EDIT January 2022: punctuation, formatting, minor wording
Introduction
This is an introduction on password managers. Although I favor one particular password manager, I'm going to try to make it more general and applicable to a broader audience.
A password manager is a way of storing and recalling all of the passwords and other secrets you may have in your digital life. I will be explaining why almost everyone with a digital presence should have one, talk about how they work (in general), how you should use one, and how to go about setting up and working with one.
What's wrong with the way I'm doing it now?
People who have multiple accounts but don't use a password manager invariably have one password, a small number of passwords, or even a small number of passwords with variations.
Even if the password is good (i.e., not a variation of your pet's name, your anniversary date, or the like), this leaves you open to a credential stuffing attack. What happens is that some website gets its stash of email addresses and associated passwords leaked. Read more here if you want some recent examples of this happening.
What happens is next is that the same list of email+password pairs are used EVERYWHERE: Gmail, Hotmail, Whatsapp, Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, and anything else you can think of.
Oh, ok, then I'm safe; I always make slight variations to my password. That's ok, right?
Like, if your password is opensesame, then your Facebook password might be opensesamefb?
Nope, sorry, the Bad Guys know all about that. They will also try variations of your known password...again, applied EVERYWHERE.
But I don't use real words! They'll never figure that.
Like 0p3ns3sam3? Right, sorry, those variations are in the bad actors' toolbox now. It won't help.
This is too hard! I can't remember all those different passwords. What can I do?
That's why you want a password manager...
What's a Password Manager?
In its simplest form, a password manager is a list of all of those accounts, and--for each one--the username and password.
Some people just keep a file on their phone with all of these secrets in there. (That's what my brother-in-law used to do.) The obvious risk is that if someone grabs his phone while it's unlocked, they can get the file with all of the secrets.
It could even be inadvertent, like if your phone does automatic cloud backups. Then that file would be in cloud storage. If your lucky, it's protected. But...then again...if that cloud account is protected with the same password you used elsewhere...well, we're back to the credential stuffing attack, and all of your secrets are gone.
So yeah, a password manager is more than a text file. It uses encryption to ensure that you and only you can read your secrets. With the help of a single secret, the password manager's "master password", you can unlock the contents and access all of your digital secrets.
The concept here is that this master password ends up being the really important one that you end up having to memorize...hence the industry names like 1Password or LastPass. Once you've committed to holding the master password close to heart, you are free to choose very random and distinct passwords for all of your other accounts. This is a good thing!
Modern password managers can also help you in other ways. If you use a "browser extension", it can verify that you are entering your password on the legitimate site as opposed to a copycat or Trojan. It can even avoid using the system clipboard so that your secrets don't leak as you put them into the web login form. If you have a site with TOTP (Time-based One Time Password) security, some password managers will help you enter the current token as well.
I encourage you to use a password manager if you don't already. I may refer to a couple of vendors that I know more about, but my intent is to remain general enough so you can research and make your own decision about which one is right for you.
Choosing A Password Manager
I am intentionally not going to discuss individual products in much detail. Not because I don't have opinions; I do. It's just that the topic is so broad it would detract from what I want to discuss here, which is actually using your password manager.
Aside from general feature sets, there are a few aspects you should consider when selecting a password manager.
Local versus Cloud -- Some password managers keep their store locally, on your machine, while others back up your store in the cloud. Some of us don't want to trust secrets like this outside of our physical possession in any way, shape, manner or form. This kind of password vault resides on your devices alone. You are responsible for copying the password store between devices (such as your laptop and your mobile phone). Some common implementations of this kind of password manager include SplashId and KeePass. The alternate implementation involves cloud storage. In this model, your password store is managed by the vendor. Each of your devices can pull the latest copy from the cloud or push changes to it. This is safe when done correctly, because the password store is encrypted with your master password. (The when done correctly is an important hedge, more on that later.) Some good examples of this kind of password manager include LastPass, 1Password, and Bitwarden.
Open Source -- Software has bugs. Lots of bugs. We make software better by continually fixing it. Open source software benefits from faster discovery and repair cycles, because literally thousands or even tens of thousands of people are actively reviewing and contributing to it. In practice this creates more reliable code. Some popular open source password managers include KeePass (and its kindred KeePassX and KeePassXC), and BitWarden.
Zero Knowledge Architecture -- This is a big term that basically means you should make sure that none of your secrets are available outside of your computing environment. Just one example, to get you thinking about this: if the vendor can reset your password if you lose it, beware! This means there is some back door to unlock your password store. It doesn't mean the vendor is malicious, but if a malicious entity were to ever coopt the vendor's persistent storage, you could be at risk.
Compliance, Auditing, and Certifications -- think of these like a home inspection before you buy a house. There will always be room for improvement, and having a neutral third party look at the house is always a good thing. In the case of a password manager, you should demand regular reviews to confirm that it does what the vendor says it does, and there are no glaring omissions or errors.
A Note about your computing platform
A password manager does not defend you against poor security on your computer! Malware on the device will vitiate any precautions you may have already taken, regardless of whether you are using a password manager.
Shoulder surfing, leaving you device physically unsecured, allowing it to remain unlocked for long periods of time, or even allowing it to reboot without protections will invalidate any other security measures you have taken. Start here!
Step One: Pick your master password.
A password manager has a "master password", which you use to unlock the password store. The randomness ("entropy" for security geeks) should be high. This is what prevents an attacker from brute force guessing your password. It is astonishingly common. Don't do that.
Don't try to come up with any password by hand, for that matter. Most password managers will randomly generate one for you. The master password, however, should also be easy to remember. Consider using a passphrase for this one. Not only do you need to memorize it, it should be easy to type...and yet provide enough randomness that it will never be easily guessed. I do recommend five words, a two digit numeral, and a piece of punctuation. If needs be, start here and dress it up so you get something like, MaternalCalculate?Hacksaw17Threefold. (Don't worry, this password generator runs entirely in your browser, so the suggested password never leaves your computer.)
Write this new password down. On a piece of paper! You can't rely on human memory for something new like this. Use the master password every day for a couple of weeks. Even after you have it memorized, hang on to that piece of paper; we'll have use for it later. If the password manager uses a zero knowledge architecture, you have to be an adult and do this yourself; the vendor WILL NOT BE ABLE to help you if you forget this master password...and again, this is a good thing.
Step Two: Start adding all of your secrets to the vault.
At this point you should always have your password manager nearby whenever you are using your computer. For the first couple of weeks, I encourage you to just add your logins and other items to your password manager. Don't worry about changing any passwords yet. Whenever possible, do try to enter the current password if you remember it.
NOTE: you should tell each of your browsers to stop "autofilling" your passwords or offering to save new entries. Don't delete the existing passwords yet; it's good to have backups, at least for now.
As these first weeks go by, keep in mind there are other things you should put into your password manager:
web logins (obviously)
email addresses and their passwords (should be obvious)
logins to your computers
cell phone passwords
passport numbers
drivers license numbers
wifi passwords
wifi router information (IP address, username, password, WPS pin, guest wifi information, configuration information including PPP logins, DNS gateways and the like),
Garage door openers door alarm codes, and other PINs
social security numbers for your spouse and children
bank account numbers
credit cards (be sure to include their contact information in case the card is lost)
a photograph of your COVID-19 vaccine record (front and back)
vaccine records for your spouse and children
health insurance cards
details on your motor vehicles (including the VIN, license plate and expiration)
License plates for your friends' vehicles (Thanks /u/Stickyhavr; this can help if you're paying for parking or checking into a hotel)
Software license keys
Store warranty cards
Frequent flier number (including all contact information)
Appliance serial numbers
Passwords for other people -- I have the master password for my wife's password manager as well as for one of my children
Medical information (esp. prescription lists for you and family members)
TOTP seeds (I know, this may be controversial; we'll touch on it more later)
Non-account passwords: do you have a VeraCrypt container, for instance? Sometimes we have passwords without having something that's exactly an online account.
You should also add notes to these entries as you go along:
Which security questions did you answer, and what answers did you give?
Why did you sign up for this account? (Thank Passwordbits for this one.)
When did you create this account?
Notes on why you don't use a website...this can remind you of why you have the account but don't use it...
Recovery codes (if you use 2FA of any sort, you are often handed some one-time codes to regain access to the account; put these in the notes field)
Again, you don't have to do all of this right away. Your digital profile is no less secure today than it was yesterday. All you're doing so far is taking inventory of what you have.
Step Three: Start the Cleanup
Note: At this point it's probably safe to delete the saved passwords in your browsers, but double check before you delete each entry to make sure you have added it to your password manager.
Beginning with your most important accounts, you want to choose new passwords. Never reuse passwords. Not ever. Use a password generator to create new passwords.
If the password is one you may need to type in by hand (like the login to a Windows or Mac computer), consider using a passphrase instead of a password. It may be longer, but it will be easier to type, which could be a win.
The process to update your password can be a bit tricky. Here's a general workflow to give you an idea of what needs to happen:
Log in to your website. Try to use your password manager, to confirm the current password is correct.
Start the "new password" dialogue on the website.
Inside your password manager, copy the current password into your system clipboard. Consider pasting the old password into the notes field for your entry, in case something goes sideways.
Paste the existing password into the new password dialogue.
Generate a new password and save it in your password manager. Make sure the new entry is saved! I read recently about a Redditor who lost $25K because he changed a cryptocurrency password but forgot to click the "save" button in his password manager!
Using your password manager, copy the new password to the clipboard, then paste it (twice, usually) in the website dialogue, then confirm the form.
IMMEDIATELY go to an anonymous browsing window and log in to the website using the new password, to make sure it still works.
If you have a mobile app, test the new password as well in the mobile app.
These last two steps may sound a little odd, but there are often bugs in these websites, especially with longer passwords. You should verify right away that the new password works everywhere you expect it to.
As the next few weeks go by, make a point of cleaning up a login or three every day. Clearly, you should prioritize your bank logins and other critical accounts ahead of, say, Twitter or Facebook. But make sure to go through all of them eventually.
Creating New Accounts
An aside if you find yourself generating new accounts now. A lot of websites try to "help" you by allowing you to use your Apple, Google, or Facebook ID to log in.
Don't.
There is a notion in security of "compartmentalization". Put simply, the idea is to limit the blast radius of any single security failure. Now that you're using a password manager, why do you care if it's yet another login? Conversely, as much as you WANT to trust Facebook...why create a new threat surface unnecessarily?
Secret Splitting
Some people choose to apply an extra level of security after their password manager by ensuring that the password manager does not, on its own, contain enough to help an attacker; that is, the entry in the vault is missing an essential piece of the secret.
One common trick is "peppering", where the stored password is modified in a known way before it is given to the website. For instance, you could always add the string frob at the end of the password in stored in your manager. This allows the manager's autofill feature to help you out, then you add the second part of the secret by hand. Others further "pepper" individual websites. For instance, you might add fb to the end of the password if you're logging in to Facebook, etc.
The intent and purpose of secret splitting is to make it more difficult for an attacker assuming they have already decrypted your password store. I for one hotly dispute whether this is the best use of your efforts to reduce your threat surface. Apply physical security to your platform. Select a good master password. Choose a password manager provider with a good security strategy (open source, frequent audits, and zero knowledge architecture).
The challenge of secret splitting is, how far away is enough? If you're using a second app on your mobile device (a second password manager or TOTP generator), what if the device is compromised? Perhaps you need a different computer? If that second computer is on the same network, are you still at risk of attack? IMNSHO this gets a little ridiculous. The fundamental assumption is that the password manager is a practical attack surface. If you pick a reputable vendor, this is never the case.
Two Factor Authentication (2FA)
Passwords, by themselves, are subject to a "replay attack". Ever hear the story Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves? When Ali Baba overheard the captain of the thieves utter, open sesame, Ali Baba had all he needed to enter the cave of riches. Password breach!
2FA is a modern answer to this risk. In ADDITION TO the password, you need to present a second factor to authenticate yourself. In modern computing systems, an authentication factor can be something you know (the password, we already have that), something you have, like a hardware token, or something you are (biometric). In practice, common forms of 2FA, in order of preference, include a hardware token like a Yubikey, TOTP (covered in the next section), email verification, or employing your mobile device (via SMS or automated voice call).
2FA is a good thing, and you should use it wherever it's offered. As far as your password manager, make a point of adding a note to the entry that says what kind(s) of 2FA have been enabled and the details on it (which email, which phone number), and the like. If you have the option to enable more than one form of 2FA, you should pick only one; multiple authentication routes widens your attack surface.
Most websites don't give you much if any choice in 2FA options. FIDO2 (a hardware key) requires the most effort and can entail customer support from people who lock themselves out. TOTP (discussed below) is becoming more popular but has the same customer support challenges. Email is slow and cumbersome. SMS is relatively easy for the website to enable. The last two have the advantage, from the website's viewpoint, of not engendering any support cost. Maintaining control of the email or mobile phone number is solidly YOUR problem.
When you enable 2FA the website may give you "backup" or "recovery" codes. These give you a failsafe if, for instance, you lose your mobile phone. Save these in your vault as well! The backup code might make the difference between recovering or abandoning an account.
Note that using your mobile phone number (SMS) for 2FA has a vulnerability called SIM swapping. Most mobile carriers now allow you to set a password to prevent unauthorized equipment changes. You should set this up in any event. Oh, and of course, put that password in your vault.
Time-based One Time Passwords (TOTPs)
TOTP is a twist on a 2FA something-you-know. Both you and the web server know a shared secret (the TOTP seed). But in order to authenticate, you prove to the server you know the TOTP seed without actually sharing it. You do this by applying the current time to the TOTP seed and proffering the resulting (time limited) token. The token itself is time limited so it is of little value to the attacker. The server itself will not accept the same token twice, so an attacker can't even use it right after you do. It's kind of like a password but not!
In order to effectively use TOTP, you need to have an application that can use TOTP seed and the current date to display the current token. Many password managers have a built-in TOTP generation capability. There are also standalone apps that do the same thing outside of the password manager. Authy is probably the most notable of these applications.
In the context of the current discussion, you should have a strategy to store your TOTP seeds. I recommend a password manager that allows TOTP to integrate with your web browsing. Others choose to separate out their TOTP seeds into a different store (secret splitting). But the point remains, the TOTP seeds and their generation should be part of your overall password management strategy.
Backups
You should make your own backups! Even if you are using a cloud based service like LastPass or 1Password, there is a risk the service could suffer an interruption or even go away entirely.
Depending on your setup, it's also possible you may need extra documentation, passwords, or recovery codes to regain your password store if you lose all of your tech (like in a house fire).
The approach I like to use is to have one copy of the backups on a thumb drive at my house, plus a piece of paper with essential secrets, since paper is actually quite durable.
I also keep a second copy offsite in a secure location (think, a safe deposit box). A few times a year, or after a major change in my password store, I refresh all of these copies. Since thumb drives are actually not very permanent, this also renews the life of those backups as well.
Keep in mind that creating a backup securely can be difficult. Try to avoid writing the backup in an unencrypted form on your computer. Deleted files can be recovered by an attacker. Details on how to do this safely will depend on your password manager.
Estate Planning
One last comment before I go: your password store is not merely for yourself! A day will arrive--hopefully not soon--when SOMEONE ELSE will need to settle your final affairs. Your password store is an important part of this puzzle.
Most companies don't even send paper statements any more. Your executor can't rely on getting a piece of paper that tells them what's going on; they need your email.
Exactly what bank accounts do you have?
Who do you owe money to, and how do I contact them?
Don't leave a mess for your loved ones for when you finally go. There should be arrangements so that your estate executor can get into your vault to sort things out. One simple approach, for instance, would be to have the piece of paper with all of the details to get into your vault in your safe deposit box along with your birth certificate, will, and vehicle title.
Whatever you do, make sure that EVERYTHING is in there. If you have an undocumented password or peppering in place, there is a risk that your executor may face a huge delay or even financial loss having your estate go through probate.
It's sometimes hard for people, especially if they are younger, to accept their mortality, or even that disaster could strike tomorrow. Don't put this off. Make your password store a guarded part of your legacy when you pass.