IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ATLANTIC COMMONWEALTH
/u/BirackObama
Petitioner,
v.
/u/ohprkl
in his official capacity as Attorney General,
Respondent.
In re: AB.087—Community Health Act
The Court has certified the following complaint as substantially compliant with Atl. Rules of Court. It is reproduced in full as submitted, without modification.
In re AB.087: Community Health Act
Rep. BirackObama (AC-1) v. Gov. UnorthodoxAmbassador
“For a century, Connecticut farmers have grown some of the world's finest cigar wrapper tobacco.” — Connecticut Businessman Vince McMahon, Made in the Shade, Cigar Aficionado
Facts
Petitioner, Member of Congress for the First District, is a recent resident of Atlantic submitting this writ in his personal capacity pursuant to Rule 2(c) and Atl. art. IV.
As an Atlantic citizen in the District, petitioner recently attempted to patronize Staza Dei Sigari in Boston’s North End, complete an express delivery of Zig Zag Blueberry Blunt Wraps to his office, and planned a constituent forum with the shade tobacco growers of Connecticut (the second largest industry behind insurance).
In Dixie, petitioner had advocated for the safety and vitality of the national tobacco industry and was already familiar with the legendary role of the First District’s Connecticut River valley as a jewel of the international cigar market.
However, petitioner learned that AB.087: The Atlantic Community Health Act of 2019 recently prevented sales, commerce, and cultivation of Connecticut shade tobacco, the purchase of blunt wraps, and smoking sales at the city’s cigar and hookah bars, amongst other effects, mandating:
It shall be unlawful in this state for any corporation or other unnatural person to sell, make available for sale, advertise, cultivate any matter or substance containing tobacco.
It shall be unlawful for any corporation or other unnatural person to cause any matter or substance containing tobacco to be transported into this state, or to transport such substance or matter into this state.
Argument
Petitioner believes the Commonwealth law affects him personally, concretely, and particularly, like his constituents throughout the District. In “Argument” section I, plaintiff argues the law plainly violates judicial precedent and federal First and Fourteenth Amendments binding the state (Atl. Const. art. III, see also art. I: protection of civil rights).
The state law also is preempted by two bedrock federal statutes enacted to ensure uniformity in tobacco regulation described in “Argument” section II.
Separately, although not focused in this claim, petitioner relays to the Court his belief that this regulation is an illegal uncompensated taking of property prohibited by Atl. Const. art. I and X (excessive fines prohibited; requirement to pay for corporate “indebtedness” caused; free exercise of religion, see e.g. Atlantic Native American Mid Winter Ceremony tobacco offerings.
The statute fails the four-part commercial speech standard in the landmark Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. New York Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
In New York Public Serv. Comm., an 8-1 bench articulated a standing test for similar total restrictions on the promotion of electricity use during the 1973 oil embargo. The Court’s analysis in four parts was:
Is the expression protected by the First Amendment?
For speech to come within that provision, it must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Tobacco use and in particular growing is a lawful and protected activity, yet the regulation does not address any specific trade practice for review to supersede that protected constitutional interest.
Is the asserted governmental interest substantial?
While a government interest in tobacco uses may be inarguable, the state’s approach is the nation’s first complete abolition of not only use, but trade and growth of tobacco.
Does the regulation directly advance the governmental interest asserted?
The regulation is not tailored to address a direct interest. While the title states “Community Health,” there is no explicit goal within the law toward community health. There is no preamble or statement. The law begins with the power of the state to preside over interstate commerce of tobacco into or out of the Commonwealth, and ends with a complete civil prohibition over the trade:
This Act shall not be interpreted as criminalizing the transportation, sale, or possession of tobacco by any natural person not acting as an agent or employee of any entity otherwise covered by this Act.
Is the regulation more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest?
There must be a "reasonable fit" between the government's ends and the means for achieving those ends. Abolition, as in alcohol prohibition, is historically found as overbroad and unreasonable under law.
As recently as 2001 in the First District, the Court applied the above standard to strike down laws banning tobacco advertising and sales within 1,000 feet of schools on the basis of freedom of speech. Lorillard v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (Massachusetts' ban on advertising and tobacco sales was both overbroad and was preempted by the landmark Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1966).
See also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (holding that a complete ban on the advertising of alcohol prices was unconstitutional under the First Amendment, and that the Twenty-first Amendment, empowering the states to regulate alcohol, did not lessen other constitutional restraints of state power); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (finding that a state may require advertisers to include "purely factual and uncontroversial" disclosures without violating the First Amendment rights of the advertiser as long as the disclosure is in the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers: the Zauderer Standard).
The Atlantic regulation is expressly preempted and cannot stand review.
The Supreme Court held that the above Massachusetts regulation was preempted by federal law. See Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI., § 2; see also Atl. Const. art. III.
As a member of the Social Concerns Committee, petitioner is familiar with the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 and points to the express preemption clauses within it.
The Tobacco Control Act preempts the Atlantic statute in at least four ways:
It constitutes a “tobacco product standard,” and the authority for this is expressly reserved to the FDA in Section 21 U.S.C. 387p(a)(2)(A);
HHS and FDA are prohibited from banning certain classes of tobacco products, explicitly cigars and cigarettes, and so state and local governments are prohibited from doing so through a sales regulation (id);
Even if state and local governments have the power to restrict the sale of a certain class of tobacco products, they are barred from completely prohibiting the sale of such products by law.
The Act’s saving clause excepts from preemption local laws that establish “requirements relating to the sale… of… tobacco products,” but not the absolute prohibition of covered trade.
See U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co. LLC v. City of New York, 708 F.3d 428 (2013) (holding that the City’s ordinance prohibiting the sale of any flavored non-cigarette tobacco product in tobacco bars was preempted by the Tobacco Control Act); Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets v. City of Providence, 2012 WL 6128707, 13 (2012) (striking from the City ordinance prohibitions on the sale of flavored non-cigarette tobacco products in tobacco bars).
The Tobacco Control Act’s legislative history is clear: as part of a broad 2009 push for financial and healthcare reform, the act included benefits for the target industry.
The law separately prohibits the FDA from using its new authority to increase the new federal minimum age of 18 to a higher level, require prescriptions for the purchase of tobacco products, ban tobacco product sales in any particular type of sales outlet, or regulate tobacco farming directly.
It prohibits states from placing requirements on cigarette or smokeless tobacco product labeling or on the content of cigarette advertisements. It gives the FDA exclusive authority to establish tobacco product standards, prohibit adulterated or misbranded tobacco products, establish labeling requirements, and regulate manufacturing standards and modified-risk tobacco products, preempting previously existing state and local authority to do so. Similarly, the law preempts state governments from licensing tobacco manufacturers and suppliers exclusively for tobacco product regulation purposes.
Congress has deemed it proper to limit state product liability cases, which cannot claim that cigarette companies failed to warn them of the health effects of smoking after 1969, when the Advertising Act preemptive language went into effect. Nor can plaintiffs bring claims based on legal theories of negligence or misrepresentation by omission.
Conclusion
The Atlantic law completely prohibiting the sale and cultivation of tobacco products impermissibly conflicts with federal law by establishing disruptive tobacco product standards, overbroadly regulating the distribution of a lawfully protected product, while prohibiting an entire class of commerce without a reasonably tailored purpose.
Although not asserted in this claim, it likely exceeds petitioner’s First and Fourteenth Amendment speech and due process claims to stretch across the First District including unlawful taking of business and farm property with no statutory or Atlantic constitutional compensation. It also interferes with his constituent services to the migrant farmers of Atlantic and the religious interests of some residents (e.g., Native Americans).
Petitioner does not argue the power of the Commonwealth to regulate tobacco products, but by completely prohibiting the sale of a class of products or all of them, the Assembly is establishing an impermissible standard which is preempted by uniform federal law and a violation of federal and Commonwealth rights.
THEREFORE, petitioner respectfully requests declaratory relief from the Court pertaining to the constitutionality of the Atlantic Community Health Act.
Respectfully submitted,
Rep. Birack “Carib” Obama, Esq.