r/crowdstrike • u/BradW-CS • 2d ago
Demo Falcon Privileged Access | Just-in-Time Local Admin: Any User, Any Endpoint
r/crowdstrike • u/BradW-CS • 2d ago
r/crowdstrike • u/BradW-CS • 1d ago
r/crowdstrike • u/BradW-CS • 1d ago
r/crowdstrike • u/BradW-CS • 2d ago
r/crowdstrike • u/BradW-CS • 2d ago
r/crowdstrike • u/BradW-CS • 3d ago
r/crowdstrike • u/rogueit • 4d ago
do you all have detection for these yet? CVE-2026-123633 and CVE-2026-123007
r/crowdstrike • u/caryc • 4d ago
Can anyone confirm if CrowdStrike MCP exposes the falcon_idp_investigate_entity tool?
r/crowdstrike • u/cyberfox126 • 4d ago
Is there any way we can autimate finding ips on host management without login ? Other use case are we need to check after nessus scan weather these x number of servers have cs so that we can close vulnerability
r/crowdstrike • u/HanSolo71 • 5d ago
Prerequisite: This data will be sent to needs to be an array of strings. Make sure your variable is set to array of string type.
A lot of logs output data like this:
data['GetAbormalAlertLogs.results'][0]["Vendor.messages.toAddresses[0]"]Where the final [0] can be any number between not existing and infinite. To parse an infinite number of strings, use this CEL code.
size(data['GetAbormalAlertLogs.results'][0]
.filter(k, k.startsWith('Vendor.messages.toAddresses['))) > 0
? data['GetAbormalAlertLogs.results'][0]
.filter(k, k.startsWith('Vendor.messages.toAddresses['))
.map(k, data['GetAbormalAlertLogs.results'][0][k])
: ['No To Address Found']Here is the logic as defined by the CrowdStrike AI (I didn't feel like writing this out by hand):
The current CEL builds a list of “To” email addresses out of a *map-like* object in `data['GetAbormalAlertLogs.results'][0]` by dynamically discovering keys that look like `Vendor.messages.toAddresses[...]`.
How it works, step-by-step:
1. **Look at the first result row**
- It assumes `data['GetAbormalAlertLogs.results']` is indexable and that `[0]` contains the first record (likely a map/object).
2. **Find all keys that represent “toAddresses” fields**
- It calls:
- `data['GetAbormalAlertLogs.results'][0].filter(k, k.startsWith('Vendor.messages.toAddresses['))`
- This is using the `filter()` macro on the keys/entries of that object (i.e., it’s filtering to only the keys whose *name* starts with `Vendor.messages.toAddresses[`).
3. **If at least one such key exists, return their values**
- It checks `size(...) > 0`.
- If true, it:
- re-runs the same filter to get the list of matching keys, then
- `.map(k, data['GetAbormalAlertLogs.results'][0][k])` to convert each key into its corresponding value via bracket indexing.
4. **If no matching keys exist, return a default message**
- If the filtered key list is empty, it returns:
- `['No To Address Found']`
- Note the output is always a **list** (either list of address values, or a single-element list with that message).
Key behaviors/assumptions:
- It’s relying on `data['GetAbormalAlertLogs.results'][0]` behaving like a **map** where you can enumerate/filter keys and then index values by `...[k]`.
- It returns *all* discovered `toAddresses[...]` entries, not just one, because the source data appears flattened into numbered keys (e.g., `...toAddresses[0]`, `...toAddresses[1]`, etc.).The final result is a list of emails like this
[
"[email protected]"
"[email protected]"
]This information can then be used in future steps
r/crowdstrike • u/BradW-CS • 5d ago
r/crowdstrike • u/melog69 • 9d ago
Would anyone be able provide information on how I can connect a Copilot Agent to Crowdstrike MCP (not Falcon MCP).
I seem to have everything but the Authorization URL
I've used a combination of these URLs without sucess
r/crowdstrike • u/About_TreeFitty • 9d ago
Disclaimer: I am a threat hunter, but I am not your threat hunter.
This hunt was built and tuned against one environment's telemetry, and it is shared as-is, with no warranty of any kind. Your fleet, software, patch tooling and Falcon configuration will differ, so expect false positives and possibly missed detections until you tune it. Treat it as a starting point, not a finished detection:
Nothing here is professional advice or a guarantee that a host is clean or compromised.
A weighted, behavior-based CQL hunt for signs that the public SignDrop proof-of-concept (or a close variant) has run on a Windows host.
SignDrop is a local privilege escalation from a standard user to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, published on November 10, 2026. It abuses the CLFS log-file authentication feature that Microsoft added in October 2025. When a privileged process opens a CLFS log whose container is empty, the CLFS driver (clfs.sys) creates the .cnpf signature file as SYSTEM. The PoC uses Object Manager symbolic links to send that SYSTEM-created file somewhere else, turning it into a planted DLL. The PoC's chain is:
Restart osk.exe hidden and create a %TEMP%\SigDrop_<GUID> working folder.
Place a bait MpEngine.dll and get Microsoft Defender to open the folder as SYSTEM.
Point the symbolic links (including mpasbase.vdm under \BaseNamedObjects\Restricted\) so the .cnpf lands as a DLL.
CLFS creates C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ink\hid.dll, which the exploit overwrites with its payload and later removes with a transacted delete.
A "runas" request starts consent.exe as SYSTEM. Because osk.exe is running, consent.exe loads the planted hid.dll, and the payload starts a SYSTEM conhost.exe.
In scope: Windows 11 25H2/26H1 and later, and Windows Server 2025, where HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CLFS\Authentication\Mode is 0 (enforced) or 1 (learning). 2 and 3 mean authentication is disabled and the host is not exposed. As of publication there was no CVE, no patch and no public file hashes, which is why this hunt looks for behavior.
Falcon endpoint telemetry in NGSIEM: ProcessRollup2, file write and delete events, and module-load events (ImageHash, ClassifiedModuleLoad).
Retention long enough for your lookback. The PoC deletes its DLL, so file and module-load telemetry is the only evidence left behind.
Optional: a host lookup file for ComputerName. The query uses aid_master_main.csv; replace it with your own lookup file, or delete that line.
| Column | Meaning |
|---|---|
Verdict | Severity tier, from Score |
Score | Sum of indicator weights. Each indicator counts once per host, however many times it fires |
DistinctIndicators | How many different indicators fired on the host |
FirstSeen / LastSeen | Earliest and latest matching event (UTC) |
IndicatorDetail | One line per indicator: [Stage] Indicator (xHits) by=<writer or parent> :: <evidence> |
| Verdict | Score | Action |
|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | ≥ 100 | Several stages of the chain on one host. Treat as an incident: isolate, collect a triage package, and look for what the attacker did as SYSTEM (security tools disabled, credential dumping, new admin accounts, services or scheduled tasks) |
| HIGH | 50–99 | One strong indicator. Investigate the same day |
| REVIEW | < 50 | Weak or contextual signals only. Usually benign, but confirm |
| Stage | Indicator | Weight | What it means |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | hid.dll loaded from ink directory | 60 | The PoC's sideload. Windows never ships hid.dll there |
| 5 | consent.exe loaded module from non-system path | 60 | Generic sideload into consent.exe; catches variants that don't use hid.dll |
| 5 | consent.exe spawned a child process | 60 | consent.exe normally starts nothing; the payload starts a SYSTEM shell from it |
| 5 | consent.exe.local redirection folder | 50 | A related consent.exe DLL-redirection technique (UACMe method 22) |
| 4 | hid.dll written/deleted in ink directory | 50 | The DLL plant, or its removal |
| 2 | MpEngine.dll written outside Defender paths | 40 | Possible Defender bait, written by a process that isn't a known Microsoft updater |
| 1 | SigDrop/SignDrop file artifact or process | 40 | The PoC's own name. Catches the published sample only |
| 5 | hid.dll loaded outside system folders | 35 | Generic hid.dll sideload (wider than the PoC's ink path) |
| 3 | .cnpf in a system/program folder, or not named after a .blf log | 30 | Unusual CLFS signature file |
| 1 | CLFS log/signature in user-writable temp | 25 | CLFS files staged in a temp folder |
| 1 | osk.exe launched by an unexpected parent | 20 | The PoC's hidden On-Screen Keyboard restart |
| 5 | consent.exe crashed (WerFault) | 15 | Context only. Meaningful next to a sideload hit, routine on its own |
A full PoC run normally produces at least the Stage 4 and Stage 5 hid.dll and consent.exe indicators, which scores 170 (CRITICAL).
by= shows the process that wrote the file (ContextImageFileName), or the parent process for process events. A writer running from a user profile or a temp folder is more worrying than one in System32 or Program Files.
MpEngine.dll hits: check the writer runs as SYSTEM (S-1-5-18), that its parent is part of the Defender or Windows Update chain, and that its hash is common across your fleet. The exploit starts as a standard user, so it can't write the bait as SYSTEM.
consent.exe crash only: search the host for any hid.dll outside System32 around the time of the crash. If there's none, close it.
Dates: activity dated before November 10, 2026 can't be the public PoC. It can still be a related technique, though.
Trusted mpengine.dll writers: Defender's own processes (MsMpEng.exe, MpCmdRun.exe), MRT.exe, MpSigStub.exe (from System32 or a SystemTemp\<GUID> folder), the mpam-fe / mpam-fe_bd definition packages in SystemTemp, and Exchange Server's FIP-FS updateservice.exe.
Delete events for mpengine.dll (no writer is recorded on deletes).
Folders, and .NET random-named temp files (GetRandomFileName(), for example lh0ufeqf.blf) that happen to end in .blf.
Writers in Windows\Temp are deliberately not trusted, because standard users can write there. Expect occasional REVIEW hits from older Windows builds that unpack Defender updates there, and triage them as described above.
Third-party patch tools (ConfigMgr, Ivanti, BigFix, Tanium and similar) may deploy Defender definitions from their own cache folders. Add each one to the Stage 2 trusted-writer regex, anchored to its full path, but only after confirming its folder can't be written by standard users. The released query includes an Ivanti ProPatches entry as an example; remove it if you don't use Ivanti.
Baseline consent.exe module loads before deploying the hunt. They should come only from System32 and WinSxS.
Adjust the osk.exe parent allowlist for accessibility tools you use.
Not visible to Falcon: the Defender RPC call, the Object Manager symbolic links and the CLFS IOCTL (0x8007A808).
May not be recorded: the bait MpEngine.dll may not be a valid PE file, so its write may not appear, and the transacted delete of hid.dll may not produce a delete event.
The name-based indicators (SigDrop, osk.exe, the ink folder path) match the published PoC and are easy for an attacker to change. The generic consent.exe indicators hold up better.
Pair this hunt with an exposure check (OS build plus the CLFS Mode value) and with alerts for sensors that go silent: the researcher claims the technique can be used to disable AV and EDR.
Validate before relying on it: run the public PoC on a test host that is in scope, then confirm which indicators fire in your telemetry.
MSNightmare, SignDrop repository: github.com/MSNightmare/SignDrop
Cyderes Howler Cell, SignDrop: Windows Zero-Day That Turns Microsoft's Own CLFS Mitigation Into a Privilege Escalation Path
ThreatDefence, Windows SignDrop CLFS Zero-Day: Mitigation and Hunting
The Hacker News; BleepingComputer; SecurityOnline (coverage, November 11–12, 2026)
// SignDrop (CLFS authentication abuse): weighted exploitation-indicator hunt
// Rev 7: generic consent.exe module-load branch now resolves the loading process via ContextProcessId -> consent.exe TargetProcessId
// (ImageHash/ClassifiedModuleLoad carry no ContextImageFileName in this tenant)
// Rev 6: + generic consent.exe non-system module load; + consent.exe.local redirection folder (UACMe 22)
// Rev 5: Stage 2 trusted writers, write events only; consent.exe WerFault crash as low-weight context;
// CLFS branches restricted to file events and .NET GetRandomFileName() .blf names excluded
defineTable(
query={
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2$/ event_platform=Win
| ImageFileName=/\\Windows\\System32\\consent\.exe$/i
| ConsentTPID := TargetProcessId
| ConsentImage := ImageFileName
},
include=[aid, ConsentTPID, ConsentImage],
name="ConsentProcs"
)
| #event_simpleName=/^(ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2|NewExecutableWritten|PeFileWritten|GenericFileWritten|DirectoryCreate|FileDeleteInfo|ExecutableDeleted|ImageHash|ClassifiedModuleLoad)$/ event_platform=Win
// Tag events whose ContextProcessId is a consent.exe process (non-filtering: strict=false keeps everything)
| match(file="ConsentProcs", field=[aid, ContextProcessId], column=[aid, ConsentTPID], include=[ConsentImage], strict=false)
| case {
// Stage 5: planted hid.dll loaded from the ink directory (by consent.exe)
#event_simpleName=/^(ImageHash|ClassifiedModuleLoad)$/ | ImageFileName=/\\Common Files\\microsoft shared\\ink\\hid\.dll$/i
| Indicator := "hid.dll loaded from ink directory" | Stage := "5-sideload" | Weight := 60 ;
// Stage 5 (generic): consent.exe loading any module from outside the Windows folders, so non-hid.dll variants are caught
#event_simpleName=/^(ImageHash|ClassifiedModuleLoad)$/ | ConsentImage=* | ImageFileName!=/^(\\Device\\HarddiskVolume\d+|[A-Z]:)\\Windows\\(System32|SysWOW64|WinSxS)\\/i
| Indicator := "consent.exe loaded module from non-system path" | Stage := "5-sideload variant" | Weight := 60 ;
// Related technique: consent.exe .local DLL redirection (UACMe 22); DirectoryCreate included on purpose
TargetFileName=/\\Windows\\System32\\consent\.exe\.local\\/i
| Indicator := "consent.exe.local redirection folder" | Stage := "5-sideload variant" | Weight := 50 ;
// Stage 5 (context): consent.exe crashed; benign alone, meaningful next to a sideload hit
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2$/ | ParentBaseFileName=/^consent\.exe$/i | ImageFileName=/\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault\.exe$/i | CommandLine=/^"?[A-Z]:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault\.exe"?\s+-u\s+-p\s+\d+\s+-s\s+\d+\s*$/i
| Indicator := "consent.exe crashed (WerFault)" | Stage := "5-sideload failure?" | Weight := 15 ;
// Stage 5: payload in consent.exe starts SYSTEM conhost.exe (consent.exe normally has no other children)
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2$/ | ParentBaseFileName=/^consent\.exe$/i
| Indicator := "consent.exe spawned a child process" | Stage := "5-SYSTEM shell" | Weight := 60 ;
// Stage 4: hid.dll written to or deleted from the ink directory (deletes kept: the PoC removes it with a transacted delete)
TargetFileName=/\\Common Files\\microsoft shared\\ink\\hid\.dll$/i
| Indicator := "hid.dll written/deleted in ink directory" | Stage := "4-DLL plant" | Weight := 50 ;
// Variant: hid.dll loaded from outside the Windows folders
#event_simpleName=/^(ImageHash|ClassifiedModuleLoad)$/ | ImageFileName=/\\hid\.dll$/i | ImageFileName!=/\\Windows\\(System32|SysWOW64|WinSxS)\\/i
| Indicator := "hid.dll loaded outside system folders" | Stage := "5-sideload variant" | Weight := 35 ;
// Stage 2: bait MpEngine.dll, write events only, trusted writers anchored to their install paths
// Windows\Temp writers are deliberately NOT trusted (user-writable); triage those by UserSid=S-1-5-18 and parent
#event_simpleName=/^(NewExecutableWritten|PeFileWritten|GenericFileWritten)$/ | TargetFileName=/\\mpengine\.dll$/i | ContextImageFileName!=/^(\\Device\\HarddiskVolume\d+|[A-Z]:)\\(Windows\\System32\\(MpSigStub|MRT)\.exe|Windows\\SystemTemp\\[0-9A-F]{8}-[0-9A-F]{4}-[0-9A-F]{4}-[0-9A-F]{4}-[0-9A-F]{12}\\MpSigStub\.exe|Windows\\SystemTemp\\[0-9A-F]{8}-[0-9A-F]{4}-[0-9A-F]{4}-[0-9A-F]{4}-[0-9A-F]{12}MpCommU\\mpam-fe(_bd)?\.exe|Windows\\ProPatches\\Patches\\mpam-fe-\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+-x(64|86)\.exe|ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Platform\\[^\\]+\\(MsMpEng|MpCmdRun)\.exe|Program Files\\Windows Defender\\(MsMpEng|MpCmdRun)\.exe|Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\FIP-FS\\Bin\\updateservice\.exe)$/i | TargetFileName!=/^(\\Device\\HarddiskVolume\d+|[A-Z]:)\\(ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender|Program Files\\Windows Defender( Advanced Threat Protection)?|Program Files\\Microsoft Security Client|Windows\\(WinSxS|SoftwareDistribution))\\/i
| Indicator := "MpEngine.dll written outside Defender paths" | Stage := "2-Defender bait" | Weight := 40 ;
// Stage 1: PoC working folder and project names (DirectoryCreate intentionally included)
TargetFileName=/\\Sig(n)?Drop/i
| Indicator := "SigDrop/SignDrop file artifact" | Stage := "1-setup" | Weight := 40 ;
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2$/ | ImageFileName=/Sig(n)?Drop/i
| Indicator := "SigDrop/SignDrop process" | Stage := "1-setup" | Weight := 40 ;
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2$/ | CommandLine=/Sig(n)?Drop/i
| Indicator := "SigDrop/SignDrop process" | Stage := "1-setup" | Weight := 40 ;
// CLFS files in odd places (file events only: a .blf/.cnpf is never a directory)
#event_simpleName!=DirectoryCreate | TargetFileName=/\\(Windows\\System32|Program Files( \(x86\))?|ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender)\\.*\.cnpf$/i | TargetFileName!=/\\System32\\(config|LogFiles)\\/i
| Indicator := ".cnpf in system/program folder" | Stage := "3-redirect" | Weight := 30 ;
#event_simpleName!=DirectoryCreate | TargetFileName=/\.cnpf$/i | TargetFileName!=/\.blf\.cnpf$/i
| Indicator := ".cnpf not named after a .blf log" | Stage := "3-redirect" | Weight := 30 ;
// .NET GetRandomFileName() names (8 chars from a-z/0-5) that happen to end in .blf are excluded; a real CLFS log still emits <name>.blf.cnpf
#event_simpleName!=DirectoryCreate | TargetFileName=/\\(AppData\\Local\\Temp|Windows\\Temp|Users\\Public)\\.*\.(blf|cnpf)$/i | TargetFileName!=/\\Temp\\[a-z0-5]{8}\.blf$/
| Indicator := "CLFS log/signature in user-writable temp" | Stage := "1-setup" | Weight := 25 ;
// Stage 1: osk.exe restarted by an unexpected parent
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2$/ | ImageFileName=/\\osk\.exe$/i | ParentBaseFileName!=/^(utilman|atbroker|explorer|osk|sihost|svchost|tabtip)\.exe$/i
| Indicator := "osk.exe launched by unexpected parent" | Stage := "1-setup" | Weight := 20 ;
}
// Events that match no branch are dropped (no fall-through on purpose)
| Evidence := coalesce([TargetFileName, CommandLine, ImageFileName])
| Writer := coalesce([ContextImageFileName, ConsentImage, ParentBaseFileName])
| default(field=[Evidence, Writer], value="-", replaceEmpty=true)
// Step 1: one row per host and indicator, so repeated events don't inflate the score
| groupBy([aid, Indicator], function=[
max(Weight, as=Weight),
count(as=Hits),
min(@timestamp, as=First),
max(@timestamp, as=Last),
selectLast([Stage, Evidence, Writer])
], limit=max)
| IndicatorDetail := format("[%s] %s (x%s) by=%s :: %s", field=[Stage, Indicator, Hits, Writer, Evidence])
// Step 2: roll up to one row per host
| groupBy([aid], function=[
sum(Weight, as=Score),
count(Indicator, distinct=true, as=DistinctIndicators),
min(First, as=FirstEpoch),
max(Last, as=LastEpoch),
collect([IndicatorDetail])
], limit=max)
| case {
test(Score >= 100) | Verdict := "CRITICAL - multi-stage SignDrop chain" ;
test(Score >= 50) | Verdict := "HIGH - strong single indicator" ;
* | Verdict := "REVIEW" ;
}
| match(file="aid_master_main.csv", field=aid, include=[ComputerName], strict=false)
| FirstSeen := formatTime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", field=FirstEpoch, timezone="UTC")
| LastSeen := formatTime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", field=LastEpoch, timezone="UTC")
| table([Verdict, Score, DistinctIndicators, ComputerName, aid, FirstSeen, LastSeen, IndicatorDetail], sortby=Score, order=desc, limit=1000)r/crowdstrike • u/MrPain__ • 9d ago
Hi All
Nice easy one for you and you can help settle an internal bet!
If you are using SOAR workflows to create tickets in something like Jira, do you need 1 workflow per detection type.
For example, Detection > NS-SIEM, Detection > Identity Detection, Detection > EPP Detection.
Or does just having the NG -SIEM trigger cover all of it.
Thanks in advance!
r/crowdstrike • u/BradW-CS • 11d ago
r/crowdstrike • u/HanSolo71 • 11d ago
Please let me know if these aren't wanted. I've got about 15 more parsers I'll be building over the next few weeks, and I plan on posting them all because parsers aren't talked about that much. If I don't get pushback, ill keep posting new parsers I build.
Using an LLM, I built a parser for some common logs in syslog, and if the log type isn't known, it just gives you the raw syslog.
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
// 3g. kernel: UFW, AppArmor, OOM killer
process.name = "kernel"
| event.dataset := "linux.kernel"
| case {
message = /\[UFW (?<event.action>[A-Z ]+)\] IN=(?<Vendor.in_interface>\S*) OUT=(?<Vendor.out_interface>\S*).*? SRC=(?<source.ip>\S+) DST=(?<destination.ip>\S+).*? PROTO=(?<network.transport>\S+)(?: SPT=(?<source.port>\d+) DPT=(?<destination.port>\d+))?/
| event.dataset := "linux.ufw"
| network.transport := lower(network.transport)
| event.category[0] := "network" | event.type[0] := "connection"
| case { event.action = "BLOCK" | event.type[1] := "denied" | event.outcome := "failure";
event.action = "ALLOW" | event.type[1] := "allowed" | event.outcome := "success";
* | event.type[1] := "info"; };
message = /apparmor="(?<Vendor.apparmor_status>[A-Z_]+)" operation="(?<event.action>[^"]+)"/
| event.dataset := "linux.apparmor"
| event.category[0] := "intrusion_detection"
| case { Vendor.apparmor_status = "DENIED" | event.type[0] := "denied" | event.outcome := "failure";
* | event.type[0] := "info"; }
| case { message = /profile="(?<Vendor.apparmor_profile>[^"]+)"/ ; * ; }
| case { message = /\sname="(?<file.path>[^"]+)"/ ; * ; }
| case { message = /\spid=(?<Vendor.target_pid>\d+)/ ; * ; }
| case { message = /comm="(?<Vendor.target_comm>[^"]+)"/ ; * ; };
message = /Out of memory: Killed process (?<Vendor.target_pid>\d+) \((?<Vendor.target_name>[^)]+)\)/
| event.action := "oom-kill"
| event.category[0] := "process" | event.type[0] := "end";
* ;
};
// 3h. sshd (auth.log); OpenSSH 9.8+ also logs as sshd-session
process.name = /^sshd(-session)?$/
| event.dataset := "linux.sshd"
| case {
message = /^(?<Vendor.ssh_result>Accepted|Failed) (?<Vendor.auth_method>\S+) for (?:invalid user )?(?<user.name>\S+) from (?<source.ip>[0-9a-fA-F:.]+) port (?<source.port>\d+)/
| event.action := "ssh-login"
| event.category[0] := "authentication" | event.type[0] := "start"
| case { Vendor.ssh_result = "Accepted" | event.outcome := "success";
* | event.outcome := "failure"; };
message = /^Invalid user (?<user.name>\S*) from (?<source.ip>[0-9a-fA-F:.]+)(?: port (?<source.port>\d+))?/
| event.action := "ssh-invalid-user"
| event.category[0] := "authentication" | event.type[0] := "info" | event.outcome := "failure";
message = /^Disconnected from (?:invalid |authenticating )?user (?<user.name>\S+) (?<source.ip>[0-9a-fA-F:.]+) port (?<source.port>\d+)/
| event.action := "ssh-disconnect"
| event.category[0] := "session" | event.type[0] := "end";
* ;
};
// 3i. sudo (auth.log)
process.name = "sudo"
| message = /^\s*(?<user.name>\S+) : (?:(?<Vendor.sudo_error>[^;]+?) ; )?TTY=(?<Vendor.tty>\S+) ; PWD=(?<process.working_directory>.+?) ; USER=(?<user.effective.name>\S+) ;(?: .*?;)? COMMAND=(?<process.command_line>.*)$/
| event.dataset := "linux.sudo"
| event.action := "sudo-command"
| event.category[0] := "process" | event.type[0] := "start"
| case { Vendor.sudo_error = * | event.outcome := "failure";
* | event.outcome := "success"; };
// 3j. su (auth.log)
process.name = "su"
| event.dataset := "linux.su"
| case {
message = /^\(to (?<user.effective.name>\S+)\) (?<user.name>\S+) on (?<Vendor.tty>\S+)/
| event.action := "su" | event.outcome := "success"
| event.category[0] := "authentication" | event.type[0] := "start";
message = /^FAILED SU \(to (?<user.effective.name>\S+)\) (?<user.name>\S+) on (?<Vendor.tty>\S+)/
| event.action := "su" | event.outcome := "failure"
| event.category[0] := "authentication" | event.type[0] := "start";
* ;
};
// 3k. useradd / groupadd (auth.log)
process.name = "useradd"
| message = /^new user: name=(?<user.target.name>[^,]+), UID=(?<user.target.id>\d+), GID=(?<group.id>\d+), home=(?<Vendor.home>[^,]+), shell=(?<Vendor.shell>[^,]+)/
| event.dataset := "linux.accounts" | event.action := "user-created"
| event.category[0] := "iam" | event.type[0] := "creation" | event.type[1] := "user";
process.name = "groupadd"
| message = /^new group: name=(?<group.name>[^,]+), GID=(?<group.id>\d+)/
| event.dataset := "linux.accounts" | event.action := "group-created"
| event.category[0] := "iam" | event.type[0] := "creation" | event.type[1] := "group";
// All other programs: header fields only
* ;
}
// 4. Schema validation defaults: fill event.category[0] / event.type[0]
// when no branch above set them (missing or empty)
// (values must be from the ECS allowed lists, so generic lines use host / info)
| default(field="event.category[0]", value="host", replaceEmpty=true)
| default(field="event.type[0]", value="info", replaceEmpty=true)
// 5. Final safety net: never drop an event
// If nothing above produced a usable message, copy the raw line into it
// and mark the event as unparsed. is always kept as ingested.
| case {
message = /\S/ ;
* | message := // ------------------------------------------------------------------
// 3g. kernel: UFW, AppArmor, OOM killer
process.name = "kernel"
| event.dataset := "linux.kernel"
| case {
message = /\[UFW (?<event.action>[A-Z ]+)\] IN=(?<Vendor.in_interface>\S*) OUT=(?<Vendor.out_interface>\S*).*? SRC=(?<source.ip>\S+) DST=(?<destination.ip>\S+).*? PROTO=(?<network.transport>\S+)(?: SPT=(?<source.port>\d+) DPT=(?<destination.port>\d+))?/
| event.dataset := "linux.ufw"
| network.transport := lower(network.transport)
| event.category[0] := "network" | event.type[0] := "connection"
| case { event.action = "BLOCK" | event.type[1] := "denied" | event.outcome := "failure";
event.action = "ALLOW" | event.type[1] := "allowed" | event.outcome := "success";
* | event.type[1] := "info"; };
message = /apparmor="(?<Vendor.apparmor_status>[A-Z_]+)" operation="(?<event.action>[^"]+)"/
| event.dataset := "linux.apparmor"
| event.category[0] := "intrusion_detection"
| case { Vendor.apparmor_status = "DENIED" | event.type[0] := "denied" | event.outcome := "failure";
* | event.type[0] := "info"; }
| case { message = /profile="(?<Vendor.apparmor_profile>[^"]+)"/ ; * ; }
| case { message = /\sname="(?<file.path>[^"]+)"/ ; * ; }
| case { message = /\spid=(?<Vendor.target_pid>\d+)/ ; * ; }
| case { message = /comm="(?<Vendor.target_comm>[^"]+)"/ ; * ; };
message = /Out of memory: Killed process (?<Vendor.target_pid>\d+) \((?<Vendor.target_name>[^)]+)\)/
| event.action := "oom-kill"
| event.category[0] := "process" | event.type[0] := "end";
* ;
};
// 3h. sshd (auth.log); OpenSSH 9.8+ also logs as sshd-session
process.name = /^sshd(-session)?$/
| event.dataset := "linux.sshd"
| case {
message = /^(?<Vendor.ssh_result>Accepted|Failed) (?<Vendor.auth_method>\S+) for (?:invalid user )?(?<user.name>\S+) from (?<source.ip>[0-9a-fA-F:.]+) port (?<source.port>\d+)/
| event.action := "ssh-login"
| event.category[0] := "authentication" | event.type[0] := "start"
| case { Vendor.ssh_result = "Accepted" | event.outcome := "success";
* | event.outcome := "failure"; };
message = /^Invalid user (?<user.name>\S*) from (?<source.ip>[0-9a-fA-F:.]+)(?: port (?<source.port>\d+))?/
| event.action := "ssh-invalid-user"
| event.category[0] := "authentication" | event.type[0] := "info" | event.outcome := "failure";
message = /^Disconnected from (?:invalid |authenticating )?user (?<user.name>\S+) (?<source.ip>[0-9a-fA-F:.]+) port (?<source.port>\d+)/
| event.action := "ssh-disconnect"
| event.category[0] := "session" | event.type[0] := "end";
* ;
};
// 3i. sudo (auth.log)
process.name = "sudo"
| message = /^\s*(?<user.name>\S+) : (?:(?<Vendor.sudo_error>[^;]+?) ; )?TTY=(?<Vendor.tty>\S+) ; PWD=(?<process.working_directory>.+?) ; USER=(?<user.effective.name>\S+) ;(?: .*?;)? COMMAND=(?<process.command_line>.*)$/
| event.dataset := "linux.sudo"
| event.action := "sudo-command"
| event.category[0] := "process" | event.type[0] := "start"
| case { Vendor.sudo_error = * | event.outcome := "failure";
* | event.outcome := "success"; };
// 3j. su (auth.log)
process.name = "su"
| event.dataset := "linux.su"
| case {
message = /^\(to (?<user.effective.name>\S+)\) (?<user.name>\S+) on (?<Vendor.tty>\S+)/
| event.action := "su" | event.outcome := "success"
| event.category[0] := "authentication" | event.type[0] := "start";
message = /^FAILED SU \(to (?<user.effective.name>\S+)\) (?<user.name>\S+) on (?<Vendor.tty>\S+)/
| event.action := "su" | event.outcome := "failure"
| event.category[0] := "authentication" | event.type[0] := "start";
* ;
};
// 3k. useradd / groupadd (auth.log)
process.name = "useradd"
| message = /^new user: name=(?<user.target.name>[^,]+), UID=(?<user.target.id>\d+), GID=(?<group.id>\d+), home=(?<Vendor.home>[^,]+), shell=(?<Vendor.shell>[^,]+)/
| event.dataset := "linux.accounts" | event.action := "user-created"
| event.category[0] := "iam" | event.type[0] := "creation" | event.type[1] := "user";
process.name = "groupadd"
| message = /^new group: name=(?<group.name>[^,]+), GID=(?<group.id>\d+)/
| event.dataset := "linux.accounts" | event.action := "group-created"
| event.category[0] := "iam" | event.type[0] := "creation" | event.type[1] := "group";
// All other programs: header fields only
* ;
}
// 4. Schema validation defaults: fill event.category[0] / event.type[0]
// when no branch above set them (missing or empty)
// (values must be from the ECS allowed lists, so generic lines use host / info)
| default(field="event.category[0]", value="host", replaceEmpty=true)
| default(field="event.type[0]", value="info", replaceEmpty=true)
// 5. Final safety net: never drop an event
// If nothing above produced a usable message, copy the raw line into it
// and mark the event as unparsed. is always kept as ingested.
| case {
message = /\S/ ;
* | message := u/rawstring
| Vendor.parse_status := "unparsed"
| event.dataset := "linux.syslog.unknown";
}
| Vendor.parse_status := "unparsed"
| event.dataset := "linux.syslog.unknown";
}This helps make syslog events searchable and allows you to create visualizations and advanced queries in the SIEM.
This will transform your raw syslog into this:
#Cps.version:1.0.0
#ecs.version:8.11.0
#event.dataset:linux.syslog
#event.kind:event
#event.module:syslog
#repo:3pi_auto_raptor_1794358557176
#repo.cid:7ed24ffd469d4f5faa5f776a43d98e04
#type:custom-UbuntuSyslog
#Vendor:linux
@collect.file:/var/log/syslog
@collect.host:server.company.lan
@collect.id:dcf71103dc1a-481e-843f-23a120455801
@collect.source_name:ubuntusyslog @collect.source_type:file
@collect.timestamp:1794415096757 @collect.timezone:CST
@dataConnectionID:f9956842e0914ef58a60b28f2281c8f0
@dataConnectionReceiveID:c1db6edefab0278491e1c1fd4d45884c
@dataConnectionReceiveTimestamp:1794415096991
@id:U1UNosRv3NRki4KNYTwub1y8_97_369_1794415096
@ingesttimestamp:1794415097042
@rawstring:2026-11-11T10:38:16.684928-06:00 server lab-agent\[1117\]:b163835a-0c49-46f5-adba-169252d0b8e6: keepalive timeout - closing stale session
@source:PlatformEvents @sourcetype:custom-UbuntuSyslog
@timestamp:1794415096684
@timestamp.nanos:928000
@timezone:-06:00
event.category\[0\]:host
event.type\[0\]:info
host.hostname:server
host.name:server
message:b163835a-0c49-46f5-adba-169252d0b8e6: keepalive timeout - closing stale session
Parser.version:1.2.0
process.name:lab-agent
process.pid:1117
Vendor.syslog\
_timestamp:2026-11-11T10:38:16.684928-06:00r/crowdstrike • u/Mier409 • 11d ago
Please, has anyone successfully set up the Fusion SOAR Domain Tools integration? We have everything set up but cannot figure out how to parse the data into an email. If anyone has successfully done this, please let me know.
r/crowdstrike • u/sudosusudo • 11d ago
Has anyone managed to deploy an agent via CoPilot Studio with the CrowdStrike managed MCP server configured as a tool? Is it supported?
I’ve had a go but not having much luck, and the docs are still anaemic on the subject.
r/crowdstrike • u/BradW-CS • 12d ago
r/crowdstrike • u/HanSolo71 • 12d ago
Thought this might be useful to others. I'm using this to turn the various Syslog fields of FreeRADIUS into searchable fields in the SIEM.
// FreeRADIUS radius.log parser - Falcon Next-Gen SIEM / LogScale
// Parser.version 1.0.0
// 1. Static metadata (CPS)
Vendor := "freeradius"
| event.module := "freeradius"
| event.kind := "event"
| event.dataset := "freeradius.log"
| observer.vendor := "FreeRADIUS"
| observer.product := "FreeRADIUS"
| ecs.version := "8.11.0"
| Cps.version := "1.0.0"
| Parser.version := "1.0.0"
// 2. Common prefix: timestamp, level, request ID, message
| case {
= /(?:(?<_ts>(?:Mon|Tue|Wed|Thu|Fri|Sat|Sun)\s+[A-Z][a-z]{2}\s+\d{1,2}\s+\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}\s+\d{4})\s+:\s+)?(?:(?<_lvl>Auth|Info|Error|ERROR|Warn|WARNING|Proxy|Debug):\s+)?\((?<_reqid>\d+)\)\s+(?<_msg>.*)$/ ;
= /(?:(?<_ts>(?:Mon|Tue|Wed|Thu|Fri|Sat|Sun)\s+[A-Z][a-z]{2}\s+\d{1,2}\s+\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}\s+\d{4})\s+:\s+)?(?<_lvl>Auth|Info|Error|ERROR|Warn|WARNING|Proxy|Debug):\s+(?<_msg>.*)$/ ;
* | _msg := u/rawstring ;
}
// 3. Timestamp (FreeRADIUS writes local time with no zone)
| case {
_ts = *
| _ts := replace(regex=" +", with=" ", field=_ts)
| parseTimestamp(format="EEE MMM d HH:mm:ss yyyy", field=_ts, timezone="America/Detroit") ;
* ;
}
| case { _lvl = * | lower(field=_lvl, as=log.level) ; * ; }
// 4. Authentication results
| case {
_msg = /(?<_result>Login OK|Login incorrect|Invalid user)(?:\s+\((?<_reason>.*?)\))?:\s+\[(?<_user>[^\]]*)\]\s+\(from client\s+(?<_client>\S+)\s+port\s+(?<_port>\S+)(?:\s+cli\s+(?<_cli>[^\s)]+))?(?:\s+via\s+(?<_via>[^)]+))?\)/
| event.dataset := "freeradius.auth"
| array:append(array="event.category[]", values=["authentication"])
| radius.result := _result
| case {
_result = "Login OK"
| event.outcome := "success"
| event.action := "login-ok"
| array:append(array="event.type[]", values=["start"]) ;
_result = "Login incorrect"
| event.outcome := "failure"
| event.action := "login-incorrect"
| array:append(array="event.type[]", values=["info"]) ;
*
| event.outcome := "failure"
| event.action := "invalid-user"
| array:append(array="event.type[]", values=["info"]) ;
}
// [user], [user/password] or [user/<via Auth-Type = eap>]
| _user = /^(?<_uname>[^\/]*)(?:\/(?<_after>.*))?$/
| user.name := _uname
| case {
_after = /^<(?<_hint>.*)>$/ | radius.auth_type_hint := _hint ;
* ; // anything else after "/" is a logged password: never stored
}
// Normalise MAC to ECS format (E6-0A-41-89-97-38)
| case {
_cli = /^(?:[0-9A-Fa-f]{2}[:\-]){5}[0-9A-Fa-f]{2}$/
| _mac := replace(regex=":", with="-", field=_cli)
| upper(field=_mac, as=source.mac) ;
* ;
} ;
* ;
}
// 5. Final field names and cleanup
| rename(field=[[_reqid, radius.request_id], [_msg, message], [_reason, event.reason], [_client, radius.client.shortname], [_port, radius.nas_port], [_cli, radius.calling_station_id], [_via, radius.tunnel]])
| drop([_ts, _lvl, _result, _user, _uname, _after, _hint, _mac])