The petitioner Notthedarkweb_MNZP, respectfully applies to the Hon. Court for preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order against the E.O.2

Standard

The state standard for relief in Northeast State constitutes of a three-pronged test, stated as follows: " “A preliminary injunction may be granted under CPLR article 63 when the party seeking such relief demonstrates:

1. a likelihood of ultimate success on the merits;

2. the prospect of irreparable injury if the provisional relief is withheld; and

3. a balance of equities tipping in the moving party’s favor.”

(Doe v. Axelrod, 73 N.Y.2d 748, 750 (1988).)

NE. CPLR § 6313 provides the same standard for temporary restraining orders without any hearing ex parte.

Arguments

1. A likelihood of ultimate success on the merits: Petitioner points out that In re: Executive Order 25—Marriage and Polygamy, the court found that the Governor lacks the authority to " The governor does not have the power to overturn Assembly passed statutes via executive order". This principle is violated multiple times over in E.O.2. The most blatant example is in Sec III. clause 1) subclause a), where the E.O. states "No state funds will be allocated to any law enforcement department that offers cash rewards to district attornies for prosecuting cases as described in Section 3 of the aforementioned statue.". Using a textual reading taken under the model established in NLRB v. SW General, Inc, the refusal to grant state funds is a direct contradiction of the statutory command that the "commissioner of the division of criminal justice services shall award grant monies to district attorneys for programs which are designed to interdict the flow of illegal guns across New York state borders. " (emphasis mine.) However, if we look to the standards of statutory construction set within the state, we see that "the Court must now look beyond the language of the statute. Our preeminent responsibility in that endeavor is to search for and effectuate the Legislature's purpose." (Fumarelli, 703 N.E.2d). Using this model of statutory construction, one can come to the conclusion that the entirety of E.O.2 is in violation of the Legislature's purpose in promulgating the laws under consideration, and therefore the executive action is exempt from the rights offered the Executive by way of violating the statute's purpose i.e. the constitutional regulation of guns. *Furthermore, following United States v. Central State, 101 M.S. Ct 104, the prohibition of communication of any and all information on law-enforcement issues between state and federal governments is regarded to be unconstitutional, and a similar principle applies to the provisions of E.O.2 (amended into pleading).*On a more fundamental level, the state has a compulsion to protect its citizens from harm and is bound against enforcing (or NOT enforcing) any law that contravenes this fundamental right of protection.(Marbury v. Madison; n South v. Maryland ex rel. Pottle; City of Chicago v. Sturges; 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.) Since the state deliberately creates danger of harm to plaintiff by non-enforcement of laws, the state is not exempted from the duty of protection by DeShaney v. Winnebago County (which in its holding explicitly states a condition of the state lacking the duty of protection if and only if the state does not increase or create the danger of harm) and deprives petitioner of their due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

2. The prospect of irreparable injury if the provisional relief is withheld: The purpose of every single one of the above statutes was to protect citizens and civilians of the State of Northeast from any injury to their person, a constitutional exercise of legislative power ( DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER (No. 07-290)). The non-enforcement of these statutes would serve to endanger the daily life of the plaintiff, who is now at a greater threat of fatal and irreparable harm to their own person from would-be felons using arms and lacking in any remedy from law enforcement due to the abdication of the duty to provide protection by the Executive.

3. A balance of equities tipping in the moving party’s favor: Petitioner argues that the non-enforcement of state statutes for the reasonable regulation of arms within the state leads to an increase in fatalities from felonious acts within the State of Northeast (Liu et. al) and has a detrimental effect on neighbourhood growth and other standard economic indicators (Irvin-Erickson et al.) . Therefore, on a pragmatic level, E.O.2 is detrimental to the well-being and equity of the population of Northeast State.

Conclusion

For the above reasons, the Court should enjoin the enforcement of E.O.2

Bibliography

Heyman, Steven J. “The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment.” Duke Law Journal 41, no. 3 (1991): 507. https://doi.org/10.2307/1372846.

Liu, Ye, Michael Siegel, and Bisakha Sen. “Neighbors Do Matter: Between-State Firearm Laws and State Firearm-Related Deaths in the U.S., 2000–2017.” American Journal of Preventive Medicine 59, no. 5 (2020): 648–57. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2020.06.022.

“DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER.” Legal Information Institute. Legal Information Institute, June 26, 2008. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/search/display.html?terms=heller&url=%2Fsupct%2Fhtml%2F07-290.ZS.html. "Like most rights, the Second Amendment right is not unlimited. It is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose: For example, concealed weapons prohibitions have been upheld under the Amendment or state analogues. The Court’s opinion should not be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. Miller’s holding that the sorts of weapons protected are those “in common use at the time” finds support in the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons. Pp. 54–56."

Irvin-Erickson, Yasemin, Matthew Lynch, Annie Gurvis, Edward Mohr, and Bing Bai. “A Neighborhood-Level Analysis of the Economic Impact of Gun Violence.” urban.org, 2017. https://www.urban.org/research/publication/neighborhood-level-analysis-economic-impact-gun-violence.

This court hereby summons u/guiltyair and convenes a grand jury to assess the validity of the criminal complaint made against him.

21-03

/u/KellinQuinn__

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

v.

/u/MyHouseIsOnFire

in his official capacity as Governor,

Defendant,

in re: Atlantic Borders Act

The Court has come to a decision in the present case, which challenges the constitutionality of the Atlantic Borders Act. The full opinion may be found at the link below. The following is only a summary of the Court's decision, and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court.

HurricaneofLies, C., delivered the opinion of a unanimous court. The court holds, among other things:

Held: The Atlantic Borders Act is unconstitutional because the Commonwealth’s boundaries were fixed by democratic consent at the Constitution’s framing and cannot be expanded except by constitutional amendment.

1. We are hesitant to invoke preemption and ultimately resolve the case on state constitutional grounds, since preemption does not arise unless it is the “clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” However, while preemption is a close question, the question of who lawfully owns Delaware and Maryland is not: Greater Appalachia indisputably does. [paras 11-17]

2. The Atlantic Commonwealth is not only some mere abstract idea but rather a physical space with actual residents, and the Commonwealth Constitution is only supreme within the boundaries of this space. [paras 19-23]

3. The constitutional definition of the Atlantic Commonwealth comprises the lands and waters in which the Commonwealth Constitution is supreme, which do not include Delaware or Maryland. [paras 24-27]

4. Because the Legislature derives its substantive authority from the Commonwealth Constitution, the structural limitations of the Constitution serve to delineate the maximal breadth of the legislative power. Neither the legislature nor the executive departments may alter the definition of the Atlantic Commonwealth within our constitutional topology except by constitutional amendment. [paras 28-36]

The full opinion may be found here

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ATLANTIC COMMONWEALTH

/u/dewey-cheatem, Petitioner

v.

/u/unorthodoxambassador, Respondent,

in the matter of Atlantic Commonwealth Penal Code section 255.15

I. Background

Section 255.15 of the Atlantic Commonwealth Penal Code (herinafter, "the Statute" or "section 255.15") provides as follows:

A person is guilty of bigamy when he contracts or purports to contract a marriage with another person at a time when he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living spouse. Bigamy is a class E felony.

This functions not only as a total ban on all marital unions between more than two persons but further imposes a criminal penalty on such unions and any persons purporting to be in such unions.

II. /u/Ibney00 v. /u/thecloudcappedstar, in re: Executive Order 25—Marriage and Polygamy is Not Controlling

Recently, this Court issued its decision in /u/Ibney00 v. /u/thecloudcappedstar, in re: Executive Order 25—Marriage and Polygamy, Case No. 19-15 (Apr. 2, 2020), in which the Court makes passing mention of the constitutionality of polygamy. However, that decision is not and ought not to be controlling in the instant case for a variety of reasons.

First, the language pertaining to the legality of polygamy is dicta. The Court explained that it "felt the need" to discuss polygamy in light of one of the arguments made--but that analysis was not essential to the outcome of the case: the Court had by that point already decided to uphold and strike down various parts of the Executive Order. For example, the Court's decision that the "governor cannot tell his or her departments to violate state laws" functions independently of the criminal prohibition on polygamy.

Second, the instant case presets several novel legal claims not raised there. For example, Ibney raised only claims about the constitutionality of limiting marriage to two persons in light of the fundamental right to marry; it failed to consider whether the Statute violates the right to free speech or the right to free exercise of religion. Moreover, Ibney considered only federal constitutional guarantees, not Atlantic Commonwealth constitutional guarantees, which are far broader than federal ones. See, e.g., People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296 (1986) (holding that New York State's constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech sweeps broader than does that of the First Amendment).

Third, to the extent that the reasoning of Ibney does apply to the instant case, that reasoning is fundamentally flawed and should be overturned for the reasons set forth below. The doctrine of stare decisis does not require the court to compound its previous mistakes. "[S]tare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it 'is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.'" Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)). Under this reasoning, for example, the Sierra Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected applicable precedent where that precedent is plainly in the wrong. E.g., In re: Executive Order No. 22--Banime, 13 West. 1, 3 (Sept. 2019) ("We decline to engage in the application of precedent for its own sake."); In re: Executive Order No. 24, 11 West 1, 3 (Sept. 2019) (“The doctrine of stare decisis cannot justify the perpetuation of prejudices for their own sake.”).

Ibney’s exclusive reliance on the dubious precedent of Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) is concerning for a number of reasons. For example, Ibney has failed to account for over a century of jurisprudential developments. Notably, Reynolds applied the low standard of rational basis review, whereas federal restrictions on free exercise are now governed by strict scrutiny pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and Atlantic Commonwealth restrictions on free exercise are similarly governed by the strict scrutiny standard. E.g., People v. Singh, 135 Misc. 2d 701, 705-6 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1987) (“While freedom to believe and worship as one chooses must remain absolute and unfettered, the State may restrict acts and conduct if the intrusion is justified by a compelling State interest to protect the health and safety of its citizens.”).

Beyond the obvious differences in standards of review, Reynolds considered only a free exercise clause challenge to a polygamy ban--the developments in the doctrine fundamental rights, and especially the fundamental right to marry, was wholly foreign to our judiciary at the time and therefore went wholly unaddressed. Obviously, since that time many cases have been decided which have established the fundamental right to marry as enshrined in our federal Constitution.

Furthermore, Reynolds’ own reasoning contravenes both our norms and our jurisprudence of freedom of religion and equal protection of the law, and should therefore be disregarded. Ibney’s uncritical reliance on Reynolds suggests the court’s wholesale adoption of Reynold’s own dubious reasoning, in which the nineteenth century’s racism was on full display. One federal court has explained well why Reynolds runs contrary to every modern notion of equality, constitutionally enshrined in our First and Fourteenth Amendments:

[T]he United States Supreme Court's 1879 decision in Reynolds v. United States displays “the essence of Orientalism” through its explicit “distinction between Western superiority and Oriental inferiority,” this is a relevant interpretative framework for evaluating the “crusade” of nineteenth-century American society against Mormon polygamy and the merits of the Reynolds decision today. Although the object of the decision was the Mormon Church, an institution virtually entirely comprised of white Americans and European immigrants, rather than the “Orient” or a people or institution geographically unique thereto, Reynolds invokes this framework because of the comparisons drawn by the Court between Mormons and non-European peoples and their practices, and the Court's views of the nature of the social harm posed by Mormon practices. For the Reynolds Court, the comparison with non-European peoples and their practices is precisely what made the Mormons' practice of polygamy problematic.

Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1183-84 (D. Utah 2013). In short, Reynolds was a decision whose reasoning rested not upon the text of our Constitution or careful analysis, but wholly upon anti-Mormon animus--a reasoning constitutionally prohibited by the many years of contrary jurisprudence which this Court overlooked by declining to critically examine the sole case upon which it chose to rely. E.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (finding that the targeting of a religious group for special disapproval to be a violation of the First Amendment). As the Supreme Court has repeatedly said in the many years since Reynolds: “[I]f the constitutional conception of `equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). Yet that is precisely what the aim of Reynolds was: to harm a politically unpopular group, Mormons.

Accordingly, while Reynolds may technically be good law, “other, more instructive precedents have expressed broader principles,” thereby bringing its vitality into question. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015)

III. The Statute Violates the Right to Freedom of Speech

A. The Statute Violates the First Amendment's Guarantee of Freedom of Speech

"[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content." Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972). As a result, "[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid." R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). More than being “presumptively invalid,” such restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny. Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal Communications Commission, 512 U.S. 622, 640 (1994).

Here, the Statute prohibits any person from “purporting” to be married to more than one person, a suppression of speech--deeply private speech about our most intimate associations--on the basis of that content: persons, for example, may present themselves as a married couple, but not as a married group of three. On its face, therefore, the Statute is a “content-based regulation” and is “presumptively invalid.” R.A.V., 505 US. at 382. The burden is upon the state to show that the content-based suppression of this speech is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest. The state cannot do so here. As an initial matter, and as explained elsewhere, it is unconstitutional for the State to limit marriage to two persons and therefore the State lacks any compelling interest in suppression of this speech. To the extent that such an aim is “compelling,” the state is perfectly capable of advancing that interest by other means, most notably through the legal restrictions upon marriage it already has in place.

B. The Statute Violates the Atlantic Commonwealth Constitution's Guarantee of Freedom of Speech

Article I(E) of our Constitution provides in relevant part: "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right." It is by now well established that "the State Constitution, in both civil and criminal matters, . . . define[s] a broader scope of protection than that accorded by the Federal Constitution in cases concerning individual rights and liberties” P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 303. Accordingly, even were this Court to reject the notion that this restriction on speech somehow comports with the First Amendment of our federal Constitution, it must independently consider whether our state constitution, which is more protective than the federal Constitution, allows for such restrictions.

The Atlantic Constitution tolerates no such restrictions. If the federal Constitution requires strict scrutiny for content-based discrimination in speech such as that contained within the Statute, then by reason that the State constitution is necessarily more protective of individual rights, the State constitution must require an even more searching scrutiny of the basis for such discriminations. And, in the instant case, this Court must find that basis wanting.

IV. The Statute Violates the Fundamental Right to Marry

The Statute also violates the fundamental right to marry. That a fundamental right to marry exists and is protected by the United States Constitution is beyond dispute. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 95 (1987); M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U. S. 102, 116 (1996) ; Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 640 (1974).

Under that fundamental right, the ability to marry--and receive state recognition for such marriage--has been extended to interracial couples (Loving), same-sex couples (Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 US _ (2015)), and even prisoners (Turner). In none of these cases has the Supreme Court articulated any coherent limit on the ability of persons to participate in the marriage relationship; to the contrary, the Court has consistently expanded the ability of new groups to participate. This Court should find no differently here, where polygamy is equally legitimate to same-sex marriage; indeed, polygamy has been practiced longer, in more cultures, and by a larger number of persons than has same-sex marriage. To differentiate between the two for no reason other than an arbitrary number is the height of absurdity.

V. The Statute Violates The Right to Free Exercise of Religion

Article I(B) of this State’s constitution provides in relevant part: The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this state to all humankind.

Under this provision, the state may not restrain the free exercise of religion unless it has met the requirement of strict scrutiny--that the restriction is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest. “While freedom to believe and worship as one chooses must remain absolute and unfettered, the State may restrict acts and conduct if the intrusion is justified by a compelling State interest to protect the health and safety of its citizens.” People v. Singh, 135 Misc. 2d 701, 705-6 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1987). The burden of proof therefore lies upon the State to establish that it has a compelling government interest to advance in restricting the free exercise of persons seeking to marry and that such restriction is done narrowly.

Here, the statutes substantially burden the free exercise of religion of those who are called by the tenets of their religion to participate in polygamous marriage. Millions of people throughout the world are called to do so, whether they are Muslim or Mormon, and many of such persons live within the Commonwealth. Because the statutes so burden the free exercise of religion, they must be subject to strict scrutiny, which they cannot survive. The statutes are not “essential to further a compelling government interest” because the state can provide no explanation as to why the marital relationship must be limited to two persons, let alone any legitimate, constitutional interest in regulating the ability of persons to hold themselves out as being married on the basis of their religious belief.

19-15

/u/ibney00

Petitioner:

v.

/u/thecloudcappedstar

in his official capacity as Attorney General,

Respondent,

in re: Executive Order 25—Marriage and Polygamy

The Court has come to a decision in the present case, which challenges the legality of EO.25—Marriage and Polygamy. The full opinion may be found at the link below. The following is only a summary of the Court's decision, and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court.

Cold_brew_coffee, J., delivered the unanimous opinion of the court. The court holds, among other things

1. The governor has the power to order executive departments to act in a matter that he or she sees fit, section 1 and section 3 are upheld.

2. The governor does not have the power to overturn Assembly passed statutes via executive order, section 2 is struck.

3. The Atlantic Commonwealth’s ban on bigamy is found to be constitutional as it is in line with established precedent.

[The full opinion may be found here] (https://docs.google.com/document/d/1aP4G9cY84LrkAz-WJNeVhS9jEfU7w4qkxnDGEYfrhwQ/edit?usp=sharing)

In re: AB.285

Your Honor-

BirackObama, investor in Consolidated Edison of New York (ConEd), the largest investor-owned energy company in the nation. ConEd is a publicly-regulated electric, gas and steam utility, with service and rates set by the Atlantic Commonwealth Public Service Commission.

Plaintiff is also a bondholder of the New York Power Authority. The New York Power Authority, created by the Long Island Power Act, is distributed by ConEd, PSEG, and LIPA/National Grid. PSEG maintains $32 billion and LIPA $3.5 billion in operating assets. Its main transmission cable alone in Long Island is valued at $500 million with $1.5 billion pledged to rebuild its infrastructure.

Questions Presented

• Whether the Assembly’s Green New Deal Act utility can, through the independent Public Service Commission, acquire other utilities without purchase agreements; to maintain, sell, and purchase preexisting non-stock bonds and equity; and ultimately subsume the private and private-public utilities completely — without paying those debts, dividends?

Whether the Act’s express requirement that all funding is appropriated per project, no more and no less, adheres to the Eminent Domain Law and Commonwealth prohibition on seizing labor if “fair market value” eliminates debts, including those purchases by union and company pensions?

Does Atlantic sovereign immunity apply to the Public Service Commission administering directly the utility, which legislatively in the Public Service Chapter is a gubernatorial partnership of a dozen officers merely to regulate rates, services, and operations?

Whether case law pertaining to pre-incorporation analysis has been foreclosed in Atlantic in light of recent findings, and if so, whether similar analysis of retributive fines is no longer applicable to the seizing of the Wall Street Bull, the taxation of universities with unfavorable names,the first energy seizure proved by the Supreme Court, the tobacco industry? Is it more akin to seizing a hot dog vendor’s truck and livelihood under a disproportionate New York City retributive fine as deemed by the Court before this term?

Court Preference

New York Public Service Law § 21 requires this Court to hear and decide actions commenced by either the Assembly-Executive independent Public Service Commission referred to in the Green New Deal Act, or by any person regarding any question in the Public Service Law chapter, “irrespective of position on the calendar” outside election law claims. “The same preference shall be granted upon application in any action or proceeding in which the commission may be allowed to intervene.”

Claims

The Green New Deal Act Fails to Adhere to Most of the Commonwealth’s Public Services Chapter, Earning the Commonwealth an Unpaid Profit from Existing Power Corporate Debt and Equity

Whenever any public utility company or municipality, whose rates are subject to the jurisdiction of the commission, shall receive any refund of amounts charged and collected from it by any source, the commission shall have power after a hearing… to determine whether or not such refund should be passed on, in whole or in part, to the consumers of such public utility company or municipality and to order such public utility company or municipality to pass such refunds on to its consumers, in the manner and to the extent determined just and reasonable by the commission.

The new Commonwealth’s utility faces no damages by complying with both the Green New Deal Act and the Public Service Laws and it should do so. The Commonwealth Assembly has decided on its own accord to cancel all outstanding debt payments to the millions of investors, worker pension funds, insurers, governments, municipalities and institutions that purchased NYPA bonds. It did so by seizing the regulated energy sector while failing to appropriate monies either sufficient for the takeover or appropriating any money for debt service. In 2017, this amounted to $769 million in liabilities on the NYPA balance sheet, more than energy generation revenue.

Canceled debt to the public is a profit. The Assembly did not appropriate funds to do so and then limited its own power in the Act to steer additional funds to bond payments from select workers’ payments and renewable energy. The sole appropriated money is set for shares, known as equity, and very little for seized property (which under some definitions can also be indebted bonds). The free money must be paid back under the law to consumers and lenders.

No gas corporation or electric corporation shall directly or indirectly acquire the stock or bonds of any other corporation incorporated for, or engaged in, the same or a similar business, in this state or any other state, or proposing to operate or operating under a franchise from the same or any other municipality...unless authorized so to do by the commission.

The new green statewide utility, a public utility the same as ConEd that preceded it, violated the Public Service Laws directly when it monopolized all equity and debt from other corporations underneath the new entity. The Green New Deal utility is in the same or substantially similar business as the nuclear, wind, electric, steam, gas and transmission utilities of the Commonwealth before it.

Only the Commission, not the Assembly, can authorize acquiring or selling stocks and bonds otherwise. Even if it could, the post-Green New Deal Commission for the first time directly operates a new corporation. Now, the Assembly requires the Commission to both independently regulate acquisitions and sales of power companies, while appropriating an insufficient budget to ethically carry out both its and the Governor’s mandatory duty of a self-monopolized utility.

ACE is hereby established as a state-owned utility under the authority of the Atlantic Public Service Commission.

The Governor or the Secretary of Finance and Infrastructure shall be given the powers over the ACE to:

Reappropriate money to different projects within the ACE, but not allocate more or less money overall;

Mandate the closing or opening of any given > part of the Electric Grid; Reorganize the ACE

The intent of the overwhelming breadth of the existing legal chapter against that of a single poorly written law is clear. For example:

No consent, permission or approval otherwise required under this section shall be necessary for the sale of the franchise, works, system, stocks or bonds by a gas or electric corporation to a duly constituted authority of the state.

The Court must defer to the overwhelming intent of the legislature: the Commonwealth must pay, in an elective sale decided by the existing utilities, before acquiring assets. If there is a legitimate public interest in the acquisition, then the duly constituted authority must still pay bond service, outstanding bond purchases based on new investor views of risk, and stockholder dividends for the debt and equity of the acquired entity. Since the new utility wasn’t funded to do so, by choice and also by inadequate capitalization, the Green Deal Act utility has no possible defense and must be repaired outside the Court.

Under Eminent Domain Proceedings Law, Fair Value Was Not Paid

Any person or persons jointly or severally, aggrieved by the condemnor's determination and findings made pursuant to section two hundred four of this article, may seek judicial review thereof by the appellate division of the Supreme Court EDPL § 207

Notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of law, general or special, the provisions of this law shall be controlling and on and after the effective date of this law, any interest in real property subject to acquisition shall be acquired pursuant to the provisions of this law.(including realty bonds).

An “appropriate judgement” in the Eminent Domain Proceedings Law is the fair market value plus interest for the seized property. The Green New Deal Act appropriates $100 billion for “shares,” known as equity in a corporation, and $50 billion for all other value of the real property taken by the Commonwealth. Assumption of debt is never mentioned although it is crucial to energy profitability.

The Assembly’s seizure, somehow without any positive executive action, takes place in two parts:

The [Commonwealth Assembly establishes the AEC and the] Atlantic Electric Grid will be seized under imminent domain for the public use of the environment and energy, and consolidated under ACE’s authority.

Part two:

ACE must, upon the expropriation of any property… [using its new independent Commission-managed authority] Provide fair financial compensation to the owner of the expropriated property.

The ACE will never be profitable. Most current profitability by New York utilities is based on debt through bond sales. It is a favorite piggy bank for Albany budget makers. The restrictions on the Green New Deal Commission’s income are onerous: those consumers who cannot afford current payments receive free supply; workers are paid over $30 an hour (although their pension plans have lost their bonds); formerly private industry must establish and fund new unions with the new utility; the Commission must subsidize green energy and then pay consumers for using it; it can charge no more than operating costs for gas, electric and steam provisions; and 90 percent of renewable infrastructure must be built in less than a decade.

To make their stinginess clear to the Commission, the Assembly states no more or less funds can be used for any specified purpose unless already in one section of the Act itself:

All previous descriptions of allocation of money is enforced in this section. Any other section containing a promise of allocation of money is purely descriptive and not put into force until listed in this section.

The Governor or the Secretary of Finance and Infrastructure shall be given the powers over the ACE to… Reappropriate money to different projects within the ACE, but not allocate more or less money overall (although limited to the “projects” of renewable energy, it would appear to violate prior controlling AC Constitution and Court precedent)

Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence n the Commonwealth is Only Recently Extremely Askew and Should Be Corrected

The Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). While Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), found the death penalty consistent with the Eighth Amendment, times have changed and the living, evolving nature of the Eighth Amendment means that the Court should no longer view Gregg as binding precedent. — Judge HurricaneofLies, CACLU, in Chesapeake

The City too narrowly views the scope of the Excessive Fines Clause. Although Eighth Amendment claims often arise in the criminal context, civil fines may also fall within reach of the amendment (see Korangy v United States FDA, 498 F3d 272, 277 [4th Cir 2007], cert denied 552 US 1143 [2008]; Towers v City of Chicago, 173 F3d 619, 623-624 [7th Cir 1999], cert denied 528 US 874 [1999]). This Court recognized as much in Matter of Street Vendor Project v City of New York (43 AD3d 345 [1st Dept 2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 709 [2008]). In that case, a group representing street vendors challenged as unconstitutional a schedule of civil fines adopted by the ECB. Although we found that the record was insufficient to permit review of the group's constitutional claim, we concluded that individual street vendors could raise such a challenge in future lawsuits where the facts of each separate case could be developed (id. at 346). Matter of Prince v City of New York 2013 NY Slip Op 03623 Decided on May 21, 2013

Because the fine here, at least in part, serves a deterrent purpose, it cannot be considered solely remedial and thus is subject to Eighth Amendment analysis (see State of New York v Town of Wallkill, 170 AD2d 8, 11 [3d Dept 1991] [civil penalty contained in Environmental Conservation Law is punitive in nature, serving purposes of both retribution and deterrence, in addition to restitution]; United States v Mackby, 261 F3d 821, 830 [9th Cir 2001] [civil sanctions under the False Claims Act are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause because the sanctions represent a payment to the government, at least in part, as punishment]). Id.

The Court was wrong in MyHouseIsOnFire_ v. TheCloudCappedStar, in re: The Green New Deal: 2019 Energy Act and it should not bind itself a an extreme precedent unfamiliar to the State of New York and likely one day will apply on a narrower gauge to civil forfeiture nationally.

The Commonwealth Judiciary has repeatedly in its short history seen the Northeast Assembly aim targeted seizures at industrial actors it does not like: defense, intelligence, energy (twice), art, Wall Street, Walmart, academia. Not only is legislation not the appropriate means to effect eminent domain, which along with regulatory taking is an executive act, it cannot use the threat of eminent domain to fine the unfortunate and pay dividends to others. It is a state fine, a wrong and capricious one by the Assembly that the Court should discourage by applying precedent in all possible ways, even if imperfectly argued by other petitioners. .

Therefore, the Court should strike the entirety of the Green New Deal Act and apply prior precedent since the 1990s to reverse the extreme holding that the Eighth Amendment in New York is completely inapplicable to analyses of the Assembly’s excessive fines.

20-01

/u/MyHouseIsOnFire

Petitioner,

v.

/u/TheCloudCappedStar

in his official capacity as Attorney General,

Respondent,

in re: AB.285—The Green New Deal: 2019 Energy Act

The Court has come to a decision in the present case, which challenges the legality of AB.285—The Green New Deal: 2019 Energy Act. The full opinion may be found at the link below. The following is only a summary of the Court's decision, and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court.

Hurricaneoflies, C.J., delivered the opinion of a unanimous court. The Court holds, among other things:

1. The Commonwealth Constitution does not bar the incorporation of publicly owned corporations via special act.

2. The appropriation of property for public use with proper notice and a method to challenge the acquisition of said property does not constitute an unreasonable seizure.

3. The Fifth Amendment’s protection against the taking of private property is not violated when the exercise of such power involves fair compensation and procedural protections.

4. In the absence of binding authority to the contrary, the Excessive Fines Clause is not incorporated against the Atlantic Commonwealth, and Petitioner’s claim must fail accordingly.

AB.285 is a lawful exercise of the General Assembly’s legislative power under the Commonwealth Constitution and does not infringe upon rights protected by the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Act is upheld in full.

The full opinion may be found here

Application for Marriage, New Jersey, State of Atlantic Comes the petitioner, /u/KellinQuinn__ Honorable Justices, I petition that the following marriage license is accepted by this Court between myself and /u/dino_inc. I further petition that this Court officates the ceremonial marriage between myself and/u/dino_inc. The following persons are authorized to conduct a marriage ceremony: [...] a justice of the supreme court [...] Enclosed are the proper fees of New Jersey County, totalling $100.00

APPLICATION FOR MARRIAGE LICENSE, NEW JERSEY COUNTY, STATE OF ATLANTIC APPLICANT ONE Name: /u/dino_inc Requirements: I have not been divorced within the last 30 days. ✓ I am not presently married. ✓ I am not presently delinquent in the payment of court ordered child support. ✓ The other applicant is not presently married. ✓ I am not related to the other applicant as: an ancestor or descendant, by blood or adoption; a brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption; a parent's brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption; a son or daughter of a brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption; a current or former stepchild or stepparent; or a son or daughter of a parent's brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption. ✓ I solemnly swear (or affirm) that the information I have given in this application is correct, /u/dino_inc APPLICANT TWO Name: /u/KellinQuinn__ Requirements: I have not been divorced within the last 30 days. ✓ I am not presently married. ✓ I am not presently delinquent in the payment of court ordered child support. ✓ The other applicant is not presently married. ✓ I am not related to the other applicant as: an ancestor or descendant, by blood or adoption; a brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption; a parent's brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption; a son or daughter of a brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption; a current or former stepchild or stepparent; or a son or daughter of a parent's brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption. ✓ I solemnly swear (or affirm) that the information I have given in this application is correct, /u/KellinQuinn__

This court having received the correct paperwork hereby grants /u/BorisTheRabid's petition to adopt /u/mika3740.

/u/mika3740 is hereafter in all respects the child of /u/BorisTheRabid

This court wishes them well in their new lives as Father and Daughter.

The Golux,

Chief Judge.

The bar requirement to argue before this court is hereby suspended.

State courts can be a useful tool to prepare people for arguments before the Supreme Court, and given the infrequency of the Supreme Court Bar exam, this Court believes it is a helpful to suspend the bar requirement.

While the requirement is suspended this Court still recommends that parties find adequate legal counsel, which will often times be someone who has passed the SCOTUS bar or a one of the state bars.

Parties should remember that if they choose legal counsel that has not passed the SCOTUS bar, they will probably need to find different counsel if they wish to appeal to SCOTUS.

General rules regarding standing still apply of course.

21-01

/u/Notthedarkweb_MNZP

Petitioner:

v.

/u/MyHouseIsOnFire

in his official capacity as Governor,

Respondent,

in re: Executive Order 02

The Court has come to a decision in the present case, which challenges Executive Order 02 on various constitutional grounds. The full opinion may be found at the link below. The following is only a summary of the Court's decision, and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court.

HurricaneofLies, C., delivered the opinion of a unanimous court. The court holds, among other things:

Sections I–III and V of the Order are unlawful exercises of gubernatorial power and consequently invalid.

1. When the Atlantic Commonwealth joined with her fellow states in perpetual Union, she made the irreversible decision to tether her destiny to that of the United States. Because section II of the Order impinges upon the just supremacy of the United States by frustrating the legitimate activities of federal law enforcement, it is conflict-preempted under the Supremacy Clause and of no force and effect. [paras 5-12]

2. The Governor’s abrogation of the firearms licensing regime would defeat the Legislature’s clear policy decision to establish a “‘may-issue’ concealed carry system” for the Commonwealth. Therefore, parts III and V(1) of the Order are contrary to the public policy of the Commonwealth and, in directing the wholesale nullification of a fine-wrought statutory regime, breach the Take Care Clause of the Commonwealth Constitution. [paras 14-17]

3. Within our constitutional framework, it is clearly established that “[t]he power of taxation is one that is innate to, and vested exclusively in, the legislative branch.” The Governor must make a good-faith attempt to collect all taxes established by the Legislature. [paras 18-22]

4. We will uphold the Governor’s non-prosecution order unless there exists “no rational basis for the exercise of discretion or the action complained of is arbitrary and capricious.” The types of penal statutes targeted by the Governor are clearly constitutional, as we have repeatedly reaffirmed and to which the broad agreement of the federal courts lends strong support. Accordingly, the Governor’s determination that the statutes in question violated the U.S. and Commonwealth Constitutions is arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion. [paras 25-36]

The full opinion may be found here

Homofuckspace v. Zurikurta, in their official capacity as Attorney General.

Parties. Homofuckspace; Zurikurta.

Jurisdiction. This court has jurisdiction as it is a challenge to state law. AC-ROC 1(d), 2(b), 2(c).

Questions presented. (1) Should the basic structure doctrine apply to courts in the Atlantic Commonwealth, and (2) does Article XI § C of the Constitution of the Atlantic Commonwealth violate the basic structure doctrine?

Relief requested. That Article XI § C be struck.

Amendments in question.

Article XI § C provides:

Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof, shall use its property or credit or any public money, or authorize or permit either to be used, directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance, other than for examination or inspection, of any school or institution of learning wholly or in part under the control or direction of any religious denomination, or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught, but the legislature may provide for the transportation of children to and from any school or institution of learning.

Article I § B provides in relevant part:

The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this state to all humankind * * *.

Article I § F provides in relevant part:

No person shall, because of * * * religion, be subjected to any discrimination in their civil rights * * * by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state.

Argument.

1. Article XI conflicts with and modifies Article I.

It is first worth noting that repeal by implication is heavily disfavored, so to the extent that Articles I and XI conflict, Article XI modifies, rather than repeals, Article I's protections. See, for instance, Columbia Law Review Vol. 55 No. 7, Repeal by Implication, 1039 (1955).

Since these articles were passed in the same session as part of a constitutional rewrite, repeal by implication is even more heavily disfavored, and the later enactment (Article XI) repeals the earlier (Article I) only to the extent of the conflict. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction §23:18 (2002). Article XI is best understood as a 'later enactment' because it comes after Article I's guarantee. That is to say, Article I provides for certain rights, and Article XI then -- and only after Article I's guarantee has been granted -- comes into play. The Assembly could provide the articles in any order they desired, but they deliberately chose to place Article XI, which stands in conflict with Article I, afterwards. We ought to give effect to, and make intelligible, that decision by the writers.

So, the question becomes, Do these articles conflict? And the answer is, plainly, yes. Since Article I provides that there shall be a guarantee "forever" "[t]he free exercise * * * of religious * * * worship, without discrimination" and that "[n]o person shall, because of * * * religion, be subjected to any discrimination," Article XI's proscription against state funding for any religious school (excepting maintenance and aid) conflicts. This peculiar ban -- extending to all private religious schools, but not to private schools altogether -- is brought into effect solely because of a school being under religious control or teaching.

"Discrimination" is defined as "prejudiced or prejudicial outlook, action, or treatment". Merriam-Webster's online dictionary (2020). Religious schools are prejudiced against in action, since there is a preconceived judgment by the state that they are unworthy of funding, solely because of religiosity. That is not to say that this discrimination rises to the level of a First Amendment claim, rather this observation serves merely as recognition that discrimination exists, and that the Commonwealth's proscription against "any discrimination" "because of * * * religion" is violated.

So the two are in conflict. Under the standard canons of interpretation, conflicts must be resolved in the narrowest sense: that Article XI does discriminate because of religion in violation of Article I, but that this cannot violate the text of the earlier section. That's to say, Article XI carves out its own exception to Article I, and all is well.

(2) The court should adopt the basic structure doctrine.

But it's undesirable for basic guarantees of human rights to be limited by future articles or amendments, so the court should instead adopt the basic structure doctrine.

As the Supreme Court of India noted, the basic structure doctrine is a recognition that even though "every provision of the Constitution is essential," not all provisions are "in the same position." Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, 4 SCC 225 (1983), ¶ 316. Instead, there is a "basic foundation" upon which constitutions are built, recognizing "the dignity and freedom of the individual," which "cannot by any form of amendment be destroyed." ¶ 317.

Article I's guarantee that "free exercise" shall be enjoyed "forever" by "all humankind" is a fundamental piece of this Commonwealth's constitution and culture. It is located in the very first article, which residents, upon reading the Constitution, will be the most likely to read, and, if we're lucky, remember. It is embodied in the ethos of this Commonwealth's courts: blind administrators of justice without regard to one's social status.

Just as "[t]he concept of the separation of powers is the bedrock of the system of government adopted by this State," Matter of Maron v. Silver, 14 N.Y.3d 230, 258 (2010), the ability of people to lead religious lives, unburdened by discrimination and prejudice, is the bedrock of the organization of power in this Commonwealth. Power is, like justice, neutral. It ought to be derived from the consent of the governed, and here, it ought to consider the rights of minorities.

Any repeal of these "forever"-guaranteed rights, in any manner and regardless of how exactly precise they are crafted, must be looked at with the greatest suspicion. Some rights are declared by language to be "fundamental" (see Article I § M), and others are by language, craft, placement, culture, history, aesthetic, and other unknowable, intangible factors best understood as fundamental.

For a provision to lie at the base of our system of government -- to be "bedrock" -- it must be unbreakable. Cf. Minecraft. For a provision to be guaranteed "forever," it may not be discarded or amended. Otherwise, there is no central guarantee whatsoever, and indeed there exists no guarantee at all, but rather a short-term promise. That our system now aligns with the principle of consent of the governed is mere happenstance, and largely stays in place because of extended, if untenable, good will. No amendment ought to be able to abrogate the basic rights of humankind, much less provide a barrier to future change. If tomorrow an amendment removed the right of people to elect members of the Assembly, that would not only bind the currently living -- which is perhaps acceptable, although hardly so -- but it would bind future generations. They will not know the taste of freedom, so they will be unable to understand what, precisely, they are missing.

But that is not to suggest that all rights are cornerstone, either. Certainly, governments provide certain protections in return for the lifting of certain rights. The natural right of humankind to travel freely, developed at the twilight of history, is limited by trespass laws. The right to attack another person is limited by battery laws. The right to religious freedom, however, is unlike either of these: It is a deliberately prominent right, expounded upon in two separate, fundamental documents (the US and Atlantic Constitutions), with carefully-used language that intends to inform the reader that these rights are inviolable, basic, and fundamental. It is also set apart in that it limits state power, rather than limiting a particular person's rights, setting this apart as an increasingly fundamental human right.

I propose that this court adopt the basic structure doctrine for human rights, comprised of the following factors, that if present prevent any abrogation of the right by amendment or modification whatsoever:

1. Is the Commonwealth's guarantee of the right made through a promise for it to exist "forever" into the future, or a recognition that the right has existed since "time immemorial"?

2. Is the right especially protective of minorities?

3. Is the right most prominently displayed in the legal texts or buildings of the Commonwealth or country?

4. Is the right protective of individual power (i.e., does it curtail state power)?

Article I meets all of these. Article XI's modification therefore harms the "basic right" to be free from state-sponsored discrimination, and must be struck according to the basic structure doctrine.

(3) Begone, formalism.

Overly formalistic formulations of law ought to be disregarded; even if there is no textual support in the Commonwealth Constitution for the basic structure doctrine, this court ought to adopt it anyway as (1) this court's rulings are final on issues of state law, so there should be no fear of reversal on appeal, (2) overly formalistic approaches to law serve only to protect majority interests, which as administrators of justice this court ought to be suspicious of, and (3) not doing so allows for an unchecked expansion of majority power, even allowing the detachment of the Commonwealth from a model where power is derived from the consent of the governed.

Petitioner, the Model Opinion Service, represented by /u/JacobInAustin, has filed the following complaint in Google Document format against /u/hurricaneoflies in his official capacity as Chief Judge of the Atlantic Commonwealth (the Atlantic Commonwealth, real party in interest).

Link to complaint

20-04

/u/dewey-cheatem

Petitioner:

v.

/u/MyHouseIsOnFire

in his official capacity as Governor,

Respondent,

in re: Penal Law § 255.15

The Court has come to a decision in the present case, which challenges the legality of Penal Law § 255.15. The full opinion may be found at the link below. The following is only a summary of the Court's decision, and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court.

Hurricaneoflies, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, which Mika3740, J. joined as to all but Part IV and which Cold_Brew_Coffee, J., joined as to all but Part III. Cold_Brew_Coffee, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. The court holds, among other things:

Penal Law § 255.15 unconstitutionally abrogates the free exercise of religion protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

1. Constitutional avoidance dictates a preference for a reasonable, constitutional reading of Penal Law § 255.15. As the language “purports to contract” in the Act only prohibits the active act of fraudulently attempting to contract a bigamous marriage, no violation of the Free Speech Clause ensues as there is no First Amendment interest in false and fraudulent speech.

2. The Commonwealth Constitution explicitly does not accord any protection to false and fraudulent speech of the nature prohibited by Penal Law § 255.15.

3. The right to marry flows from the constitutional protections of equal protection and substantive due process. Insofar as the number of sexual partners is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause, and insofar as there is no established fundamental right to multiple marriage in American jurisprudence, the right to marry is not violated by Penal Law § 255.15.

4. A free exercise claim must be held to strict scrutiny. While the prohibition of polygamy implicates many important government interests, none of them are achieved by the least restrictive means.

[The full opinion may be found here] (https://docs.google.com/document/d/1OQdswgw3JZ0QxUENSqIkSFePGfMipfL5e-WIz7bz_Q8/edit?usp=sharing)

19-14

/u/BirackObama

Petitioner:

v.

/u/thecloudcappedstar

in his official capacity as Attorney General,

Respondent,

in re: AB.087—Community Health Act

The Court has come to a decision in the present case, which challenges the legality of AB.087—Community Health Act. The full opinion may be found at the link below. The following is only a summary of the Court's decision, and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court.

Hurricaneoflies, C.J., delivered the opinion of a unanimous court. The court holds, among other things:

The operation of the Community Health Act to restrain the use and acquisition of tobacco for American Indian ceremonies violates the Free Exercise Clause.

1. A substantial burden upon the free exercise of religion must be held to strict scrutiny under Carey v. Dixie Inn, 101 M.S.Ct. 112 (2020).

2. Promoting public health is a compelling interest and the Assembly makes a strong demonstration of the tobacco ban’s cogent relationship to its interest.

3. The enforcement of the tobacco ban against American Indians who have a genuinely-founded belief in the sanctity of the ceremonial use of tobacco is unconstitutional because it does not demonstrably constitute the least restrictive means of achieving the Commonwealth’s interest.

4. The General Assembly validly prohibited commerce in tobacco and restrictions on the advertisement of an illegal product do not implicate commercial speech or any other form of protection under the First Amendment.

5. Restrictions on the sale, advertisement and transportation of tobacco are not preempted by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act because they fall squarely within the Act’s exception clause.

6. A wholesale prohibition on tobacco advertisement is not preempted because it is not a content-based advertisement regulation within the meaning of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.

7. The Court declines to review Petitioner’s Civil Rights Act of 1964, takings and due process claims because they were not briefed and consequently abandoned.

8. While the Act as enforced against certain American Indians is unconstitutional, the violation does not rise to a level that makes the Act facially invalid.

[The full opinion may be found here] (https://docs.google.com/document/d/1191QpVaxDrY-hqbGEGxtBfWBYv9Uo4u1VixErZ9UyeE/edit?usp=sharing)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ATLANTIC COMMONWEALTH

/u/dewey-cheatem, Petitioner

v.

/u/MyHouseIsOnFire, Respondent,

in the matter of Executive Order 40: Atlantic First

I. Introduction

On May 7, 2020, newly-inaugurated governor /u/_MyHouseIsOnFire (hereinafter "the Governor" or "Governor House") promulgated Executive Order 40: Atlantic First (hereinafter "the Order" or "EO 40"). In the Order, the Governor repealed a plethora of executive orders issued by former governor /u/UnorthodoxAmbassador , including Executive Order 38: The Order of the Atlantic (hereinafter "EO 38").

EO 38 created an award for citizens of the Atlantic who have had a "positive impact" on the state and "history of civic engagement," which could be awarded by the state's Governor, Lieutenant Governor, or Speaker of the Assembly.

II. Violation of the Fifth Amendment

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that "no person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. Const. Amend. V.

A person has a property interest in benefits or awards provided to him by the government; accordingly, he must be provided due process before he is deprived of those benefits or awards. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (Social Security benefits).

Here, recipients of the Order of the Atlantic medal have been denied their ongoing property interest because by eliminating Executive Order 38 in its entirety, without limitation, the Governor has not only eliminated future awards of the medal but also the existence of the medal itself. Furthermore, the recipients have been provided no process at all, let alone the process that is "due."

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above the Executive Order in question should be struck down as unconstitutional.

Appellant Sexy Lady Studios has submitted the following application for leave to appeal in the case Fondle v. Sexy Ladies Studios, 1 A.D.1d 1 (2020):

https://itsaweirdworld.xyz/Cases/SLSFondle/Appeal%20Application.pdf

/u/MyHouseIsOnFire

Petitioner,

v.

/u/nothedarkweb

in his official capacity as Attorney General,

Respondent.

In re: AB.285—The Green New Deal: 2019 Energy Act

Facts

Petitioner, Member of Congress for the state of Atlantic Commonwealth, is a resident of Atlantic submitting this writ of certiorari, in his personal capacity pursuant to Rule 2(c) and Atl. art. IV, to question the constitutionality of AB.285 The Green New Deal 2019 Act.

As an Atlantic citizen in the District, petitioner recently attempted to invest in Con Edison, a popular electric company in New York City.

The petitioner learned that AB.285 The Green New Deal 2019 Act has consolidated all electric companies into a single, state ran corporation:

State-Owned Utility: A corporation owned and controlled publically, by the Atlantic Commonwealth.

ACE is hereby established as a state-owned utility under the authority of the Atlantic Public Service Commission.

ACE shall be the sole entity allowed to use the Atlantic Electric Grid.

The total AB.033 Northeast Budget Beginning Oct 1 2019 has allocated around 360 billion dollars to the operations of the State of the Atlantic Commonwealth.

AB.285 The Green New Deal 2019 Act calls for appropriating one trillion, two hundred and fifty billion dollars in expenses over a ten year period. Spread evenly over ten years, the taxpayers must pay an additional one hundred and twenty five billion dollars per year.

Argument

Petitioner believes the Constitution of the Commonwealth law affects him personally, concretely, and particularly, like his constituents throughout the state. In “Argument” section I, plaintiff argues the law plainly violates the Atlantic Commonwealth Constitution, Article X, § A and the Atlantic Commonwealth Constitution, .

Corporations may be formed under general law; but shall not be created by special act, except for municipal purposes, and in cases where, in the judgment of the legislature, the objects of the corporation cannot be attained under general laws. All general laws and special acts passed pursuant to this section may be altered from time to time or repealed.

The petitioner believes that Amendment V of the United States Constitution is violated with the passage of AB.285. The petitioner argues that Sections 3 and 5 of AB AB.285 is an unjust “taking of property”, as there is no due process for the taking of said property. Amendment V also states “nor shall private property be taken for public use” showing their should be both public and private property. This bill effectively removes this distinction, turning private to public. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the President of the United States does not have the authority to seize and operate steel mills, despite it being a time of war. This can be applied to AB.285 as property, and capital, is being taken from private individuals.

The petitioner also argues that Amendment IV of the United States Constitution is violated in §III of AB.285 with private property being unjustly taken without a warrant a violation of the taking clause.

The petitioner finally argues that Amendment VIII of the United States Constitution is violated by §IX of AB.285. Amendment VIII states “nor excessive fines imposed.” The total Atlantic Commonwealth Budget of October of 2019 has allocated around 360 billion dollars to the operations of the State of the Atlantic Commonwealth. A budget increase of 35% must occur in order to fund AB.285. The taxpayer will be the one footing the bill, so the taxpayer would be fined an excessive amount through §Xi of this bill.

Conclusion

Law AB.285 conflicts with the Constitution of the United States by taking the property of citizens of the United States without just cause. The line between public and private property is also blurred by AB.285. If the court finds this law, in its many sections, to be unconstitutional, the plaintiff asks for the court to strike the law down.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ATLANTIC COMMONWEALTH

/u/BirackObama

Petitioner,

v.

/u/ohprkl

in his official capacity as Attorney General,

Respondent.

In re: AB.087—Community Health Act

The Court has certified the following complaint as substantially compliant with Atl. Rules of Court. It is reproduced in full as submitted, without modification.

In re AB.087: Community Health Act

Rep. BirackObama (AC-1) v. Gov. UnorthodoxAmbassador

“For a century, Connecticut farmers have grown some of the world's finest cigar wrapper tobacco.” — Connecticut Businessman Vince McMahon, Made in the Shade, Cigar Aficionado

Facts

Petitioner, Member of Congress for the First District, is a recent resident of Atlantic submitting this writ in his personal capacity pursuant to Rule 2(c) and Atl. art. IV.

As an Atlantic citizen in the District, petitioner recently attempted to patronize Staza Dei Sigari in Boston’s North End, complete an express delivery of Zig Zag Blueberry Blunt Wraps to his office, and planned a constituent forum with the shade tobacco growers of Connecticut (the second largest industry behind insurance).

In Dixie, petitioner had advocated for the safety and vitality of the national tobacco industry and was already familiar with the legendary role of the First District’s Connecticut River valley as a jewel of the international cigar market.

However, petitioner learned that AB.087: The Atlantic Community Health Act of 2019 recently prevented sales, commerce, and cultivation of Connecticut shade tobacco, the purchase of blunt wraps, and smoking sales at the city’s cigar and hookah bars, amongst other effects, mandating:

It shall be unlawful in this state for any corporation or other unnatural person to sell, make available for sale, advertise, cultivate any matter or substance containing tobacco.

It shall be unlawful for any corporation or other unnatural person to cause any matter or substance containing tobacco to be transported into this state, or to transport such substance or matter into this state.

Argument

Petitioner believes the Commonwealth law affects him personally, concretely, and particularly, like his constituents throughout the District. In “Argument” section I, plaintiff argues the law plainly violates judicial precedent and federal First and Fourteenth Amendments binding the state (Atl. Const. art. III, see also art. I: protection of civil rights).

The state law also is preempted by two bedrock federal statutes enacted to ensure uniformity in tobacco regulation described in “Argument” section II.

Separately, although not focused in this claim, petitioner relays to the Court his belief that this regulation is an illegal uncompensated taking of property prohibited by Atl. Const. art. I and X (excessive fines prohibited; requirement to pay for corporate “indebtedness” caused; free exercise of religion, see e.g. Atlantic Native American Mid Winter Ceremony tobacco offerings.

The statute fails the four-part commercial speech standard in the landmark Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. New York Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).

In New York Public Serv. Comm., an 8-1 bench articulated a standing test for similar total restrictions on the promotion of electricity use during the 1973 oil embargo. The Court’s analysis in four parts was:

Is the expression protected by the First Amendment?

For speech to come within that provision, it must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Tobacco use and in particular growing is a lawful and protected activity, yet the regulation does not address any specific trade practice for review to supersede that protected constitutional interest.

Is the asserted governmental interest substantial?

While a government interest in tobacco uses may be inarguable, the state’s approach is the nation’s first complete abolition of not only use, but trade and growth of tobacco.

Does the regulation directly advance the governmental interest asserted?

The regulation is not tailored to address a direct interest. While the title states “Community Health,” there is no explicit goal within the law toward community health. There is no preamble or statement. The law begins with the power of the state to preside over interstate commerce of tobacco into or out of the Commonwealth, and ends with a complete civil prohibition over the trade:

This Act shall not be interpreted as criminalizing the transportation, sale, or possession of tobacco by any natural person not acting as an agent or employee of any entity otherwise covered by this Act.

Is the regulation more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest?

There must be a "reasonable fit" between the government's ends and the means for achieving those ends. Abolition, as in alcohol prohibition, is historically found as overbroad and unreasonable under law.

As recently as 2001 in the First District, the Court applied the above standard to strike down laws banning tobacco advertising and sales within 1,000 feet of schools on the basis of freedom of speech. Lorillard v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (Massachusetts' ban on advertising and tobacco sales was both overbroad and was preempted by the landmark Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1966).

See also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (holding that a complete ban on the advertising of alcohol prices was unconstitutional under the First Amendment, and that the Twenty-first Amendment, empowering the states to regulate alcohol, did not lessen other constitutional restraints of state power); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (finding that a state may require advertisers to include "purely factual and uncontroversial" disclosures without violating the First Amendment rights of the advertiser as long as the disclosure is in the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers: the Zauderer Standard).

The Atlantic regulation is expressly preempted and cannot stand review.

The Supreme Court held that the above Massachusetts regulation was preempted by federal law. See Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI., § 2; see also Atl. Const. art. III.

As a member of the Social Concerns Committee, petitioner is familiar with the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 and points to the express preemption clauses within it.

The Tobacco Control Act preempts the Atlantic statute in at least four ways:

• It constitutes a “tobacco product standard,” and the authority for this is expressly reserved to the FDA in Section 21 U.S.C. 387p(a)(2)(A);

• HHS and FDA are prohibited from banning certain classes of tobacco products, explicitly cigars and cigarettes, and so state and local governments are prohibited from doing so through a sales regulation (id);

• Even if state and local governments have the power to restrict the sale of a certain class of tobacco products, they are barred from completely prohibiting the sale of such products by law.

• The Act’s saving clause excepts from preemption local laws that establish “requirements relating to the sale… of… tobacco products,” but not the absolute prohibition of covered trade.

See U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co. LLC v. City of New York, 708 F.3d 428 (2013) (holding that the City’s ordinance prohibiting the sale of any flavored non-cigarette tobacco product in tobacco bars was preempted by the Tobacco Control Act); Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets v. City of Providence, 2012 WL 6128707, 13 (2012) (striking from the City ordinance prohibitions on the sale of flavored non-cigarette tobacco products in tobacco bars).

The Tobacco Control Act’s legislative history is clear: as part of a broad 2009 push for financial and healthcare reform, the act included benefits for the target industry.

• The law separately prohibits the FDA from using its new authority to increase the new federal minimum age of 18 to a higher level, require prescriptions for the purchase of tobacco products, ban tobacco product sales in any particular type of sales outlet, or regulate tobacco farming directly.

• It prohibits states from placing requirements on cigarette or smokeless tobacco product labeling or on the content of cigarette advertisements. It gives the FDA exclusive authority to establish tobacco product standards, prohibit adulterated or misbranded tobacco products, establish labeling requirements, and regulate manufacturing standards and modified-risk tobacco products, preempting previously existing state and local authority to do so. Similarly, the law preempts state governments from licensing tobacco manufacturers and suppliers exclusively for tobacco product regulation purposes.

• Congress has deemed it proper to limit state product liability cases, which cannot claim that cigarette companies failed to warn them of the health effects of smoking after 1969, when the Advertising Act preemptive language went into effect. Nor can plaintiffs bring claims based on legal theories of negligence or misrepresentation by omission.

Conclusion

The Atlantic law completely prohibiting the sale and cultivation of tobacco products impermissibly conflicts with federal law by establishing disruptive tobacco product standards, overbroadly regulating the distribution of a lawfully protected product, while prohibiting an entire class of commerce without a reasonably tailored purpose.

Although not asserted in this claim, it likely exceeds petitioner’s First and Fourteenth Amendment speech and due process claims to stretch across the First District including unlawful taking of business and farm property with no statutory or Atlantic constitutional compensation. It also interferes with his constituent services to the migrant farmers of Atlantic and the religious interests of some residents (e.g., Native Americans).

Petitioner does not argue the power of the Commonwealth to regulate tobacco products, but by completely prohibiting the sale of a class of products or all of them, the Assembly is establishing an impermissible standard which is preempted by uniform federal law and a violation of federal and Commonwealth rights.

THEREFORE, petitioner respectfully requests declaratory relief from the Court pertaining to the constitutionality of the Atlantic Community Health Act.

Respectfully submitted,

Rep. Birack “Carib” Obama, Esq.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ATLANTIC COMMONWEALTH

/u/Kingmaker502

Petitioner,

v.

/u/UnorthodoxAmbassador

in his official capacity as Governor of the Commonwealth,

Respondent.

In re: Executive Order 25—Marriage And Polygamy

The Court has certified the following complaint as substantially compliant with Atl. Rules of Court. It is reproduced in full as submitted, without modification.

Kingmaker502 v. unorthodoxambassador, in re: Executive Order 25

Comes petitioner, /u/Kingmaker502, requesting the Honorable Justices of this Court to grant a writ of certiorari to review the constitutionality of Executive Order 25: Marriage and Polygamy.

1. Jurisdiction

The Atlantic Commonwealth Supreme Court has original jurisdiction for conflicts “arising under the Laws and Constitution of the Atlantic Commonwealth.” AC-ROC 2(a).

2. Claim - Executive Order 38 violates the Atlantic Commonwealth Constitution

Executive Order 25: Marriage and Polygamy was issued by Governor Parado-I on November 22, 2019. The order allows for the issuance of marriage licenses to multi-person relationships. Although Section 3 is not facially unconstitutional, it is worth discussing:

"[t]he Atlantic Commonwealth will prosecute no cases which deal with AC Penal L § 255.15."

It is within the power of the Governor to direct executive agencies under his purview (such as the Department of Justice) as he sees fit. Therefore, by itself, Section 3 is perfectly acceptable from a constitutional standpoint (both state and federal). However, Section 2 muddies the waters:

"[l]icenses to engage in "Marriage" or a civil union shall be issued to people with no discrimination in place being put in place with regard to the number of spouses."

This section directly urges clerks to violate the law by creating a new legal requirement that directly conflicts with AC Penal L § 255.15 as established by the Assembly. In addition, as with any legal requirement, the Executive Order seems to indicate a penalty for failing to break the law.

Article V(A) of the Atlantic Commonwealth Constitution states that:

"[t]he legislative powers of the Atlantic Commonwealth shall be fully vested in a General Assembly of the Atlantic Commonwealth."

The Executive of the Atlantic Commonwealth does not have the vested power of modifying state statutes to their will, and is effectively attempting to repeal law and establish their own by executive fiat. In no way or manner did the Assembly delegate such power to the Governor to legalize bigamy or polygamy, nor did the Assembly ever indicate that it desires as such (as evidenced by AC Penal L § 255.15).

3. Questions for the Court

1. Does Executive Order 25, Section 2 violate Article V(A) of the Atlantic Commonwealth Constitution by conflicting with AC Penal L § 255.15?

4. Relief/Conclusion

I request that the Honorable Justices of this Court seek to provide relief as soon as possible by striking down E.O. 25, Section 2 as an unconstitutional exercise of executive power. Thank you.

The Court has certified the following complaint as substantially compliant with Atl. Rules of Court. It is reproduced in full as submitted, without modification.

ST. THOMAS MORE CATHOLIC HIGH SCHOOL

BY AND THROUGH THEIR ATTORNEY JOSEPH IBNEY

V.

/u/TUCKLET1911

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF EDUCATION OF THE ATLANTIC COMMONWEALTH

Your honors,

Now comes Joseph Ibney, barred attorney in good standing with this mighty court, humbly requesting certiorari in the following action:

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the Secretary of Education may require Private and Religious High Schools to mandate classes which are in contradiction with their religion?

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CONSTITUTIONAL

• Constitution of the Atlantic Commonwealth, Article XI

• Constitution of the United States, 1st Amendment

CASE LAW

• Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)

BACKGROUND

On November 5th, 2019, Secretary /u/Tucklet1911 released Labor, Education, Health, and Human Services Directive 12 which required all "high schools" defined as "any school which teaches grades 9th through 12th" to require LGBTQ+ classes within their curriculum, and requiring all students to pass such a class to graduate. That same day, the petitioner contacted the offices of Joseph Ibney and asked that suit be filed.

GROUNDS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI

Your honors, the directive as it stands requires that all high schools within the Atlantic Commonwealth teach "about the LGBTQ+ community, LGBTQ+ rights movements, and other relevant topics." This is in direct violation of the first amendment by requiring the teaching of doctrine in contrast to plaintiffs' religious beliefs.

St. Thomas More Catholic High School is a religious school whose doctrine believes LGBTQ+ adherence and lifestyle is immoral. By the state requiring private religious schools to teach about such topics, plaintiff asserts that the state is mandating a doctrine against a religion.

In Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), the First Amendment was applied to the many states within the United States. This thus applies to the Atlantic Commonwealth. The Constitution of the Atlantic Commonwealth even requires that all private religious schools receive no public funding within Article XI. There is no standing for the state to mandate any doctrine relating to religious beliefs.

RELIEF

For the reasons above, we request the court strike down Labor, Education, Health, and Human Services Directive 12 for violating the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Respectfully submitted,

Joseph Ibney esq.

Barred Attorney

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ATLANTIC COMMONWEALTH

/u/OptimizedUmbrella,

petitioner

v.

/u/parado-i

in their official capacity as Governor of the Commonwealth,

Respondent.

In re: Executive Order 24: Mexican Aid

The Court has certified the following complaint as substantially compliant with Atl. Rules of Court. It is reproduced in full as submitted, without modification.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The claims herein arise under Section 4 of the State Finance Law.

This court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to AC-ROC 2(b), which prescribes that the Court shall have jurisdiction to hear cases arising under the Laws and Constitution of the Atlantic Commonwealth and the former state of New York.

PARTIES

Petitioner /u/OptimizedUmbrella is a citizen of the Atlantic Commonwealth.

The Governor is the chief executive officer of the state, responsible for overseeing the operations of the state and the faithful execution of its laws.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Did the governor exceed their constitutional powers by issuing an executive order providing funds to state agencies contrary to Section 4 of the State Finance Law?

THE GOVERNOR ISSUED AN EXECUTIVE ORDER CONTRADICTORY TO THE STATE FINANCE LAW OVERVIEW

On October 3, 2019, Governor Parado-I issued Executive Order 24 (hereinafter the “Executive Order”), allocating ten million dollars to be disbursed to various aid groups. The executive order further provided that twenty million dollars be provided to the Department of Agriculture and Markets, and instructed the Department of Health to expend ten million dollars on medical supplies.

At issue here is whether the governor improperly applied Article IV of the Constitution of the Atlantic Commonwealth in order to allocate additional funds to various aid groups and the Department of Agriculture and Markets, as well as instruct the Department of Health to expend ten million dollars on medical supplies, in contradiction to the State Finance Law.

THE STATE FINANCE LAW HAS SUPREMACY OVER THE EXECUTIVE ORDER

Executive Orders are not laws. The Constitution of the Atlantic Commonwealth makes this fact abundantly clear, vesting the sole legislative power of the Atlantic Commonwealth in the General Assembly of the Atlantic Commonwealth. A.C. Const. art. V §A.

Executive Orders are meant to serve as directives to departments internal to the Executive branch. Article IV of the Constitution of the Atlantic Commonwealth makes this abundantly clear stating that, “The Governor may issue executive orders, demanding action by an executive department or branch.” A.C. Const. art. IV, § C, cl. C.

THE EXECUTIVE ORDER CONTRADICTS THE STATE FINANCE LAW

The Executive Order provides for the allocation and payment of forty million dollars to various internal departments, as well as external aid groups.

These provisions contradict the State Finance Law, which prescribes that: “no money shall be paid from any fund under the management of the state, or any agency or officer thereof except in pursuance of an appropriation by law.” N.Y. State Finance Law § 4.

As executive orders are not laws, the payment of money from state funds by the Executive Order does not constitute an appropriation by law for the purposes of the State Finance Law, thus placing the Executive Order in conflict with this provision.

THE STATE LAW SUPERSEDES THE EXECUTIVE ORDER

The Constitution of the Atlantic Commonwealth provides that, “Where there is no conflict [with the Constitution], the laws of the State of New York shall govern, except where the laws passed by the Atlantic Commonwealth conflict with them, in which case the simulation law shall be supreme.” A.C. Const. art III, § A.

The supremacy of New York Law, of which the statute at issue is part, implicitly means that relevant statutes will supersede inferior governing authorities, such as the Executive Order.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(State Finance Law - Appropriation of Funds)

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations set forth in each of the preceding paragraphs of this complaint.

Section 4 of the State Finance Law prohibits the expenditure of state funds without an appropriation by law.

Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Executive Order expend state funds without an appropriation by law, in violation of the State Finance Law.

Respondent’s violation causes ongoing harm to petitioner.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the Court:

Declare that Sections I, II, and III of the Executive Order are unauthorized by and contrary to the Constitution and laws of the Atlantic Commonwealth;

Enjoin respondent from implementing or enforcing Sections I, II, and III of the Executive Order; and Award such additional relief as the interests of justice may require.

DATED this 3rd day of November, 2019.

Respectfully Submitted,
/s/OptimizedUmbrella