In this r/Marxism, I've noticed many Western comrades have varying opinions or questions when discussing China. As a Chinese labor, leftist, and a cpc’s grassroots, I've experienced these things firsthand. So, I'll attempt to combine Marxist analysis, my personal experiences, and the general perspective of Chinese leftists (basically based on Maoism) to address a crucial question: Is China still a socialist country today?
Through observations of the chinese bureaucracy, ideology, political economy, and social classes and my personal view, I argue that China has strayed far from the true path of socialism.
Maybe you might totally disagree, but I invite you to share your thoughts, please treat this as my honest feelings rather than an invitation to a theoretical debate.
Article will be quite long. If you're interested, you can read it slowly, or have a generative AI summarize it?
Chinese Historical Bureaucracy
Before analyzing, I'd like to introduce a group that must be recognized when discussing Chinese politics: China's bureaucracy.
Firstly, let's acknowledge a crucial point: "China probably has the longest continuously functioning bureaucratic system on this planet". Allow me to briefly outline its history:
Beginning as early as 356 BC during China's Warring States period, the state of Qin (later the Qin Dynasty) began establishing a centralized bureaucratic monarchy. By 221 BC, Emperor Qin Shi Huang had unified China and fully institutionalized this authoritarian imperial bureaucratic system.
Over subsequent dynasties, the system underwent several reforms, culminating during the Tang Dynasty with the perfection of the imperial examination system (a nationwide bureaucratic selection process). This effectively solidified China's bureaucratic framework.
Moving into the 20th century, the 1911 Xinhai Revolution merely removed the Qing emperor in name, leaving the bureaucratic structures virtually intact. Provincial governors and bureaucrats simply changed their titles—governors (xunfu/巡抚) became provincial heads (shengzhang/省长)—and many quickly evolved into warlords, shaping Chinese politics throughout the subsequent decades.
It wasn't until the establishment of the People's Republic of China that the Communist Party injected new blood into this decaying bureaucratic structure. The newly formed People's Government, together with revolutionary-minded masses and party members, attempted to build a new democratic society on the ruins of the old order.
However, something went wrong. Within the new People's Government emerged a new elite of officials seeing themselves as superior "parental officials," preserving bureaucratic protectionism, personal favors, and the growth of a privileged class. They opposed proletarian democracy and dictatorship, fearing it might threaten their power and privilege.
This petite-bourgeoisie mentality is deeply rooted in Chinese society, among peasants and bureaucrats alike, and not even Mao or the Cultural Revolution could fundamentally shake it.
After Mao's gone, things reverted to their "orthodox" path. Perhaps Deng's early ideas could be viewed as a variant of Bukharinism, but forty years of capitalist development have completely changed everything. The CPC is effectively dead; what's left within its corpse is the same 2000-years-old bureaucratic system.
Today, China isn't submitting to capital—it has become the biggest advocate of State Monopoly Capitalism. Many so-called state-owned enterprises exploit workers even more harshly than private capitalists. And today, the CPC doesn’t govern based on Marxist-Leninist principles, but rather a mix of Keynesianism and traditional Chinese Confucian-Legalist ideas. If you swapped "Communist Party of China" with "Kuomintang" and "Communism" with "Tridemism", you wouldn't even notice a difference.
Of course, socialist legacies remain in sectors like healthcare, education, firefighting, and railways, but unfortunately, even these areas may see gradual market-oriented reforms soon.
Is China still a socialist country today?
About this question, even among leftists—both in china and international—opinions differ greatly. Personally, based on my experiences and analysis, China has no longer a socialist nation. I'd like to elaborate on several points:
Perspective of Ideology
Ideologically, today’s China isn’t fundamentally different from any other country in the world. We have a small number of Marxists, liberals, ultra-nationalists, and a dominant conservative majority—which, in China’s context, takes the form of moderate right-wing populism that’s "left in form but right in essence."
And i think i’m part of China’s left. Thanks to China’s legacy of socialist education, many people still hold a basic Marxist worldview, especially younger folks—even though what’s taught in schools is mostly a watered-down, revisionist Marxism. Ironically though, a lot of these people who outwardly identify as leftists actually support the CPC’s current "weird" ideology—or what you might call the "officially sanctioned left."
Inside the CPC, however, you won't find many leftists who share my critical perspective; and even if they do exist, they're likely hiding their true ideologies just like I am. With over 90 million members, obviously, the party has diverse ideologies, but overall, pragmatism (think Deng's "Cat theory") and moderate right-wing populism have become dominant within the CPC and in broader Chinese society, not Marxism-Leninism.
While the CPC’s official rhetoric is quite moderate in its right-wing leanings, they tacitly—or even intentionally—encourage the growth of right-wing populism in society. This "left in form but right in essence" strategy has turned anti-imperialist sentiment into nationalism rather than class-based politics, resulting in a narrative like, "We oppose imperialism only because we aren’t imperialists ourselves." At its core, China’s dream of "great national rejuvenation" isn’t fundamentally different from Trump's "Make America Great Again"—it's just delivered in a milder form.
Nevertheless, there are also not a few genuine leftist groups in China, which is mainly determined by the class relations and class contradictions in contemporary China. As the world's second-largest economy with a highly developed capitalist system, China has created the largest proletariat on the planet—factory workers, Uber drivers, programmers, and rural peasants flooding into cities as migrant workers. Today, the real left-wing forces in China aren't within the CPC, but rather within these working-class groups.
December 26 is Mao Zedong’s birthday. With the CPC’s ideological shift toward revisionism, official commemorations have become subdued. But every year, large crowds still gather spontaneously at Shaoshan, Hunan Province-Mao's hometown, to waving red flags and holding his portraits. I've personally attended one of these gatherings and noticed participants range from elderly folks who lived through Mao's era to a many numbers of younger people. They commemorate Mao because under his leadership, farmers and workers truly felt like masters of a socialist country—and that's exactly the class foundation today's Chinese Maoists draw from.
Of course, due to China’s unique socialist history, there’s a distinct split within the Chinese left itself—between internationalists and nationalists. left-wing internationalists, like me, come here to share our truly experiences of living in China. and meanwhile, left-wing nationalists, who seem closer (but not identical) to the cpc’s official ideology, are somewhat similar to Russia’s "National Bolshevism". typically, these are older leftists who deeply respect mao and seek an metaphysically return to the "planned economy paradise" of the past. But honestly, while that era certainly offers valuable lessons and experiences, it was a history, not some eden we should romantically try to recreate.
Perspective of politics
Politically, let me illustrate with a straightforward example. The composition of delegates to China’s National People’s Congress (NPC, China’s highest legislative authority) from the 4th session (1975) onward shows a clear decline in representation of workers and peasants, despite these groups forming the majority of the Chinese population. Conversely, representation of bureaucrats, capitalists (“people’s entrepreneurs”) has notably increased. For example, worker and farmer representation dropped from 51.1% in the 4th NPC to around 15.7% in the 13th NPC, while bureaucrats rose from 11.2% to approximately 33.9%. This clearly reflects the changing class relations in reform-era China.
Perspective of economy
Economically, China has veered far from a socialist model and now shows distinctly capitalist characteristics. The market economy is highly developed, and there’s effectively no real difference between state-owned enterprises and private capital – in fact, some SOEs are even worse when it comes to labor exploitation. Although the government still labels it a “socialist market economy” and claims public ownership is intact, in practice, profit-driven logic dominates.
And sure, we’ve supposedly become the world’s second-largest economy, boasting high development and “total poverty eradication”—but is that really the case?
Class Relations
I can tell you in advance that from the perspective of class relations, China is far from being what is called a "socialist country". Deng famously said, "Poverty isn’t socialism," I absolutely agree—but I’d add, Exploitation isn’t socialism either.
First, Chinese workers are increasingly turning away from the CPC for help when facing exploitation, and even many so-called state-owned enterprises, which are supposedly owned by the CPC, exploit workers even more harshly than private capitalists.
Since the EU passed its "Forced Labor Ban" in November 2024, it turned out (unsurprisingly) that one of our state-owned enterprises within Apple’s iPhone battery supply chain got caught violating our own labor laws—hiring underage temporary workers, enforcing 10-hour minimum shifts (8 hours counts as absenteeism), and threatening workers and their families once exposed. Interestingly enough, almost none of our workers thought of seeking help from the CPC or government after finding out. Instead, they directly wrote complaint letters to Apple and EU. Isn’t the Communist Party supposed to be the vanguard of the proletariat? Why don’t Chinese workers instinctively turn to the CPC for help anymore? Well, what can I say, if a state-owned enterprise wants to survive in today’s market-driven environment, they’ve got to exploit like capitalists do—but hey, they’re not theoretically capitalists, so it’s "fine."
This realization – that China isn't socialist in practice, is fueling a growing genuine leftist movement among the proletariat. I’m pretty optimistic about the growth of left-wing ideas and movements among China’s working class, but honestly, I'm pessimistic about whether such movements can genuinely change the CPC. We definitely need a party that’s more genuinely socialist, but unfortunately, the CPC holds all the violence apparatuses—the people's police, the people’s liberation army, the people's armed police—making real revolution incredibly difficult.
This has created almost clan-like corporatist society in East Asia: when class conflicts aren’t overt, everything appears peaceful and harmonious, just like a beatific big family, and even the police and army seem true to their slogan "serve the people." (maybe is a legacy of socialism). But whenever class tensions erupt and the CPC decides it’s necessary to protect capitalist interests or state-owned capital for economic development, left-wing and worker movements face devastating crackdowns, like the “the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation”, “Peking University Marxist Society”, “the Jasic incident”, and “Li Hongyuan incident”. (you can research on Wiki)
Therefore, while China desperately needs a united proletarian movement and perhaps a truly socialist party, both seem nearly impossible while the tools of state violence apparatuses remain outside genuine proletarian control. On the bright side, though, China’s working class is increasingly aware of their own exploitation, leading to small-scale mutual aid organizations (web, app etc.) that help improve working conditions to some extent. Unfortunately, these efforts still can’t fundamentally change the CPC under its current leadership.
Poverty Alleviation
Let’s take the "poverty alleviation" as an example, to begin with the conclusion: China's comprehensive poverty alleviation is essentially aimed at transferring urban capital surplus to rural areas and cultivating a new agricultural capitalists, the gap between rich and poor, as well as the urban-rural divide, have only been narrowed "on paper."
In 2021, xi announced at the cpc's 100th-anniversary celebration that China had achieved a "great victory" in eradicating poverty. Indeed, investment in rural infrastructure has greatly improved living conditions in rural areas—I live in an underdeveloped area myself and deeply feel these improvements. But did this really tackle the root causes of poverty, and does it lay the groundwork for permanently ending poverty?
Let’s start by looking at the definition of poverty. China's poverty line (an annual net income per capita above 4,000 CNY, roughly 552 USD) is far below the World Bank's international poverty standard (about 2 USD per day, or around 730 USD annually). Clearly, this threshold is very low. In China today, having just over 4,000 RMB annually means you can't afford to get sick or have an emergency—and this is merely a theoretical figure, as practical circumstances often introduce additional complexities.
On a practical level, although the poverty alleviation campaign did bring support and investment to underdeveloped regions, the whole process was highly bureaucratic and superficial. Poverty has genuinely been eradicated? Will people fall back into poverty again? remains questionable. Before 2021, the department responsible was called the "Poverty Alleviation and Development Office", and after 2021, it was simply renamed the "Rural Revitalization Administration", though the mission itself hasn't fundamentally changed. Local governments still struggle with debt, barely preventing communities from slipping back into poverty. For government leaders, the "victory" of poverty alleviation became their greatest political achievement, after which the issue lost its urgency. As for truly addressing the roots of poverty—who really cares? I'm not sure if you can understand this frustration I'm expressing.
It's said that around 30 billion CNY was invested in the poverty alleviation campaign over five years. But why, despite this massive investment, do people in underdeveloped areas still struggle with poor living standards? Why haven't we resolved regional inequalities? Why does this "great victory" only exist in the speeches of bureaucrats, capitalists, and bourgeois?
During Mao’s era, socialist production aimed to meet people’s needs, promoting coordinated regional development. Through agricultural collectivization and mechanization, rural productivity was significantly increased. Policies like sending educated youth to the countryside helped spread healthcare and education, narrowing the gap between rural and urban areas.
But since reversal began, socialist rural economies disintegrated, returning rural China to natural economy prevalent for thousands of years. The only difference is that yesterday’s tenant farmers working for landlords now move to urban factories to work for capitalist bosses, leaving behind agricultural machines torn apart into parts and land divided into thin "noodly" strips*(form William Hinton‘s The Great Reversal, page 14)*.
Ironically, the CPC, having dismantled the worker-peasant alliance, now promotes capitalist methods for rural poverty alleviation. The inevitable outcome is a narrowed gap between agricultural and industrial capitalists, but an even wider gap between capitalists and the proletariat, exploiters and exploited.
Fundamentally, campaigns like "poverty alleviation" and "rural revitalization" serve as avenues for capital to penetrate rural regions. They attract investment through preferential policies, establish industrialized "cooperatives," and foster a new agricultural bourgeoisie in the name of "developing rural productivity." But for poor farmers and urban workers, has anything really improved?
On July 16, 2024, a influencer in Shandong interviewed a 77-year-old elder sanitation worker who earns just 700 RMB per month, works nine hours daily, and hadn't been paid for months. His child had died, and his wife suffered a stroke. Similarly, on July 17, a influencer from Guangdong shared a video of a 65-year-old grandmother collecting recyclables to support two grandchildren whose parents died in a car accident.
Isn't it strange that such poverty exists three years after the supposed "victory" in poverty alleviation? According to the People's Political Consultative Conference's official report:
"Absolute poverty has been eliminated, and the entire nation has entered a moderately prosperous society. Registered poor individuals' average annual net income increased from 2,982 RMB in 2015 to 10,740 RMB in 2020… People’s living standards have improved significantly, boosting their sense of achievement, happiness, and security."
"Amazing! Absolute poverty has been eradicated, and all the people of the nation have entered into a moderately prosperous society together." So what is "prosperous"? According to official definitions, it's a living condition between mere sustenance and wealth, enjoyed by the masses. "All the people of the nation have entered into a prosperous society together" means that all citizens enjoy this living condition. By this logic, these two elderly people are definitely not part of this nation's people. A 77-year-old oldman working under the scorching sun and a grandmother moved to tears over basic food donations hardly reflect even moderate prosperity, let alone comfort.
Agricultural Capitalism
But on the other hand, consider a TikTok influencer from Xinjiang called "Jiangyu Alimu." After failing at business in 2020, he stumbled into livestreaming to sell local products, becoming famous through viral a meme"Your background is too fake". Official media quickly praised him as a figurehead for poverty alleviation. After gaining fame, he gathered local beekeepers into an association, became a PCC(political consultative conference) adviser, and branded himself a "rural development officer."
However, when he promoted overpriced local produce online and faced criticism from netizens, he angrily retaliated, even asserting that agricultural capitalists deserved to buy luxury cars like Bentleys and Rolls-Royces. Ultimately, backlash forced him to delete these remarks.
Clearly, "rural development officers" like Jiangyu Alimu represent nothing more than a new agricultural capitalists defending their own class interests. This vividly illustrates the true nature of "poverty alleviation" and "rural revitalization" in capitalist China.
In summary, rural changes in post-reform China echo Marx's manuscripts in Capital, Volume One:
In the sphere of agriculture, modern industry brought about the greatest revolution in agriculture: it eliminated the bastions of the old society—the self-sufficient peasants, destroyed the natural economy that combined agriculture and handicrafts, and replaced them with agricultural laborers. Machine production led to an absolute decrease in rural populations, forcing large numbers of rural people to crowd into cities as proletarian or migrant workers.
-Karl Marx. Capital Volume One. Chapter Fifteen: Machinery and Modern Industry. Section 10.Modern industry and agriculture
However, unlike Marx’s account, China's rapid capitalism growth post-reform didn’t rely landless labour s displaced from traditional agriculture but rather on migrant workers "freed" from collectivized rural people's communes. Is this truly progress? I don't know, but I only know that a distant relative in my family went to the city to work in factory and had their finger crushed by a machine, but they didn't receive any compensation, and such things are not uncommon in today's China.
Personal perspective
On a personal perspective, I'm a cpc member myself. At the grassroots level, no one discusses concepts like "leftism" or "socialism"; No one studies MLM or sees socialism as relevant. So what do we discuss? "The Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation" (MCGA); We study abstract theories of xi, unify closely around the Party's central leadership, and just follow orders. The only practical consideration is securing a stable government salary—there's nothing socialist about it.
Cult of personality, Bureaucracy and Worker Democracy
Cult of personality about Xi and Mao
Regarding xi potentially reviving elements of mao's era—enough for liberals to fear a second "GPCR"—it's understandable that Xi might admire Mao’s unparalleled status, especially since Xi is arguably China’s most powerful leader since the Opium Wars. However, Xi overlooks something crucial: Mao’s status was deeply rooted in genuine popular support. As the Chinese leftist poet Zang Kejia famously wrote:
Lives that create better lives,
Will be deeply revered.
Unfortunately, Xi doesn't have such thoughts, and even as a "red prince,"over ten years ago, people used to be more support about "Ode to the red, defeat the black crime" with Bo Xilai.
Today, as Chinese people once again experience blatant exploitation by privileged classes, Mao, his ideas, and the revolutionary "red era" have become symbols that many young leftists and working-class Chinese aspire to once again.
While admiration for Mao in his time sometimes crossed into blind worship, this largely stemmed from traditional Chinese ideology's lingering notions of divine-right monarchy. Yet, crucially, Mao himself actively resisted deification. In 1970, during an interview with Edgar Snow, Mao clearly expressed discomfort with excessive titles and personality cults, insisting that eventually only the humble title "Teacher" should remain:
"After the Cultural Revolution, the personality cult went too far, with people emphasizing meaningless formalism—calling me the 'Four Greats': 'Great Teacher, Great Leader, Great Commander, Great Helmsman.' It’s annoying. Eventually, all these titles should be removed, leaving only 'Teacher.' I started as a teacher; before becoming a communist, I was a primary school teacher in Changsha, and I’m still basically a teacher today. All other titles should disappear."
About DPRK
This contrasts sharply with North Korea’s approach, where self-deification of the Kim dynasty is actively encouraged, reflected in exaggerated heroic stories on official websites. Honestly, I'm not a fan of that approach.
North Korea also differs from China political structure, even though both systems inherited their bureaucratic frameworks from ancient Chinese imperial tradition. While North Korea's hereditary succession of absolute power clearly resembles a monarchy, China never accepted such dynastic power transfers post-1911. If China’s leader tried passing power directly to descendants today, protests—or even revolution—would likely follow immediately.
Economically, North Korea maintains a planned economy similar to China's 1980s "dual-track" system. Although living conditions there remain harsh—an ethnic Chinese-North Korean has shared openly on Chinese social media how tough life is for most North Koreans—people consider conditions acceptable if there's no repeat of the severe 1990s famine known as the "Arduous March."
About Worker Democracy
Meanwhile, the continued ideological struggle within socialist countries illustrates a significant weakness inherent to the Leninist or Stalinist vanguard-party model. After a vanguard party seizes power, establishes a proletarian dictatorship, and inevitably disconnects from actual production and the working class, bureaucratic opportunists infiltrate the party. Genuine Marxists remain but become part of a factional struggle between revolutionaries who advocate continued socialism and proletarian democracy and conservatives who push an opportunist, revisionist line.
In practice, this conservative faction prevailed in the USSR, China, DPRK, and Vietnam. As the ruling party increasingly overlaps with the bureaucratic elite, it disconnects from the proletariat, allowing capitalist or feudal ideologies even relation of production to resurface. Eventually, this leads to full revisionism and even party collapse, as seen with the USSR, where former bureaucrats swiftly became capitalist oligarchs.
Even under planned economies, capitalist practices—like small-scale trading and speculation—remain entrenched, demonstrating the persistence of bourgeois ideology. Neither Marx nor Lenin had the opportunity to fully analyze this, Stalin treated factionalism brutally (but not analytically), and Trotsky foresaw the danger clearly yet was unable to prevent it. Mao, particularly in his later years, devoted significant energy to confronting this problem.
Mao envisioned the GPCR as an "exercise" for masses (workers, peasants) to actively liberate themselves. But he, too, faced limitations. When Shanghai established a people's commune modeled after the Paris Commune, Mao immediately questioned:
"If we all call it a Commune, then what about the Party? Where does the Party go? We must have a Party; there must be a core. You can call it the Communist Party, Social Democratic Party, Social Democratic Labor Party, Kuomintang, or even Yiguandao—it’s still a Party. Even the Yiguandao is a Party. A Commune must still have a Party. Can the Commune replace the Party?"
This reveals Mao couldn't fully overcome Leninism's fundamental issue—the inevitable corruption of the vanguard party. But Mao’s concern reflects the genuine risk that without a revolutionary party and clear political line, communes or mass movements could easily drift back toward economicism or even capitalism.
I’ve had discussions with other Chinese leftists, proposing the idea that a vanguard party could function like a "train engine" or "shield" before victory, but afterward, power must genuinely return to the proletariat through worker democracy (e.g., Paris Commune or Soviet models). Realistically, this transition is extremely challenging due to vested party interests and constant pressure from imperialist powers.
In short, a vanguard party should function like a walker for a toddler: helpful at first, but eventually people must learn to walk on their own without relying on it forever.
From Dengism to Imperialism with Chinese Characteristics
After the GPCR, Deng aimed to build a mixed economy and politically create a social democratic system free from imperialism. I'd agree with that—he wasn't an imperialist, As a first-generation revolutionary, while his arguments had a tendency towards "productive force determinism," overall, he helped China's development by being pragmatic.
Here are some key points Deng made late in his political career that, known as the "Ten Ifs.", unfortunately, have been buried by today’s CPC just as much as Maoism, not mentioned and barely put into practice:
If we take the capitalist path, a few percent of Chinese people might get rich, but we definitely won't solve the issue of prosperity for the other 90%.(Building a Socialism With a Specifically Chinese Character, 1983)
If our country remains as open as it is now, and even when our per capita GNP reaches several thousand dollars, no new bourgeoisie will emerge, because the basic means of production will still be state-owned or collectively owned.(Speech At the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Commission of the Communist Party of China, 1984)
If our policies led to polarization, it would mean that we had failed.(Unity Depends On Ideals and Discipline, 1985)
If a new bourgeoisie emerged, it would mean that we had strayed from the right path.(Unity Depends On Ideals and Discipline, 1985)
If moral standards deteriorate, what's the point of economic success? The economy itself will degrade, becoming corrupted by theft, bribery, and fraud.(Talk At a Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, 1986)
If we choose capitalism, a small minority might become wealthy faster in some regions, creating millionaires—but they'll never exceed 1% of the population, leaving the majority stuck in poverty.(China Can Only Take the Socialist Road, 1987)
If we maintain socialism, our $4,000 GNP per capita will differ fundamentally from capitalist nations, especially given China's huge population. With 1.5 billion people reaching $4,000 per capita and an annual GNP of $6 trillion, it would demonstrate socialism's superiority over capitalism.(To Uphold Socialism We Must Eliminate Poverty, 1987)
If we adopted the capitalist system in China, probably a small number of people would be enriched, while the overwhelming majority would remain in a permanent state of poverty. If that happened, there would be a revolution in China. China’s modernization can be achieved only through socialism, not capitalism. There have been people who have tried to introduce capitalism into China, and they have always failed.(We Shall Draw On Historical Experience and Guard Against Wrong Tendencies, 1987)
If wealth polarization occurs, conflicts between ethnic groups, regions, classes, and even between central and local governments will grow, causing instability.(Seize the Opportunity To Develop the Economy, 1990)
If the rich keep getting richer and the poor keep getting poorer, polarization will emerge. The socialist system should—and must—prevent such polarization. One solution is for wealthier regions to pay higher taxes to support the development of poorer areas.(Excerpts From Talks Given In Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai, 1990)
If viewed from the perspective of "Ten Ifs.", it is clear that China's socialist reforms have failed, as everything develops and changes, quantitative changes eventually lead to qualitative shifts. Deng's choice to implement a mixed economy essentially paved the way for China to eventually become imperialist or social-imperialist, because capitalism inherently requires valorisation to continue growing, and the Chinese capitalist and CPC are obviously not content with merely being the manufacturing base for Western capital; they want to become the main beneficiaries of profits.
So today, as domestic markets can no longer satisfy China’s capital expansion, and China has already established a complete production chain system with advanced technology and high productivity through monopolistic capitalism, China inevitably starts exporting goods and capital abroad with a very aggressive attitude.
All these developments in China's capitalist economy—huge monopolistic enterprises, dominance of financial capital, increasing capital exports for a bigger share in global markets, along with supportive political, economic, and diplomatic policies—fit Lenin’s classic definition of imperialism from "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism"
Here's an bulletin from the Russian Communist Labor Party (РКРП-КПСС), reporting on Kazakh oil workers striking at a Chinese state-owned enterprise-China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation(SINOPEC) in Kazakhstan, demanding equal pay for equal work:
Нефтяники Актюбинской области требуют от китайских работодателей повысить зарплату
Similar things have happened in Brazil, where a private capitalist company—BYD's electric car factory—was accused of having "slavery-like conditions." But do you know how this was received in China? Most people—including Chinese workers—believed it was just Western countries using dirty tricks to hold back China's rise. This is exactly the widespread right-wing populist mindset I've mentioned before. Chinese workers at the factory even publicly insisted they weren’t exploited. It's understandable because their domestic conditions aren't much better, and working abroad at least pays relatively more. But it's tragic, without independent unions and with a CPC that no longer truly represents workers, there's no public channel to revolt. Over time, what's wrong things starts to feel right.
Notably, these aren't isolated incidents—they happen wherever Chinese capital (state-owned or private) operates, regardless of whether the workers are Chinese or foreigners.
So, Deng wasn’t imperialist himself; the qualitative shift happened during Jiang's era—specifically in 2001, when the CPC officially allowed capitalists to become Party members, marking the alliance between bureaucratic groups and the emerging capitalist class. After nearly a quarter-century, today's CPC actively exports Chinese goods and capital globally, aligning perfectly with the interests of Chinese capitalists, all under the banner of "National Rejuvenation".
This explains why, as Trump tried undermining global institutions (like UN or WTO etc.), China ironically stepped in to lead these same institutions—stability helps China export capital. Maybe that's China's new imperialism—more subtle, more gentle.
But trust me please my friends, imperialism is imperialism, even east or west.
The path of Socialism with Chinese characteristics was perhaps not the capitalist-imperialist path once, but today, no matter how progressive, peaceful, or gentle it may appear, it cannot hide the fact that it has become substantive imperialism.
Maybe Chinese imperialism looks more progressive than western neo colonialism now, and I agree with that, but that's probably just because we're at a stage where China's imperialism is trying to replace western. Historically, even US imperialism looked progressive during the times it wasn't globally dominant or was competing with the Soviet Union (a genuinely different social system, unlike today's China and US under global capitalism). So who knows what the future?
But at least in China, under the sweeping narrative of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” people aren’t happy. Some might even call Xi-the Brezhnev of China. And frankly, it wouldn’t be surprising if he and his privileged bureaucratic clique decide to change course and flag at some point—just like how Soviet-era party bureaucrats turned themselves into the new Russian oligarchs.
Obviously, we shouldn't support one imperialism just because it looks "relatively more progressive," right?
Summary
So, if we take a closer look at China’s current politics, economy, and society, it becomes clear that this self-proclaimed “socialist” country isn’t all that different from capitalist or even imperialist country. Sure, modern China looks prosperous and successful, but do these gains really trickle down to the working class? The answer, from this perspective, isn’t very optimistic.
In that sense, China is no longer a socialist nation. Real leftists exist among ordinary workers, whereas the CPC itself has been captured by bureaucrats and capitalists. Xi isn’t a true Marxist—no committed communist could realistically climb the ranks of a massive, entrenched bureaucratic leviathan like this. The CPC isn’t really the CPC anymore-it’s basically the same bureaucratic framework China’s had for 2,000 years (just like Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT before them). Think of it as a huge barrel of ink—anything new tossed in just ends up dyed black, unless you smash the entire barrel first.
At the same time, unlike in Mao’s era—or even Deng’s—China has evolved into a new imperialist power, with huge interests in keeping the global order stable so foreign markets stay open to absorb its surplus production. Even if China replaces the U.S. as the world’s leading superpower, it wouldn’t be a leap forward for socialism; it’d just be another shift in who’s running the capitalist game. Meanwhile, both Chinese and global workers are left out of the game, seeing none of the benefits from this massive economic success.
So, can we still call a system like this “socialist”?
Feel free to ask me or discuss anything else about the realities of Chinese society!
