r/crowdstrike • • Jul 19 '24 Polished Gold Turd Popcorn Sipping Tea Take My Silver Polished Silver Turd Heart of Silver

Troubleshooting Megathread BSOD error in latest crowdstrike update

22.9k Upvotes

Hi all - Is anyone being effected currently by a BSOD outage?

EDIT: X Check pinned posts for official response


r/crowdstrike • • Mar 29 '23

Emerging // 2023-03-29 // SITUATIONAL AWARENESS // CrowdStrike Tracking Active Intrusion Campaign Targeting 3CX Customers //

331 Upvotes

What Happened

On March 29, 2023, Falcon OverWatch observed unexpected malicious activity emanating from a legitimate, signed binary, 3CXDesktopApp — a softphone application from 3CX. The malicious activity includes beaconing to actor-controlled infrastructure, deployment of second-stage payloads, and, in a small number of cases, hands-on-keyboard activity.

Falcon Prevent and Insight have behavioral preventions and atomic detections targeting the abuse of 3CXDesktopApp. OverWatch has notified customers where hands-on-keyboard activity has been observed and Falcon Complete is in contact with customers under their management where 3CXDesktopApp is present.

The 3CXDesktopApp is available for Windows, macOS, Linux, and mobile. At time of writing, activity has been observed on both Windows and macOS.

This is a dynamic situation and updates will be provided here as they become available. CrowdStrike's Intelligence Team is in contact with 3CX. There is suspected nation-state involvement by the threat actor LABYRINTH CHOLLIMA.

Detection and Prevention

Falcon has coverage utilizing behavior-based indicators of attack (IOAs) targeting malicious behaviors associated with 3CX on both MacOS and Windows. Please ensure that your prevention policies are properly configured with "Suspicious Processes" enabled.

Hunting

Falcon Discover

Falcon Discover customers can use the following link: US-1 | US-2 | EU | Gov to look for the presence of 3CXDesktopApp in their environment.

Falcon Spotlight

Falcon Spotlight customers can search for CVE-2023-3CX to identify vulnerable versions of 3CX software. Spotlight will automatically highlight this vulnerability in your vulnerability feed.

Falcon Insight - Application Search

Falcon Insight customers can assess if the 3CXDesktopApp is running in their environment with the following query:

Falcon LTR - Application Search

#event_simpleName=/^(PeVersionInfo|ProcessRollup2)$/ AND (event_platform=Win ImageFileName=/\\3CXDesktopApp\.exe$/i) OR (event_platform=Mac ImageFileName=/\/3CX\sDesktop\sApp/i)
| ImageFileName = /.+(\\|\/)(?<FileName>.+)$/i
| groupBy([event_platform, FileName, SHA256HashData], function=count(aid, distinct=true, as=endpointCount))

Event Search - Application Search

event_simpleName IN (PeVersionInfo, ProcessRollup2) FileName IN ("3CXDesktopApp.exe", "3CX Desktop App")
| stats dc(aid) as endpointCount by event_platform, FileName, SHA256HashData

Atomic Indicators

The following domains have been observed beaconing which should be considered an indication of malicious intent.

akamaicontainer[.]com
akamaitechcloudservices[.]com
azuredeploystore[.]com
azureonlinecloud[.]com
azureonlinestorage[.]com
dunamistrd[.]com
glcloudservice[.]com
journalide[.]org
msedgepackageinfo[.]com
msstorageazure[.]com
msstorageboxes[.]com
officeaddons[.]com
officestoragebox[.]com
pbxcloudeservices[.]com
pbxphonenetwork[.]com
pbxsources[.]com
qwepoi123098[.]com
sbmsa[.]wiki
sourceslabs[.]com
visualstudiofactory[.]com
zacharryblogs[.]com

Indicator Graph

Falcon Insight customers, regardless of retention period, can search for the presence of these domains in their environment spanning back one year using Indicator Graph: US-1 | US-2 | EU | Gov.

Falcon Insight - Domain Search

Falcon Insight customers can search for presence of these domains using the following queries.

Falcon LTR - Domain Search

#event_simpleName=DnsRequest
| in(DomainName, values=[akamaicontainer.com, akamaitechcloudservices.com, azuredeploystore.com, azureonlinecloud.com, azureonlinestorage.com, dunamistrd.com, glcloudservice.com, journalide.org, msedgepackageinfo.com, msstorageazure.com, msstorageboxes.com, officeaddons.com, officestoragebox.com, pbxcloudeservices.com, pbxphonenetwork.com, pbxsources.com, qwepoi123098.com, sbmsa.wiki, sourceslabs.com, visualstudiofactory.com, zacharryblogs.com])
| groupBy([DomainName], function=([count(aid, distinct=true, as=endpointCount), min(ContextTimeStamp, as=firstSeen), max(ContextTimeStamp, as=lastSeen)]))
| firstSeen := firstSeen * 1000 | formatTime(format="%F %T.%L", field=firstSeen, as="firstSeen")
| lastSeen := lastSeen * 1000 | formatTime(format="%F %T.%L", field=lastSeen, as="lastSeen")
| sort(endpointCount, order=desc)

Event Search - Domain Search

event_simpleName=DnsRequest DomainName IN (akamaicontainer.com, akamaitechcloudservices.com, azuredeploystore.com, azureonlinecloud.com, azureonlinestorage.com, dunamistrd.com, glcloudservice.com, journalide.org, msedgepackageinfo.com, msstorageazure.com, msstorageboxes.com, officeaddons.com, officestoragebox.com, pbxcloudeservices.com, pbxphonenetwork.com, pbxsources.com, qwepoi123098.com, sbmsa.wiki, sourceslabs.com, visualstudiofactory.com, zacharryblogs.com)
| stats dc(aid) as endpointCount, earliest(ContextTimeStamp_decimal) as firstSeen, latest(ContextTimeStamp_decimal) as lastSeen by DomainName
| convert ctime(firstSeen) ctime(lastSeen)

File Details

SHA256Operating SystemInstaller SHA256FileName
dde03348075512796241389dfea5560c20a3d2a2eac95c894e7bbed5e85a0accWindowsaa124a4b4df12b34e74ee7f6c683b2ebec4ce9a8edcf9be345823b4fdcf5d8683cxdesktopapp-18.12.407.msi
fad482ded2e25ce9e1dd3d3ecc3227af714bdfbbde04347dbc1b21d6a3670405Windows59e1edf4d82fae4978e97512b0331b7eb21dd4b838b850ba46794d9c7a2c09833cxdesktopapp-18.12.416.msi
92005051ae314d61074ed94a52e76b1c3e21e7f0e8c1d1fdd497a006ce45fa61macOS5407cda7d3a75e7b1e030b1f33337a56f293578ffa8b3ae19c671051ed3142903CXDesktopApp-18.11.1213.dmg
b86c695822013483fa4e2dfdf712c5ee777d7b99cbad8c2fa2274b133481eadbmacOSe6bbc33815b9f20b0cf832d7401dd893fbc467c800728b5891336706da0dbcec3cxdesktopapp-latest.dmg

Recommendations

The current recommendation for all CrowdStrike customers is:

  1. Locate the presence of 3CXDesktopApp software in your environment by using the queries outlined above.

  2. Ensure Falcon is deployed to applicable systems.

  3. Ensure “Suspicious Processes” is enabled in applicable Prevention Policies.

  4. Hunt for historical presence of atomic indicators in third-party tooling (if available).

Helpful Links

  • Find answers and contact Support with our Support Portal

  • Specific Tech Alert

  • CSA-230489 LABYRINTH CHOLLIMA Suspected of Conducting Supply Chain Attack with 3CX Application: ( US-1 | US-2 | EU | GOV ) [Intelligence subscription required]

  • LABYRINTH CHOLLIMA battle card ( US-1 | US-2 | EU | GOV )

Conclusion

Again, this situation is dynamic and we will continue to provide updates as they become available.

** UPDATE 2023-03-29 20:35 ET **

After review and reverse engineering by the CrowdStrike Intelligence Team, the signed MSI (aa124a4b4df12b34e74ee7f6c683b2ebec4ce9a8edcf9be345823b4fdcf5d868) is malicious. The MSI will drop three files, with the primary fulcrum being the compromised binary ffmpeg.dll (7986bbaee8940da11ce089383521ab420c443ab7b15ed42aed91fd31ce833896). Once active, the HTTPS beacon structure and encryption key match those observed by CrowdStrike in a March 7, 2023 campaign attributed with high confidence to DPRK-nexus threat actor LABYRINTH CHOLLIMA. CrowdStrike Intelligence customers can view the following reports for full technical details:

  • CSA-230387: LABYRINTH CHOLLIMA Uses TxRLoader and Vulnerable Drivers to Target Financial and Energy Sectors ( US-1 | US-2 | EU | GOV )

  • CSA-230489: LABYRINTH CHOLLIMA Suspected of Conducting Supply Chain Attack with 3CX Application ( US-1 | US-2 | EU | GOV )

  • CSA-230494: ArcfeedLoader Malware Used in Supply Chain Attack Leveraging Trojanized 3CX Installers Confirms Attribution to LABYRINTH CHOLLIMA ( US-1 | US-2 | EU | GOV )

At this point, my recommendation would be to remove 3CX software from endpoints until advised by the vendor that future installers and builds are safe.

** UPDATE 2023-03-30 08:45 ET **

  • For those looking for additional details on macOS, Patrick Wardle has a great thread on Twitter where he reverse engineers a 3CX binary (Twitter link). There is also an associated blog post.

  • As pointed out below, there is a sleep function included in the weaponized binary (Twitter link). The purpose of the sleep function is unknown, however, dynamic analysis defense evasion is a likely motive.

  • Side note: thanks to all those sharing and crowdsourcing details below. This post has gotten quite a bit of attention and there are quite a few non-regulars posting and lurking. It's nice to see everyone stepping up to help one another.


r/crowdstrike • • Jul 24 '24

Preliminary Post Incident Review (PIR) Preliminary Post Incident Review (PIR): Content Configuration Update Impacting the Falcon Sensor and the Windows Operating System (BSOD)

269 Upvotes

Moderators Commentary: Good evening, morning, afternoon, wherever or whoever you are. Below you will find a copy of the latest updates from the Content Update and Remediation Hub.

As a reminder, this subreddit is still under enhanced moderation practices for the short term and the mod team are actively participating to approve any conversation inappropriately trapped in the spam filter.


Updated 2024-07-24 2207 UTC

Preliminary Post Incident Review (PIR): Executive Summary PDF


Updated 2024-07-24 0335 UTC

Preliminary Post Incident Review (PIR): Content Configuration Update Impacting the Falcon Sensor and the Windows Operating System (BSOD)

This is CrowdStrike’s preliminary Post Incident Review (PIR). We will be detailing our full investigation in the forthcoming Root Cause Analysis that will be released publicly. Throughout this PIR, we have used generalized terminology to describe the Falcon platform for improved readability. Terminology in other documentation may be more specific and technical.

What Happened?

On Friday, July 19, 2024 at 04:09 UTC, as part of regular operations, CrowdStrike released a content configuration update for the Windows sensor to gather telemetry on possible novel threat techniques.

These updates are a regular part of the dynamic protection mechanisms of the Falcon platform. The problematic Rapid Response Content configuration update resulted in a Windows system crash.

Systems in scope include Windows hosts running sensor version 7.11 and above that were online between Friday, July 19, 2024 04:09 UTC and Friday, July 19, 2024 05:27 UTC and received the update. Mac and Linux hosts were not impacted.

The defect in the content update was reverted on Friday, July 19, 2024 at 05:27 UTC. Systems coming online after this time, or that did not connect during the window, were not impacted.

What Went Wrong and Why?

CrowdStrike delivers security content configuration updates to our sensors in two ways: Sensor Content that is shipped with our sensor directly, and Rapid Response Content that is designed to respond to the changing threat landscape at operational speed.

The issue on Friday involved a Rapid Response Content update with an undetected error.

Sensor Content

Sensor Content provides a wide range of capabilities to assist in adversary response. It is always part of a sensor release and not dynamically updated from the cloud. Sensor Content includes on-sensor AI and machine learning models, and comprises code written expressly to deliver longer-term, reusable capabilities for CrowdStrike’s threat detection engineers.

These capabilities include Template Types, which have pre-defined fields for threat detection engineers to leverage in Rapid Response Content. Template Types are expressed in code. All Sensor Content, including Template Types, go through an extensive QA process, which includes automated testing, manual testing, validation and rollout steps.

The sensor release process begins with automated testing, both prior to and after merging into our code base. This includes unit testing, integration testing, performance testing and stress testing. This culminates in a staged sensor rollout process that starts with dogfooding internally at CrowdStrike, followed by early adopters. It is then made generally available to customers. Customers then have the option of selecting which parts of their fleet should install the latest sensor release (‘N’), or one version older (‘N-1’) or two versions older (‘N-2’) through Sensor Update Policies.

The event of Friday, July 19, 2024 was not triggered by Sensor Content, which is only delivered with the release of an updated Falcon sensor. Customers have complete control over the deployment of the sensor — which includes Sensor Content and Template Types.

Rapid Response Content

Rapid Response Content is used to perform a variety of behavioral pattern-matching operations on the sensor using a highly optimized engine. Rapid Response Content is a representation of fields and values, with associated filtering. This Rapid Response Content is stored in a proprietary binary file that contains configuration data. It is not code or a kernel driver.

Rapid Response Content is delivered as “Template Instances,” which are instantiations of a given Template Type. Each Template Instance maps to specific behaviors for the sensor to observe, detect or prevent. Template Instances have a set of fields that can be configured to match the desired behavior.

In other words, Template Types represent a sensor capability that enables new telemetry and detection, and their runtime behavior is configured dynamically by the Template Instance (i.e., Rapid Response Content).

Rapid Response Content provides visibility and detections on the sensor without requiring sensor code changes. This capability is used by threat detection engineers to gather telemetry, identify indicators of adversary behavior and perform detections and preventions. Rapid Response Content is behavioral heuristics, separate and distinct from CrowdStrike’s on-sensor AI prevention and detection capabilities.

Rapid Response Content Testing and Deployment

Rapid Response Content is delivered as content configuration updates to the Falcon sensor. There are three primary systems: the Content Configuration System, the Content Interpreter and the Sensor Detection Engine.

The Content Configuration System is part of the Falcon platform in the cloud, while the Content Interpreter and Sensor Detection Engine are components of the Falcon sensor. The Content Configuration System is used to create Template Instances, which are validated and deployed to the sensor through a mechanism called Channel Files. The sensor stores and updates its content configuration data through Channel Files, which are written to disk on the host.

The Content Interpreter on the sensor reads the Channel File and interprets the Rapid Response Content, enabling the Sensor Detection Engine to observe, detect or prevent malicious activity, depending on the customer’s policy configuration. The Content Interpreter is designed to gracefully handle exceptions from potentially problematic content.

Newly released Template Types are stress tested across many aspects, such as resource utilization, system performance impact and event volume. For each Template Type, a specific Template Instance is used to stress test the Template Type by matching against any possible value of the associated data fields to identify adverse system interactions.

Template Instances are created and configured through the use of the Content Configuration System, which includes the Content Validator that performs validation checks on the content before it is published.

Timeline of Events: Testing and Rollout of the InterProcessCommunication (IPC) Template Type

Sensor Content Release: On February 28, 2024, sensor 7.11 was made generally available to customers, introducing a new IPC Template Type to detect novel attack techniques that abuse Named Pipes. This release followed all Sensor Content testing procedures outlined above in the Sensor Content section.

Template Type Stress Testing: On March 05, 2024, a stress test of the IPC Template Type was executed in our staging environment, which consists of a variety of operating systems and workloads. The IPC Template Type passed the stress test and was validated for use.

Template Instance Release via Channel File 291: On March 05, 2024, following the successful stress test, an IPC Template Instance was released to production as part of a content configuration update. Subsequently, three additional IPC Template Instances were deployed between April 8, 2024 and April 24, 2024. These Template Instances performed as expected in production.

What Happened on July 19, 2024?

On July 19, 2024, two additional IPC Template Instances were deployed. Due to a bug in the Content Validator, one of the two Template Instances passed validation despite containing problematic content data.

Based on the testing performed before the initial deployment of the Template Type (on March 05, 2024), trust in the checks performed in the Content Validator, and previous successful IPC Template Instance deployments, these instances were deployed into production.

When received by the sensor and loaded into the Content Interpreter, problematic content in Channel File 291 resulted in an out-of-bounds memory read triggering an exception. This unexpected exception could not be gracefully handled, resulting in a Windows operating system crash (BSOD).

How Do We Prevent This From Happening Again?

Software Resiliency and Testing

  • Improve Rapid Response Content testing by using testing types such as:

  • Local developer testing

  • Content update and rollback testing

  • Stress testing, fuzzing and fault injection

  • Stability testing

  • Content interface testing

  • Add additional validation checks to the Content Validator for Rapid Response Content. A new check is in process to guard against this type of problematic content from being deployed in the future.

  • Enhance existing error handling in the Content Interpreter.

Rapid Response Content Deployment

  • Implement a staggered deployment strategy for Rapid Response Content in which updates are gradually deployed to larger portions of the sensor base, starting with a canary deployment.

  • Improve monitoring for both sensor and system performance, collecting feedback during Rapid Response Content deployment to guide a phased rollout.

  • Provide customers with greater control over the delivery of Rapid Response Content updates by allowing granular selection of when and where these updates are deployed.

  • Provide content update details via release notes, which customers can subscribe to.


In addition to this preliminary Post Incident Review, CrowdStrike is committed to publicly releasing the full Root Cause Analysis once the investigation is complete.


r/crowdstrike • • Jul 20 '24

Executive Viewpoint Technical Details on Today’s Outage

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crowdstrike.com
174 Upvotes

r/crowdstrike • • Aug 06 '24

Channel File 291 Incident RCA is Available | CrowdStrike

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crowdstrike.com
153 Upvotes

r/crowdstrike • • Oct 29 '25 I’ll Drink to That Galaxy Brain Snek Take My Energy Bless Up Helpful

Next Gen SIEM CrowdStrike Query Library

147 Upvotes

Hey everyone,

A couple of weeks ago we launched CQL-Hub.com, a community-driven use-case library for CrowdStrike NG-SIEM queries.

The idea is to bring together useful CQL queries from across the community so they’re easier to find, reuse, and improve.

We decided to host all queries on GitHub to allow proper versioning, transparency, and contributions. Right now, the contribution flow isn’t super smooth yet, so if you’d like to contribute, follow the readme, or just open an issue in the GitHub repo and we’ll take care of the rest.

Github Repo: https://github.com/ByteRay-Labs/Query-Hub
Query Hub: https://cql-hub.com/

Would love your feedback or ideas to make it more useful for the community!


r/crowdstrike • • Jul 25 '24

Counter Adversary Operations Hacktivist Entity USDoD Claims to Have Leaked CrowdStrike’s Threat Actor List

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crowdstrike.com
130 Upvotes

r/crowdstrike • • Feb 03 '26

Threat Hunting Hunting Potentially Compromised Notepad++ Installs

118 Upvotes

https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-chrysalis-backdoor-dive-into-lotus-blossoms-toolkit/

https://www.validin.com/blog/exploring_notepad_plus_plus_network_indicators/

https://notepad-plus-plus.org/news/hijacked-incident-info-update/

Hunting DLLs

// Comprehensive IoC Hunting - Multiple Detection Methods
// ========================================================


// Method 1: File Hash Matches
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 event_platform=Win
| in(field="SHA256HashData", values=["a511be5164dc1122fb5a7daa3eef9467e43d8458425b15a640235796006590c9",
                                      "8ea8b83645fba6e23d48075a0d3fc73ad2ba515b4536710cda4f1f232718f53e",
                                      "2da00de67720f5f13b17e9d985fe70f10f153da60c9ab1086fe58f069a156924",
                                      "77bfea78def679aa1117f569a35e8fd1542df21f7e00e27f192c907e61d63a2e",
                                      "3bdc4c0637591533f1d4198a72a33426c01f69bd2e15ceee547866f65e26b7ad",
                                      "9276594e73cda1c69b7d265b3f08dc8fa84bf2d6599086b9acc0bb3745146600",
                                      "f4d829739f2d6ba7e3ede83dad428a0ced1a703ec582fc73a4eee3df3704629a",
                                      "4a52570eeaf9d27722377865df312e295a7a23c3b6eb991944c2ecd707cc9906",
                                      "831e1ea13a1bd405f5bda2b9d8f2265f7b1db6c668dd2165ccc8a9c4c15ea7dd",
                                      "0a9b8df968df41920b6ff07785cbfebe8bda29e6b512c94a3b2a83d10014d2fd",
                                      "4c2ea8193f4a5db63b897a2d3ce127cc5d89687f380b97a1d91e0c8db542e4f8",
                                      "e7cd605568c38bd6e0aba31045e1633205d0598c607a855e2e1bca4cca1c6eda",
                                      "078a9e5c6c787e5532a7e728720cbafee9021bfec4a30e3c2be110748d7c43c5",
                                      "b4169a831292e245ebdffedd5820584d73b129411546e7d3eccf4663d5fc5be3",
                                      "7add554a98d3a99b319f2127688356c1283ed073a084805f14e33b4f6a6126fd",
                                      "fcc2765305bcd213b7558025b2039df2265c3e0b6401e4833123c461df2de51a"])
| iocType := "File Hash Match"
| iocValue := SHA256HashData
| riskScore := "CRITICAL"


// Extract filename
| ImageFileName=/\\(?<FileName>[^\\]+)$/


// Enrich with user context
| join({#event_simpleName=UserIdentity | groupBy([aid, UserSid], function=selectLast([UserName]))}, 
       field=[aid, UserSid], include=UserName, mode=left)


// Create investigation links
| format("[VirusTotal](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/%s)", field=[SHA256HashData], as=vtLink)
| format("[Hybrid Analysis](https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/search?query=%s)", field=[SHA256HashData], as=haLink)
| format("[Process Explorer](https://falcon.crowdstrike.com/investigate/process-explorer/%s/%s)", 
        field=[aid, TargetProcessId], as=peLink)


// Format timestamp
|  := formatTime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", field=@timestamp, locale=en_US, timezone=Z)


// Output table
| table([riskScore, iocType, iocValue, u/timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, FileName, 
        ImageFileName, CommandLine, SHA256HashData, MD5HashData, peLink, vtLink, haLink], limit=5000)

Hunting All IOCs (except Update.exe)

// Comprehensive Multi-IoC Hunt Across Event Types
// =================================================


#event_simpleName=/(ProcessRollup2|NetworkConnectIP4|DnsRequest)/ event_platform=Win


// Tag each event with matched IoC type
| case {
    // File hash matches
    SHA256HashData=/^(a511be5164dc1122fb5a7daa3eef9467e43d8458425b15a640235796006590c9|8ea8b83645fba6e23d48075a0d3fc73ad2ba515b4536710cda4f1f232718f53e|2da00de67720f5f13b17e9d985fe70f10f153da60c9ab1086fe58f069a156924|77bfea78def679aa1117f569a35e8fd1542df21f7e00e27f192c907e61d63a2e|3bdc4c0637591533f1d4198a72a33426c01f69bd2e15ceee547866f65e26b7ad|9276594e73cda1c69b7d265b3f08dc8fa84bf2d6599086b9acc0bb3745146600|f4d829739f2d6ba7e3ede83dad428a0ced1a703ec582fc73a4eee3df3704629a|4a52570eeaf9d27722377865df312e295a7a23c3b6eb991944c2ecd707cc9906|831e1ea13a1bd405f5bda2b9d8f2265f7b1db6c668dd2165ccc8a9c4c15ea7dd|0a9b8df968df41920b6ff07785cbfebe8bda29e6b512c94a3b2a83d10014d2fd|4c2ea8193f4a5db63b897a2d3ce127cc5d89687f380b97a1d91e0c8db542e4f8|e7cd605568c38bd6e0aba31045e1633205d0598c607a855e2e1bca4cca1c6eda|078a9e5c6c787e5532a7e728720cbafee9021bfec4a30e3c2be110748d7c43c5|b4169a831292e245ebdffedd5820584d73b129411546e7d3eccf4663d5fc5be3|7add554a98d3a99b319f2127688356c1283ed073a084805f14e33b4f6a6126fd|fcc2765305bcd213b7558025b2039df2265c3e0b6401e4833123c461df2de51a)$/i 
        | iocType := "File Hash Match" | iocValue := SHA256HashData | riskScore := "CRITICAL";
    
    // Suspicious filenames
    ImageFileName=/\\(BluetoothService|admin|system|loader1|loader2|s047t5g|ConsoleApplication2|3yzr31vk|uffhxpSy)\.exe$/i 
        | iocType := "Suspicious Filename" | iocValue := ImageFileName | riskScore := "MEDIUM";
    
    ImageFileName=/\\(log\.dll|libtcc\.dll)$/i
        | iocType := "Suspicious DLL" | iocValue := ImageFileName | riskScore := "MEDIUM";
    
    ImageFileName=/\\(u\.bat|conf\.c)$/i
        | iocType := "Suspicious Script/Code" | iocValue := ImageFileName | riskScore := "MEDIUM";
    
    // Malicious IPs
    RemoteAddressIP4=/(95\.179\.213\.0|61\.4\.102\.97|59\.110\.7\.32|124\.222\.137\.114)/ 
        | iocType := "Malicious IP" | iocValue := RemoteAddressIP4 | riskScore := "HIGH";
    
    // Malicious Domains
    DomainName=/(api\.skycloudcenter\.com|api\.wiresguard\.com)/i 
        | iocType := "Malicious Domain" | iocValue := DomainName | riskScore := "HIGH";
    
    // NSIS installer indicator
    CommandLine=/\[NSIS\.nsi\]/i 
        | iocType := "NSIS Installer" | iocValue := "[NSIS.nsi]" | riskScore := "LOW";
    
    * | iocType := null;
}


// Only keep IoC matches
| iocType=*


// Extract filename for readability
| ImageFileName=/\\(?<FileName>[^\\]+)$/


// Normalize process ID
| case {
    TargetProcessId=* | falconPID := TargetProcessId;
    ContextProcessId=* | falconPID := ContextProcessId;
    * | falconPID := null;
}


// Enrich with user information
| join({#event_simpleName=UserIdentity | groupBy([aid, UserSid], function=selectLast([UserName]))}, 
       field=[aid, UserSid], include=UserName, mode=left)


// Create threat intelligence links
| format("[VirusTotal](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/%s)", field=[SHA256HashData], as=vtLink)
| format("[Hybrid Analysis](https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/search?query=%s)", field=[SHA256HashData], as=haLink)
| format("[Process Explorer](https://falcon.crowdstrike.com/investigate/process-explorer/%s/%s)", 
        field=[aid, falconPID], as=peLink)


// Format timestamp
| timestamp := formatTime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", field=@timestamp, locale=en_US, timezone=Z)


// Final output
| table([riskScore, iocType, iocValue, timestamp, aid, ComputerName, UserName, FileName, ImageFileName, CommandLine, SHA256HashData, RemoteAddressIP4, RemotePort, DomainName, peLink, vtLink, haLink], limit=5000)

r/crowdstrike • • Jul 21 '24

Megathread Remediation and Guidance Hub: Falcon Content Update for Windows Hosts

Thumbnail
crowdstrike.com
108 Upvotes

r/crowdstrike • • May 31 '23

Emerging 2023-05-31 // SITUATIONAL AWARENESS // Spyboy Defense Evasion Tool Advertised Online

101 Upvotes

What happened?

On May 21, 2023, an online persona named spyboy began advertising an endpoint defense evasion tool for the Windows operating system via the Russian-language forum Ramp. The author claims that the software — seen in a demonstration video as being titled “Terminator” — can bypass twenty three (23) EDR and AV controls. At time of writing, spyboy is pricing the software from $300 USD (single bypass) to $3,000 USD (all-in-one bypass).

Technical Details

At time of writing, the Terminator software requires administrative privileges and User Account Controls (UAC) acceptance to properly function. Once executed with the proper level of privilege, the binary will write a legitimate, signed driver file — Zemana Anti-Malware — to the C:\Windows\System32\drivers\ folder. The driver file is given a random name between 4 and 10 characters. An example of this driver file can be found on VirusTotal here.

This technique is similar to other Bring Your Own Driver (BYOD) campaigns observed being used by threat actors over the past several years.

Under normal circumstances, the driver would be named zamguard64.sys or zam64.sys. The driver is signed by “Zemana Ltd.” and has the following thumbprint: 96A7749D856CB49DE32005BCDD8621F38E2B4C05.

Once written to disk, the software loads the driver and has been observed terminating the user-mode processes of AV and EDR software.

Detection

Falcon has detection and prevention logic for the tactics and techniques employed by the spyboy defense evasion tool. Please refer to the Prevention Policy Best Practices article on the Support Portal.

Intelligence

Falcon Intelligence customers can use the following link to see finished intelligence reporting on the spyboy defense evasion tool [ US-1 | US-2 | EU | Gov ].

Falcon Recon customers can use the following link to follow online forum chatter concerning the spyboy defense evasion tool [ US-1 | US-2 | EU | Gov ].

Hunting

As the Zemana Anti-Malware driver is not overly common, it becomes a good target for hunting. Please note: the presence of the Zemana Anti-Malware driver in your environment is not necessarily indicative of the presence of the spyboy defense evasion tool, rather, it is a point of investigation to determine if the use of the driver is legitimate. The following will look for the presence of software signed with Zemana’s code signing certificate:

Falcon LTR

ExternalApiType=Event_ModuleSummaryInfoEvent
| /Zemana/i
| select([SHA256HashData, IssuerCN, IssuerDN, SubjectCN, SubjectDN, SubjectCertThumbprint, SubjectSerialNumber])
Event Search
index=json ExternalApiType=Event_ModuleSummaryInfoEvent "Zemana"
| table SHA256HashData, IssuerCN, IssuerDN, SubjectCN, SubjectDN, SubjectCertThumbprint, SubjectSerialNumber

Event Search

index=json ExternalApiType=Event_ModuleSummaryInfoEvent "Zemana"
| table SHA256HashData, IssuerCN, IssuerDN, SubjectCN, SubjectDN, SubjectCertThumbprint, SubjectSerialNumber

To cast a very wide (and likely very noisy) net, we can look for file writes to C:\Windows\System32\drivers\ that match the observed naming format (4 to 10 characters) observed in the wild.

Please note: you will almost certainly have matches when running the queries below. Thresholds can be used to look for rare or uncommon writes. In the queries below, only results with 5 writes or fewer are displayed. This can be adjusted up and/or down as desired.

Falcon LTR

event_platform=Win #event_simpleName=PeFileWritten
| TargetFileName=/(?<FilePath>\\Windows\\System32\\drivers\\)(?<FileName>[a-zA-Z]{4,10}\.sys)/i
| groupBy([SHA256HashData], function=([count(aid, as=writeCount), count(aid, distinct=true, as=uniqueEndpoints), collect([FileName, FilePath])]))
| test(writeCount<5)
// Hash search link. Uncomment correct rootURL for your cloud.
| rootURL  := "https://falcon.crowdstrike.com/" /* US-1 */
//| rootURL := "https://falcon.us-2.crowdstrike.com/"  /* US-2 */
//| rootURL  := "https://falcon.laggar.gcw.crowdstrike.com/" /* Gov */
//| rootURL := "https://falcon.eu-1.crowdstrike.com/"  /* EU */
| format("[Hash Search](%sinvestigate/events/en-us/app/eam2/investigate__hash?&form.computer=*&form.user_tok=*&form.customer_tok=*&form.exfilename_tok_p=NONE&form.excmd_tok_p=NONE&form.hash=%s)",field=["rootURL", "SHA256HashData"], as="Hash Search")
| drop([rootURL])

Event Search

event_platform=Win event_simpleName=PeFileWritten "drivers" "system32"
| regex FilePath="^\\\Device\\\HarddiskVolume\d+\\\Windows\\\System32\\\drivers\\\$"
| regex FileName="^[a-zA-Z]{4,10}\.sys$"
| stats count(aid) as writeCount by SHA256HashData, FileName, FilePath
| where writeCount < 5

If either of these events is deemed to be uncommon or unexpected in your environment, Custom IOAs targeting file write activity can be created for real-time detection and/or prevention.

Other Mitigations

If default-deny allowlisting software (e.g. Airlock Digital) is available in your security stack, blocking the signing certificate of Zemana Anti-Malware driver can provide additional coverage.


r/crowdstrike • • May 31 '22

Hunting Follina - Microsoft Code Execution Vulnerability

91 Upvotes

On May 27, 2022, a security researcher identified a code execution flaw in Microsoft Windows Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT). When invoked, an endpoint can be coerced into downloading and invoking remote code via the diagnostic and troubleshooting wizard (msdt.exe). The code execution flaw is being colloquially called Follina and is classified as a zero-day.

Falcon has detection and prevention logic to mitigate this attack. With "Suspicious Process Blocking" enabled, Falcon will block code execution attempts from msdt.exe. Without "Suspicious Process Blocking" enabled, Falcon will still generate a detection in the Falcon UI.

Current iterations of the proof of concept will invoke msdt.exe from a Microsoft Office application. A generalized hunting query can be found here:

index=main sourcetype=ProcessRollup* event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| search ParentBaseFileName IN (winword.exe, excel.exe, powerpnt.exe, outlook.exe) 
| search FileName=msdt.exe
| table _time, aid, ComputerName, UserName, UserSid_readable, ParentBaseFileName, FileName, CommandLine
| lookup local=true aid_master aid OUTPUT AgentVersion, Version, MachineDomain, OU, SiteName

To further profile and baseline normal msdt.exe usage in your environment, the following query can be used:

index=main sourcetype=ProcessRollup* event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| search FileName=msdt.exe
| eval FileName=lower(FileName)
| eval ParentBaseFileName=lower(ParentBaseFileName)
| stats dc(aid) as endpointCount, count(aid) as executionCount by FileName, ParentBaseFileName
| sort -executionCount

Note that Microsoft Office applications are not the only programs in scope for msdt.exe abuse. See: https://twitter.com/0xBacco/status/1531599168363548672.

CrowdStrike's Intelligence, OverWatch, and Complete Teams are actively monitoring for adversary activity. Updates will be posted here as required.

Falcon Intelligence customers can view CSA-220561 Microsoft Office “Follina” Exploit (CVE-2022-30190) Used as Zero-Day via the Falcon Intelligence portal.

01-June-2022 Update

Additional research continues to be conducted by security researchers (and CrowdStrike) on ways to invoke code execution via msdt.exe. As we await a patch to mitigate the root cause, the good (?) news is that the use of msdt.exe in corporate environments can seemingly be scoped.

To try and account for all the ways that msdt.exe can be abused (that haven't been thought of just yet), we can use a combination of statistical analysis in Event Search and Custom IOAs.

In Event Search, we can use the following query (also above):

index=main sourcetype=ProcessRollup* event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| search FileName=msdt.exe
| eval FileName=lower(FileName)
| eval ParentBaseFileName=lower(ParentBaseFileName)
| stats dc(aid) as endpointCount, count(aid) as executionCount by FileName, ParentBaseFileName
| sort 0 -executionCount

What this shows us is what usually launches msdt.exe in our specific Falcon instance.

Very broadly, on a macro scale, the top processes that launch msdt.exe are:

  1. explorer.exe

  2. sihost.exe

  3. wmplayer.exe

  4. rundll32.exe

  5. iexplore.exe

  6. msedge.exe

  7. chrome.exe

Knowing this, what I might do is create a Custom IOA that will generate a detection in when msdt.exe is launched and one of the above processes is NOT the parent. You can use my list or, if you want to make a Custom IOA that is tailored to your environment, you can use the output from the query above.

Now, time to make a Custom IOA. Navigate to Configuration > Custom IOA Rule Groups. I'm going to make a new rule group named "CVE-2022-30190" and select "Windows" as the platform.

Next, I'll select "Add New Rule" and choose "Process Creation" as the rule type.

Under "Action to Take" I'm going to choose "Detect" and, for the time being, I'll choose a severity of "Low." I'm choosing "Low" because, by default, low and informational alerts do not auto-generate emails from Falcon. Once my rule is battle tested, I'll upgrade it to medium, high, or critical as I see fit.

For "Rule Name" I'm going to use "T1218 - Defense Evasion - Proxy Execution via MSDT" and in "Rule Description," I'm going to put "Created 2022-006-01 by Andrew-CS. Detects unusual parent process of MSDT."

Next, under "PARENT IMAGE FILENAME" I'm going to click "Add Exclusion." Under "PARENT IMAGE FILENAME– EXCLUDE" I'm going to add the following regex:

.*\\(explorer|sihost|wmplayer|rundll32|iexplore|msedge|chrome)\.exe

Under "IMAGE FILE NAME" I'm going to use the following regex:

.*\\msdt\.exe

I will then save the Custom IOA, enable the Custom IOA Group and Rule, and apply the rule group to a prevention policy.

Once deployed, our Custom IOA will trigger on any process that spawns msdt.exe unless that process is included in the exclusions specified above. If you've used the hunting query to scope msdt.exe and there aren't many executions — or you want a detection any time msdt.exe is invoked — you do not have to add any exclusions (although I would not recommend that).

This will be a belt + suspenders approach as Falcon will be detecting this for you and you'll have the added bonus of your own IOA running as well.

Spotlight customers can scope impact by searching for CVE-2022-30190.

01-June-2022 Update 2

Starting to go cross-eyed after staring at this for too long, however, this Tweet from @Antonlovesdnb was interesting. If you all wouldn't mind experimenting with the following query, I'd be interested to know your results:

(event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 AND FileName=msdt.exe) OR (event_simpleName=ImageHash AND FileName IN (ieframe.dll, mshtml.dll, DiagnosticDataSettings.dll, hlink.dll, optimization_guide_internal.dll))
| eval falconPID=coalesce(ParentProcessId_decimal, ContextProcessId_decimal) 
| eval executingFile=if(match(event_simpleName,"ProcessRollup2"),FileName,null())
| eval parentFile=if(match(event_simpleName,"ProcessRollup2"),ParentBaseFileName,null()) 
| eval parentdllLoad=if(match(event_simpleName,"ImageHash"),FileName,null()) 
| eval parentdllLoad=lower(parentdllLoad)
| stats dc(event_simpleName) as eventCount, earliest(ProcessStartTime_decimal) as processStartTime, values(parentFile) as parentFile, values(executingFile) as executingFile, values(CommandLine) as cmdLine, values(parentdllLoad) as parentdllLoad by aid, ComputerName, falconPID
| regex cmdLine!="^\-modal\s.*"
| where eventCount > 1
| convert ctime(processStartTime)
| table processStartTime, ComputerName, aid, falconPID, parentFile, executingFile, cmdLine
| eval ProcExplorer=case(falconPID!="","https://falcon.crowdstrike.com/investigate/process-explorer/" .aid. "/" . falconPID)

My results are as follows:

02-June-2022 Update

Here's another hunting query. It looks for uncommon processes spawning sdiagnhost.exe via an RPC call (which is what msdt.exe does to invoke code execution).

index=main event_platform=win sourcetype=ProcessRollup2* event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 
| search FileName IN (sdiagnhost.exe, msdt.exe)
| eval msdtParentFile=if(match(FileName,"msdt.exe"),ParentBaseFileName,null())
| eval msdtFileName=if(match(FileName,"msdt.exe"),FileName,null())
| eval msdtCmdLine=if(match(FileName,"msdt.exe"),CommandLine,null()) 
| eval msdtFalconPID=if(match(FileName,"msdt.exe"),TargetProcessId_decimal,null()) 
| eval msdtTimeStamp=if(match(FileName,"msdt.exe"),ProcessStartTime_decimal,null())
| eval sdiagFileName=if(match(FileName,"sdiagnhost.exe"),FileName,null())
| eval sdiagFalconPID=if(match(FileName,"sdiagnhost.exe"),RpcClientProcessId_decimal,null()) 
| eval falconPID=coalesce(sdiagFalconPID, msdtFalconPID) 
| stats dc(FileName) as eventCount, values(msdtTimeStamp) as msdtTimeStamp, values(ComputerName) as computerName, values(UserName) as userName, values(msdtParentFile) as msdtParentFile, values(msdtFileName) as msdtFileName, values(msdtCmdLine) as msdtCmdLine, values(sdiagFileName) as sdiagFileName by aid, falconPID
| where eventCount > 1 
| search NOT msdtParentFile IN (msdt.exe, pcwrun.exe, dllhost.exe, rundll32.exe)
| regex msdtCmdLine!="(^\-modal.*|^\-skip.*)"
| eval processFlow = msdtParentFile. " > " .msdtFileName. " > " .sdiagFileName
| table msdtTimeStamp, aid, falconPID, computerName, userName, processFlow, msdtCmdLine
| sort - msdtTimeStamp
| convert ctime(msdtTimeStamp) 

Example output is here:

Not that my exclusions are in these lines:

| search NOT msdtParentFile IN (msdt.exe, pcwrun.exe, dllhost.exe, rundll32.exe)
| regex msdtCmdLine!="(^\-modal.*|^\-skip.*)"

You can remove these or tailor them to better suit your environment if you wish.


r/crowdstrike • • Oct 21 '26

Emerging // SITUATIONAL AWARENESS // php2shell: CVE-2026-109618 & CVE-2026-109619

86 Upvotes

PHP has announced two critical-severity CVEs in PHP. Both vulnerabilities can lead to remote code execution (RCE) and further adversary actions on systems running unpatched versions of PHP. 

Customers should prioritize patching PHP as quickly as possible or follow vendor-specific guidance. 

CrowdStrike systems are not affected.

Falcon has post-exploitation detection and prevention logic in place for these CVEs. Falcon Exposure Management is evaluating systems for the presence of unpatched and vulnerable PHP instances. The best advice we can give is to patch PHP as quickly as possible or to follow vendor-specific guidance on mitigation strategies.

Again: CrowdStrike systems are not affected, we have post-exploitation detections in place in Falcon, and we continue to actively hunt for signs of abuse.

CrowdStrike's Tech Alert can be found here and there is a public blog post live here. The Tech Alert will be updated as additional details become available.

CVE Details

  • RCE via OOM corruption, CVE-2026-109618 (GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w): out-of-memory handling can interrupt PHP while internal request data is only partially initialized. Request cleanup may then treat the invalid data as valid.

  • RCE via stale global state, CVE-2026-109619 (GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp): request-owned internal state can survive after its backing memory has been freed. A later request handled by the same worker may use that stale state before normal initialization resets it.

Resource Summary


r/crowdstrike • • Dec 30 '24

Threat Hunting Threat Hunt Malicious Browser Extensions

86 Upvotes

This query will identify compromised browser extensions in Crowdstrike Falcon. The query will return the BrowserExtensionId, BrowserExtensionName, BrowserExtensionPath and Compromised status of the browser extensions. The Compromised status will be set to true if the browser extension is compromised, and false if it is not compromised.

We are only returning the compromised browser extensions in this query. If you want to see all browser extensions, you can remove the Compromised = "true" filter from the query.

Note: Please refer to the Google Spreadsheet Compromised extensions and update this query accordingly.

You could theoretically upload the Google Spreadsheet as a lookup table and use it in the query. However, I did not have the time to test this.

#event_simpleName=InstalledBrowserExtension
| regex(field=BrowserExtensionVersion, regex="(?<MajorVersion>[0-9]+)\\.(?<MinorVersion>[0-9]+)(\\.(?<PatchVersion>[0-9]+))?", strict=true)
| case {
        BrowserName = "0" | BrowserName := "UNKNOWN" ;
        BrowserName = "1" | BrowserName := "FIREFOX" ;
        BrowserName = "2" | BrowserName := "SAFARI" ;
        BrowserName = "3" | BrowserName := "CHROME" ;
        BrowserName = "4" | BrowserName := "EDGE" ;
        BrowserName = "5" | BrowserName := "EDGE_CHROMIUM" ;
        BrowserName = "6" | BrowserName := "INTERNET_EXPLORER" ;
        BrowserName = "7" | BrowserName := "EDGE_LEGACY" ;
        BrowserName = "8" | BrowserName := "IE_TYPED_URL" ;
        BrowserName = "9" | BrowserName := "FIREFOX_APP" ;
        * }
| case {
BrowserExtensionId="nnpnnpemnckcfdebeekibpiijlicmpom"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=2.0.1
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="kkodiihpgodmdankclfibbiphjkfdenh"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=1.16.2
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="oaikpkmjciadfpddlpjjdapglcihgdle"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=1.0.12
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="dpggmcodlahmljkhlmpgpdcffdaoccni"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=1.1.1
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="acmfnomgphggonodopogfbmkneepfgnh"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=4.00
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="mnhffkhmpnefgklngfmlndmkimimbphc"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=4.40
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="cedgndijpacnfbdggppddacngjfdkaca"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=0.0.11
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="bbdnohkpnbkdkmnkddobeafboooinpla"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=1.0.1
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="egmennebgadmncfjafcemlecimkepcle"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=2.2.7
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="bibjgkidgpfbblifamdlkdlhgihmfohh"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=0.1.3
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="cplhlgabfijoiabgkigdafklbhhdkahj"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=1.0.161
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="befflofjcniongenjmbkgkoljhgliihe"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=2.13.0
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="pkgciiiancapdlpcbppfkmeaieppikkk"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=1.3.7
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="llimhhconnjiflfimocjggfjdlmlhblm"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=1.5.7
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="oeiomhmbaapihbilkfkhmlajkeegnjhe"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=3.18.0
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="ekpkdmohpdnebfedjjfklhpefgpgaaji"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=1.3
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="epikoohpebngmakjinphfiagogjcnddm"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=2.7.3
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="miglaibdlgminlepgeifekifakochlka"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=1.4.5
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="eanofdhdfbcalhflpbdipkjjkoimeeod"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=1.4.9
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="ogbhbgkiojdollpjbhbamafmedkeockb"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=1.8.1
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="bgejafhieobnfpjlpcjjggoboebonfcg"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=1.1.1
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="igbodamhgjohafcenbcljfegbipdfjpk"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=2.3
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="mbindhfolmpijhodmgkloeeppmkhpmhc"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=1.44
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="hodiladlefdpcbemnbbcpclbmknkiaem"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=3.1.3
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="pajkjnmeojmbapicmbpliphjmcekeaac"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=24.10.4
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="ndlbedplllcgconngcnfmkadhokfaaln"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=2.22.6
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="epdjhgbipjpbbhoccdeipghoihibnfja"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=1.4
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="cplhlgabfijoiabgkigdafklbhhdkahj"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=1.0.161
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="lbneaaedflankmgmfbmaplggbmjjmbae"
| test(MajorVersion<=1)
| test(MinorVersion<=3)
| test(PatchVersion<=8)
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="eaijffijbobmnonfhilihbejadplhddo"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=2.4
| Compromised := "true";
BrowserExtensionId="hmiaoahjllhfgebflooeeefeiafpkfde"
| BrowserExtensionVersion=1.0.0
| Compromised := "true";
*
| Compromised := "false";
}
| Compromised = "true"
| groupBy([BrowserExtensionId], function=collect(fields=[aid, BrowserExtensionName, BrowserName, BrowserExtensionPath, Compromised]))

anak0ndah/BrowserExtensionHijacked Pull Request to add the Crowdstrike Falcon query

EDIT:

You can also search using CrxFileWritten but this is slightly less accurate as it is harder to see which version of the extension was downloaded:

#event_simpleName=CrxFileWritten
| FileName=/(nnpnnpemnckcfdebeekibpiijlicmpom|kkodiihpgodmdankclfibbiphjkfdenh|oaikpkmjciadfpddlpjjdapglcihgdle|dpggmcodlahmljkhlmpgpdcffdaoccni|acmfnomgphggonodopogfbmkneepfgnh|mnhffkhmpnefgklngfmlndmkimimbphc|cedgndijpacnfbdggppddacngjfdkaca|bbdnohkpnbkdkmnkddobeafboooinpla|egmennebgadmncfjafcemlecimkepcle|bibjgkidgpfbblifamdlkdlhgihmfohh|befflofjcniongenjmbkgkoljhgliihe|pkgciiiancapdlpcbppfkmeaieppikkk|llimhhconnjiflfimocjggfjdlmlhblm|oeiomhmbaapihbilkfkhmlajkeegnjhe|ekpkdmohpdnebfedjjfklhpefgpgaaji|epikoohpebngmakjinphfiagogjcnddm|miglaibdlgminlepgeifekifakochlka|eanofdhdfbcalhflpbdipkjjkoimeeod|ogbhbgkiojdollpjbhbamafmedkeockb|bgejafhieobnfpjlpcjjggoboebonfcg|igbodamhgjohafcenbcljfegbipdfjpk|mbindhfolmpijhodmgkloeeppmkhpmhc|hodiladlefdpcbemnbbcpclbmknkiaem|pajkjnmeojmbapicmbpliphjmcekeaac|ndlbedplllcgconngcnfmkadhokfaaln|epdjhgbipjpbbhoccdeipghoihibnfja|cplhlgabfijoiabgkigdafklbhhdkahj|jiofmdifioeejeilfkpegipdjiopiekl|hihblcmlaaademjlakdpicchbjnnnkbo|lbneaaedflankmgmfbmaplggbmjjmbae|eaijffijbobmnonfhilihbejadplhddo|hmiaoahjllhfgebflooeeefeiafpkfde)/
| groupby([aid, ComputerName], function=collect(fields=[#event_simpleName, TargetFileName, FileName]), limit=20000)

EDIT 2024-12-30 8:10PM UTC

  • The queries have been updated with the latest extension IDs.

EDIT 2024-12-30 9:13PM UTC

  • Added BrowserExtensionPath to the initial query.

EDIT 2024-12-31 6:06PM UTC

  • The queries have been updated with the latest extension IDs.

  • Added BrowserName to the query.


r/crowdstrike • • Mar 10 '25

PSFalcon Application Blocking Via CrowdStrike

85 Upvotes

Hey,

Ever tried to use CrowdStrike agent as an application control, or got an email from your manager if its possible to block certain apps with CrowdStrike?

Well, its not simple as that, but there are multiple ways to tighten things up and get as much as possible from the platform.

In this use case I will show the example on AnyDesk :

1st, we create a Custom IOA rule - This will check for any filenames that matches our regex.
Image file name : .*anydesk.*

2nd part is using PSFalcon to add AnyDesk hash with a script to IOC management.

The script below will :

  1. Download AnyDesk

  2. Calculate the hash

  3. Delete the file

  4. Check if the hash exist in the IOC management, if it does not, the has get added

You can modify the script as your needs suit you - you might to log this information, or use it to download any other app.

#Get Falcon Token
Request-FalconToken -ClientId <ClientID> -ClientSecret <ClientSecret>

# Define variables
$downloadUrl = "https://download.anydesk.com/AnyDesk.exe"
$localFile = "$env:TEMP\AnyDesk.exe"
 
# Download AnyDesk installer
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $downloadUrl -OutFile $localFile
 
# Calculate SHA256 hash
$hashObject = Get-FileHash -Path $localFile -Algorithm SHA256
$anydeskHash = $hashObject.Hash.ToLower()
 
# Delete the downloaded file
Remove-Item -Path $localFile -Force
 
# Output the hash
Write-Host "SHA256 Hash of AnyDesk.exe (lowercase): $anydeskHash"
 
# Check if the hash already exists in Falcon IOC Management
$existingIOC = Get-FalconIoc -Filter "value:'$anydeskHash'"
 
if ($existingIOC) {
    Write-Host "IOC already exists in Falcon: $anydeskHash"
} else {
    Write-Host "IOC not found in Falcon. Creating a new IOC..."
    New-FalconIoc -Action prevent -Platform windows -Severity medium -Filename "AnyDesk" -AppliedGlobally $True -Type sha256 -Value $anydeskHash
    Write-Host "IOC added successfully!"
}

Run this script using a scheduled task to be updated to your needs (day/week etc..)
You might be also want to create a workflow that auto close a detection related to the IOC on the specific host you gonna run the script from

Bonus -

If you have the Discover module in CrowdStrike you can also use automated workflow to add IOC's every time an RMM tool is used/installed in your company.

https://imgur.com/a/IwongB0

Its not bulletproof , but I think it gets you the most out of what we can work with.

Here you can see a full list of RMM applications to build around -

https://lolrmm.io/

Hope that help some people here, and I am open to any suggestion or improvements.


r/crowdstrike • • Jul 22 '24

Video CrowdStrike Host Self-Remediation for Remote Users

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84 Upvotes

r/crowdstrike • • Dec 10 '21

CQF 2021-12-10 - Cool Query Friday - Hunting Apache Log4j CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell)

84 Upvotes

Welcome to our thirty-second* installment of Cool Query Friday. The format will be: (1) description of what we're doing (2) walk though of each step (3) application in the wild.

* One of you were kind enough to inform me that this is actually the thirty-third CQF as I accidentally counted the 14th CQF twice. We'll keep the broken numbering scheme for posterity's sake.

CVE-2021-44228

Yesterday, a vulnerability in a popular Java library, Log4j, was published along with proof-of-concept exploit code. The vulnerability has been given the designation CVE-2021-44228 and is colloquially being called "Log4Shell" by several security researchers. The CVE impacts all unpatched versions of Log4j from 2.0-beta9 to 2.14. Current recommendations are to patch Log4j to version 2.15.0-rc2 or higher.

The Log4j library is often included or bundled with third-party software packages and very commonly used in conjunction with Apache Struts.

When exploited, the Log4j vulnerability will allow Remote Code Execution (RCE). This becomes extremely problematic as things like Apache Struts are, most commonly, internet facing.

More details can be found here:

The CVE score is listed as 10.0 and the severity is listed as "Critical" (Apache).

Assessment and Mitigation

CrowdStrike is observing a high volume of unknown actors actively scanning and attempting exploitation of CVE-2021-44228 via ThreatGraph. Falcon has prevention and detection logic in place for the tactics and techniques being used in CVE-2021-44228 and OverWatch is actively monitoring for malicious behavior, HOWEVER... <blink>it is critical that organizations patch vulnerable infrastructure as soon as possible. As with any RCE vulnerability on largely public-facing services, you DO NOT want to provide unknown actors with the ability to make continuous attempts at remotely executing code. The effort required for exploitation of CVE-2021-44228 is trivial.</blink>

TL;DR: PATCH!

Hunting

Why does this always happen on Fridays?

As we're on war-footing here, we won't mess around. The query we're going to use is below:

event_simpleName IN (ProcessRollup2, SyntheticProcessRollup2, JarFileWritten, NewExecutableWritten, PeFileWritten, ElfFileWritten)
| search log4j
| eval falconEvents=case(event_simpleName="ProcessRollup2", "Process Execution", event_simpleName="SyntheticProcessRollup2", "Process Execution", event_simpleName="JarFileWritten", "JAR File Write", event_simpleName="NewExecutableWritten", "EXE File Write", event_simpleName="PeFileWritten", "EXE File Write", event_simpleName=ElfFileWritten, "ELF File Write")
| fillnull value="-"
| stats dc(falconEvents) as totalEvents, values(falconEvents) as falconEvents, values(ImageFileName) as fileName, values(CommandLine) as cmdLine by aid, ProductType
| eval productType=case(ProductType = "1","Workstation", ProductType = "2","Domain Controller", ProductType = "3","Server", event_platform = "Mac", "Workstation") 
| lookup local=true aid_master aid OUTPUT Version, ComputerName, AgentVersion
| table aid, ComputerName, productType, Version, AgentVersion, totalEvents, falconEvents, fileName, cmdLine
| sort +productType, +ComputerName

Now, this search is a little more rudimentary than what we usually craft for CQF, but there is good reason for that.

The module Log4j is bundled with A LOT of different software packages. For this reason, hunting it down will not be as simple as looking for its executable, SHA256, or file path. Our charter is to hunt for Log4j invocations in the unknown myriad of ways tens of thousands of different developers may be using it. Because this is our task, the search above is intentionally verbose.

The good news is, Log4j invocation tends to be noisy. You will either see the program's string in the file being executed, written, or in the command line as it's bootstrapped.

Here is the explanation of the above query:

  • Line 1: Cull the dataset down to all process execution events, JAR file write events, and PE file write events.

  • Line 2: search those events, in their entity, for the string log4j.

  • Line 3: make a new field named falconEvents and provide a little more verbose explanation of what the event_simpleNames mean.

  • Line 4: organizes our output by Falcon Agent ID and buckets relevant data.

  • Line 5: Identifies servers, workstations, and domain controllers impacted.

  • Line 6: Adds additional details related to the Falcon Agent ID in question.

  • Line 7: reorganizes the output so it makes more sense were you to export it to CSV

  • Line 8: Organizes productType alphabetically (so we'll see DCs, then servers, then workstations) and then organizes those alphabetically by ComputerName.

We'll update this post as is necessary.

Happy hunting, happy patching, and happy Friday.

UPDATE 2021-12-10 12:33EDT

The following query has proven effective in identifying potential POC usage:

event_simpleName IN (ProcessRollup2, SyntheticProcessRollup2) 
| fields ProcessStartTime_decimal ComputerName  FileName CommandLine
| search CommandLine="*jndi:ldap:*" OR CommandLine="*jndi:rmi:*" OR CommandLine="*jndi:ldaps:*" OR CommandLine="*jndi:dns:*" 
| rex field=CommandLine ".*(?<stringOfInterest>\$\{jndi\:(ldap|rmi|ldaps|dns)\:.*\}).*"
| table ProcessStartTime_decimal ComputerName FileName stringOfInterest CommandLine
| convert ctime(ProcessStartTime_decimal) 

Thank you to u/blahdidbert for additional protocol detail.

Update 2021-12-10 14:22 EDT

Cloudflare has posted mitigation instructions for those that can not update Log4j. These have not been reviewed or verified by CrowdStrike.


r/crowdstrike • • Mar 15 '23

Emerging // SITUATIONAL AWARENESS // Hunting Microsoft Outlook NTLM Relay Vulnerability CVE-2023-23397

83 Upvotes

What Happened?

On Tuesday, March 14, 2023, Microsoft disclosed a privilege escalation vulnerability — CVE-2023-23397 — in Microsoft Outlook that can lead to an NTLM relay attack. By sending a user a specially crafted email message, the CVE triggers Outlook to send the authenticated user's NTLM hash to an actor controlled system for collection. The NTLM hash can then be used to further actions on objectives, in pass-the-hash style attacks, or attacked offline in an attempt to crack the hash.

Useful Links

  • CVE-2023-23397 Trending Vulnerability Page (link)

  • CSA-230413: Outlook Zero-Day Vulnerability (CVE-2023-23397) Likely Adopted by Multiple Actors Following Exploit Release [ US-1 | US-2 | EU | GOV ] (Falcon Intelligence subscription required)

  • March 2023 Patch Tuesday: 9 Critical CVEs, Including Two Actively Exploited Zero Days (link)

  • Microsoft Disclosure (link)

  • MDSec Technical Breakdown (link)

Recommendations

Due to the simplicity of weaponizing this CVE, and its use in the wild, patching impacted systems should be given high priority.

Mitigations

Falcon Spotlight is actively looking for systems unpatched and vulnerable to CVE-2023-23397 ( US-1 | US-2 | EU-1 | US-GOV-1 ).

If an NTLM hash is leveraged in a pass-the-hash style attack (via an actual NTLM relay), Falcon Identity Threat Protection has the ability to detect such activity. Fusion Workflows can also be used to automate response.

Microsoft has released a PowerShell script that can be run on Exchange infrastructure to scan email files for malicious UNC paths, however, patching is the preferred mitigation strategy.

Hunting

Attack Flow

  1. User receives weaponized email message and is unpatched against CVE-2023-23397.

  2. Outlook processes the message.

  3. Due to CVE-2023-23397, Outlook is tricked into trying to authenticate to an actor controlled system (outside of your organization) via a UNC link with the current user's NTLM hash.

  4. The actor controlled system collects the NTLM hash to further actions on objectives.

The collection of NTLM hashes has been a technique observed by CrowdStrike, in the wild, since early 2017.

In thinking through the attack flow, one thing sticks out: Microsoft Outlook making unexpected TCP/445 connections . Now, the NTLM relay can traverse TCP/445, but it doesn't have to traverse TCP/445. It can be modified. Further compounding things: Microsoft Outlook is a strange beast. It does all sorts of things you would never expect your email client to do. Because of this, we want to perform statistical analysis on our data to see if we can create signal that detects this type of activity.

Falcon LogScale (LTR)

(#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 event_platform="Win" ImageFileName=/\\outlook\.exe/i) OR (#event_simpleName=NetworkConnectIP4 RemotePort="445" event_platform="Win")
| falconPID := ContextProcessId | falconPID := TargetProcessId
| selfJoinFilter([aid, falconPID], where=[{#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2}, {#event_simpleName=NetworkConnectIP4}], prefilter=true)
| groupBy([RemoteAddressIP4, RemotePort, Protocol], function=([count(aid, as=connectionCount), min(ContextTimeStamp, as=firstSeen), max(ContextTimeStamp, as=lastSeen)]))
| case{
   Protocol=6 | Protocol := "TCP";
   Protocol=17 | Protocol := "UDP";
   Protocol=0 | Protocol := "ICMP";
}
| timeDeltaDays := ((lastSeen-firstSeen)/60/60/24) | round("timeDeltaDays")
| firstSeen := firstSeen * 1000 | formatTime(format="%F %T", field=firstSeen, as="firstSeen")
| lastSeen := lastSeen * 1000   | formatTime(format="%F %T", field=lastSeen, as="lastSeen")
| asn(RemoteAddressIP4)
| ipLocation(RemoteAddressIP4)
| sort(order=asc, connectionCount)
| select([RemoteAddressIP4, RemotePort, connectionCount, RemoteAddressIP4.asn, RemoteAddressIP4.org, RemoteAddressIP4.country, RemoteAddressIP4.state, RemoteAddressIP4.city, firstSeen, lastSeen, timeDeltaDays])

Event Search

event_platform=win (event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 FileName=outlook.exe) OR (event_simpleName=NetworkConnectIP4 RemotePort_decimal=445)
| eval falconPID=coalesce(TargetProcessId_decimal, ContextProcessId_decimal) 
| eval ipData = RemoteAddressIP4.":".RemotePort_decimal
| stats dc(event_simpleName) as eventCount, values(FileName) as fileName, values(CommandLine) as cmdLine, values(ipData) as ipData by aid, falconPID
| where eventCount>1 

Custom IOA

Okay, say the following out loud: "Dear Andrew-CS, I promise, under the pains and penalties of nerd-shame, I will use the above queries to scope how common this is in my environment before creating a Custom IOA that will rock my telemetry-socks off." Repeat that twice and throw some salt over your right shoulder and leave a comment below so I know you read this.

Okay, good. Here we go...

  1. Create a new Windows Custom IOA Rule

  2. Type: Network Connection

  3. Action to Take: Monitor

  4. Severity: Informational

  5. Rule name: CVE-2023-23397 TCP/445 Emanating from Outlook

  6. Rule Description: Document everything you're doing in a Google Doc, ticketing system, whatever and put a link to that page in the description along with some details about what is happening.

  7. ImageFileName: .*\\outlook\.exe

  8. Remote TCP/UDP Port: 445

  9. Save rule.

  10. Enable rule.

  11. Ensure Custom IOA Rule Group is applied to host groups you desire.

Again, you want to use the queries above to make sure that this rule is a good idea. If you find common IP Addresses making TCP/445 connections from Outlook in your environment, you can select "Add Exclusion" next to "REMOTE IP ADDRESS" and add that exclusion (remember to use regex).

Once you're 100% sure this rule is sound in your environment, you can move from "Monitor" to "Detect" mode.

Conclusion

We hope this has been helpful. As a reminder:

  1. Check Spotlight for vulnerable systems.

  2. Patching gets high priority.

  3. Assess TCP/445 traffic from Outlook using above queries.

  4. Deploy Custom IOA rule if feasible.

As always, happy hunting.

2023-03-17 Update

Dominic Chell from MDSec has confirmed that, even when patched, Outlook will still relay NTLM hashes to "Trusted Zones" in Windows (Twitter link).

After further testing on my part, I'm starting to notice that Windows will anchor most (not all) NTLM TCP/445 traffic to PID 4 (read: the root process). So the detection logic above, or any other logic targeting Outlook and TCP/445 traffic, will be hit or miss. u/_vanvleet also did some testing that seems to confirm the same thing below. Thank you!!

This one is a bit of a dumpster fire.

Again, recommendation is to patch and ensure that proper countermeasures are in place for NTLM hashes that are relayed to domain controllers to further actions on objectives.

2023-03-17 Update 2

Having some luck with this with WebDav ( u/drkramm gets credit for this idea!) , but you will have to hunt over the signal that comes in:

Falcon LTR

#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 ImageFileName=/\\(?<FileName>rundll32\.exe)/i
| CommandLine=/davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie(?<interestingStrings>.*)/i
| ProcessStartTime := ProcessStartTime*1000 | formatTime(format="%c", field="ProcessStartTime", as="ProcessStartTime")
| select([ProcessStartTime, aid, FileName, interestingStrings, CommandLine])

Event Search

event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 FileName=rundll32.exe "davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie"
| rex field=CommandLine ".*davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie(?<interestingStrings>.*)$"
| table ProcessStartTime_decimal, aid, ComputerName, FileName, interestingStrings, CommandLine
| convert ctime(ProcessStartTime_decimal)

r/crowdstrike • • Mar 02 '26

CQF 2026-03-02 - Cool Query Friday - Hunting for Typosquatted Domains

78 Upvotes

Welcome back to another installment of Cool Query Friday (on a Monday). I’ll be your guest host for today’s session. As always, the format will be: (1) description of what we're doing (2) walk through of each step (3) application in the wild.

Summary

On Feb 2, 2026, CrowdStrike debuted a new adversary dubbed SNARKY SPIDER. Snarky is known to use typosquatting to trick victims. Their domains often resemble legitimate targets either by 1. Inserting, omitting, or swapping characters (e.g., crowstrike[.]com, crowdstirke[.]com), or 2. prefixing/appending strings like id, my, or go (e.g., mycrowdstrike[.]com, crowdstrikeid[.]com).

It just so happens that we’ve recently released two new functions to calculate Levenshtein edit distance, and this week we’re putting them to work. Rather than relying on regex or exact string matching, we’ll use text:editDistance() and text:editDistanceAsArray() to find domains that are suspiciously close to your real ones. This is perfect for catching typosquatted domains like those seen in recent Snarky Spider activity.

Side note: For a deeper dive into Typosquatting, refer to the latest blog post from CrowdStrike Threat Intelligence.

Query A) Single Reference - text:editDistance()

Use this when comparing observed domains against a single reference domain (e.g., your primary corporate domain).

Let’s build it line by line.

Step 1 - Start with Observed Domains

If you’re hunting in Falcon telemetry, DNS logs are available with #event_simpleName=DnsRequest.

// Get DNS request telemetry from Falcon sensor
#event_simpleName=DnsRequest

Within these events, the field we’ll evaluate is DomainName.

If you’re working with other telemetry, sub in the appropriate events and fields. Common sources include:

  • DNS logs

  • Proxy logs

  • Web gateway logs

  • Email security logs

Step 2 - Extract the Base Domain

Before calculating edit distance, we first need to normalize the data.

If we compare full hostnames directly, legit subdomains like go.crowdstrike.com will appear “close” to crowdstrike.com, creating false positives. To avoid this, we’ll break it down to the base domain.

TLD structures vary (.com, .co.uk, .com.tr, etc.), so this can be a bit tricky. We can solve this by combining parseUri() with regex. You can extend your list of TLDs as needed.

// Normalize input as a URI so we can reliably work with hostnames
| parseUri(DomainName, defaultBase="https://")

// Extract the registrable/base domain into base_domain (extend TLD list as needed)
| DomainName.host=/(?<base_domain>[-a-zA-Z0-9]+\.(?:co\.uk|com\.tr|com|net|org|edu|gov|io|co))$/

This creates a new field called base_domain, meaning every event has a normalized base domain for comparison.

Step 3 - Compute Levenshtein Distance

We can now compute edit distance against that base_domain:

// Compare the observed base_domain against the provided reference domain
| text:editDistance(
    target=base_domain,
    reference="crowdstrike.com",
    maxDistance=10,
    ignoreCase=true,
    as=lev_dist)

Let’s break that down:

  • target=base_domain -> The field you’re evaluating

  • reference="crowdstrike.com" -> Your reference base domain

  • maxDistance=10 -> If it’s more than 10 edits away, we don’t care

  • ignoreCase=true -> Domains are case-insensitive, your query should be too

  • as lev_dist -> Store the computed distance in a field called lev_dist

You’ll notice that every event has a numeric similarity score relative to crowdstrike.com.

Step 4 - Keep “Close but Not Exact”

// Remove exact matches (distance 0 means it is one of our legitimate reference domains)
| lev_dist != 0

// Keep only near matches for triage (tune as needed)
| lev_dist <=3

This is where we’ll define our threshold. First, let’s drop any exact matches. Then, we’ll filter out any domains that are too far from our reference.

  • != 0 removes exact matches

  • <= 3 keeps domains 1–3 edits away, indicating a high likelihood of typosquatting

Step 5 - Putting it all together

That’s it! The entire query should look like the following:

// Get DNS request telemetry from Falcon sensor
#event_simpleName=DnsRequest

// Normalize input as a URI so we can reliably work with hostnames
| parseUri(DomainName, defaultBase="https://")

// Extract the registrable/base domain into base_domain (extend TLD list as needed)
| DomainName.host=/(?<base_domain>[-a-zA-Z0-9]+\.(?:co\.uk|com\.tr|com|net|org|edu|gov|io|co))$/

// Compare the observed base_domain against the provided reference domain
| text:editDistance(
    target=base_domain,
    reference="crowdstrike.com",
    maxDistance=10,
    ignoreCase=true,
    as=lev_dist)

// Remove exact matches (distance 0 means it is one of our legitimate reference domains)
| lev_dist != 0

// Keep only near matches for triage (tune as needed)
| lev_dist <=3

This finds domains between one and three edit operations away from crowdstrike.com, like gocrowdstrike[.]com, or crowstrike[.]com.

Query B - Multi-Reference: text:editDistanceAsArray()

This is where things get fun.

Most organizations don’t have just one domain. You may want to monitor:

  • Primary corporate domain

  • Authentication and login portals

  • Customer-facing applications

  • High-trust third-party platforms

Instead of running 10 queries, we can just compare once against a single list.

Step 1 - Start with Observed Domains

Once again, we’ll start by filtering for DNS request events.

// Get DNS request telemetry from Falcon sensor
#event_simpleName=DnsRequest

Step 2 - Normalize to the Base Domain

Before computing the edit distance, normalize to the base domain so comparisons are consistent.

// Normalize input as a URI so we can reliably work with hostnames
| parseUri(DomainName, defaultBase="https://")

// Extract the registrable/base domain into base_domain (extend TLD list as needed)
| DomainName.host=/(?<base_domain>[-a-zA-Z0-9]+\.(?:co\.uk|com\.tr|com|net|org|edu|gov|io|co))$/

Step 3 - Compute Distance Against Multiple References

The only change here is that we’re using the text:editDistanceAsArray() function. Unlike the single-reference version, this function requires a references array containing one or more domains to compare against.

// Compare the observed base_domain to multiple reference domains
| text:editDistanceAsArray(
    target=base_domain,
    references=["crowdstrike.com","servicenowservices.com"],
    maxDistance=10
)

This function will create a new field called _distance[], which is an object array. Each element in this array contains both the calculated distance and the corresponding reference domain. It will look something like this:

_distance[0].distance_distance[0].reference_distance[1].distance_distance[1].reference
0crowdstrike.com5servicenowservices.com

So for every event, you now know how similar the observed domain is to each of your reference domains.

Step 4 - Keep Events Where ANY Reference Is Suspiciously Close

Instead of evaluating _distance[] as an array, we’ll expand it so each reference comparison becomes its own row. This makes filtering and triage much simpler.

// Split the _distance[] object array so each reference comparison becomes its own row
| split(_distance)

// Remove exact matches (distance 0 means it is one of our legitimate reference domains)
| _distance.distance != 0

// Keep only near matches for triage (tune as needed)
| _distance.distance <= 3

What’s happening here:

  • split(_distance) takes the object array and creates a new row for each {reference, distance} pair

  • Once split, _distance.distance and _distance.reference become directly accessible fields

  • We first drop exact matches (distance != 0)

  • Then, we retain only values within our similarity threshold (<= 3)

Step 5 - Format the results

Now that we’ve isolated near matches, let’s clean up the output so it’s easier to triage.

// Rename fields for clarity in the output
| Reference_Domain:=_distance.reference
| Observed_Domain:=base_domain
| lev_dist:=_distance.distance

// Output results and sort by closest match first
| groupBy([Observed_Domain,Reference_Domain,lev_dist], function=collect([DomainName,ComputerName,aid]), limit=max)
| sort(lev_dist, order=asc)

// Intelligence Graph; uncomment out one cloud
| rootURL := "https://falcon.crowdstrike.com/"
// | rootURL := "https://falcon.laggar.gcw.crowdstrike.com/"
// | rootURL := "https://falcon.eu-1.crowdstrike.com/"
// | rootURL := "https://falcon.us-2.crowdstrike.com/"
| format("[Link](%sinvestigate/dashboards/domain-search?isLive=false&sharedTime=true&start=7d&domain=*%s)", field=["rootURL", "Observed_Domain"], as="Domain Search")

| drop(rootURL)

Step 6 - Putting it all together

Your final query will look like this:

// Get DNS request telemetry from Falcon sensor
#event_simpleName=DnsRequest

// Normalize input as a URI so we can reliably work with hostnames
| parseUri(DomainName, defaultBase="https://")

// Extract the registrable/base domain into base_domain (extend TLD list as needed)
| DomainName.host=/(?<base_domain>[-a-zA-Z0-9]+\.(?:co\.uk|com\.tr|com|net|org|edu|gov|io|co))$/

// Compare the observed base_domain to multiple reference domains
| text:editDistanceAsArray(
    target=base_domain,
    references=["crowdstrike.com","servicenowservices.com"],
    maxDistance=10
)

// Split the _distance[] object array so each reference comparison becomes its own row
| split(_distance)

// Remove exact matches (distance 0 means it is one of our legitimate reference domains)
| _distance.distance != 0

// Keep only near matches for triage (tune as needed)
| _distance.distance <= 3

// Rename fields for clarity in the output
| Reference_Domain:=_distance.reference
| Observed_Domain:=base_domain
| lev_dist:=_distance.distance

// Output results and sort by closest match first
| groupBy([Observed_Domain,Reference_Domain,lev_dist], function=collect([DomainName,ComputerName,aid]), limit=max)
| sort(lev_dist, order=asc)

// Intelligence Graph; uncomment out one cloud
| rootURL := "https://falcon.crowdstrike.com/"
// | rootURL := "https://falcon.laggar.gcw.crowdstrike.com/"
// | rootURL := "https://falcon.eu-1.crowdstrike.com/"
// | rootURL := "https://falcon.us-2.crowdstrike.com/"
| format("[Link](%sinvestigate/dashboards/domain-search?isLive=false&sharedTime=true&start=7d&domain=*%s)", field=["rootURL", "Observed_Domain"], as="Domain Search")

| drop(rootURL)

Step 7 - Let’s see it in action

We’ll run our query to look for suspicious DNS activity

As you can see, the query uncovered many DNS requests to crowstronk[.]com and caw.crowstronk[.]com. By normalizing them, we’ve combined everything under the base domain of crowstronk[.]com, which is four character edits away from our reference domain crowdstrike.com. Note - To capture this result, the edit distance threshold was adjusted from 3 to 4.

We’ve collected all ComputerName and aid values, so we can immediately identify the impacted hosts.

From there, we can pivot into our domain search to gather additional info and review related activity tied to this domain.

Tuning Tips

  • Edit threshold: Start conservative and tune based on your environment. Smaller distances reduce noise, while larger distances increase coverage but may introduce false positives.

  • Reference list: Include all high-trust domains such as corporate brands, login portals, and key SaaS platforms.

  • Ignore case: Always recommended for domains (ignoreCase=true).

  • Bonus: Enrich your results with CrowdStrike’s threat intelligence using the ioc:lookup() function.

Conclusion

The new text:editDistance() and text:editDistanceAsArray() functions have a ton of interesting use cases. Domains are the obvious starting point, but any string is fair game.

Anywhere an adversary benefits from “close enough,” edit distance gives you a scalable way to measure it.

For adversaries like Snarky Spider that rely on typosquatting, this is a powerful proactive hunting technique. Tune your thresholds, expand your reference lists, and enrich the results.

And as always, happy hunting and happy Friday Monday.


r/crowdstrike • • Jan 03 '25

Emerging Hunting Weaponized Chrome Extensions in Falcon

78 Upvotes

Happy New Year.

I've been on PTO. I know this post is a late — and there are already a ton of great resources available — but I wanted to make sure an aggregate post was created with a few additional hunting options. First, the current resources...

  1. CrowdStrike Tech Alert published on 12/27.

  2. Counter Adversary Operations report published 12/26.

  3. Great r/CrowdStrike post from u/Emergency-Associate4 found here published 12/31.

  4. Official Cyberhaven vendor disclosure published 12/27.

If you've read the above, you'll be all caught up.

The TL;DR is we need to hunt down a large swath of around 30 chrome extensions. There is a good list here (WARNING: this is a Google Doc, you may want to open the link in an Incognito window if you're logged into your Google account).

There are two ways to easily accomplish this in Falcon: (1) using Falcon Exposure Management data via NG SIEM (2) Using Falcon for IT via that module or NG SIEM.

My preference is using Falcon for IT as it will be a live sweep of my environment, but you can choose your own adventure.

Falcon Exposure Management

Falcon Exposure Management will collect and cloud Chrome extensions installed on Window and macOS endpoints running the Falcon sensor using the event InstalledBrowserExtension. The impacted Chrome extensions enumerated in the Google Sheet above can be placed into a lookup table and uploaded to Falcon to make things very, very speedy. A pre-made lookup file can be downloaded here.

Download the CSV linked above, or make your own, and upload it to Falcon. Be sure to note the name of the file you upload.

Next, you want to search your Falcon data against this list, which contains the Extension ID values of known-bad Chrome extensions (as of 2025-01-03). That syntax, at its simplest, looks like this:

#event_simpleName=InstalledBrowserExtension
| match(file="cyberhaven_bad_extensionId.csv", field=[BrowserExtensionId], column=BrowserExtensionId)
| groupBy([ComputerName, UserName, BrowserName, BrowserExtensionId, BrowserExtensionName, BrowserExtensionVersion, Version, BrowserExtensionStatusEnabled, BrowserExtensionPath])
| rename(field="Version", as="knownBad")
| case {
    test(BrowserExtensionVersion==knownBad) | Status:="CHECK";
    knownBad="" | Status:="CHECK";
    * | "OK";
}

You can customize the groupBy() aggregation to include any additional fields you desire.

Falcon for IT

My preferred way is to use Falcon for IT as it will search systems live and also has coverage for Linux. If you do not license Falcon for IT, you can navigate to the CrowdStrike Store and start a free trial to gain access. Again, there is no charge and you'll be able to use it for a week or two.

Once you have access to Falcon for IT, from the mega menu, navigate to:

IT Automation > Live Asset Query > Create Query

You can imput the following osQuery syntax to search for the identified extensions:

SELECT * FROM users 
JOIN chrome_extensions USING (uid) 
WHERE identifier IN ('nnpnnpemnckcfdebeekibpiijlicmpom','kkodiihpgodmdankclfibbiphjkfdenh','oaikpkmjciadfpddlpjjdapglcihgdle','dpggmcodlahmljkhlmpgpdcffdaoccni','acmfnomgphggonodopogfbmkneepfgnh','mnhffkhmpnefgklngfmlndmkimimbphc','cedgndijpacnfbdggppddacngjfdkaca','bbdnohkpnbkdkmnkddobeafboooinpla','egmennebgadmncfjafcemlecimkepcle','bibjgkidgpfbblifamdlkdlhgihmfohh','befflofjcniongenjmbkgkoljhgliihe','pkgciiiancapdlpcbppfkmeaieppikkk','llimhhconnjiflfimocjggfjdlmlhblm','oeiomhmbaapihbilkfkhmlajkeegnjhe','ekpkdmohpdnebfedjjfklhpefgpgaaji','epikoohpebngmakjinphfiagogjcnddm','miglaibdlgminlepgeifekifakochlka','eanofdhdfbcalhflpbdipkjjkoimeeod','ogbhbgkiojdollpjbhbamafmedkeockb','bgejafhieobnfpjlpcjjggoboebonfcg','igbodamhgjohafcenbcljfegbipdfjpk','mbindhfolmpijhodmgkloeeppmkhpmhc','hodiladlefdpcbemnbbcpclbmknkiaem','pajkjnmeojmbapicmbpliphjmcekeaac','ndlbedplllcgconngcnfmkadhokfaaln','epdjhgbipjpbbhoccdeipghoihibnfja','cplhlgabfijoiabgkigdafklbhhdkahj','jiofmdifioeejeilfkpegipdjiopiekl','hihblcmlaaademjlakdpicchbjnnnkbo','lbneaaedflankmgmfbmaplggbmjjmbae','eaijffijbobmnonfhilihbejadplhddo','hmiaoahjllhfgebflooeeefeiafpkfde');

Make sure to select "Windows," "Mac," and "Linux" in the "Platform" section (this can be customized as desired).

Be default, Falcon for IT will only run the query against online assets. If you would like to queue the query to execute against offline assets as they become available, click the little gear icon in the upper right and choose your queue expiry.

Finally, you can execute by clicking "Run."

Any matches will begin to show in the window below.

If you would like to further manipulate the results in NG SIEM, you can select "View in Advanced event search" in the middle right.

That will bound you to NG SIEM with a pre-populated query included. You can add the following line to the end of it to aggregate the results:

[ preopulated query is here ]
| groupBy([hostname, result.username, result.browser_type, result.identifier, result.profile_path, , result.version, result.description])result.nam

We can check the "Live" box (next to Search) to have the results updated in real time as your Falcon for IT query executes across your fleet.

Conclusion

Again, this post is a little late and I apologize for that. It does provide some additional hunting workflows and I hope that is helpful. Happy hunting.


r/crowdstrike • • Oct 17 '23

General Question IOCTLBlockVulnDriver spike

77 Upvotes

anyone else get a bunch of these in the last hour ? someone in crowdstrike bump that dial up a little too much?

seems to be two commandlines, with of course no actual mention of what driver was loaded.


r/crowdstrike • • Feb 07 '26

Threat Hunting CVE-2026-25049 - n8n Activity Hunting

75 Upvotes

Disclaimer: I am a threat hunter, but I am not your threat hunter. Here are the queries I am using to help track down n8n instances used to respond to the slew of n8n vulns popping up. It doesn't hunt for exploitation specific activity, just where instances might be running.

Query 1: Hunt for n8n Process Executions (Cross-Platform)

// Detect n8n binary execution or Node.js running n8n across all platforms
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| in(field="FileName", values=[n8n, n8n.exe, node.exe, node, npm, npm.exe, npx, npx.exe], ignoreCase=true)
| CommandLine=/n8n/i

// Extract clean filename
| ImageFileName=/(\/|\\)(?<CleanFileName>\w*\.?\w*)$/

// Build process lineage for context
| ProcessLineage:=format(format="%s > %s > %s", field=[GrandParentBaseFileName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName])

// Aggregate by key attributes
| groupBy([aid, ComputerName, UserName, CommandLine, ProcessLineage, SHA256HashData], function=[
    count(as=execCount), 
    min(@timestamp, as=firstSeen), 
    max(@timestamp, as=lastSeen),
    collect([TargetProcessId], limit=5)
])

// Format timestamps
| formatTime(format="%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", field=firstSeen, as=firstSeenTime)
| formatTime(format="%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", field=lastSeen, as=lastSeenTime)

// Create investigation links
| RTR:=format("[RTR Console](https://falcon.crowdstrike.com/activity/real-time-response/console/?aid=%s)", field=[aid])
| VirusTotal:=format("[VT](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/%s)", field=[SHA256HashData])
| ProcessExplorer:=format("[PE](https://falcon.crowdstrike.com/investigate/process-explorer/%s/%s)", field=[aid, TargetProcessId])

// Sort by execution frequency
| sort(execCount, order=desc)

// Table output
| table([ComputerName, UserName, ProcessLineage, CommandLine, execCount, firstSeenTime, lastSeenTime, RTR, VirusTotal])

Query 2: Hunt for n8n Installation Activity

// Detect npm/npx installing or initializing n8n
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| in(field="FileName", values=[npm, npm.exe, npx, npx.exe, yarn, yarn.exe, pnpm, pnpm.exe], ignoreCase=true)
| CommandLine=/n8n/i

// Extract installation type
| case {
    CommandLine=/install.*n8n/i | InstallType:="npm install";
    CommandLine=/npx.*n8n/i | InstallType:="npx run";
    CommandLine=/add.*n8n/i | InstallType:="yarn/pnpm add";
    * | InstallType:="other";
}

// Group by installation details
| groupBy([aid, ComputerName, UserName, InstallType, CommandLine], function=[
    count(as=installAttempts),
    selectLast([@timestamp, SHA256HashData, TargetProcessId])
])

// Format timestamp
| formatTime(format="%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", field=@timestamp, as=installTime)

// Create links
| RTR:=format("[RTR Console](https://falcon.crowdstrike.com/activity/real-time-response/console/?aid=%s)", field=[aid])
| ProcessExplorer:=format("[Explore Process](https://falcon.crowdstrike.com/investigate/process-explorer/%s/%s)", field=[aid, TargetProcessId])

// Sort by most recent
| sort(@timestamp, order=desc)

Query 3: Hunt for n8n Network Activity (Port 5678)

// Correlate n8n process execution with network connections on default port
(#event_simpleName=NetworkConnectIP4 RemotePort=5678) OR 
(#event_simpleName=NetworkListenIP4 LocalPort=5678) OR 
(#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 CommandLine=/n8n/i)

// Normalize process ID fields
| falconPID:=TargetProcessId 
| falconPID:=ContextProcessId

// Join network events with process events
| selfJoinFilter(field=[aid, falconPID], where=[
    {#event_simpleName=/^Network/}, 
    {#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2}
])

// Aggregate connection data
| groupBy([aid, ComputerName, falconPID], function=[
    collect([ImageFileName, CommandLine, UserName, RemoteAddressIP4, RemotePort, LocalPort, LocalAddressIP4, Protocol]),
    count(RemoteAddressIP4, distinct=true, as=uniqueRemoteIPs),
    count(as=connectionCount)
])

// Ensure we have process details
| ImageFileName=*

// Exclude RFC1918 private ranges to focus on external connections
| !cidr(RemoteAddressIP4, subnet=["10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16"])

// Enrich with GeoIP data
| ipLocation(RemoteAddressIP4)

// Create investigation links
| RTR:=format("[RTR Console](https://falcon.crowdstrike.com/activity/real-time-response/console/?aid=%s)", field=[aid])
| ProcessExplorer:=format("[Process Explorer](https://falcon.crowdstrike.com/investigate/process-explorer/%s/%s)", field=[aid, falconPID])

// Table output
| table([ComputerName, UserName, ImageFileName, RemoteAddressIP4, RemotePort, "RemoteAddressIP4.country", connectionCount, uniqueRemoteIPs, RTR, ProcessExplorer])

Query 4: Hunt for n8n DNS Activity (Noisy)

// Detect DNS requests from n8n-related processes
#event_simpleName=/^(DnsRequest|ProcessRollup2)$/

// Normalize PID fields
| case {
    TargetProcessId=* | falconPID:=TargetProcessId;
    ContextProcessId=* | falconPID:=ContextProcessId;
}

// Self-join to correlate DNS with process
| selfJoinFilter(field=[aid, falconPID], where=[
    {#event_simpleName=DnsRequest},
    {#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 CommandLine=/n8n/i}
], prefilter=true)

// Group by process and collect DNS requests
| groupBy([aid, ComputerName, falconPID], function=[
    collect([ImageFileName, CommandLine, UserName, DomainName]),
    count(DomainName, distinct=true, as=uniqueDomains),
    count(as=totalRequests)
])

// Ensure we have required fields
| ImageFileName=* DomainName=*

// Filter out common noise domains (customize for your environment)
| DomainName!=/ocsp\.digicert\.com|localhost|arpa$/i

// Create investigation links
| ProcessExplorer:=format("[Process Explorer](https://falcon.crowdstrike.com/investigate/process-explorer/%s/%s)", field=[aid, falconPID])

// Table output with domain details
| table([ComputerName, UserName, ImageFileName, DomainName, uniqueDomains, totalRequests, ProcessExplorer])

Query 5: Hunt for n8n File Activity (.n8n Directory)

// Detect file writes to .n8n configuration directories
#event_simpleName=FileWritten
| TargetFileName=/(\\|\/)\.n8n/i

// Convert file size to human-readable format
| case {
    Size>=1099511627776 | FileSize:=unit:convert(Size, to=T) | format("%,.2f TB", field=[FileSize], as=FileSize);
    Size>=1073741824 | FileSize:=unit:convert(Size, to=G) | format("%,.2f GB", field=[FileSize], as=FileSize);
    Size>=1048576 | FileSize:=unit:convert(Size, to=M) | format("%,.2f MB", field=[FileSize], as=FileSize);
    Size>=1024 | FileSize:=unit:convert(Size, to=K) | format("%,.2f KB", field=[FileSize], as=FileSize);
    * | format("%d B", field=[Size], as=FileSize);
}

// Aggregate file writes
| groupBy([aid, ComputerName, UserName, TargetFileName], function=[
    count(as=writeCount),
    sum(Size, as=totalBytes),
    selectLast([@timestamp])
])

// Format timestamp
| formatTime(format="%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", field=@timestamp, as=lastWrite)

// Create RTR link
| RTR:=format("[RTR Console](https://falcon.crowdstrike.com/activity/real-time-response/console/?aid=%s)", field=[aid])

// Sort by write frequency
| sort(writeCount, order=desc)

// Table output
| table([ComputerName, UserName, TargetFileName, FileSize, writeCount, lastWrite, RTR])

Query 6: Frequency Analysis - Rare n8n Deployments (Noisy)

// Find n8n executions on low numbers of endpoints (potential testing/malicious)
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| CommandLine=/n8n/i
| ImageFileName=/(\/|\\)(?<FileName>\w*\.?\w*)$/

// Aggregate by binary hash
| groupBy([FileName, CommandLine, SHA256HashData], function=[
    count(aid, distinct=true, as=uniqueEndpoints),
    count(aid, as=totalExecutions),
    collect([ComputerName], limit=20)
])

// Filter for low-prevalence (adjust threshold as needed)
| uniqueEndpoints<=10

// Sort by rarest first
| sort(uniqueEndpoints, order=asc)

// Create threat intel links
| VirusTotal:=format("[VirusTotal](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/%s)", field=[SHA256HashData])
| HybridAnalysis:=format("[Hybrid Analysis](https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/search?query=%s)", field=[SHA256HashData])

// Table output
| table([FileName, uniqueEndpoints, totalExecutions, ComputerName, CommandLine, VirusTotal, HybridAnalysis])

Query 7: n8n with Suspicious Parent Processes

// Detect n8n spawned from unexpected parent processes
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| CommandLine=/n8n/i


// Exclude legitimate parent processes
| !in(field="ParentBaseFileName", values=[
    cmd.exe, powershell.exe, pwsh.exe, bash, sh, zsh, fish,
    explorer.exe, terminal, Code.exe, WindowsTerminal.exe,
    wt.exe, ConEmu64.exe, services.exe, svchost.exe
], ignoreCase=true)


// Build process tree
| ProcessTree:=format(format="%s\n  └─ %s\n     └─ %s", field=[GrandParentBaseFileName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName])


// Aggregate suspicious spawns
| groupBy([aid, ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, CommandLine, ProcessTree], function=[
    count(as=spawnCount),
    selectLast([TargetProcessId, u/timestamp])
])


// Format timestamp
| formatTime(format="%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", field=@timestamp, as=lastSeen)


// Create investigation links
| ProcessExplorer:=format("[Process Explorer](https://falcon.crowdstrike.com/investigate/process-explorer/%s/%s)", field=[aid, TargetProcessId])


// Sort by frequency
| sort(spawnCount, order=desc)


// Table output
| table([ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, ProcessTree, CommandLine, spawnCount, lastSeen, ProcessExplorer])

Query 8: Comprehensive n8n Dashboard Query (Noisy)

// Multi-faceted n8n activity dashboard
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| CommandLine=/n8n/i

// Extract execution context
| ImageFileName=/(\/|\\)(?<FileName>\w*\.?\w*)$/
| ProcessLineage:=format(format="%s > %s > %s", field=[GrandParentBaseFileName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName])

// Categorize activity type
| case {
    CommandLine=/start/i | ActivityType:="Service Start";
    CommandLine=/webhook/i | ActivityType:="Webhook";
    CommandLine=/import/i | ActivityType:="Workflow Import";
    CommandLine=/export/i | ActivityType:="Workflow Export";
    * | ActivityType:="Other";
}

// Aggregate comprehensive stats
| groupBy([ActivityType, ComputerName, UserName], function=[
    count(as=executionCount),
    count(aid, distinct=true, as=uniqueHosts),
    min(@timestamp, as=firstSeen),
    max(@timestamp, as=lastSeen),
    collect([CommandLine, SHA256HashData], limit=5)
])

// Format timestamps
| formatTime(format="%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", field=firstSeen, as=firstSeenTime)
| formatTime(format="%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", field=lastSeen, as=lastSeenTime)

// Sort by activity type and count
| sort([ActivityType, executionCount], order=[asc, desc])

r/crowdstrike • • Jan 31 '25

Feature Question Crowdstrike overwatch

74 Upvotes

I’m in talks with a sales rep and we’re pretty close to finalizing the deal. They slapped on overwatch and to me, it sounds like an added MDR / threat hunting tool. I brought it up to my sales rep that we didn’t need it and he insisted that “I really don’t want to move forward with crowdstrike without it”.

For a high level context, we’re wanting to do a 1:1 replacement of our current endpoint solution / vendor. We currently have AV / EDR and some basic media control. We have a 24/7 SOC, and we really don’t need this unless it’s absolutely that beneficial.

Is this something I absolutely need? I don’t remember using it during our POC with crowdstrike and it feels like an unnecessary SKU they threw on to boost their bottom line.


r/crowdstrike • • Jun 28 '24

General Question CS messed up CPU

74 Upvotes

I do not want to re-start my servers. What is the work around for this? Do you realize how big of impact it is?

Worst situation to be in:

Tech Alert | US-1, US-2, EU-1 | High CPU from CsFalconService | 2024-06-27 (crowdstrike.com)


r/crowdstrike • • Feb 13 '26

APIs/Integrations (RTR Script) Passwords Stored in Plaintext from Browser Auto-fill

73 Upvotes

When a user stores a password in a browser's autofill, it's saved plaintext in a sqlite file. Most credential stealers work by reading this file, so it's pretty important to discourage users from using it. I didn't find any existing ways to do this, so I wrote an RTR script that opens the sqlite file, reads it, and give you a count breakdown by user for a host. We then ran this on all hosts in batches, and used it as a pushing point to get a password manager. Thought it could be useful to others as-well.

Example Output

# Get-ChromeSavedPasswords
# Audits saved credentials across Chromium browsers (Chrome, Edge, Brave).
# Returns structured JSON with counts per user/browser/profile.
#
# Requires: Windows 10+ (uses winsqlite3.dll from System32 — no installs needed)
# Usage:    RTR > runscript -CloudFile="Get-ChromeSavedPasswords"

Set-StrictMode -Version Latest
$ErrorActionPreference = "Stop"


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Preflight — bail early with a JSON error if the host can't run this
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

if (-not (Test-Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\winsqlite3.dll")) {
    [PSCustomObject]@{
        hostname    = $env:COMPUTERNAME
        scan_time   = (Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-ddTHH:mm:ssZ")
        error       = "winsqlite3.dll not found — requires Windows 10 or later"
        total_saved = $null
        details     = @()
    } | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 3
    exit
}


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SQLite bindings — P/Invoke into the Windows-native winsqlite3.dll
# Compiles in memory at runtime; drops nothing to disk
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Add-Type -TypeDefinition @"
using System;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;

public static class SQLite
{
    // Result codes we care about
    public const int OK       = 0;
    public const int ROW      = 100;
    public const int READONLY = 1;   // open flag

    [DllImport("winsqlite3.dll", EntryPoint = "sqlite3_open_v2")]
    public static extern int Open(
        [MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.LPStr)] string path,
        out IntPtr db, int flags, IntPtr vfs);

    [DllImport("winsqlite3.dll", EntryPoint = "sqlite3_close")]
    public static extern int Close(IntPtr db);

    [DllImport("winsqlite3.dll", EntryPoint = "sqlite3_prepare_v2")]
    public static extern int Prepare(
        IntPtr db,
        [MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.LPStr)] string sql,
        int nBytes, out IntPtr stmt, IntPtr tail);

    [DllImport("winsqlite3.dll", EntryPoint = "sqlite3_step")]
    public static extern int Step(IntPtr stmt);

    [DllImport("winsqlite3.dll", EntryPoint = "sqlite3_column_int")]
    public static extern int ColInt(IntPtr stmt, int col);

    [DllImport("winsqlite3.dll", EntryPoint = "sqlite3_finalize")]
    public static extern int Finalize(IntPtr stmt);
}
"@ -ErrorAction Stop


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Helpers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

# Runs a SELECT COUNT(*) query against a copied Login Data file and returns the int
function Get-Count {
    param([string]$Path, [string]$SQL)

    $db = [IntPtr]::Zero
    $stmt = [IntPtr]::Zero

    try {
        if ([SQLite]::Open($Path, [ref]$db, [SQLite]::READONLY, [IntPtr]::Zero) -ne 0) { return 0 }
        if ([SQLite]::Prepare($db, $SQL, -1, [ref]$stmt, [IntPtr]::Zero) -ne 0)        { return 0 }
        if ([SQLite]::Step($stmt) -eq [SQLite]::ROW) { return [SQLite]::ColInt($stmt, 0) }
        return 0
    }
    finally {
        if ($stmt -ne [IntPtr]::Zero) { [void][SQLite]::Finalize($stmt) }
        if ($db   -ne [IntPtr]::Zero) { [void][SQLite]::Close($db) }
    }
}


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Scan
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

# Every Chromium browser stores credentials in the same schema, just different paths
$browsers = @(
    @{ Name = "Chrome"; Path = "Google\Chrome\User Data" }
    @{ Name = "Edge";   Path = "Microsoft\Edge\User Data" }
    @{ Name = "Brave";  Path = "BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser\User Data" }
)

# SQL against Chrome's "logins" table
# blacklisted_by_user = 1 means user clicked "Never" on the save prompt
$sqlSaved   = "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM logins WHERE blacklisted_by_user = 0 AND origin_url != ''"
$sqlBlocked = "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM logins WHERE blacklisted_by_user = 1"

$findings = @()
$total    = 0

foreach ($user in (Get-ChildItem "C:\Users" -Directory -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)) {
    foreach ($browser in $browsers) {

        $root = Join-Path $user.FullName "AppData\Local\$($browser.Path)"
        if (-not (Test-Path $root)) { continue }

        # Each profile (Default, Profile 1, etc.) has its own Login Data file
        $loginFiles = Get-ChildItem $root -Filter "Login Data" -Recurse -Depth 1 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

        foreach ($file in $loginFiles) {
            $tmp = Join-Path $env:TEMP "LD_$(Get-Random).tmp"

            try {
                # Copy to temp — Chrome holds a lock on the live file
                Copy-Item $file.FullName $tmp -Force

                $saved   = Get-Count $tmp $sqlSaved
                $blocked = Get-Count $tmp $sqlBlocked
                $total  += $saved

                $findings += [PSCustomObject]@{
                    user       = $user.Name
                    browser    = $browser.Name
                    profile    = $file.Directory.Name
                    saved      = $saved
                    never_save = $blocked
                }
            }
            catch { <# skip unreadable files silently #> }
            finally {
                if (Test-Path $tmp) { Remove-Item $tmp -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue }
            }
        }
    }
}


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Output — single JSON object to stdout
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[PSCustomObject]@{
    hostname    = $env:COMPUTERNAME
    scan_time   = (Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-ddTHH:mm:ssZ")
    error       = $null
    total_saved = $total
    details     = $findings
} | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 3