r/CredibleDefense • • Feb 28 '22

The Mysterious Case of the Missing Russian Air Force. One of many unanswered questions is why Russia has launched a military campaign at huge cost with maximalist objectives, and then declined to use the vast majority of its fixed wing combat aircraft.

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1.5k Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • Jul 28 '22

Dispelling the Myth of Taiwan Military Competency

1.3k Upvotes

So, this kind of evolved out of when r/noncredibledefense banned me for 7 days after I posted a meme that the ROC military has way more in common with the Russian military than people realize.


Popular media--partly fueled by Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense propaganda posts, and partly out of general ignorance--continues to view the cross-strait balance of power as if it's 40 years ago. And the most egregious myth about the ROC military is that it's a well-trained, well-equipped, and well-maintained force capable of holding back the mainland on its own.

The reality is anything but. Taiwan's military has become a ghost of its former self. It faces regular personnel shortage issues, poorly trained troops, a non-sensical reserves system, and a terrifyingly lackluster maintenance and safety record even during peacetime.

So why post this now? Because current events suggests that we're headed towards a Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis, where most of the recent reforms/actions taken by the Taiwanese government to address existing issues seem more akin to Potemkin village style fabrications than actual deep necessary reforms.

So let's start:

Why is Taiwan's military so bad?

For a lot of reasons: the first one is the army's own history vis-a-vis Taiwan's social hierarchy. The ROC army (ROCA) was formerly the armed wing of the KMT party. When Chiang and pals landed in Taiwan, the army became the armed thugs that enforced KMT rule over the island. When martial law was lifted in '87, the civilian government acted to defang the army as much as possible - which leads to:

Shortened conscription period - In 1991, conscription was shortened from 2 years to 22 months and alternative military service became an option for those who didn't want an active combat billet. Between 2004 and 2007, the conscription period was shortened by 2 months every year until it was just a single year in 2008. By 2013, men who were born after 1994 only needed to serve 4 months. The reasoning by the civil government was that rather than rely on a conscript model, the army should be filled with volunteers so that it can become a professional fighting force. But they never got rid of conscription because there just weren't enough volunteers, so you have situations like these:

An acquaintance did his four months in an anti-tank unit. They were able to shoot six bullets at a time for weapons training, but their anti-tank training did not involve any firing of real weapons at targets. They received one day of first aid training, absolutely minimal. Most of the younger males I know report similar experiences.

The ministry of national defense (MoND) has never really given the military that much of a budget--17 billion USD for 2022. Taiwan also maintains a massive arsenal of big ticket items better suited for power projection like fighter jets and a new indigenous LPD that they just launched this year. For reference, an F-16 costs about 10 million maintenance per airframe. With 200 F-16s, that's roughly $2 billion USD (about 11% of the entire military budget) spent on just maintaining the airframes. Once you throw in maintenance for things like their older equipment whose parts aren't mass produced anymore like the Kidd class destroyers and the Tench class submarines, and you have very little cash left for everything else, which leads to...

... a shitty reserve system that's aptly described as an elaborate form of suicide. Page 13 of this RAND report describes the four types of ROCA reserves:

  • A level - Second echelon active duty troops. 8 total brigades. Supposed to be ready to deploy on demand.

  • B level - They'll take a bit more time to muster but are still part of the higher level readiness

  • C level - Local infantry brigades. 22 brigades total with 3-5 light infantry battalions and 1 field artillery battalion

  • D level - 2-3 brigades without organic artillery support.

The kicker here is that Taiwan's reserves are cobbled together without regard for prior MOS. So it doesn't matter if you were a tanker or a paratrooper or an artillerist in active service, when you're called up for your reserve duty (7 day refresher every 2 years), you're given a rifle and told that you'll be a light infantryman.

But wait! There's more.

Remember how the military is kind of chronically underfunded? Well, the big brains at the MoND decided that when defunding the military, they can't afford to defund things like the flashy big ticket items (i.e. jets, tanks, ships, artillery) because that would make the military look terrible and incapable of defending the island. This is actually something that they touch on in the proposed Overall Defense Concept:

Conventional weapon systems are effective for countering gray-zone aggression. Their high visibility positively impacts Taiwanese morale, improves public confidence in the military, and frustrates CCP political warfare operations.

In other words, per their own doctrine, they cannot afford to cut away their flashy big ticket items because it would cause morale and confidence in the military to plummet. So where do they cut their budget?

Somewhere that the civilians can't see: Logistics and rear services.

This comes with obvious problems - namely, maintenance is subpar, with frequent plane crashes and typical reports that troops need to steal from other units just to pass inspection. Which touches on another huge part of the issue:

Manpower shortage is a chronic issue with the ROCA, where only 81% of the positions were filled in 2018, and frontline combat units are at effective manpower levels of 60-80%, including units tasked with potentially defending Taipei from PLA armored formations.

The underfunding of the military also means salaries in the army is trash compared to the civilian sector with little benefits provided after service, even if you volunteered. Volunteer troops get the chance to request to rear line services as well--similar to how Russian kontraktniki get certain benefits over the conscripts--which further adds burden on those who are unfortunate enough to serve in the frontline units. And it really is only in the last couple of years that the MoND actually even acknowledged that there is a problem. Which brings me to...

... the culture of the MoND itself. There's been a history of lying and covering things up so as to not report bad news to those higher up at the MoND--specifically the Joint Operations Command Center. One recent incident was when a helicopter crashed and the JOCC found out b/c it was reported in social media after seeing viral posts. Similarly, incidents like the 2016 HF3 misfire that killed a Taiwanese fisherman when an accidentally armed missile hit his boat, but the JOCC didn't find out until an official in Taipei disclosed it. In 2018, a junior officer killed himself because he was forced to use his own money to purchase replacement parts for his brigade's units, and it was all covered up until his mother made a fuss about it that garnered national attention. And this is just the surface of what we can quickly find in English.

But the wildest part about the whole ROCA is the fact that during the martial law period, the ROC made a deliberate choice to adopt a Soviet style army with political commissars that remains to this day. To add insult to injury, they even purged General Sun Lijen, who was a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute and one of the few officers who conducted an effective resistance against the IJA in WW2--both in China and in Burma--in order to do this.


To sum up - Taiwan's military is:

  • chronically underfunded

  • logistically deprived

  • frequently undertrained

  • poorly maintained

  • overly focused on big ticket "wunderwaffe" to put on a show for the civilians

Taken together, all of these factors make the ROCA way more like the Russian military than with the US army. Should a hot war break out within the Strait, it is likely that the ROCA will suffer similar performances as the Russian military, but on an island where strategic depth is practically nonexistent.


r/CredibleDefense • • Mar 04 '22

Is the Russian Air Force Actually Incapable of Complex Air Operations? More than a week into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Air Force has yet to commence large-scale operations. The continued absence of major air operations now raises serious capability questions.

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816 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • Mar 08 '22

A Ukrainian Insurgency Will Be Long and Bloody. Even if it does lead to a Russian defeat, Ukrainians—and the Western policymakers who are backing them—should not deceive themselves about just how awful insurgent warfare will be.

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726 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • Apr 25 '22

Operation Z: The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion. Russia's military setbacks in Ukraine pose a new set of security challenges in Europe and beyond. The perception of declining influence appears to be pushing the Russians to take greater risks.

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683 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • Oct 12 '22

Bombing Kyiv Into Submission? History Says It Won’t Work. Even though it creates misery and loss, the methodical bombing of civilian centers has more often been shown to rally support for resistance.

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664 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • Mar 03 '22

The Wargame Before the War: Russia Attacks Ukraine. In the two weeks prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Marine Corps University ran a four-day wargame to simulate the first several days of just such an invasion.

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617 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • Mar 27 '22

What the invasion tells us about a potential invasion of Taiwan

582 Upvotes

Many have made the analogy between the PRC obsession with Taiwan, and Russia's with Ukarine. While there are many differences between the two, this current invasion shows us, and the PRC, why an invasion of the ROC is unlikely to be successful.

What have we learned?

  1. It's impossible to hide an invasion force. Pretty much everyone saw the possibility of this invasion coming from miles away. Modern SATINT have made surprise invasions effectively impossible. Because of the nature of the distance involved in an invasion of Taiwan, it would take even more build up, many of which would happen in view of some of the busiest shipping lanes in the world.

Furthermore, something else we've seen is that invading party had to make two trade offs with OPSEC, they can keep the details of the plane secret to all but a few in the government, leading to a smaller chance of it leaking, but less prepared troops, or they could do visa versa.

2) One cannot rely on things like sabotage, sleeper cells, decaption strikes, special ops and cyber warfare. This isn't to say these things aren't a risk, and that the ROC should not spend many resources defending against them. They certainly should, and they should. But from the PRC perspective you can't go in with the assumption that any of these acts of subterfuge will work, simply because you can't know. Cyberwarfare has no been that big a part of the current conflict as far as we can see, nor has internal sabotage and assassination.

3) Geography. War is about overcoming geography as much as overcoming the enemy. The geography in the case of Taiwans invasion is about as hard as you can get. Consider the following:

A) You're look at least a 5 hour journey for any amphibious transport across the Taiwanese strait, and that's if they taking the quickest route possible. Note that the quickest route possible is a straight line, and the Taiwanese will be able to that line to a rough approximation, so they will likely need to add in time for minesweeping.

B) Taiwanese mountains are tall, almost two miles in some places. This allows their ISR assets to see the entire Taiwanese strait without relying on on AWACs or any other airborne assets. If you notice in the RUS-UKR conflict, most airplanes are avoids AA fire by flying below the radar horizon. This simply does not work when the radar is mounted on a 1-2 mile tall island(I've simulate the radar horizon in CMO, which account for Terrain)

C) Taiwan's mountains also protected numerous assets on it's Eastern Side from ballistic missiles due to their trajectory(not cruise though)

D) Taiwanese airforce can use the mountains to hide from certain Chinese ISR assets.

E) Taiwanese strait weather is not favorable for invaders for most of years, this gives them a very tight time table to establish a beach head.

F) They are few beaches that the Chinese can land at, funneling their forces into well prepared kill boxes

4) The nature of amphibious warfare leaves very little room for error. China's amphibious assault capacity is not particularly large, and ships are the most expensive and the most difficult thing to replace, they have about 50 active transport ships, so it's very possible for Taiwan to have 100 anti ship missiles for every ship . Once those 50 ships are gone, the war is over. And their transport capacity is pretty weak, about 25,000 troops in one go if I'm reading this correctly, with limited armor support.

5) Evidence from the current conflict shows us that any force on the landing beach would be very vulnerable. Anti tank munitions like Javeline and drones can destroy their vehicles before they even land, those that do land will have no cover from MLRS which can strike from far away concealed positions. A single MLRS volley can kill everyone on a landing beach. The beach's perimeter will be likely be so mined, that the landing force will be limited to it for sometimes.

Recommendations for Taiwan:

  1. They need to invest alot in anti drone warfare. China's massive industrial capacity almost certainly means they'll use drone swarm to try and overwhelm the countries AA defenses. Something like Israelis Iron Dome would be ideal, alot of relatively cheap missiles that can easily be mass produced and spread all over the island.

  2. Massive use of decoys. Modern inflatable decoys are extremely cost effect, and can mimic IR and RF signature of actual units. The Chinese have for better SATINT capacity than Taiwan, and some fo their drones will get through so decoys are key for keeping your assets protected. Decoy RF emitters can draw the fire of anti radiation missiles.

  3. Invest heavily into anti air. China can not hope to win without complete air superiority, so you must ensure you have anti air assets in spades, both in terms of radars, missiles, and mobility. Abandon all anti air assets that are static. Make sure all the vechiles are up to date as far as maintenance is concerned.

  4. Have counterassault teams ready to prepare for paratroop insertions meant to wreck havoc behind your lines, similar to what the VDV attempted at Hostomel.

  5. Have a propaganda arm to create sympathy in the West, and unity among your own people.

  6. Use conscripts for logistics and recon, not fighting. This is going to be a war of tech, where you're going to win by using very sosphicated weapons, that are only useful when used by very well trained troops. Conscripts have their place but it's not manning an AA battery, or Zerg rushing the beaches. Realize the limits of your conscription program and focus training on where there's a comparative advantage.


r/CredibleDefense • • Jun 25 '22

The war in Ukraine is on track to be among modern history’s bloodiest. It is killing far more soldiers per day than the typical war — and all signs point to protracted conflict.

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572 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • Mar 05 '22

Primer: Statistical Armour. Designed to defeat RPGs, it has become a normal sight on every class of vehicle from logistics trucks to main battle tanks. But how does it actually work, and why do you almost certainly think it does some things it doesn’t?

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568 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • Oct 18 '22

Foreign Servants. Retired U.S. generals, admirals take top jobs with Saudi crown prince. Hundreds of veterans have taken lucrative jobs with Saudis and other repressive governments, which U.S. officials approved — but fought to keep secret.

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550 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • Oct 02 '22

Even as Iranians Rise Up, Protests Worldwide Are Failing at Record Rates. Mass protests, once a grave threat to even the fiercest autocrat, have plummeted in effectiveness, a study shows. Factors appear to include polarization, social media and rising nationalist attitudes.

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533 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • Feb 24 '22

NATO officials say Russian attack on Ukraine has begun

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520 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • Mar 31 '22

How the West Got Russia’s Military So, So Wrong. Good equipment and clever doctrine reveal little about how an army will perform in a war.

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519 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • May 09 '22

Ethiopia: An All-Out War Looks Imminent. While Ukraine grabs the headlines, Ethiopia is in the midst of a civil war that has brought famine and economic crisis in its wake. As public anger grows, the conflict may be heading towards a bloody conclusion.

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509 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • Jun 26 '25

Article: "I Fought in Ukraine and Here’s Why FPV Drones Kind of S*ck"

502 Upvotes

For those of you interested in the discussions about FPV strike drone usage in the Russo-Ukraine War, you will find this recent article in War on the Rocks fascinating and enlightening.

I Fought in Ukraine and Here’s Why FPV Drones Kind of Suck

The article was written by a former Slovak military officer, with prior service in multiple elite units, who joined Ukraine's International Legion of the TDF and served for 6 months on drone team.

I’m going to list out some points he discussed that I found interesting, some are specific about his unit while others some seem general and systematic:

  • 43% hit rates when everything went as planned, and his drone team not taking calls for fire because the conditions weren’t right, dropping to 20-30% if they were launched regardless. He says that is a bad hit rate, though compared to what?

  • Most of his drone unit’s FPV targeting was done against pre-disabled vehicles, most often caused by mortars or bomber drones.

  • “The proportion of missions when we successfully carried out a task that only a first-person view drone can fulfill — delivering a precision strike on a target that could not be hit by other means — was in the single-digit percent.”

  • FPV drones have low success rates because most commanders tasking their usage don’t know how to properly use them, and technical reasons.

  • “Few first-person view drones have night-vision capability,” and most can’t fly in “wind, rain, snow, and fog.”

  • A quarter of FPV drones fail to launch, due to tech issues, usually relating radio receiver/video transmission issues, resulting in the drone being cannibalized for parts.

  • About 10% of FPV drones that hit the target, the onboard munition doesn’t detonate.

  • “First-person view drones cannot really hover, fly slowly, or linger above a target,” and are very hard to fly properly, especially without formal training.

  • FPV drones have no navigational aids for the pilots to find the target, other than visual terrain association.

  • “The greatest obstacle to the successful use of these drones by far is the unreliability of the radio link between the operator and the drone.”

  • Radio controlled FPV drones typically lose signal with the operator while traveling close to the ground and while on the terminal phase of their strikes against targets.

  • Unmodified FPV drones typically use unencrypted radios and operate on a small spectrum of frequencies that are shared by friendly and enemy drones, leading to major deconfliction issues and ease in enemy EW to jam them.

  • The need to deconflict with friendly EW especially and other drone operators greatly limits FPV drone usage. This impacts the Russians too.

  • Lack of drone standardization, bad designs, low quality control for parts and assembly have caused problems that can hopefully be solved with maturity.

  • Issued drones with digital radio modulation/frequency hopping are starting to arrive in small numbers, though those come with the cost of worse battery performance.

  • While his unit didn’t use fiber-optic controlled drones, he notes multiple problems with them, including limited maneuverability, wire tangling problems, and overall cost. Also, Ukrainian access to fiber optics for use with drones are in short supply.  

  • FPV drones definitely didn’t replace artillery or mortars, which are more effective, cheaper, not affected by weather.  

  • His unit’s kill chain took about 15 minutes from request to launch of an FPV drone (and again, 25% of the time they don’t launch).  

  • For armies wanting to invest in strike drones, the writer recommends investing into something more high-end than commercial FPV type, such as something like Switchblade, with better day/night capabilities, easier to use, and better EW resistance.


r/CredibleDefense • • Jan 19 '22

Why are things between Russia and Ukraine escalating NOW?

502 Upvotes

I consider myself pretty well read on the current Russia/Ukraine crisis, but what I almost never see is an explanation of why things are going to shit right now. Here's what I have read:

  1. It's about NATO expansion. That's what the Russians keep saying, but NATO expanded to Russia's borders over a decade ago when the Baltics joined, and to my knowledge Ukraine was no closer to NATO membership now than they were in 2014 when Russia invaded. In fact they're probably further away from NATO membership in the current situation. So if that is the reason, why now?

  2. It's about Russia wanting to end the war in Ukraine soon and on favorable terms. Seems plausible, but why now? To my knowledge the war has been on a constant low simmer, with not a lot of escalation in the last 12-18 months.

  3. It's about Ukraine denying water rights to Russian occupied Crimea. There again, I think this has been going on for some time.

I believe that generally states act rationally, but I can't figure out why Russia has picked this particular moment in time for brinksmanship. The size of their troop movements and their intensity of their diplomacy is unusual. Any ideas on why now? Is there are crisis or opportunity I'm not seeing?


r/CredibleDefense • • Aug 10 '22

War Game Finds U.S., Taiwan Can Defend Against a Chinese Invasion. All sides would pay a heavy price if ever there were a military conflict over the island.

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500 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • Mar 31 '26

An important announcement regarding this subreddit.

493 Upvotes

Dear Credible Defense readers,

As a team we have been in active discussions over the state of the subreddit. Henceworth, we have a very important announcement to make:

WE ALL QUIT WE ARE TIRED OF MODDING YOUR STUPID UNINFORMED HORSE SHIT OPINIONS GO GET SOME COURAGE AND MOD YOUR OWN SUBREDDITS.

Please use this space to discuss.

Sincerely yours,

u/veqq

u/milton117

u/sokratesz

u/funwonderful1936

u/jrex035

u/for_all_humanity


r/CredibleDefense • • Mar 18 '22

Russia Crisis Military Assessment: The weapons Ukraine needs most to win the war. The war has transitioned from a lightning offensive designed to take the capital (if not the whole country) to a brutal war of attrition designed to suffocate Ukraine.

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481 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • Jul 03 '22

The U.S. Keeps Losing Wars Because Nobody Listens to the Spooks. The intel failures behind conflicts from Vietnam to Afghanistan are not identical, but most of them come down to the people in power not listening to the spies on the ground.

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477 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • Mar 25 '26

Trump is blundering into a ground war. It would be a disaster

462 Upvotes

Almost a month of US and Israeli bombing of Iran has been a stunning demonstration of what air power can achieve – and what it cannot. The Iranian mullahs have prepared for this kind of asymmetric warfare for decades. They are not giving in. In fact, hardliners in the regime have only been strengthened.

Nor have the Iranian people risen up as Donald Trump hoped they would. Now he faces a painful choice: declare victory, an obvious lie and a humiliation, or start a ground war.

Credible reports say that around 5,000 Marines are on their way, along with elements of the 82nd Airborne Division. This is nowhere near enough for a march on Tehran. That would take hundreds of thousands of troops. It may be enough to start securing the Strait of Hormuz, or for a bridgehead on the coast.

But this is the “mission-creep” that terrified Trump’s predecessors and led to the Powell Doctrine, set out by the former chairman of the joint chiefs and secretary of state Colin Powell: define what victory looks like, use overwhelming force to achieve it and have a clear exit strategy.

Read the full article: https://inews.co.uk/news/world/trump-blundering-into-ground-war-would-be-disaster-iran-4314157


r/CredibleDefense • • Jul 12 '22

Poland Begins to Fortify a New Iron Curtain. The country is making enormous investments in defense and will soon become one of Europe’s pre-eminent land powers.

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458 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • Oct 14 '22

The US is imposing sweeping sanctions on American involvement in Chinese tech, which is causing an effect that can only be described as a systemic shock.

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456 Upvotes

r/CredibleDefense • • Mar 11 '22

Russian military performance in Ukraine shows glaring weaknesses in their training and culture, but many of their failings are fixable.

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455 Upvotes