Hello world. I was playing around with the idea of a secure "jail" environment, and I think I came up with a basic solution that requires little effort to setup. Feel free to critique this is only a test concept. These instructions are going to assume you are using i3wm, so tweak to fit your wm of choice or base cwm, fvwm. I use i3 because it's easy and idiot-proof.
So basically you log into #
# useradd -m jail1
# passwd jail1
Create a strong password https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7U-RbOKanYs
Log into jail1.
$ echo "exec i3" >> .xinitrc
$ cd ..
$ chmod -R 700 jail1/
$ startx
Now the user jail1 has no doas access and belongs to no additional groups. No outside users can look at jail1's home directory. I have also used chmod 700 on all other home directories, so nobody can see each other's stuff. I assume also that processes by other users cannot be seen, but I haven't tested that yet to be sure. For use of doas; I can type Ctrl+Alt+F2, then login as my regular user to use tmux for any priviledged terminal needs, then Ctrl+Alt+F5 to switch back to my unprivileged environment.
The i3 config is very basic and just autoloads xcompmgr (a base composition manager), terminal is base xterm, and the web browser iridium http://openports.se/www/iridium which is an "ungoogled" chromium build well known to be a privsep oriented browser. https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-misc&m=152872551609819&w=2
i3 config - https://pastebin.com/2TN3D3cK
Now I can use iridium to browse with no possible root access, since even an open terminal cannot use doas or sudo. For extra protection I employ ublock origin for adblocking, dj noscript for script blocking, and an user-agent spoofer that tells websites I'm a mac or ubuntu browser. Of course avoiding google, facebook, and browsing only trusted sites. So it's not anything state-of-art or high tech, but it's a couple more stopgaps to use. I know I can remove the "persist" argument from /etc/doas.conf in case an attacker were able to use a browser bug to access tty2 and the other user (would that require cracking my other users password?). However persist is a nice feature especially when your password is long and easy to mistype. Well that's all, cheers.
/etc/doas.conf
permit persist keepenv reguser as root
permit nopass keepenv reguser as root cmd reboot
as you can see user jail1 is not even part of the equation.
*edit users can see each other's processes, can this be disabled?
*edit2 This whole concept revolves around the idea that although the OpenBSD kernel is hardened and secure, the security of the web browser is probably never going to be perfect or unbreakable, therefore running a web browser in a completely unprivileged environment is ideal.