r/CredibleDefense • • Mar 14 '15

Oops: US Close-Air Support Bomb Doesn’t Fit on the F-35

Thumbnail
thediplomat.com
0 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • Feb 12 '24

Planning for the Aftermath - Assessing Options for U.S. Strategy Toward Russia After the Ukraine War

8 Upvotes

Planning for the Aftermath - Assessing Options for U.S. Strategy Toward Russia After the Ukraine War

by Samuel Charap, Miranda Priebe

A new Rand analysis of post-war alternate realities. I find this kind of thought exercise fascinating if for no other reason than because it refocuses our attention from short-term war highlights (Avdiivka, the number of tanks lost) to the real long-term effects (does the USA benefit from a longer war, what will the Russia-China relationship look like).

Rand analyses four alternative futures, i.e. four combinations of: 1) less favourable post-war world and 2) more favourable world with a) hardline US postwar approach and b) less hardline approach.

Main observations

- A longer, more violent war would have long-term and likely irreversible adverse consequences for U.S. interests

- The United States may be able to influence the conflict outcome to promote its long-term interests.

- U.S. policy during and after the war can reduce the risk of Russia-Ukraine conflict recurrence.

- A hardline postwar U.S. strategy in Europe could make conflict with Russia more—not less—likely.

- This assessment assumes that U.S.-Russia conflict would result from Moscow’s assertive responses to hardline policies, not opportunistic aggression.

- Closer Russia-China ties may be irreversible.

- Some postwar divides within NATO might prove more significant for the United States than others. [This sounds a bit woolly. It essentially means that after the war the USA can afford to pursue policies that would anger Eastern European NATO allies because those allies cannot afford to quit NATO]

Conclusion

This alternative futures analysis suggests that U.S. policy choices both during the Russia-Ukraine war and immediately after can have significant effects on long-term U.S. interests. With so much uncertainty about the trajectory of the war as of this writing, the policy debate is likely to focus on immediate and urgent decisions rather than postwar planning. But putting off these considerations could be counterproductive for the United States. Our analysis indicates that wartime choices could shape the postwar world; not taking these longer-term factors into consideration could lead to missed opportunities to shape the postwar environment. Moreover, the choices that will have to be made in the immediate aftermath of the war can have ripple effects on many long-term U.S. interests, and these effects are not straight-forward. Policymakers thus need time long before the war ends to consider these choices. We hope that this analysis can help start that process of long-term planning.

Samuel Charap is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. His research interests include the foreign policies of Russia and the former Soviet states; European and Eurasian regional security; and U.S.-Russia deterrence, strategic stability, and arms control.

From November 2012 until April 2017, Charap was the senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Prior to joining the IISS, he served at the U.S. Department of State as senior advisor to the undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security and on the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff, covering Russia and Eurasia. From 2009 to 2011, Charap was director for Russia and Eurasia at the Center for American Progress.

Charap's book on the Ukraine crisis, Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia (coauthored with Timothy Colton), was published in January 2017. His articles have appeared in The Washington Quarterly, Foreign Affairs, Survival, Current History, and several other journals.

Charap was a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center and the International Center for Policy Studies (Kyiv), and a Fulbright Scholar at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. He is fluent in Russian and proficient in Ukrainian. Charap holds a Ph.D. in political science and an M.Phil. in Russian and East European studies from the University of Oxford, where he was a Marshall Scholar. He received his B.A. in Russian and political science from Amherst College. He is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Miranda Priebe is director of the Center for Analysis of U.S. Grand Strategy and a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation.
Her work at RAND has focused on grand strategy, the future of the international order, effects of U.S. forward presence, military doctrine, history of U.S. military policy, distributed air operations, and multi-domain command and control. She has also conducted research on deterrence, reassurance, threat perceptions, rising powers, alliance politics, and U.S. defense budgets. Priebe received a Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She also received a Master of Public Affairs degree from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School and S.B. degrees in physics and political science from MIT.


r/CredibleDefense • • Mar 09 '24

Analyzing Russian Banzai Tactics: Meat Trickles Eroding Ukrainian Defenses (translation of article by Yigal Levin, Israeli military officer)

0 Upvotes

Why do Russians sometimes conduct banzai attacks with many very small groups acting separately? Literally, as squads, not even platoon-sized forces.

One reason is as a way to avoid a chain reaction during panic. The discipline of Russian soldiers is maintained through violence - they fear their own more than the Ukrainians. But when ending up in terrifying situations, when they start getting killed in bunches even just on the approaches, like targets, it has been noticed that when in a large group, they try to retreat, abandoning the lines they managed to reach, exposing themselves to attack even more.

The saying "everyone ran away, so I ran too" perfectly describes this phenomenon. Panic is wildly contagious and works with large formations. When hell is going on around you on the battlefield, and you have no idea what's just to your left or right, finding out that someone over there is taking off gives you the stimulus to try to get out of that hell as quickly as possible too. Like, those guys over there are running away, so if they're running, maybe it's an order and I just didn't hear it, or they found out something we don't know, or there's going to be such mayhem here soon and they know about it, and I'm not an idiot to stay alone.

Panic, started by one or two, can easily spread through a chain reaction to large formations. Entire platoons and companies can easily flee, abandoning their positions. Incidentally, this is precisely why in all armies and times, the harshest punishment - from execution on the spot to strict repression and tribunals - was given to panickers and cowards.

But if you break up the advancing units into tiny groups of 2-5 people, then panic simply cannot spread beyond that squad. Moreover, it's easy to run when in a crowd, when no one will figure it out anyway. Again, the psychology of "everyone ran away, so I ran too" kicks in. But when you have a tiny squad of just a man or two, then in a crisis situation where you could die, the opposite biological mechanisms kick in, like hiding, hunkering down, going to ground, helping your comrade-in-arms.

This is precisely what Russian officers are counting on. Those tiny groups who survived and reached a point should secure it and wait for the next tiny group and then another. Not one huge meat wave, but a trickle of meat - by that logic, a constant drip hollows out the stone. Meaty drips slowly erode the Ukrainian defense.

Moreover, if at the new point among the corpses and piles of burnt iron, say, two survived, Ukrainians may pay less attention to it, like, two bums, the drone operators will soon finish them off anyway. But at night, two more join them, and by morning there are already ten of them, and there they are, deep in their new holes, and it turns out that the foothold has been taken, the Russian forces advanced another couple hundred meters.

Russian officers are experimenting with their meat waves, breaking them up into meaty droplets and trickles.

Link to OP: https://t.me/yigal_levin/63526


r/CredibleDefense • • Mar 31 '22

John Mearsheimer on why the West is principally responsible for the Ukrainian crisis

Thumbnail
economist.com
0 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • Aug 31 '23

OPINION The Case for Negotiating with Russia - Samuel Charap is asking Ukraine and its allies to consider how much worse the war could get.

Thumbnail
newyorker.com
0 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • Sep 13 '23

US Diplomacy after the Russo-Ukrainian War - War on the Rocks

0 Upvotes

A very good article with (in my opinion) a completely quixotic goal - advising an administration long-steeped in an illusion of its own omnipotence to change its way. To act flexibly, make deals where it can, on what issues it can. Offer concessions to get concessions. Ignore ideological differences and democratic deficits to achieve common tangible goals.

A cynic might argue that had Washington been capable of implementing such an approach, we wouldn't be in this crisis to begin with.

US Diplomacy after the Russo-Ukrainian War

by Kelly McFarland, Chester Crocker and Ryan Conner

- The new strategic environment is defined by a global diffusion of power, where the agency and importance of middle powers have risen in tandem.

- The new assertiveness from the BRICS, coming on the heels of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, demonstrates the changing global landscape in which the United States is now competing.

- Emerging dynamics fall into three broad categories:

  1. Previously known but have now been cast in sharper focus, like the rise of a new non-aligned movement, the limits of Western sanctions, economic regionalization, and an increase in cross-border challenges such as food insecurity.

  2. The trends that revealed Russia’s aggression and the world’s reaction - the collective investment in security organizations such as NATO and Russia’s slipping grasp on its traditional area of influence

  3. Black swan events.

- Middle powers and regional groupings have bucked U.S. or Russian attempts to win over their exclusive support, instead forging their own paths. India is a clear example.

- Security-wise, India is closely aligned with the West. Yet India refuses to align with the USA over the war in Ukraine.

- African countries have become stronger independent players in the international system and, as a result, few have aligned with the West on the war in Ukraine.

- Middle powers are not a homogenous grouping of necessarily like-minded states. These nations and blocs use different tools and levers of power to exercise their own agency.

- The linchpin of any successful US diplomatic strategy moving forward will be a special emphasis on multilateral diplomacy. The USA should not seek explicit commitments to stand by the US, but should show flexibility.

- Assembling a plurality of powers will require the difficult work of coalition building with the emerging middle powers and their divergent interests.

- First, the State Department should focus more on training multilateral diplomats. U.S. diplomats at all levels should be familiar with multilateral, consensus-driven negotiations and understand their nuanced dynamics. [in other words, the State Department should somehow produce the one set of skills that the US diplomacy never, ever had in its long history].

- Second, the United States should continue to support U.N. Security Council reform.

- Finally, the United States should embrace variable geometry in its coalition building efforts. In practice, this would involve working within existing institutions and forming ad hoc coalitions to corral states with a shared interest without necessarily requiring agreement on other core issues.

Kelly M. McFarland is a U.S. diplomatic historian and the director of programs and research at Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. He also hosts the institute’s Diplomatic Immunity podcast. Prior to Georgetown, he served in the U.S. Department of State as an intelligence analyst.

Chester A. Crocker is professor emeritus of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and distinguished fellow at its Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. A former assistant secretary of state for African affairs, he subsequently served as chairman and board member at the U.S. Institute of Peace for 20 years.

Ryan Conner is a research and communications associate at Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. He recently completed an MA in European Studies in the School of Foreign Service.


r/CredibleDefense • • Feb 21 '23

The Persistence of Great-Power Politics

7 Upvotes

The Persistence of Great-Power Politics

Emma Ashford argues that it is crucially important not to misdiagnose the war in Ukraine as a triumph f US policy - if policymakers view the war in Ukraine as such they will be more likely to make similar mistakes elsewhere. And as the United States enters a period of growing contestation over the borders of the Western sphere of influence, and how it will interact with those of Russia and China, learning the correct lessons from Ukraine could not be more urgent.

  • The war in Ukraine is—if not precisely a deterrence failure for the United States—then at least a clear failure of U.S. policy decisions over the last few decades to maintain peace in Europe. It is certainly true that the war has shown the West’s willingness to confront the return of power politics. But it has also shown the practical limitations of that strategy.

  • The last year has been not a refutation of a world of rivalry, great-power competition, or spheres of influence, as some have described it, but rather a demonstration of what all these look like in practice. It proves that the United States cannot always deter a resolute revisionist state without bearing unacceptably high costs and risks.

  • If Washington knew all along that the odds of preventing conflict were slim—and that the United States would not directly engage—then why did they not consider other policy options, such as offering a moratorium on admitting Ukraine to NATO? Why continue to play such an exceptionally poor hand in the hope it would deter Russian action?

  • It would take a truly blinkered view of the region to argue that the inflexible policies pursued by U.S. policymakers in eastern Europe over the last few decades played no role at all in the run-up to the war. The unwillingness to contemplate any alternative path for Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and other states contributed to a toxic stew of political disputes, security fears, and imperialist ambition that ultimately brought the region to the brink of war.

  • In a broader geopolitical sense, the war in Ukraine marks the return of contestation over spheres of influence in world politics.

  • U.S. policymakers had ceased to recognize spheres of influence “not because the concept had become obsolete" but because "the entire world had become a de facto American sphere.”

  • Today, however, the world is entering a period of contestation over the limits of American power, as Russia and China are increasingly capable of asserting their own interests in the areas nearest to their borders.

Emma Ashford was a resident senior fellow with the New American Engagement Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, which focused on challenging the prevailing assumptions governing US foreign policy and sought to develop effective solutions that preserved America’s security and prosperity. She was also a nonresident fellow at the Modern War Institute at West Point.

Emma’s work focused on questions of grand strategy, international security, and the future of US foreign policy. She had expertise in the politics of Russia, Europe, and the Middle East.

Previously, she was a research fellow in defense and foreign policy at the Cato Institute, where she worked on a variety of issues including the US-Saudi relationship, sanctions policy, US policy towards Russia, and US foreign policy and grand strategy more broadly. She founded and co-hosted the Power Problems podcast. Her long-form writing has been featured in publications such as Foreign Affairs, the Texas National Security Review, and Strategic Studies Quarterly, and her opinion writing has been featured in the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, Foreign Policy, Vox, The National Interest, and War on the Rocks, among others.

Ashford writes a bi-weekly column, “It’s Debatable,” for Foreign Policy, and is a regular contributor to Inkstick. She is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and holds a PhD in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia.


r/CredibleDefense • • Jan 26 '25

Is engaging an unarmed enemy with an FPV or bomber drone considered a war crime? What if the enemy is surrendering but can't be detained?

3 Upvotes

I've come across a multitude of videos on various sites that show Ukranian drone operators engaging either unarmed or seemingly surrendering combatants. A variety of people are claiming or dismissing that doing so is a war crime so I was hoping that the people in this subreddit could shed some light on it.
Here's some examples as to what I mean, I'd appreciate it if someone could affirm whether the videos are considered war crimes or not -
https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1gyac7l/final_moments_of_encounter_between_fpv_drone_and/
https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1gaj2ea/ukrainian_kamikaze_drone_hits_a_group_of_russian/
https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/comments/1cvksxy/ukrainian_fpv_drone_takes_out_3_wounded_russian/
https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/comments/16os33s/russian_soldier_begs_for_mercy_from_a_ukrainian/


r/CredibleDefense • • Nov 22 '21

This Scientist Explains Why Israel's Iron Dome Is Overrated

Thumbnail
defenseone.com
3 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • May 14 '24

China's defense policy and potential conflict

0 Upvotes

I've skimmed through some posts about Chinese military affairs, and there are just too many errors and biases. Let me give you an introduction to the current Chinese military and military strategy from the perspective of Chinese themselves. (My English is not very good, so my expression may not be fluent or clear enough, and there may even be mistakes).

In 2015, the top command believed that the previous military management and command system lacked clear division of functions and specialization, making it difficult to efficiently coordinate operations among different services. It was also inadequate for coping with high-tech warfare between major powers and high-intensity localized conflicts under conditions of informatization. Without improving the command structure, the PLA's combat capability would be severely restricted. Subsequently, the PLA began implementing reforms. The goal of the reform is to adapt to informationized warfare by assigning military management and operational command to different services and theaters, allowing each theater and service to focus on its own development and thus enhancing the overall combat effectiveness of the entire military.

I. Overall Strategy

China's defense policy is defensive in nature. The government stated in its 2019 white paper, "We will never threaten any country or seek any sphere of influence." It pursues a policy of not being the first to use nuclear weapons and does not participate in any military alliances. This is different from the Soviet Union. Although both are socialist countries, China, unlike the Soviet Union, does not seek global military presence or pursue "world revolution." For us Chinese, ideology is not important; reality is what matters. Under the central strategy of "centering on economic development," China's defense strategy is destined to be defensive in nature.

II. Potential Conflict

The only region where large-scale conflict could potentially occur in China is Taiwan.

The military is working to build Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities to prevent U.S. military intervention in China.

Although foreigners like to refer to China and Taiwan separately, this is incorrect for both the CCP and the Taiwanese authorities. Regardless of whether it is the "People's Republic of China" or the "Republic of China," Taiwan is a province, because they both claim sovereignty over the entire territory of China. In their dealings with other countries, they all demand one or the other. That is where the “one China” principle comes from, that is, you can only choose between the Chinese Communist Government and the Taiwan authorities.

This situation stems from the civil war many years ago, in which the Kuomintang government lost all internal provinces except Taiwan Province. You can see today's conflict between Taiwan and the mainland as a continuation of that civil war.

The CCP has always tried to achieve true national unity, even nominally (one country, two systems allows Taiwan to retain its military and all political systems unchanged, only requiring the Taiwanese authorities to recognize themselves as a local government, while the CCP is the legitimate central government). However, obviously, this has not been smooth. The Taiwanese authorities are unwilling to accept only becoming a local government, even nominally.

If you were to ask me whether the mainland would attack Taiwan? My answer is I don't know. As long as Taiwan is still called the "Republic of China" and remains within the framework of "One China," not seeking to become a "Taiwan Republic" hostile to China, then armed conflict is unlikely to occur. As long as Taiwan nominally belongs to China, its ideology and system are something we don't particularly care about. If the "Republic of China" in Taiwan seeks to become a "Taiwan Republic" and willingly becomes a forward military base for the United States against China (Taiwan is only a hundred kilometers away from the mainland's heartland, and even deploying short-range weapons there would pose a huge threat), Then there's a possibility of war.

However, both sides have been calling out to each other for 70 years—whether it's the CCP aiming to reunify Taiwan Province or Taiwan planning to counterattack and unify China. So, who knows?

This is an analysis from a historical and geopolitical perspective. "Freedom" and "democracy" are good things, but this is not the real conflict between Taiwan and the mainland. That's all I'm going to write, and sometime I can talk more about how the Chinese view U.S. military actions and the strategic goals and approaches taken.


r/CredibleDefense • • Aug 17 '22

Taiwan's Pyromania, or a follow-up to "Dispelling the Myth of Taiwan Military Competency"

48 Upvotes

"The greatest tragedy of defence-reddit has been the memeification of it."

I am writing this post for two reasons. First, so I have a place to compile my thoughts regarding Taiwan and China that I can link to when they tell me that the ROCA could beat the PLA. And second, out of respect and a desire to expand upon a previous post that I very much admire.

The Democratic Progressive Party - A Struggling Identity

To begin any discussion of Taiwan's current situation requires a discussion of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Informally formed in the 1980s during the authoritarian rule of the KMT, the DPP won early success by not being the party that enacted brutal massacres from 1946 to the 1980s, but as that faded from public consciousness they needed a way to stay relevant. During the 1990s, the DPP struggled with the question of what kind of party it should become, emerging in the 2000s as a pro-independence party. Curriculum in schools emphasized the separate cultural identity of Taiwan, which was explicitly different from the previous Chinese identity that the KMT pushed. In September 2007, the DPP passed a resolution that called for the establishment of a separate Republic of Taiwan and a new constitution. This was the result of a power struggle during the 2005 election that saw the pro-independence faction within the DPP win out over moderates. In 2008, another shakeup saw current party leader Tsai Ing-wen rise to power, who at the time was a moderate.

The Umbrella Movement - Tsai's Big Break

In 2016, the DPP won a majority in the Legislative Yuan, and current President Tsai Ing-wen won the concurrent presidential election. President Tsai was initially elected due to dissatisfaction from Taiwanese voters, winning over half the vote. However, once in power, she struggled to remain relevant, and her popularity slipped as a result. In other words, she faced the very real possibility that she could be a single term president. The opposition, the KMT, were making very real accusations that she was ineffectual. Then came her big break.

There are two important facts that everyone glosses over when it comes to the 2019 Hong Kong protests. First, that it started because of a murder. And second, that Taiwan antagonised the situation, possibly on purpose.

In February of 2018, a Hong Kong couple went on vacation to Taiwan. While there, the woman, who was 3 months pregnant, revealed to her boyfriend that she was cheating on him and that the child was not theirs. The man killed her, hid her body at a train station, and then returns to Hong Kong, emptying her bank account while there. He is quickly caught by HKPD and confesses to the murder, who reach out to the Taipei Police Department. They find the body. However, because the murder and evidence are in Taipei, the murderer would need to be extradited. This resulted in the need for an extradition treaty between Taiwan and Hong Kong. The treaty would have given precedence to Taiwanese statehood. Hong Kong and Taiwan waffled back and forth until the Legislative Council came up with a bright idea - why not allow the Chief Executive to approve extraditions to countries without a treaty on a case by case basis? However, by the end of 2018, this bright idea turned into a rumor that HK would draft an extradition treaty with the mainland. This of course blew up into the 2019 protests.

Taiwan is not innocent in this, however. At the peak of the protests, a priest in the mainland offered to retrieve the murderer and bring him to Taiwan. The deal seemed to work, until Taipei torpedoed it at the 11th hour, stating that any extradition would need to go through "proper diplomatic channels"; in essence, HK would need to recognise the idea of a separate Taiwanese state.

Some rather interesting slogans were also used in the protests as well. One of the rallying cries, "Restore Hong Kong, revolution of our times" was parroted by the New Power Party, a Taiwanese pro-military independence party. Additionally, the way the second half of that slogan is read, 时代革命, sounds a lot like "New Power Revolution." Very similar, no? Even if the NPP wasn't directly assisting or otherwise influencing the HK protesters, it's obvious that they drew inspiration from them.

Anyways, conspiracy theory or not, for what it's worth, Tsai rode the wave of popularity from the HK protests. In early 2019, her campaign was still centered around the same economic issues that she had consistently failed to solve. But by the time January 2020 rolled around, her campaign rhetoric had shifted to a far more pro-independence tone, ignoring her economic problems and allowing her to achieve a very wide margin of victory over the KMT opposition candidate. In short, Tsai's political popularity depends entirely on her ability to keep up momentum for a legally independent Taiwan, which explains her aggressive pro-independence stance. Arguably, she sacrificed or at least threw Hong Kong under the bus in order to achieve her political victory in 2020.

Entering the Danger Zone - Why Taiwanese Independence Threatens The People of Taiwan

So if you're still with me and not typing up an angry response on how I'm a massive China shill, you're probably thinking to yourself "So what? It seems like the Taiwanese people want to be independent, even if it was manufactured, and China should simply let Taiwan be independent and the US should step in if it needs to defend it." However, this is the most superficial reading of this. The issue with viewing geopolitics through a purely ethics-based lens is that it ignores hundreds of years of history and bad blood between the two. Do note that the Chinese Civil War, much like the Korean War, is still in progress, and neither side has called for a treaty. In other words, we're basically in a time-out right now. This is also what drove the One China Policy, the understanding that the US only recognises that there is one legitimate Chinese government (which is left ambiguous on which government is legitimate). The rhetoric involving "West Taiwan" and "Republic of Taiwan" therefore is in breach of an agreement that the US signed decades ago that led to years of economic partnership. For what it's worth, the PRC is perfectly willing to play along with the One China Policy too. As long as the ROC does not try to pretend it is an independent entity, both the PRC and ROC can pay lip service to the idea that both are locked in a cold civil war and that only one is the legitimate heir to both Taiwan and the mainland, in other words, the kabuki theatre. And the PRC is not limited to just playing along either. 22% of Taiwan's imports come from either China or Hong Kong. At face value, it seems like the PRC is perhaps less ideologically driven than initial viewers may assume. However, that 22% import statistic is also a knife pointed straight at Taiwan's heart. Much of its food is imported from other parts of the world; for example the US supplies 92% of Taiwan's chickens consumed. It is easy to tell that Taiwan is an import based nation when it comes to raw materials. And as anyone can tell you, an island nation is only well protected insofar it is self-sufficient. But just how prepared is China? Well, they're more prepared than you think.

The Real Hidden Dragon - How China Is Taking Advantage of A Trick First Pulled 100 Years Ago

One of the biggest criticisms leveled at China is their lack of military hardware or experience. Observers often point towards their supposed complete lack of preparation for naval landings based on a lack of experience and a lack of equipment. Rather shockingly to most, both of these assumptions are built on flawed reasoning that resembles history.

When Imperial Japan invaded its neighbor in 1936, observers from the west traveled to China. What they saw seemed to confirm their biases; Japanese planes were inferior copies of western aircraft, and they lacked the tactics and skilled pilots to pull off complex maneuvers. US observers in particular felt they could rest easy, knowing that the US Navy with its powerful dreadnoughts could seize the day. That is, until 7 December 1941, when a Japanese carrier force sailed thousands of miles across the Pacific to launch a coordinated strike on the US fleet in Pearl Harbor, an attack that costed the US dozens of ships and thousands of casualties. This strike was supposedly something that the Japanese did not have the material or training to pull off, and yet there was no denying the facts that day: The US had been outfoxed. Latent racism had caused the US to underestimate its greatest foe, and it paid dearly for it, something that the Bureau of Ordnance continued even throughout the war, lengthening it by a year. The US only managed to beat the Japanese through its superior industrial base and logistics. Today, we see something similar playing out.

So-called China watchers are suspiciously ignorant of the numerous Chinese amphibious exercises that have been going on for years. In fact, just last year a Chinese amphibious exercise saw the usage of the Type 071 LPD, just one of 20 exercises in the first half of last year. They are training hard, no doubt about it, and are perfecting joint-service integration in a manner that most armies around the world could only dream of. Their only match in terms of both scope and skill is that of the US Marines. Furthermore, China has been experimenting with using civilian RoRos as a quick emergency means of moving large concentrations of troops around China. The PLA has the logistics capability and is acutely aware of the importance of logistics, unlike another country currently stuck in day 174 of their 72 hour invasion. Another important thing to remember about their navy is that they operate three carriers: the Liaoning, Shandong, and Fujian, along with an impressive surface fleet of modern Type 052D and Type 055 destroyers and Type 075 LHDs. This puts them ahead of the French, British, Russian, and Indian navies.

In the air, too, the PRC is far ahead of what most would believe. A common criticism of China's aerospace program is their reliance on Russian engines to power even domestic airframes. However, Chinese metallurgy has made leaps and bounds in the last two decades. China's J-35, long dismissed as an F-35 clone, is coming into its own, sporting domestic engines and a clean, smooth finish that would indicate a stealthy carrier-capable design. And their J-20 also has domestic engines and seems to be a match for the F-35. In some ways, the Chinese aerospace program is more ambitious than the US, with the J-20S being the world's first twin seater stealth fighter. The gap between the US Navy and the PLANAF is closing.

Contrast this military powerhouse that seemed to have crept up on you with the sorry state of the ROC's armed forces, and it's easy to see that gap between the two may have been misjudged.

"Fortress Taiwan", Also Known As "Doing The PLAN's Job For Them"

A common idea parroted by the Ian Easton Project 2049 Institute is that Taiwan can simply lock itself down and become impenetrable. Ignoring for a fact the state of Taiwan's military and readiness, this should seem like a terrible idea to you if you've been following along. Taiwan primarily relies on imports for its food and raw materials; we established this in the previous section. Think for a second what happens if Taiwan decides to mine its straits and all around it. It would be an absolute disaster, with basic medical supplies and food not making it through and local industry being unable to keep up with demand or even produce anything in the first place. We already saw the PLAN's ability to blockade Taiwan in the 4th Taiwan Strait Crisis. A Fortress Taiwan scenario would simply lead to dysentery and cholera outbreaks on the island for months and then the PLA waltzing in and executing President Tsai on live TV. So absolutely not, terrible idea, Ian Easton should lose his job.

PRC Invasion of Taiwan

Of course, the most anticipated is that of the PRC invasion of Taiwan. The ROC boasts about its ability to contest a landing on Taiwan's shores, but their drills are so poorly executed that a retaliatory drill earlier this month ended prematurely when the mountainside they were firing at caught fire and turned into a dangerous blaze. Meanwhile, we've seen just how prepared the PRC is for the invasion of the island. Any invasion would start with a heavy aerial and ballistic missile bombardment of the Taiwanese island, much like the dry run they performed in previous exercises. Then, after destroying key military installations and early warning systems, PRC forces would make landfall on the west coast, which is where 80% of the population lives. After brutally brief urban battles between hardened and trained Chinese marines versus scared conscript ROC kids, PRC forces would move into government buildings and declare victory after executing or driving out ROC political leadership. And don't even think about heading to the east coast of the island to make a desperate last stand; not only does the island lack strategic depth, being only 100 km across, but also very few roads navigate across the entire island and they would be clogged by evacuating civilians anyways. It would make the Highway of Death look like a children's cartoon.

Towards a Formosa Faceoff?

It seems, then, that the only way Taiwan can hope to survive would be from behind the shield of the US military. I won't even try to predict how the US would respond and whether it would be successful, but personally I don't have high hopes on the US ability to respond to Chinese aggression owing to our latent Sinophobia and disgust for direct intervention. The US barely survived having $5 gasoline; imagine how angry the population would get over having to send their kids to die in some East Asian island nation they can't even locate on a map. Sounds like a redo of Vietnam to me, and we all know how Vietnam ended.

Conclusion

If I were President Tsai, I would put out the flame, place down the torch, and bury it in sand. The dangerous game of flirting with independence for domestic political gain can only lead to disaster. The kabuki theatre had worked fine for almost half a century before; there is no reason to upset the balance except in an openly bold attempt to seize political power. However, the chances of anyone important reading this is very low. Instead, I encourage the average reader to reflect on this and reconsider their preconceived notions involving the ROC, PRC, and the balance of power between the two. If you walk away from this with a better understanding of just how vastly underprepared Taiwan is compared to China, then I have done my job right.

An Afterword

I originally wrote this post because of an offhand joke I posted that got a very interesting response. I think that people tend to conflate what they want to be true with what is actually true, and oftentimes that means buying into the hype of something that isn't real. I am not a Chinese shill, nor do I live in China or like their government. I am an Asian-American who was born in the US and feels very strongly about continuing the Anglo-American hegemony that has placed the US on top of the global system. I am studying policy at the university level and challenged myself to write this commentary as a warmup to get back into long form writing before the school year starts. I want nothing more than for Taiwan to have its right to self-determination, but so far I have yet to see that the people are willing to bleed and die for that right instead of simply calling the US to send us to die for their rights. Ergo, this commentary serves as a criticism of those who blindly follow ROC propaganda and is trying to challenge the traditional narrative with the hope that one day the ROC could make itself ready for the kind of warfare it will experience, instead of wasting money on LPDs and cruise missiles while conscripts don't even fire their weapons in training for fear of running out of ammo. Thanks to an anonymous user around here for helping me understand the intricacies of Taiwanese politics, thank you readers for making it this far, and I hope this is enlightening to you.


r/CredibleDefense • • Feb 24 '23

Developments in European Security through the Russian lens. A focus on the failure of the adapted CFE Treaty, the self-described "cornerstone of European security"

0 Upvotes

I came across an interesting article today which piqued my interest in the CFE treaty and i thought (having gone down various rabbitholes) that the history of the CFE treaty provided some interesting insights/ a microcosm into the general breakdown of east-west security relations within Europe and particularly how both sides perceived the developing security situation over time. I'll try and lay out my thoughts, but recognise that some things may be inaccurate (it's surprisingly hard to find information on some of the developments without devoting days to this) and that people may disagree. I'd like to emphasise the point that the way that sides perceive things doesn't necessarily have to reflect what you would consider to be the real situation; two sides can perceive the same action in completely the opposite way.


I guess my overall thesis is that we made a mistake in being immovable regarding the ratification and/or renegotiation of the adapted CFE treaty and prioritising ideological goals over security realities. What could we have done differently? I think that the example of CFE is both important on its own and demonstrative of a wider pattern that has potentially led us down a road to where we are.

NATO countries from their position of comparative dominance didn't take it seriously and repeatedly tried to leverage our dominant position to extract concessions and maintain a security imbalance, rather than seeking to find a comfortable post-cold-war status quo that promoted mutual interests and security concerns. CFE-2 was an essential new treaty, but we had no real interest in implementing it due to the imbalance that already existed in our favour (along with numerous other factors)


CFE?

The treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)(p5 for summary) was (is?) an agreement from 1990 between NATO member states and the Warsaw pact which limited the existence of heavy weaponry on both sides (for example, 20,000 battle tanks each) and established a regime of almost total transparency between both sides to ensure limits were being adhered to. These were further limited by geographical area.

It was extremely effective and the mass destruction of hardware was completed within 4 years, leaving everyone involved in compliance.

People will be aware that Russia suspended its participation in 2007 and it effectively ceased to apply. Whilst some would consider it a relic of the past, I'd question that assumption and think that this is the period where relations really began to break down... potentially leading us along the path to where we find ourselves today.

With the collapse of such treaties we see a collapse of mutual balancing of interests and thus a collapse in diplomatic and security concerns.


The problem?

The treaty was agreed in november 1990 and entered force in november 1992. A somewhat important event took place during this period.... namely the collapse of the USSR and warsaw pact. This means that:

  1. the treaty was signed by 22 countries, but ratified by 30 2 years later. 16 nato countries + 6 warsaw pact members + 8 former USSR republics west of the Urals (N.B. The baltics had already declared independence and were never party to the agreement)

  2. The status quo that it was designed to protect no longer existed. Whilst arguably useful, it wasn't fit for purpose.

  3. A problem that would also become relevant was that there was no procedure for accession.


The solution?

in 1997 a small amendment to the CFE treaty (CFE 1A) known as the 'flank agreement' was signed which raised the limits for weapons in border regions. (at the behest of russia and ukraine)

[to briefly hint at the problem] since the break-up of the Soviet Union, 30 per cent of the USSR's flank entitlements have been shared between Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova.

in 1999 terms were agreed on the adapted CFE treaty (CFE II). This changed the hardware limits to a 'per country' basis, addressed changes to russia's 'flank', improved information exchange, addressed rights regarding stationing of troops in other countries and added an accession clause. (N.B. this was after the 'visegrad group' joined NATO).

NATO’s negotiating strategy in the 1997–99 adaptation talks was generally aimed at preventing steps which could slow down or hamper its ‘open door’ policy, and safeguarding its operational flexibility and capability for the future.

Russia’s position was different. It strove to link military security with the European and global political processes and demanded a kind of military equilibrium in Europe which would have inevitably resulted in deep cuts on the part of the West. When this proved unrealistic, Russia sought stronger security guarantees. The Agreement on Adaptation addressed some of the Russian concerns, mainly with regard to Central Europe and the southern flank. In turn, Russia granted a number of concessions. It signed the Agreement on Adaptation despite its earlier militant rhetoric and warnings (a threatened deployment of tactical nuclear weapons close to the NATO area) and in spite of its diplomatic and political defeats—the admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to NATO; NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia; and the sharp criticism by the West of Russian military operations in Chechnya.

The adapted CFE treaty was never ratified. Bel, Kaz, Ukr and Russia ratified it, but NATO states refused citing russia's refusal to enact non-binding political pledges in the annex of the treaty regarding moldova and georgia.


Now, what piqued my interest was this article - View from Russia: The Expansion of NATO and the Future of the CFE Treaty - written in 1995 by Vladislav Chernov from the russian ministry of foreign affairs. I really recommend giving it a read as i think it does provide a pretty open, honest account. I'll provide a couple of key quotes below

Abstract: According to the Russian standpoint, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty should establish a material foundation for creating an effective system of transEuropean security, including Russia. Any expansion of NATO to the East would render the treaty meaningless, and no possible concessions on the flank issue would save it. If the CFE treaty is doomed, another arms control arrangement should be substituted immediately

we are witnessing how the "vacuum of power" due to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union is being filled by West European and transatlantic structures. The process is accompanied by the ever-growing political weight of Western security institutions.... Russia's Western partners make it clear that the CSCE will never be allowed to duplicate effective European and transatlantic institutions and that the conference will never grow into a system of collective security with an equally high security level for all.

In this situation Russia faces a choice to be ousted from the European political kitchen, or to be a satellite of Western military and political institutions, again without access to the kitchen.

.

one thing is predictable—the CFE treaty will vanish the day the first country of Eastern Europe joins NATO, and no possible concessions on the flank issue would save it

.

If the CFE treaty is doomed, then another arms control arrangement should be substituted immediately. The CFE-2 treaty should limit existing security level differences among European states as well as outlining the scope of their military and political obligations. It should provide reliable safeguards against any attempts to split Europe and revive military confrontations. In particular, it is important to drop the elements of the bloc approach to arms control and to be faithful to the principle of having only national limits on the armed forces.

I think the passage of time showed his assessment to be broadly accurate. Some of his suggestions were indeed incorporated into CFE-II, but it eventually became a non-starter and the dynamics he highlighted that would threaten shared european security took over.

He also made a speech to the OSCE on 2010 as someone that had been involved in the CFE from its beginning to its end. Again i think it provides a fascinating insight into just how the European security situation developed over the years and his perceived problems with it.

In my opinion, the deadlock in the OSCE’s work in the politico-military area is caused by a mentality that was expressed most graphically in a report by a professor at the last OSCE Seminar on Military Doctrine. You may recall that he divided all countries into two categories – those who had won the Cold War and those who had lost. In the diagram he had drawn the victors ascending to the sky, to a paradise called globalization, whereas the fate awaiting the defeated was to be thrown into the abyss if they did not do what the divine voices from on high told them to. There is no doubt that for those who hold these views the Cold War is still not over. It will end for them when the victory receives a reward, the dimensions of which are seemingly incalculable. Russia, having given up its vital interests and lost the ability to effectively ensure its security in the face of growing threats and challenges, would have to pay a considerable portion of that reward.

.

Some participating States feel very comfortable with NATO’s protection and show no interest whatsoever in arms control. I remember one delegation which used to speak at almost every meeting of the Joint Consultative Group. But as soon as that country became a member of the Alliance, our eloquent colleagues fell silent forever and are probably keeping quiet to this today

My personal view is that this line of thinking has been present throughout the last 20/30 years. The feeling that 'we won', that russia is irrelevant and that security was a 'solved problem' during the end of history. Arms control is nice and all, but what are they gonna do about it? This dynamic underpins in fact much of our international decision making, including the refusal to ratify the adapted CFE treaty


a few brief points:

Under CFE-1 any expansion of NATO made the treaty increasingly worthless. By the time CFE-2 was agreed (months after visegrad expansion) CFE-1 had been severely undermined, and it only got worse until falling apart. Then NATO expanded again before CFE-2 was in place and once again fatally undermined it.

In April 1995, the Russian defence minister, Pavel Grachev, openly told his US counterpart, William Perry, that Russia would not meet its CFE obligations if NATO expanded

.

There was and is zero link between NATO membership and CFE accession. Now this makes sense from a NATO perspective because it essentially creates a power imbalance whereby Russia is incentivised to accept new accessions and inferior terms as preferable to vetoing them, but from a russian perspective it's clearly a really poor situation

The procedure for accession is actually very vague and leaves much room for interpretation and discussion among the States Parties. The accession procedure is solely related to the individual applicant's case without specific political preconditions involved. This exemption from rigid political considerations is primarily the result of U.S. insistence whereas Russia and Germany preferred a more detailed and legally binding accession procedure. Consequently, Baltic CFE-membership can only be expected after hard political and military negotiations on the accession terms.

At no point in time have the baltics for instance ever been party to CFE, despite being NATO members. This again means that post-2004 the treaty was near worthless... as was the adapted CFE treaty, whether they 'voluntarily complied' or not. post 2002 (baltic accession announced), NATO wanted to ratify the treaty that wasn't even in force and then subsequently enter negotiations regarding the baltics and their role. That is not a credible proposal between good faith actors in my opinion.

Essentially, whilst you can argue over the timely ratification of CFE-2, the system was fundamentally flawed in a number of ways and clearly in need of some sort of further renegotiation (especially by 2007)

.

The lack of a coherent security regime doesn't just make russia feel less safe, but also its neighbours (especially those not in NATO).

.

Despite being at a perceived disadvantage by CFE-2 (the US government itself called it a 'nato friendly treaty') The russians still ratified it and tried hard to get NATO states to ratify it, because it was a hell of a lot better than CFE-1. The 2007 suspension itself was supposed to pressure NATO into ratifying and we did eventually suggest some alternative pathways after this, but by that time relations had already broken down significantly.


Why wasn't CFE-2 ratified?

Ostensibly NATO refused to sign CFE-2 due to political pledges made in the declaration annex. These related to declarations made at the Istanbul OSCE summit rather than being part of the treaty and preconditions for legal ratification.

It's worth noting that they did completely remove their heavy weapons and most of their stockpiles from moldova by 2004, but they left 1200 troops there as a 'peacekeeping force'. They also withdrew entirely from georgia bar 200 troops by 2005 (prior to suspending the treaty). In CFE terms this is largely irrelevant and things seemed relatively positive.

We all know that political declarations aren't binding, yet we decided to make them effectively so. The literal purpose of CFE-2 was that political pledges aren't binding and legally binding agreements are required.

Was putin being obstinate? Yes. Were we being obstinate? Also yes

[from 2009] The NATO states have long prioritized Russia’s complete implementation of the Istanbul commitments over the ratifi cation of the adapted treaty. The USA’s attitude has been that of disinterest, as it treated the CFE as being finished business and simply a pawn in its political game with Russia. Most European NATO states, situated much closer to Russia, have more or less reluctantly followed suit, while a few have sought, weakly or belatedly, ways out of the stalemate

Russia has apparently calculated that raising the ante will pay off. Russia has demonstrated that it is not interested in a collapse of the European arms control system. Rather, it hopes to extract concessions from and strike a better deal with the West, not only on the CFE regime, but also in other areas of discord—from missile defence to the START Treaty and other disarmament agreements—and to drive a wedge between NATO members. These hopes are confi rmed by the proposal of a new Euro-Atlantic security arrangement called for by President Medvedev during 2008. However, Russia actually loses much by abandoning the insight into its neighbours’ armed forces provided by the CFE mechanisms.


It's also worth noting the context within which all of this was happening and what was going on during the period

The treaty was signed in 1999 recently following the Kosovo war, which whilst causing significant diplomatic tensions between NATO and Russia had also seen NATO breach its politically binding force transparency obligations under the vienna document (imagine that) when they refused to allow russian inspectors access to observe forces in macedonia and albania. This ironically demonstrated the importance of CFE-2.

A month later yeltsin the drunk was shuffled out and putin took over. You then have 9/11 and the war on terror which turned the world upside down and led to everyone looking elsewhere for the next 10-15 years. The US pulled out of the ABM treaty (in itself damaging the european security situation), rejected the comprehensive test ban treaty, Iraq once again seriously damaged relations, NATO expansion once again damaged relations (whilst still incentivising CFE-2 adoption). Then shortly before russia suspended the treaty you had the initiation of missile defence complexes in poland and the czech republic.

These things all hurt russia's security situation without really impacting ours. Because (despite contemporary rhetoric) the balance of conventional power overwhelmingly lies on our side. Though in the long term the non-ratification of CFE-2 was most definitely against our interests.

[from 2010] While there has been a profound shift in the nature of the threat, this does not negate the CFE Treaty’s contribution to a regime of transparency and limitation because of the still uncertain European security environment, especially in the area along the eastern edge of NATO. This environment, while not a direct threat to NATO in the old-fashioned sense, could become a zone of instability, conflict and hegemony that could mean a reversal of favorable trends in Europe. Moreover, as will be argued below, there is increasing evidence that Russia seeks precisely a special security sub-region in this part of Europe, particularly encompassing those states (except for the Baltics) that were once part of the Soviet Union. It is important to recall the hedge that the CFE and CSBMs undertakings provide against unfavorable developments in the east. CFE limitations on overall levels of forces and, to a lesser extent, CSBM transparency on military activities have value as an instrument of regulation of military forces. The two regimes build trust, transparency and military-to military dialogue, and are part of the U.S. vision of a secure and stable Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals

Quite.


Honestly this has taken way too long and i'm tired. There's indoubtedly going to be a lot of disagreement and nitpicking.

Am I overestimating the importance of arms control treaties such as CFE? Should such legally binding treaties not be used far more widely, given their transparency requirements make them thoroughly enforceable?

tl;dr: The CFE fell apart (on our side) due to poor decisions harming relations, due to a mixture of distraction (war on terror etc) and hubris ('end of history' overconfidence) and due to the age old (hypocritical) demands that other maintain the highest of standards getting in the way of practical, pragmatic security considerations. We forgot that security is in fact indivisible.

and it led us down a road of collapsing relations and escalating military tensions that ended up where we are today.

NATO expansion in itself has never been the problem (before anyone claims that). The cumulative post-cold-war decision making processes have been. It all could have been handled so much better...


A few of the links that i've used during this:

https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/misc/SIPRIPB0901.pdf

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/03_armed_forces_europe_treaty.pdf

https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999-09/features/endgame-cfe-adaptation-osce-summit

https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007-12/europe-eager-preserve-cfe-treaty

https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/f/68285.pdf

https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1080/01495939508403013

https://www.baltdefcol.org/files/docs/bdreview/03bdr200.pdf

https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/PP/SIPRIPP01.pdf


r/CredibleDefense • • Feb 21 '19

Russia to China: Together we can rule the world

Thumbnail
politico.eu
0 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • Feb 28 '24

(Ukraine) I’m starting to support ceasefire—assess my logic and tell me why I’m wrong??

0 Upvotes

I have been pro Ukraine since day one.

From a certain standpoint, setting aside the Ukrainian human factors and lives lost, haven’t we now seen that Russia is nothing to be feared by NATO (militarily), and it doesn’t even appear to be close?

And hasn’t Russia itself eliminated the prospect of European dependence on its energy supply let alone economic reintegration with the West for at least a solid 20 years….

Whether the resources in occupied Ukraine end up in Russian hands or not seems borderline non-consequential….

And I think it’s clear Putin’s not going to use nukes offensively against a technologically & militarily superior NATO….

I think NATO has data mined the conflict to its maximum benefit, Russia has destroyed its own interests by ruining its relationship with Europe, losing its lucrative energy business in Europe, and forcing other European nations to join (or desire to join) NATO…

At this point the only thing left to fight over is the land and the principle of the matter and I’m not so sure those provide enough value to USA or NATO to justify its continued economic support here….

I’m not arguing for abandonment of Ukraine, but if the collective NATO interests began advocating heavily for Ukraine to accept the current borders and end this thing, well, I wouldn’t be shocked… assuming our data mining aims are satisfied and assuming Russia remains economically and culturally blacklisted in Europe, then the ROI of continuing the war seems to have bottomed out for NATO….

I swear I have been a fervent and hawkish pro-Ukraine supporter until something in my brain reached the above logic over the last day or two and I decided I’m not so sure any more, I feel like from a cold master chess player standpoint, USA has accomplished its primary aims at this point: weaken its adversary, data mine its adversary, identify the absence of true military threat and nuclear threat, see its adversary eliminated from markets, see European energy dependence on its adversary eliminated….

While NATO might like some of those borders to recede back a bit, these new borders aren’t creating a new security (threat) paradigm….

Not sure what cold strategic benefits remain here for USA/NATO other than “principle of the matter” brutal and costly war to further deplete Russian citizens and materiel, neither of which seem necessary given that Russia has undressed itself as truly unable to wage war against NATO in the 21st century …


r/CredibleDefense • • Oct 18 '20

SCMP: China beefs up coastal forces as it prepares for possible Taiwan invasion

Thumbnail
scmp.com
40 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • Apr 24 '24

Why doesn't NATO or Russia construct a huge trench network at their borders?

4 Upvotes

Given the success of the fortifications put up within and across Ukraine (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65615184), why doesn't Russia nor NATO invest more heavily in heavily fortified trenches with landmines, and other anti-tank obstructions?

I understand it would be expensive, but I see at least a few points in favour of this argument. Firstly, even if partially built, if done so effectively, it may at least allow for a narrowing of possible routes for either side to take in the event of an invasion. Secondly, the very construction of this network, is to some extent a communication of the lack of interest in invading the other side, as whilst it keeps the enemy out, it also keeps you locked in (from a land warfare perspective). Thirdly, although I understand it could be very expensive, the method does appear to have stood the test of time in at least slowing down your opponent.


r/CredibleDefense • • May 18 '26

Ukraine Endgame: The Path to an Imperfect Peace - JPMorganChase

13 Upvotes

Ukraine Endgame: The Path to an Imperfect Peace

An interesting report by JPMorganChase, particularly since it compares its predictions from 2025 to the current state of affairs.

Overall, it presents what looks to me like a viable path to peace - Finlandisation of Ukraine. Such a peace would include Ukraine giving up on NATO, formally declaring neutrality, but being allowed to pursue EU membership. The military would be limited in some aspects, but big enough to provide deterrence against future Russian aggression. The EU (and possibly the USA) would provide certain security guarantees, but likely without troops in Ukraine.

Recap

- JPMorganChase’s 2026 report argues that Ukraine’s likely endgame has improved from a “Georgia-like” drift back toward Moscow (they predicted as the most likely outcome in 2025) to a “Finland-like” settlement that preserves sovereignty but accepts limits.

- With time working against Kyiv and Washington pushing for a deal, Ukraine may be forced to accept painful terms: roughly 20% of its territory remaining under Russian control, formal neutrality, and constraints on military size and capabilities. These concessions would give Putin the optics of victory while still stopping well short of full Ukrainian capitulation.

- Economically, Ukraine faces an imperative to rebuild, but with advantages Finland lacked: strong agricultural output, a growing technology sector, and a defense industrial base already shaped by wartime demand. Crucially, Ukraine won’t have reparations hanging over its head as Finland did or necessarily feel compelled to reject western assistance to appease Moscow - giving it a more diversified and resilient economic path.

• Politically, Finland maintained its democratic system despite sustained Soviet pressure, carefully calibrating policy to avoid provocation. Ukraine will face similar interference but with a more consolidated national identity and stronger Western ties. The challenge will be preserving democratic integrity without ceding effective veto power to Moscow. Ukraine’s ability to tackle corruption within its political system will also be decisive in determining both how much influence Russia is able to maintain as well as how fully and quickly Ukraine is allowed to integrate westward.

• Militarily, Finland balanced deterrence with restraint. Ukraine would face a similar balancing act: building a capable territorial defense while avoiding postures that Moscow could exploit, likely with more Western support but under similar strategic constraints. Official neutrality would remove a key Russian justification for hostility, potentially stabilizing the ceasefire in ways more formal NATO backing might not

In this scenario, Ukraine adopts a “Finland - without full Finlandization” strategy: managing a persistent threat on its borders through a mix of deterrence, economic resilience, selective accommodation, and strategic restraint. Unlike post-war Finland, Ukraine is now deeply aligned with Europe, and overt deference to Moscow would be politically untenable. But in the absence of a tripwire force or NATO/American security umbrella, Kyiv would likely be pushed toward a more calibrated posture than it would otherwise choose.

- Europe has become Ukraine’s main backer after a sharp fall in US military support, increasing aid enough to keep total support broadly stable.

- Ukraine’s financial runway remains narrow, with a projected 2026 budget deficit of around $50 billion and reconstruction needs estimated at nearly $600 billion.

- Russia still benefits from time pressure, higher energy revenues, larger manpower reserves, and the possibility that Western political unity weakens.

Authors

Derek Chollet - Managing Director and Head of the JPMorganChase Center for Geopolitics

Lisa Sawyer - Executive Director, JPMorganChase Center for Geopolitics

Thomas O’Mealia - Vice President, JPMorganChase Center for Geopolitics

Emily Sullivan - Senior Associate, JPMorganChase Center for Geopolitics


r/CredibleDefense • • Mar 30 '26

Su-57 (Felon): A Fifth-Generation Multirole Stealth Fighter — Independent Aerodynamic Analysis (Strictly from public data) | V1.0

Thumbnail
reddit.com
9 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • Dec 14 '14

DISCUSSION Some thoughts on Russia, and their aggressive posture.

7 Upvotes

In five years Russia's demographic profile plunges. The number of males available for military service plunges 50% over two years. It declines another 10% to 20% over the following ten years. Russia is facing a catastrophic decline in military manpower in immediate terms. They have five years to secure their geopolitical position, then they won't be able to act at all. They simply won't have the men to act.

Amplifying this trend is the collapse of their engineering and technical education after the Soviet system imploded. The process of recruitment, training, and OJT of engineers collapsed and never recovered. The average age of Russian engineers and technicians is 54. The average life expectancy of Russian males is 59. In five years Russia is going to have to start shutting down major infrastructure systems.

To be blunt, in five years they will have to choose between keeping their energy infrastructure running, or the transport grid, or the electric grid, or the ICBM force. They will have enough engineers to keep one of these systems going. Perhaps two if they run both systems with skeletal staff on perpetual 12 hour shifts.

There is also the problem that these engineers are not going to die in any uniform way. You may loose half your nuclear engineers, then the petro engineers, etc. Severe disruption in basic systems is dead ahead for the Russian Federation. Disruption in day to day operations, and disruption in the export of nuclear and military technology that pays for much of the government's budget.

In addition to all the above, Russian scientists are actually expecting global cooling to hit Eurasia. Western scientists are expecting global warming. If either are correct, if there is even a two degree shift in temperatures, the arable belt will move radically to the north or the south.

A radical shift where there is no infrastructure what ever. Infrastructure that will take twenty plus years to build, when they have no engineers to build it. To cut to the chase, Russia is looking at the imminent loss of 80% plus of their food production. This makes the Ukraine look mighty interesting to them.

Russia needs to secure itself from these looming realities. The generals want to advance to the 9 geographic choke points that would secure the Russian interior for this time of dislocating change. They also want the Ukraine as a food reserve against all the possible ecologic threats proposed by the scientists.

I think Russia is going to go for it. Not a World War Three into Western Europe. By no means. Russia is going to try to secure the Ukraine and the Baltic states. If they can they will advance all the way to Poland, or even into Poland if they can get that far.

The West needs to decide what it is going to do in the face of Russia's desperate need. Most of the major wars in history have been initiated by the nation that was sliding towards collapse. America in particular needs to most carefully weigh it's options before committing to a course of action and policy.


r/CredibleDefense • • Dec 11 '24

Should IFVs be replaced with dedicated AFVs and APCs?

1 Upvotes

Found out recently the next gen Bradley replacement will also only house 6 men. Its clear they want to double down on the highly effective Bradley as an AFV, it does great supporting infantry, supporting tanks, hunting tanks, performing recce, calling for fire, etc.

But it doesn't transport troops well.

Sure a small team of FOs/JTACs/Scouts, or a small team operating ATGMs, MANPADs, or drones are very useful on the modern, hyper lethal battlefield. But you're also still going to need resilient, attritable infantry to take and hold ground, to screen an armoured push, to storm a trench or building, take the inevitable casualties, and remain a cohesive and effective unit to continue its mission at less than full strength.

A 6 man infantry squad isn't going to cut it for that role. The moment they take casualties, they aren't going to remain combat effective for long. Sure you can merge attritted squads, but C2 wise thats a headache, as a squad is designed to be a cohesive unit. Better to have 2 squads of 9 than 3 squads of 6 when they all take a few casualties each. (Counter argument is if an IFV is wiped out on the way to unloading its troops, you don't have as many eggs in one basket).

The Russians used to have the Mi-24 hind helicopter as a combination troop transport and attack gunship. It was kind of ass at both. Now they have their Kamovs escorting their Mi17s.

Would it make more sense with IFVs, to ditch the troop carrying requirement altogether (or bring it right down to 2-3 for recce scouts, small atgm/manpad/drone teams, and picking up dismounted crew from mission kill vehicles) and focus even more on being effective fighting vehicles (clearly their main focus now), and design a sister tracked and survival APC to go alongside it, get escorted into battle by the IFV/AFVs, share logistics (can't have Strykers and Bradleys together for that reason)?

I think so. What do yall think? And if you disagree, where do you reckon I've gone wrong doctrinally or overlooked something?


r/CredibleDefense • • Dec 14 '22

How Likely is it that Vladimir Putin will be able to Claim some sort of Victory in Ukraine?

0 Upvotes

How Likely is it that Vladimir Putin will be able to Claim some sort of Victory in Ukraine? An Assessment based on Events from February-early November 2022

by Alexander Hill

Hill analyses the war goals and dynamics so far and concludes that:

- future developments in the war are likely to be in the form of an escalation and counter-escalation that will not give either side a decisive advantage.

- had Zelensky’s Ukrainian government been willing to negotiate back in April then the eventual outcome on the ground would probably have ended up being better for Ukraine than is likely to be the case today or in the future (Such an assertion has of course to be understood in the context of damage done to Ukraine since April)

- For Ukraine, any plausible scenario at this point will involve Ukraine having defended most of its territory from its larger neighbour and accelerated the incorporation of the remaining territory into the Western political and military alliance systems, even if not NATO. That territory will have a much smaller Russian-identifying minority to destabilise the country than was the case in 2014.

- The human cost of trying to teach Russia a lesson for its transgressions will be high in any scenario but could be considerably higher and more widely spread if the current escalation and counter-escalation continues for the foreseeable future.

- In a situation where neither Putin’s nor Zelensky’s government is likely to back down, it is probable that the deciding factor in bringing an end to the current war is likely to be the failure of European powers to sustain their support for Ukraine during the longer term – ultimately forcing Ukraine to accept some sort of ceasefire.

- In the longer term in exchange for accepting a de facto loss of territory Ukraine is likely to be rewarded with EU membership, even if the cost of that membership is likely to be astronomical for other EU members.

- Although cracks in the Western alliance supporting Ukraine might be the deciding factor in bringing an end to the bloodshed, such an outcome is some way off. Consequently, the killing and destruction are, sadly, likely to continue for some time.

Alexander Hill is a Professor in Military History, University of Calgary, Canada

Professor Alexander Hill has taught history at the University of Calgary since 2004. He has PhD in Social and Political Sciences from the University of Cambridge and specializes in Soviet military and political history, with a particular emphasis on the period 1928-1945 and on Soviet Cold War involvement in Africa. He also has a Diploma in Russian from the University of Cambridge and has spent a significant period of time living and researching in Russia. He has written a number of books on the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War, including The Red Army and the Second World War (Cambridge University Press, 2016). His most recent book, The War on the Eastern Front: The Soviet Union, 1941-1945 - A Photographic History has just been published by Pen and Sword (2021).

Dr Hill’s main interests are in military history and the military and political history of Russia and the Soviet Union since c.1914. His research is concerned primarily with Soviet military, naval and strategic history. He has written on:

*The nature and military effectiveness of the Soviet partisan movement in north-west Russia, 1941-1944

*The development of Soviet naval power in the Arctic to 1945

*The significance of British 'Lend-Lease' aid for the Soviet war effort, 1941-1945

*The development of the Soviet Red Army, from the early 1920s to 1945

In addition to continuing work on the Red Army to 1945, he is currently examining the nature and significance of Soviet military assistance to national liberation movements and governments in Africa during the Cold War.


r/CredibleDefense • • Jul 26 '22

Should we do away with "5th generation" combat aircraft ?

Thumbnail
meta-defense.fr
1 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • Jan 04 '24

A NO-FLY ZONE OVER UKRAINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

12 Upvotes

The idea of imposing a no-fly zone over Ukraine is unpopular with current Western leadership, and many commentators, for some legitimately good reasons. However, many objections I have read to it as a policy conflate the realpolitik consequences of imposing one with the act itself being illegal, or an act of war against Russia.

Although this article was published in 2022, I believe the author (Michael N. Schmitt, G. Norman Lieber Distinguished Scholar at the United States Military Academy and Professor of Public International Law at the University of Reading etc.) gives a solid reasoning for the legality of establishing a no-fly zone in Ukraine. As their conclusion states

"Time will tell whether the deteriorating situation on the ground in Ukraine causes States to rethink their position on the establishment of a no-fly zone. But if they do, they would be on sound legal footing. The issue is the will, or lack thereof, of those States in the face of Russian war crimes, not international law."

https://lieber.westpoint.edu/no-fly-zone-ukraine-international-law/


r/CredibleDefense • • Jun 23 '23

Creating and replacing the Air Force with a "Missile Force"???

0 Upvotes

Hey there. I'm not military in any way, shape or form. But I had a question that seems like hasn't been asked online and was wondering if someone here could provide me some insight on it. If that's not appropriate I'll see exit left and be on my way.

My question is pretty simple, but may have a complex answer...

Why does the USAF continue in the 21st century down the path of Aircraft via Bombers/Air Superiority Fighters instead of just switching all focus to Ballistic/Satellite guided Ballistic Missiles? They're far cheaper than producing an entire airframe, the time to train the pilot and quite frankly, the pilots life. They're accurate and can carry out the same damage. What is it that is more desirable to have a fixed wing airforce rather than just solely for the sake of argument a "Missile Force" as it were?

Don't get me wrong, I love all aircraft. From the P51, to the Phantom II, to the Aardvark, to the F15, to the B1 Lancer to the F22.... But as far as a logistical, economical and just overall shear power standpoint... One Missile on average(depending on type and mission purpose) costs $1.4 Million. A Single F35 Costs $75 Million. 50+ Missiles for every 1 aircraft(could easily come down the more you buy). Missiles are also launched from aircraft, but they could just be launched from fixed sites on the ground and the range could obviously be increased with very little struggles.

What true advantages are given with fixed wing aircraft over just having missiles launched from sites via satellite? By advantages, I mean solely something the aircraft provides that a fixed Missile site cant provide for?

With this argument I also would say the Army wouldn't need mechanized units solely dedicated to Artillery either, because the fixed missile site would be the artillery. Tanks would still obviously be needed because small arms will never be enough to occupy a territory if/when you capture it.


r/CredibleDefense • • Jun 13 '20

The United States has lost every Wargame simulating a maritime armed conflict with China (medium-range ballistic missiles). With the recent ban of advanced semiconductors from American suppliers to Huawei, will this trigger a real war with China over Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturing?

0 Upvotes

On May 15, the US Commerce Department banned all sales of advanced semiconductors from American suppliers to Huawei. It also prohibited all sales of equipment to design and produce advanced semiconductors by foreign companies that use U.S. technology or intellectual property. This could realistically put Huawei back a year or two in order to get their own manufacturing quality up to par, which is unacceptable in a race for control over the technology that will wield the most influence in the future.

Having said that, imagine the Trump administration actually implementing the ban on all sales of advanced semiconductors and equipment to manufacture semiconductors to China. Also, take into consideration Huawei’s Chairman said after the ban was announced that this forces Huawei “to seek survival.” If President Xi Jinping concludes that this is a matter of life and death for his champion advanced technology company that is the poster child for his signature program promising Chinese technological leadership by 2025 and 2030, then what options does China have? 

The United States would lose in a maritime armed conflict with China and would have difficulties to stop an amphibious attack on Taiwan, according to a series of war games by the Pentagon.

How do you guys see this playing out? How important is Taiwain to the US? And how long does Taiwan have to stay in the fight for the US to come to its aid? Are there any scenarios where the US can counter-balance China's advanced A2 / AD?