So.3d 964 (Fla.2009); Fla. Bar v. Martocci, 791 So.2d 1074 (Fla.2001).

For example, in Florida Bar v. Ratiner, No. SC13-539 (Fl., Feb. 22, 2018) the Florida Supreme Court affirmed suspension of an attorney's license in part based on findings that "during the entire trial [the attorney] had been rude, overly aggressive, unprofessional and at times appeared to try to intimidate the witness" and that the attorney's behavior "had been totally disruptive [and] that he was a 'bully.'" In Ratiner, the sanctions imposed resulted from the attorney's conduct during a single legal case; here, Out-of-State Judge and Serial Harasser DC has engaged in this conduct across every single case in which he has appeared before this Court, and continues to discriminate against litigants to this very day.

Requested Sanctions

Complainant requests that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law before this Court for a period of ninety days. This sanction is warranted in light of Respondent's pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his misconduct, and substantial nature of his misconduct. See Norkin, No. SC11-1356 (noting these among aggravating factors in considering severity of sanction).

Signed,

DFH

Attorney in Great Standing


r/SSSC • • Sep 10 '18

Petition Granted in re: B001, the Putting Dixie Businesses First Act

5 Upvotes

Your Honors,

At this link, please find a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Constitutionality of B001, aka the Putting Dixie Businesses First Act.

In the event the petition is granted, I also request an extension of argument in the form of a word count limit of 2000 words for the merit briefs stage, as we challenge the law on three different grounds and believe it would be virtually impossible to brief this Court on all three questions with a word count limit of 1500 without leaving out critical information and precedent. Obviously, the extension of the word count limit would apply to my friends on the other side as well. Thank you for your consideration.

Respectfully submitted,

SHOCKULAR, AG, Northeast State

TO: Chief Justice /u/FPSLover1, Associate Justice /u/chaosinsignia

CC: Governor /u/Reagan0, Attorney General /u/deepfriedhookers


r/SSSC • • May 14 '21

21-5 Petition In re: Fair Work Ethic Act

6 Upvotes

May it please the Court:

Parties and Jurisdiction

Plaintiff is a managing general partner of CannibalHookers, a registered government relations firm based in Miami, DX. As part of its business, plaintiff employs lobbyists to develop long term relationships with public figures and/or their families.

Governor u/Tripplyons18 is the executive leader of the state of the firm’s incorporation and author of the law in question.

Plaintiff and defendant are subject to the general laws of the State of Dixie. This Court has general jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the Court Rules II and III.

Introduction

This action seeks declaratory judgment that certain provisions in the Dixie "Fair Work Ethic Act" ("FWEA"), recently passed by the Assembly and written by and signed by Governor u/Tripplyons18, are unconstitutional under multiple sections of the Dixie Constitution, both on their face and as applied.

For the first time in Southern history, the Assembly has empowered a politicized reliant agency to investigate workplaces and terminate employment contracts without an employer or employee’s assent, upon a mere allegation of workplace harassment or bullying. There is no right of appeal or of intervention. The board represents an undue and unauthorized state burden on the right to own and operate an enterprise unencumbered, and to execute employment contracts for benefit without unreasonable state interference. The manner in which the Assembly has granted investigative powers to the board also strongly implicates violations of the the Fourth Amendment and Dixie equivalent.

Though the Assembly recently adopted a new constitution that voluntarily eliminated the power of the Assembly to impose taxation, FWEA also creates a business tax to fund an expansion of paid spousal leave far beyond any other federal or state program. Mandated paid family leave is considered by the federal government and major accountancies as benefits subject to income tax treatment, to be reported by employees and employers and withheld by businesses as needed. For example, beneficiaries may withhold family leave taxes through the federal W4-V form.

Aside from Washington D.C., the current states that mandate PFL [like FWEA] require employees to pay into the fund. Deducting the employee’s portion before withholding taxes means their contributions are not taxable (e.g., pre-tax deduction). Deducting the employee’s portion after withholding taxes means their contributions are taxable (e.g., post-tax deduction). So, which is it? Are employee PFL contributions pre-tax or post-tax deductions? Employee PFL contributions are post-tax deductions, therefore their contributions are subject to taxes... Employee PFL benefits are subject to federal income tax (aside from the disability portion of Rhode Island’s program). However, PFL benefits are not subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes, or federal unemployment (FUTA) tax... When an employee receives PFL benefits, the payments come from the state. Employers do not withhold taxes on an employee’s PFL benefits because they are not included in payroll. State governments do not automatically withhold paid family leave federal tax from an employee’s PFL benefits. However, an employee can request to have income taxes withheld by filing Form W-4V, Voluntary Withholding Request. Mercer.

As designed, FWEA’s funding renders it a state-federal tax accountability and relief nightmare, but a nightmare requiring tax powers.

This unconstitutional law in addition to “separate but equal” requisite power granted by the people in the Dixie Bill of Rights cannot be enforced by the state.

General Allegations

FWEA, unless enjoined, violates several sections of the Dixie Constitution:

  • The power of the FWEA board to terminate private employees interferes with the “right to own and operate a business in the State of Dixie, in accordance with reasonable and applicable laws, [and] shall not be infringed.” Art. I.

  • As employment services are contracted for mutual material benefit, the board’s interference in employment agreements impairs “obligations stipulated under a binding contract agreed upon by all involved parties that does not violate any provisions of this Constitution or any law made by the Assembly,” and also because the “right to exchange goods and services for monetary profit, in accordance with reasonable and applicable laws, shall not be infringed.” Art. I.

  • FWEA implicates civil rights protections in both constitutions because the board’s civil search and seizure power actually implicates the Fourth Amendment according to federal precedent, and it also cannot be enforced by the Dixie Court, because a “person shall [not] have their persons, houses, papers, and otherwise personal property be unreasonably searched or seized without a warrant,” and “the Supreme Court or any other lower court shall not issue any warrant unless probable cause is presented, proven, or otherwise apparent.” Art. I.

  • The taxes imposed on businesses by FWEA are unconstitutional and unenforceable because the Assembly rejected the authority to issue state business taxes. Legislative Powers, Unitary Clause.

Analysis

An unreasonable state burden on business and against the contracts binding willing employees and employers is impermissible under the Constitution and this Court’s own doctrines, fundamentally destroying carefully guarded Court precedent.

The Dixie Courts “have long recognized the strongly embedded public policy favoring freedom of contract. And, absent a compelling reason, courts must respect and enforce the terms of a contract that the parties have freely and voluntarily made.” Bombardier Aerospace Corp. v. SPEP Aircraft Holdings, LLC, 572 S.W.3d 213, 230 (Tex. 2019); Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Discovery Operating, Inc., 554 S.W.3d 586, 595 (Tex. 2018); Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 95–96 (Tex. 2011).

Employment contracts, particularly those already in force willingly accepted by both employees and employers, are granted significant constitutional protections under Dixie law. These critical agreements power Southern enterprise, typically exchanging legal services for benefits such as pay or leave, and remedies outside litigation to address capricious or biased termination.

[I]f there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of justice. Therefore, you have this paramount public policy to consider—that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract.” *Wood Motor Co. v. Nebel, 238 S.W.2d 181, 185 (Tex. 1951); see also *St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. of Tex. v. Griffin, 171 S.W. 703, 704 *(Tex. 1914) (“The citizen has the liberty of contract as a natural right which is beyond the power of the government to take from him. The liberty to make contracts includes the corresponding right to refuse to accept a contract or to assume such liability as may be proposed.”)

This Court does not recognize the ability of the Assembly to terminate or alter legal business contracts without overwhelming public interest. As an example of permitted regulation, at-will employees may be terminated for any legal reason or no reason at all, but Dixie still may penalize businesses in the appearance of biased termination. An employer that fires an employee based on mere allegations sent to a state agency subjects itself to costly civil liability issues at the state and federal levels.

“These [multiple U.S. state] courts have reasoned that a negligent-investigation claim would be inconsistent with, and would significantly alter, the at-will employment relationship.   We, too, believe that recognizing such a duty in this context would significantly damage the at-will employment relationship that Texas has so carefully guarded.   See City of Midland, 18 S.W.3d at 216. By definition, the employment-at-will doctrine does not require an employer to be reasonable, or even careful, in making its termination decisions... And creating an incentive for insurance companies to summarily dismiss their agents when misconduct is merely rumored is certainly not in the best interest of agents in Sears's position.” Texas Farm Bureau Insurance Companies v. Sears (Tex. 2002).

Plaintiff and other businessss agree that there exists a reasonable level of needed protection for employees in an at-will contract, such as racial or gender-motivated termination. The state cannot force employers take preemptive action and assume civil liability for firing the morally accused. The state also cannot force employees and employers to renegotiate private contracts whatsoever based on this executive board’s determinations. The Assembly has decided without foundational police power to render Dixie’s “carefully guarded” judicial protections void.

Dixie and federal constitutional precedent prohibit abusive and general administrative searches of the workplace.

Sweeping administrative search power by a state agency may be at times permitted. This is often employed in long-regulated industries like alcohol, radio, securities, and tobacco. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970). Firearms are also subject to warrantless search, because weapons were already “pervasively” regulated with an urgent need for investigative speed and surprise. Therefore, these business dealers already have little expectation of privacy. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).

On the other hand, a scheme similar to FWEA was deemed unconstitutional. The Supreme Court rejected OSHA’s argument that warrantless searches of all businesses in its legislative purview without evidence was allowable. Because occupational inspections of every business serves little explicit government purpose, the administrative powers exercised were arbitrary. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).

The FWEA board offers businesses employing morally accused employees an unconstitutional bargain implicating the Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment and mirror texts of the Dixie Constiution. This is because a search of a business and its records, and seizure of material benefits to both employer and employee, is “equivalent [to] a compulsory production of a man's private papers.” Even with an arguable public purpose, such a demand is “an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (state law allowing state and private agents to issue warrants to search business papers for the purpose of debt recovery is unconstitutional). This choice presents a further Dixie Constitution violation because of the absolute bar against self-incrimination in “any matter, civil and criminal.”

A politically appointed board with no independent arbiter is also suspect. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972). “Warrants provide the ‘detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, and thus ensur[e] an objective determination whether an intrusion is justified.’” Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2187–88 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 (1989)). Judicial warrants should always be sought, and therefore “give life to [the Court’s] instruction that the Fourth Amendment ‘is designed to prevent, not simply to redress, unlawful police action.’” Id. at 2188 (quoting* Steagald v. United States*, 451 U.S. 204, 215 (1981)).

The state cannot popularly reject state tax power in its Constitution months ago, and then mandate a sizable tax on all business operating in Dixie without amending its powers to fulfill such an agenda.

The Governor of Dixie may propose the amount of revenue required for the annual budget. Revenue includes anything from property and sales taxes (as in all other states), to intergovernmental transfers (such as through Dixie congressional advocacy), to government-run liquor stores, pension funds and public utilities (as under Dixie statutes). The assumption that raising revenue means issuing appropriations laws and tax powers would render both terms meaningless, when Texas and Florida each had separate executive, legislative and county Revenue and Taxation agencies previously.

The Assembly approves or rejects the suggestion that there could be an inherent tax power inline any other in the nation and reserved to the states if the opportunity is taken:

Section 1. All political power is inherent in and derived from the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their benefit. The rights of the people shall not be denied or infringed upon.

Section 16. No person shall be deprived of the rights put forth by this Constitution without ample due process under letter of the law.

Section 5. All legislation enacted by the state of Texas prior to January 20, 2021 shall continue in effect upon adoption of this Constitution, except legislation which contradicts the provisions of this document.

Section 1. The Legislative power of this state shall be vested in a unicameral General Assembly consisting of 7 members.

Section 6. (a) The General Assembly may make no law except by bill. ... (c) No bill shall be so amended in it’s passage through the Legislature as to change its original purpose.

Section 7. Upon passage by the General Assembly, the bill shall be sent to the Governor. The Governor may sign the bill, at which point it shall become statutory law.

1. The General Assembly shall have the right to amend this Constitution by an absolute two-thirds majority of the sitting Assemblypeople in the affirmative.

Section 2. All amendments to this Constitution must either directly amend Articles I-V of this Constitution or add a new section to Article VI of this Constitution. No new Articles may be added to this document.

In A.001 (the proposed and adopted Constiution), the Assembly by and through the “supreme power” of the people, adopted language that did not intend and never did grant the Assembly the power to tax. The budget process is the Governor proposes adjustments to state revenue, and the Assembly retorts. That a governor both wrote his bill and signed it may in fact be a retort between branches, but the dilemma exceeds the timing issue.

The Assembly debated this arrangement and finally decided it would clearly adopt the Atlantic Constiution’s (and New York’s) approach that the Governor proposes revenue measures and the legislature accepts or rejects them upon presentation.

It is abundantly clear the amount of thought the Assembly placed into this process: Dixie citizens today must constitutionally address the Assembly in a non-gendered state title; Dixie governors constitutionally and uniquely may have executive orders directly vetoed by the Assembly; The Dixie Assembly expressly prohibits any citizen amendment in two instances: reproductive rights, or renumbering the Constitution; The Assembly moved itself from Florida to Texas while keeping Florida legal precedent; The Assembly allows a veto override without receiving a gubernatorial veto; It constitutionally prohibits independents to be appointed to a vacant Senate seat; it expanded Florida’s opinion capacity of the Attorney General to nearly any topic...

What the Assembly decided not to empower itself with is the burdensome tax process, a decision popular with the Dixie people and with business.

By the letter of the law, a look to neighboring states, and the historical debate record, the Assembly cannot now pass a bill taxing business for expanded spousal leave or any purpose. It would be unethical and unconstitutional for any other branch, serving as “checks on the other,” to empower another branch to do so for political purposes.

FWEA contains multiple revenue schemes, but its mandate that businesses provide 20 weeks of paid spousal sick and parental leave is “fairly possibly” construed as a tax benefitting Dixie, as Chief Justice Robert’s expressed in NFIB v. Sebelius interpreting the The Affordable Healthcare Act. FWEA’s mandate looks like an unconstitutional tax, not only because of its content, but because family leave deductions can be required by the state; the amount of tax is based on numerous factors in the bill; it mirrors IRS and other state reporting and withholding requirements; and the work and benefit is itself taxed and at times held held by the government.

Because the law deploys an unsupported legislative power to impose a mandate or tax with penalties for noncompliance, it should be struck.

Relief and Conclusion

Plaintiff CannibalHookers seeks declaratory relief clarifying the fundamental rights of CannibalHookers as a business operator and employer, and as a state taxpayer, pursuant to the FWEA and Dixie and U.S. Constitutions, chiefly on the issues of the regulatory reach of state agencies into corporate affairs and of the state’s constitutional capacity to legislate taxation on domestic and foreign business entities operating in-state.

Respectfully submitted to the Dixie State Court,

Hon. Carib Cannibette Biden, Jr., Esq.


r/SSSC • • Mar 05 '16

Petition Accepted In re: Executive Order 004

6 Upvotes

To the Honorable Justices of this Court, the petitioner, /u/theSolomonCaine representing The American Media PAC, respectfully submits this petition for a writ of certiorari to review the constitutionality of Executive Order 004 of the Southern State, known for long title as Executive Order 004 - Establishing the Order of Cavaliers.

The following questions have been raised for review by the Court:

  1. Whether Executive Order 004 violates Article I, Section 10, ¶ 1 of the United States Constitution by granting titles of nobility to members inducted to the Order of the Cavaliers by the Governor of the Southern State.

  2. Whether Executive Order 004 violates Article I, Section 10, ¶ 1 of the United States Constitution by establishing an Order of Merit, which may be defined as a dynastic order which draws power from royal patronage, with the prerogative of transferring exclusive titles of nobility.


r/SSSC • • Dec 14 '17

Announcement Announcement Regarding the Chief Justice

3 Upvotes

/u/dillon1228 is hereby declared inactive. /u/reagan0 may appoint a Chief Justice to replace him.


r/SSSC • • Dec 10 '17

18-10 In re: B175, The Voting Rights Act of 2017

2 Upvotes

To the Honorable Justices of this Court, now comes /u/jacksazzy

respectfully submitting this petition for a writ of certiorari to review the constitutionality of B.175, which reads:

(a) Any state law that prevents felons who have completed their prison sentence, probationary period, and/or parole sentence from voting is hereby repealed.

(b) All felons who have met the qualifications above will be given the right to vote, provided they meet all other requirements for voting.

(c) Local municipalities whose polling places are found to be in violation of section 2(b) will be fined $1,000 per incident.

The following questions have been raised for review by the Court:

  • Whether the bill is in violation of Article VI § 4 section (a) of the Florida Constitution, which states that "No person convicted of a felony, or adjudicated in this or any other state to be mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to vote or hold office until restoration of civil rights or removal of disability."

  • Whether "restoration of civil rights" has another meaning than the one it has had until today, which is a pardon from the executive branch.


r/SSSC • • Mar 06 '16

17-1 In re: Executive Order 004 Hearing

5 Upvotes

Pursuant to the Rules of Court, the bench has unanimously voted to extend review. We find that the Plaintiff, /u/theSolomonCaine, has submitted a complaint on which relief may be provided.

The Complaint Reads:

To the Honorable Justices of this Court, the petitioner, /u/theSolomonCaine representing The American Media PAC, respectfully submits this petition for a writ of certiorari to review the constitutionality of Executive Order 004 of the Southern State, known for long title as Executive Order 004 - Establishing the Order of Cavaliers.

The following questions have been raised for review by the Court:

  1. Whether Executive Order 004 violates Article I, Section 10, ¶ 1 of the United States Constitution by granting titles of nobility to members inducted to the Order of the Cavaliers by the Governor of the Southern State. 2. Whether Executive Order 004 violates Article I, Section 10, ¶ 1 of the United States Constitution by establishing an Order of Merit, which may be defined as a dynastic order which draws power from royal patronage, with the prerogative of transferring exclusive titles of nobility.

The order in question can be found here: https://www.reddit.com/r/ModelSouthernState/comments/48ykua/executive_order_4_establishing_the_order_of_the/

The cited article of the constitution states:

No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

This court shall now be open to all those with a vested interest in this case.

Amicus briefs are in order at this time.

Please keep all filings before this Court within the Rules of Court Part III and IV.

J. Dillon1228


r/SSSC • • Dec 11 '17

Opinion Ruling on 18-10: In re: B175, The Voting Rights Act of 2017

2 Upvotes

Supreme Court of the Southern State

No. 18-10

Final Decision

In Re: B175, The Voting Rights Act of 2017

 

The Court has reached a decision on the request for Summary Judgement, as requested by both sides in 18-10. There is not too much to discuss with this case, as both sides agree on the unconstitutional nature of the Act in question.

The citations in question are as follows:

  1. Article VI § 4 section (a) of the Dixie Constitution:

"No person convicted of a felony, or adjudicated in this or any other state to be mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to vote or hold office until restoration of civil rights or removal of disability."

2) A portion of the bill itself:

(a) Any state law that prevents felons who have completed their prison sentence, probationary period, and/or parole sentence from voting is hereby repealed.

(b) All felons who have met the qualifications above will be given the right to vote, provided they meet all other requirements for voting.

(c) Local municipalities whose polling places are found to be in violation of section 2(b) will be fined $1,000 per incident.

3) The definition of "restoration of civil rights". According to Wikipedia, it is defined as "the process of restoring voting rights to persons with prior felony convictions who lost their rights under felony disenfranchisement."

It should be noted that, in Dixie, restoration was a process which required the approval of at least 2 members of the Clemency board, plus the approval of the Governor, before the passage of this act.

This Court notes that the Act, and the Dixie Constitution, are in conflict over this issue. The bill is not an amendment to the state's constitution, which is what would be required to change the section specified. It is impossible to use a simple bill to modify the state's constitution. Both sides agree on this point, which is a rarity in this Court.

The Court notes that while the Assembly may have had good intentions, they passed a law when they needed to pass an amendment. Keeping this clearly unconstitutional law in force is not an option, and is particularly ill-advised. The Court does also note that the bill may have infringed on the Governor's executive privilege to pardon whom he chooses, for whatever reason he chooses, but that is neither here nor there.

The bill is clearly unconstitutional, and is struck down in its entirety.

It is so ordered.


r/SSSC • • Mar 09 '20

20-2 Petition Granted Petition for Relitigation in the matter of in re: florida code § 826.01 et seq.

1 Upvotes

Your honors,

And may it please the court, petitioner Joseph Ibney, Vice President of the United States and attorney in good standing before this blessed court, brings forth this petition for relitigation of the matter of In Re: Florida Code § 826.01 Et Seq.

Your honors, the previous case as litigated had several procedural problems which caused the end result to be muddled. Original Attorney General /u/DeepFriedHookers was abruptly removed from the case without ability to properly resolve the case, and the court mistakenly took attorney /u/CariboftheDead (AKA /u/BirackObama) to be the states new attorney as a result.

As stated by the (non) attorney for the state here:

"I never accepted this case, despite the request of the Governor. I am not the Attorney General"

The courts finding in favor of the plaintiff, in a case revolving around a constitutional dispute without the opposing side being able to give their argument for the merits, has had serious consequences on the state as a whole. The court has ordered the state to resolve the issue without any guidance on what is and is not illegal. It has in effect created a per curiam opinion without even giving a single reason.

Petitioner believes there are serious merits to be argued from the opposing side which have been overlooked as a result of a miscommunication on behalf of both parties involved.

We humbly request you revisit this matter and give the ability of petitioner to argue the merits of this case in full.

Respectfully submitted,

Vice President Joseph Ibney

Barred Attorney


r/SSSC • • Sep 22 '19

19-28 Default Judgement In re: Florida Code § 826.01 et seq.

1 Upvotes

Pursuant to the Rule of Court, a majority of the bench has voted to extend review to In re: Florida Code § 826.01 et seq.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has filed a complaint upon which relief may be provided.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Directive violates the United States Constitution


r/SSSC • • Mar 10 '20

20-3 Petition Granted Presentsale V. Model National Enquirer

3 Upvotes

Your Honors,

And if it may please this most Honorable Court, I, Comped, a member of the bar of this State in good standing, and a frequent litigant before this Honorable Court, am filing a civil suit on behalf of Congressman /u/presentsale, a resident of this state, and a public figure, against the Model National Enquirer, owned by /u/DuceGiharm. The defendant's publication submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court of this State by committing a tortious act within this State (Dixie Statutes, Title VI, Chapter 48, section 48.193(1)(b)), and having that defamanous material about a resident of this State, accessable and having been read by other residents of this State (Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201, 1216 (Fla. 2010)).

The article claimed that, among other things " Rep. Present Sale was driving his 1992 Geo Metro down S Perry Avenue in Chicago, LN when local police noticed his erratic swerving and began pursuit. The highspeed chase lasted for just over a kilometre and ended on W 91st Street when the Representative slammed into a parking meter." It goes on to accuse the Congressman, a current candidate for the Democratic nomination for President, of several other crimes that evening, including resisting arrest, running from the police on foot, and threatening a public official. Most of these crimes could be charged as either class A misdemeanors, or even a low-level felony. Threatening a public official, in the state of Illinois, is a 3rd degree felony.

The defendant, it should be noted, has allowed defamation, as well as defamation per se. As threatening a public official was in Illinois at the time, and continues to be in the state of Lincoln, a felonious act, the defendant has committed defamation per se by publishing that statement claiming the plaintiff committed a felonious act without it being correct in any fashion (Teare v. United Asso. of Journeymen & Apprentices, etc., 98 So. 2d 79, 82 (Fla. 1957)) There are no records of the plaintiff committing or being arrested for those acts, on the night in question or otherwise. As the defendant is a politician - this can also satisfy another point recognized in this state as defamation per se - that a statement or imputation was made that a person possesses characteristics unfit for business. (Teare, 98 So. 2d 79, 82 (Fla. 1957) Politicians require votes to have themselves elected to office. Accusations of a DUI, much less several other crimes including a severe felony, harm his chances at being elected - and in this case nominated by his party for their candidate for President of the United States. Such false accusations left standing not only provide him with moral and social repugnance, but also hurt his chances at continuing to advance in his chosen profession.

As for regular defamation, the plaintiff notes that the defendant also committed such acts. The five elements of regular defamation in Florida are - publication, falsity, the defendant acted with reckless disregard or knowledge as to the falsity of the matter, actual damages, and the defamatory nature of the statement. (Jews for Jesus, Inc., 997 So. 2d at 1106) As the statement has been published, and no records have been found to support their claim of such events happening (of which it would be quite odd for an arrest not to be recorded if he was fingerprinted and photographed, and presumably arrested, as those fingerprints go through AFIS and other state and federal databases of such biometric records as per standard procedure of police in Lincoln), the statement must also be false. As criminal records checks are widely available as a service, on the internet or otherwise, the defendant could have simply checked the records before publishing such falsity - and such actions can clearly be seen by any reasonable person as reckless, particularly with such record checks being easily available and common practice in media when publishing such claims. Actual damages are easy to find as well - people are not going to vote for the plaintiff in primaries because of such a accusation, true or not, and it has caused irreparable harm to his standing as a politician and leading political figure. Further, his reputation as a member of the community, and this State, is in shambles. He also has been forced to obtain legal representation to fight this case, costing him financial resources he could be spending elsewhere, such as his campaign, on his family, or on luxury ride-sharing rides, among other things. Further, such libel is known to be defamatory - much like in old times implying a woman was unchaste, or that she was a 30-minute 3 nickle hooker (as my grandpa used to say), implying that someone committed a DUI, lead police on a high speed chase in an urban area, resisted arrest, ran from police on foot, and threatened a public official, among other laws broken, is of a similar character. Being an accused felon is a simply defamatory statement of the lowest regard.

The defendant is seeking legal fees, a retraction, and a public apology.

Sincerely,

Comped

Member of this Bar in Good Standing,

Counsel for Congressman /u/PresentSale