After more than four decades in psychiatry, I have become increasingly interested in a peculiar problem with the word malingering.
It is a diagnosis—or perhaps more accurately, a clinical formulation—that can cause harm when used carelessly.
But avoiding it can also cause harm.
Malingering is not simply having something to gain from being ill. Our patients frequently have secondary gains associated with illness: shelter, disability benefits, medications, avoidance of responsibilities, hospitalization, attention from family, or protection from an intolerable environment.
None of that establishes malingering.
The critical element is intentional production or substantial exaggeration of symptoms for an external incentive.
And there lies the difficulty: intention is one of the hardest things in medicine to establish.
We cannot measure malingering with a blood test. We cannot look inside another person's mind and directly observe intent. Even substantial discrepancies between reported symptoms and observed behavior do not, by themselves, prove deliberate deception.
This makes caution appropriate.
But I wonder whether our profession sometimes moves from appropriate caution to something else: we recognize the possibility of malingering clinically but become reluctant to document it.
An experienced psychiatrist may notice that the history changes depending upon who is interviewing the patient. Reported symptoms may be inconsistent with prolonged observation. A symptom may appear or disappear when disposition is discussed. Collateral information may directly contradict important parts of the history. Reported psychotic experiences may be phenomenologically unusual. There may also be a clearly identifiable external incentive.
The psychiatrist thinks: There is a significant possibility that some of these symptoms are being intentionally produced or exaggerated.
The team may even discuss precisely that possibility.
And then the medical record says almost nothing about it.
The next psychiatrist encounters the patient and essentially starts from zero.
That creates another kind of risk.
A patient may undergo repeated hospitalization, medication changes, escalating doses, unnecessary testing, or increasingly complicated diagnoses because previous clinicians were uncomfortable documenting what they had actually observed.
There is another complication that I think is particularly important:
Malingering and genuine psychiatric illness are not mutually exclusive.
A person with schizophrenia can exaggerate hallucinations.
A person with PTSD can fabricate a particular symptom.
A person with substance-use disorder can report suicidality for admission while simultaneously having substantial genuine psychiatric illness.
The discovery of deception does not magically make everything else about the patient false.
Perhaps, therefore, our choice should not be between:
“This patient is malingering.”
and
saying nothing at all.
There is a third possibility: document the evidence.
Instead of writing simply “malingering,” we can describe the discrepancies we observed, relevant collateral information, changes in presentation, possible external incentives, and—most importantly—our degree of certainty.
For example:
“There is concern for possible intentional exaggeration of reported symptoms because of X, Y and Z. An external incentive is present. However, genuine psychiatric illness remains present/has not been excluded.”
That gives the next clinician information rather than merely a label.
It also leaves room for us to be wrong.
I am curious how colleagues approach this.
How much evidence do you require before you actually document malingering? Do you use the term itself, document “concern for malingering,” or avoid it and describe only the observed inconsistencies? And have you seen cases in which reluctance to document the concern resulted in unnecessary admissions or treatment later?