The Court relies heavily upon the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court of the Model United States for every non-criminal proceeding before this Court. In them the Court has seen fit to prescribe minimum standards of decorum for any person before this Court (Rule 7). However, we hold those granted the privilege of being rostered attorneys of the Court to an even higher standard.

On July 22, the Clerk of the Court received a formal complaint from /u/caribofthedead in which he degraded sitting Justices as "mentally confused" and suggested said Justices suffer from "mental indecision". The Court forbids such denigration under Rule 7d. However, this alone would not be enough to warrant the attention of the Court. Rather the reckless disregard for proper court procedures by a rostered attorney of the Court gives rise to our actions. The complaint process used does not apply to the Supreme Court and is meant to be confidential. The officer of the Court knowingly abused this process in order to publicly call into question the mental health of several sitting Justices. Such behavior is unbecoming of any responsible citizen, least of all a rostered attorney who is expected to behave professionally and follow all decorum set forth by the Court.

Rule 8 allows the Court to impose sanctions on any person who "knowingly violates the Rules of this Court" (Rule 8(a)), including "any violation of the rules by a rostered attorney" (Rule 8(b)).

THEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of this Court, /u/caribofthedead is hereby ORDERED to appear before this Court by Monday, July 22, 2019 and show cause, if any, why he should not be sanctioned under Rule 8 for his knowing violations of Rule 7 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure and his reckless behavior before the Court.

Now comes /u/bomalia, Esq., petitioning for writ of certiorari in the Constitution of the United States of America.

May it please the court,

Ratified on Friday, formerly known as Frīġedæġ the day named for Frige, the 1st day of March, the third month of the old Roman Calendar, Anno Domini Nostri Jesu Christi 1781 according to the Gregorian Calendar as established by His Holiness Pope Gregory XIII in October 1582, the Articles of Confederation formed the frame of government before the current constitution we know was ratified. It remained this nation's constitution for the better part of six years. Of course, it became evident that these articles provided a very weak political union. This was first demonstrated by territorial disputes between the various states. It could be said that without a doubt, Shays' Rebellion of Anno Domini Nostri Jesu Christi 1786 & 1787 was the nail in the coffin for the Articles of Confederation However, the Articles of Confederation promulgated clear and specific provision with regards to the amendment of that document, saying

The Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State.

However, the Constitution which replaced the Articles of Confederation contradicted this, saying

The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.

First, the Articles of Confederation (henceforth referred to as "the Articles") were the supreme law of the land. Nothing was more significant in the governance of the infant nation than the Articles. Further, nothing could supersede the Articles, unless they were duly repealed. Amendment, as established in the Articles, required each signing state to agree to such an amendment. However, all signatories did not ratify the Constitution until Anno Domini Nostri Jesu Christi 1790, clearly violating the provisions as established in the Articles. The final signatory to ratify, Rhode Island, ratified the new constitution on Saturday, formerly known as Sæterdæġ the day named for Saturn, the 29th day of May, the fifth month of the old Roman Calendar, Anno Domini Nostri Jesu Christi 1790 according to the Gregorian Calendar as established by His Holiness Pope Gregory XIII in October 1582. This was when the Articles could, without a doubt, be thrown out completely. However, both houses of congress met quorum on Monday, the day named for the Moon, the 6th day of April, the fourth month of the old Roman Calendar, Anno Domini Nostri Jesu 1789 according to the Gregorian Calendar as established by His Holiness Pope Gregory XIII in October 1582.

Lastly, I would like to raise the following questions for the court:

1. When was the constitution ratified?

2. Should this court find that the constitution was ratified on Saturday, formerly known as Sæterdæġ the day named for Saturn, the 29th day of May, the fifth month of the old Roman Calendar, Anno Domini Nostri Jesu Christi 1790 according to the Gregorian Calendar as established by His Holiness Pope Gregory XIII in October 1582, would it not follow that all laws passed from Saturday, formerly known as Sæterdæġ the day named for Saturn, the 29th day of May, the fifth month of the old Roman Calendar, Anno Domini Nostri Jesu Christi 1790 according to the Gregorian Calendar as established by His Holiness Pope Gregory XIII in October 1582 and Monday, the day named for the Moon, the 6th day of April, the fourth month of the old Roman Calendar, Anno Domini Nostri Jesu 1789 according to the Gregorian Calendar as established by His Holiness Pope Gregory XIII in October 1582 were unconstitutional, as they violated the current established constitution?

3. As the constitution does not have a severance clause, should it be struck down?

To the Honourable Justices of the Court, The Honourable member from the United Kingdom, /u/agentnola, petitions this court, on behalf of the 1814 Whitehouse Party, in response to the censorship displayed by the current administration of ModelUSGov in response to the 1814 Whitehouse Party.

The Administration deliberately deleted comments, and prevented members of the party from going official. As evidenced here, several comments were deleted in response to many new members attempting to let their membership towards the party become public. This is in clear violation of the First Ammendment, particularly the "the right of the people peaceably to assemble" subsection.

The 1814 Whitehouse Party fulfills are requirements to be granted party status within the United States. The Party has over 25 active members, and differs significantly from all other American Parties.

Honourable Justices of the Court, I come before you to reinforce freedom of Assembly.

ON APPEAL

ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF DIXIE

ex rel.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT

SECRETARY CARIBOFTHEDEAD, in his official capacity

MAJORITY LEADER U/JARLFROSTY,

v.

THE STATE OF LINCOLN

GOVERNOR U/LEAVENSILVA_42.

IN RE: L.S.S.C 19-09

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

• Whether, after demonstrating inadequate regulatory control during a pollution crisis entering the State of Dixie, the Dixie Assembly may seek equitable relief from the tortfeasor Lincoln State parens patriae generally?

• Whether a Lincoln pollution fund is a valid Dixie target for subrogation of contracted annual payments to Lincoln taxpayers, if the payments derive from an unconstitutional pool of state monies and Lincoln has applied subrogation to similar environmental claims since 1880?

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

• Trial Court Record, State of Lincoln

• Lincoln Const. Art. I s. 4: Waiver of Central Sovereign Immunity by the Legislature Assumed

• Lincoln Const. Art. IX s. 3: Limit on Ratio of Corporate to Individual Income Tax “Imposed” is 8:5

• Lincoln Const. Art XI: Environmental Responsibilities And Individual Rights

• Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (finding a state may properly sue another state in state court to recover civil damages caused to the petitioning-state’s citizens)

• Massachusetts v. EPA, 529 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding that air pollution is to be regulated by agencies and that standing of a variety of parties is satisfied even without damages assessed)

• Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (holding that Kansas had standing to seek injunctive relief to prohibit Colorado from diverting water from the Arkansas River, an interstate waterway)

• Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (granting Missouri standing to seek an injunction preventing Illinois’s discharge of sewage into the Mississippi River)

• E.H. Ashley & Co. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., 907 F.2d 1274, 1277 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that when a subrogee steps into the shoes of a subrogor, the subrogee “has no greater rights against a third party” than did the subrogor, or less).

• In re: Atlantic Commonwealth U.S. Senate Vacancy, Model Supreme Court (2019) (questioning if district court claims touching states belong in state court first if a federal remedy is the historical preference)

• Dixie Coastal Protection Fund, Dixie Statutes 376.11(8): Extraterritorial Damages and Responsibility of the Department to Recover Claims Owed to the Dixie Assembly

• Lincoln Code 735 ILCS 5: Wrong Remedy Sought Not Fatal to Claim

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In September 2019, the State of Dixie represented by the Department of the Environment filed a subrogation claim upon the Lincoln carbon pollution annual tax refund dividend program during a pollution crisis affecting the Gulf Coast.

Petitioner cited extraterritorial statutory authority to seek recovery costs associated with pollution cleanup. This authority is granted by the Dixie Assembly in the State Coastal Pollution Fund, granting the Department nationwide authority to recover these costs or the fund may suffer budgetary losses affecting annual operations. In the absence of an Assembly Majority Leader, the Minority caucus petitioned to join the suit in support of the claim.

The Lincoln Attorney General resigned upon receipt of the suit. Counselor and, after state closure for elections, Sierra Gov. u/Zairn, filed motions in opposition based solely on a claim of state sovereign immunity.

Petitioners opposed because the Lincoln constitution prohibits sovereign immunity defenses, and Lincoln Attorney General nominee u/HeidiHeitVamp disagreed with the interpretation of counselor Zairn.

Judge Chapo was informed of this disagreement. The following day Lincoln Court denied the claim without dicta.

ISSUE

CENTRAL GENERALLY

The State of Lincoln administers a carbon pollution tax measured by a dollar amount ($20-$50) per ton of emissions produced. Half of the collected funds are then reissued to some individual residents in an annual dividend. The legislative intent is allegedly to protect the environment from pollution.

Each year, Lincoln must issue 50 percent of all pollution revenues collected in the form of rebates but solely to eligible individual filer-residents. Although taxed at a higher rate, corporate filers, even those foreign companies merely touching Lincoln commerce, are rendered ineligible for annual deductions.

The corporate tax year filing in Lincoln is an income tax. The 50 or greater percent annual deduction for only certain individual tax filings exceeds the upper limit Lincoln constitutional ratio of 8:5 corporate:individual rates in the most generous calculation.

There are foundational concerns concerning the Carbon Fund legality, and thus so may its argued sovereign protections as a debtor to Dixie if Lincoln is found liable as tortfeasor through parens patriae or subrogation.

DIXIE GENERALLY

The Dixie Fish and Wildlife Service administers the legislative-chartered State Coastal Protection Fund. The Fund finances pollution cleanup programs and is a disaster relief program for properties. All affected claimants with a nexus in Dixie are eligible for relief.

Like the Lincoln Carbon Fund and in accordance with the Supreme Court in Hall, its public policy intent is to protect from and recover damage due to torts against state residents.

Unlike the Lincoln Carbon Fund, the Dixie law provides enforcement measures to recover losses and requires the Department to pursue recoverable claims nationally after pollution events. If not sought, the Dixie Assembly is unable to appropriate an equal annual fund.

This means fewer Americans in Dixie benefit from pollution cleanup relief. Importantly, the Dixie fund does not discriminate based on permanent location but on a mere presence in Dixie unlike the Lincoln Fund.

On September 4, the Department was asked directly by the Assembly (Rules Chairman /u/jarlfrosty, Hon. /u/maiqknowsmuch, Hon. /u/tripplyons18) to enforce pollution laws impacting State waters due to agricultural, industrial, and waste emissions from neighboring states. Options to reduce polluting emissions by recovery and if necessary injunction were discussed between branches and with then-Gov. blockdenied.

Majority Leader Frosty joined the action when filed. Gov. u/stormstopper succeeded Blockdenied after his removal.

Within a week of the Department’s new leadership, U.S. Congressman cold_brew_coffee passed a bill fining agricultural runoff disproportionately affecting Dixie State, for surveillance and recovery of expenses to the U.S. Treasury. The bill was likely based on Departmental research on runoff into Dixie from Lincoln sources.

The state and federal delegations operate under good faith belief that foreign pollution is a crisis uniquely affecting the geography of the south.

DIXIE’S COSTLY GULF CRISIS: LINCOLN’S PROBLEM

As noted in PBS News, national and state leaders became aware of a major pollution disaster stemming from the Great Plains and south to the Gulf of Mexico. This was referred to as the “Gulf Dead Zone crisis.”

The crisis is the result of sources of carbon emissions which kill entire base species populations in a wide swath of Dixie’s water. Toxic emissions in Lincoln are concentrated upstream as far north as Illinois, further concentrated along lands downstream to Dixie, and put intense pressure on the foundational reefs and plankton that larger animals and humans rely on for food, tourism, and work.

NOAA estimates this year Dixie residents face $82m in direct losses. Mitigation may cost Dixie upwards of $2.7b. Dixie hosts 40% of the national fishing industry; NOAA has directly correlated the cost of fishing and to consumers to upstream hypoxia events.

Imagery analyzed by the Supreme Court during a past extradition hearing illustrates the source of a majority of this pollution: Lincoln industrial and farming areas, where long trails of emissions and subsequent water pollution seep down the coastal plain into Dixie and then state coasts. Sources from other states are limited by distance and shorter borders, in addition to large state rivers running south to Dixie.

Lincoln politicians and even residents should not pollute at will and profit from a yearly pollution refund. It should instead, as equitable, reimburse Dixie for annual environmental damages incurred by south of Lincoln’s border.

LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE DIXIE TRUST INCLUDE PROPERTY OF SINGLE CITIZENS

The U.S. Department of Commerce review of the Trust and its 1972 authorization explains in part its carbon emissions jurisdiction:

> SOURCES OF WATER POLLUTION

> The Dixie Air and Water Pollution Control Act (Chapter 403 D.S.) was enacted in 1967, and has been amended at several subsequent sessions of the legislature. The Act was passed in response to a growing concern about the environmental and health impacts of industrial and domestic waste discharges and emissions. It recognized that it is Dixie’s pleasant climate, clean air and abundance of sunshine and water resources which have attracted the majority of its citizens.

> Section 403.021(2), D.S., provides that:

> It is declared to be the public policy of this state to conserve the waters of the state and to protect, maintain, and improve the quality thereof for public water supplies, for the propagation of wildlife, fish and other aquatic life, and for domestic, agricultural, industrial, recreational, and other beneficial uses, and to provide that no wastes be discharged into any waters of the state without first being given the degree of treatment necessary to protect the beneficial uses of such water.

> The Department has jurisdiction over natural and artificial bodies of water which include, but are not limited to "... rivers, lakes, streams, springs, impoundments, and all other waters or bodies of water, including fresh, brackish, saline, tidal, surface or underground. Waters owned entirely by one person other than the state are included only in regard to possible discharge on other property or water. Underground waters include, but are not limited to, all underground waters passing through pores of rock or soils or flowing through in channels, whether man-made or natural"; D.S. 403.031(3).

> The Department has the authority to develop plans, adopt standards, require permits, conduct surveillance, and initiate enforcement actions; D.S. 403.061, 403.087, 403.088, 403.091, 403.121, 403.131, 403.141, and 403.161.

APPELLATE ARGUMENT

In Massachusetts v. EPA, 529 U.S. 497 (2007), the majority found that air pollutants are a major source of pollution worthy of judicial relief as an equitable solution. On standing to force another agency to properly regulate air pollution, the Court quoted Justice Holmes from a 1907 case:

> The case has been argued largely as if it were one between two private parties; but it is not. The very elements that would be relied upon in a suit between fellow-citizens as a ground for equitable relief are wanting here. The State owns very little of the territory alleged to be affected, and the damage to it capable of estimate in money, possibly, at least, is small. This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.

> One helpful indication in determining whether an alleged injury to the health and welfare of its citizens suffices to give the state standing to sue parens patriae is whether the injury is one that the state, if it could, would likely attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers. (458 U.S. at 607).

As in Hall, Dixie attempted to pursue foreign official tortfeasors for relief of its citizens. In Hall, Nevada represented an injured citizen struck by a California employee-driven vehicle in Nevada. Here, poor regulation of effluent waste in Lincoln and untoward programming ties directly to Dixie’s costs.

As in Massachusetts, the Dixie recovery fund is seeking legally-authorized reimbursement after long term notice of damages by the Dixie Assembly that governors in Atlantic and elsewhere responded to. In 2019, the Lincoln partner has still failed to begin remedying the regulatory issue. Instead, Lincoln has developed a system of rewarding 50% of the pollution it allegedly tasked itself to eliminate in its constitution.

REMEDY FAIRNESS AND PRECEDENT

The equitable intervention reflecting the flawed structure of the pool of monies is certainly subject to judicial review. However, a potential solution could be to prioritize revenues from the similar agencies but would incentivize pollution control rather than merely causing pollution losses. This is likely less damaging to the Lincoln fiscal plan than an outright award.

For example, the federal statutes governing Medicaid require states to seek reimbursement from any tortfeasors whose actions caused harm to Medicaid recipients that results in medical expenses paid by Medicaid. States will “step into the shoes” of Medicaid recipients and takes their causes of action, subject to any defenses that would be available if the recipients themselves had sued the tortfeasors causing their injuries. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(B); Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 32.033 (Vernon 2001); E.H. Ashley & Co. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., 907 F.2d 1274, 1277 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that when a subrogee steps into the shoes of a subrogor, the subrogee “has no greater rights against a third party” than did the subrogor).

The Dixie Trust, unlike the Carbon Fund, represents both the government and any type of claimant affected by pollution in Dixie, in effect utilizing the debts owed for the same alleged purpose but to a greater mutual constitutional goal than the Lincoln legislature’s own Fund.

Dixie is “stepping into the shoes” of its citizens to address the environmental harm Lincoln’s regulators have caused, but does not claim to solely suffer from the torts committed. Lincoln too shares a history of legislates encouraging equitable relief through subrogation. See, e.g., Lincoln Worker’s Compensation Administration Fund Act [5b and 7a-6]

> Subrogation: Third Party Claims

> The Board shall be a party in interest in all proceedings involving compensation claims against an insolvent self-insurer whose compensation obligations have been paid or assumed by the Board and shall have all rights of subrogation of the insolvent employer.  In such proceedings the Board shall assume and may exercise all rights and defenses of the insolvent self-insurer.

ENRIONMENTAL SUBROGATION CLAIM SUPPORT IN LINCOLN DATES TO 1880

There remains the issue of whether the Carbon Fund itself is an unconstitutional pool of surplus legislative funds to satisfy individual taxpayers each year. If so, the funds sought in the lower court through subrogation could have been deemed invalid, but Lincoln law states the mistake is not fatal to the original action.

However, Lincoln is unique in the nation pertaining to environmental payment subrogation. For example, since 1880 the Lincoln Courts recognize an “absolute right” to recovery for surface property damaged by subsurface mining. Along with the province of Pennsylvania, the Lincoln Assembly agreed.

However, third parties, properties on mines using recently outdated but unsafe mined shafts, abandoned surface plots purchased by public and private buyers, and government entities including state schools built on abandoned shafts, would not be covered by existing mining insurance. Accordingly, Lincoln passed the Mining Subsidence Act in 1979, encouraging equitable relief of environmental damage through subrogation of state insurance claims.

As the legislature admittedly applied mere “guesswork” as to how to appropriate the state fund share with premiums on the insurance policies offered, the Assembly stated:

> It is clear that the Act's purpose should not be frustrated by inadequate premiums and thus inadequate funding. . . . premium rates must be sufficient to satisfy all foreseeable claims upon the Fund . . . . and to provide a reasonable reserve fund for unexpected contingencies. To keep the premiums low enough to make the insurance affordable and to minimize the insurance company losses, the program would be subsidized by up to two million dollars from state tax funds.” Page 422.

THE LINCOLN POLLUTION FUND BONUS DIVIDEND IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND UNAPPROPRIATED POOL OF MONEY WITHOUT SUBROGATION CLAIM PROTECTION

The Lincoln Assembly has designed an annual dividend, in the form of withholding taxes of some filers to pay preferred individual tax filers at the end of the year. This is done under the guise of a pollution control fund title.

The Fund on its face violates the 8:5 Lincoln constitutional ratio of corporate to individual income taxes “imposed.” Taxes imposed are known as effective tax rates. These are estimated before a return, but actually then actually imposed on state filers. Whether held now or later, in form of dollars per ton of carbon or any other measure, the annual effective income tax ratio imposed in Lincoln never alters by slight of hand.

Not only does the income tax formula harm any foreign American corporate entity touching Lincoln and more than some long term residents, it adds another annual income tax return fine for corporate filers only: a 50 percent annual tax return bonus dividend payment to longterm Lincoln residents. It incentivizes the shared environmental problem the Lincoln Assembly claims to pay to solve as obligated by its constitution to our citizens.

The scheme appears to fail the constitutional scope, and therefore its dividends should be considered a potential and useful subrogation source of financing these claims by the Court.

VENUE, JURISDICTION, WAIVER, AND STANDING

Lincoln was the proper RPPS venue, as the state claim is based on state law. On appeal, federal court is the proper venue, due to federal original jurisdiction and the Dixie extraterritorial statute’s reliance on federal district court.

Petitioner maintains sovereign immunity exception does not apply, which was also found invalid in Hall as a Sierra defense against Lincoln. The Lincoln assembly has completely waived immunity for environmental damage claims separately in the same constitution.

The Lincoln constitution guarantees citizens’ right to environmental stewardship from the government. It also permits the enforcement against any party in legal proceedings as necessary to ensure it for “this or future generations.”

In every Supreme Court case in the area of environmental and related parens patriae, the harms suffered by the original victims were causally connected to their residency within that particular state. In the environmental cases, the original victims experienced harm because of their physical locations within a state’s territory (e.g., noxious gases drifting from Tennessee that harmed individuals and property located within Georgia’s boundaries). In the economic discrimination cases, the economically harmed individuals were harmed because they were citizens of a particular state. In other words, the victims’ harms were directly related and causally connected to their identities as a residents of the states that sought to vindicate their interest through parens patriae litigation. When the causes and residencies were independent variables, states filed subrogation litigation as an alternative (e.g., a Dixie smoker in Atlantic cannot rely on either variable alone to file a tobacco injury suit). Page 933

CONCLUSION

THEREFORE, petitioner respectfully requests consideration of this appeal and if accepted, an entry of an Order of Equitable Relief including but not limited to an Order of Subrogation of the Lincoln Carbon Tax Fund dividends to be paid toward outstanding annual environmental recovery debts owed to the Dixie Coastal Protection Fund, pursuant to the laws of our two states’ and Court precedent.

Respectfully submitted,

Caribofthedead, Esq.

Dixie Secretary of the Environment

(2010) My right to self determination with in my state is being violated by my state not being able to adiquitly protect us by banning fire arms. The second amendment clearly states that if you are in the militia then you have a right to own a gun but does not specify and other reason that shall be granted. Further more the 14th amendment only mentioned due process in relation to the bill of rights applying to the states and there for the second amendment does not apply to the states and should therefor be with in the right of the people of the state to legislate restrictions or lack there of on guns as they please.

Bureau Pictures et al v. SR Governor /u/Zairn et al in re: Exec. Order 22 — Banime

May it please the Court,

I am an edumacational filmmaker and beneficiary of comingled state and federal funding through the federal Corporation for Public Broadcasting and its PBS station affiliates. See also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 1984.

On October 8, after producing a short PBS film, ‘BANIME: The Story of the Rise, Rule, and Fall of America’s Anime Prohibition, including Japanese cartoon images, petitioner and namesake charity proceeded with full production of a Ken Burns-style film for public benefit.

On October 27, the State of Sierra judiciary issued a final order permitting the state government to suspend public telecommunications employees from viewing, possessing or “discussing” cartoons; prohibiting the display of cartoons in academic environments; block digital cartoons; and ultimately to discontinue public assistance for production of cartoons.

In summary, this action is preempted by the Supremacy Clause and Article I congressional power of Communications Act and Public Broadcasting Act where CPB and FCC licensees and grantees “shall” schedule programming that serves the public interest, convenience, and necessity.

Both orders are separately preempted due to sanctions authorized by Presidents /u/GuiltyAir and Obama pursuant to the the International Economic Emergency Powers, Magnuson, and USA PATRIOT Acts in Executive Order 14: Bōryokudan Animation Nonproliferative Interdiction of Multinational Exports.

As the uncredited National Security Staff author and subject matter expert on animation prohition at the State Department Bureau of Asian and Pacific Affairs, petitioner was responsible for the interdiction of criminal trade in Japanese and Taiwanese animated materials. At the repeated direction of the President, Petitioner has knowledge of and developed the federal Order balancing constitutional protections and narrowly limiting trade of certain animated materials trafficked by Yakuza gang leaders based on transnational crime fighting precedent.

I assert that that the two Sierra orders jeopardize the federal directive out of alignment with Court precedent. Americans and foreign entities in Sierra will be unable to adhere to both orders to the detriment of national security, commerce, and constitutional due process in those acts.

Additionally, as the U.S. Trade Representative that negotiated the Trans-Pacific Partnership pact with Canadian Foreign Minister /u/spacedude2169, including anime copyright protections approved by the president and congress, petitioner also asserts that the Pact’s specific protections for anime copyright are evidence that the agreement preempts state action in the Banime court holding in Sierra 19-13). Bureau Pictures is an agreement beneficiary and obligee under federal copyright law, and is harmed by state interference.

Finally, petitioner argues in this writ of certiorari as a counsel to the New York Civil Liberties Union and Foundation asserting violations of First, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Civil Rights Act privileges of U.S. person protected interests which were unconstitutionally violated by the Governor but also in the highly-unusual conduct of the Sierra trial, which resulted in significant harm to both procedural and substantive due process of citizens and coordinate representative branches. In particular, a class of persons including petitioner are harmed by disregard for Sierra law in the appearance of a foreign appellate judge using trial rules, and in the abandonment of trial and appellate code and non-waiverable ethical code by both majority judges (presiding official /u/Dewey-Cheatem) in violation of federal precedent.

Accordingly, the Governor and Presiding Judges are effective co-defendants for the civil rights action, and the State for violations of First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the Supremacy Clause.

Questions Presented

• Whether State of Sierra orders broadly restricting cartoons are preempted by the federal order narrowly combatting cartel trade, the president’s exclusive foreign power, and the Communications and Public Broadcasting Acts?

• If not, whether the Banime Court violated the procedural and substantive due process rights of U.S. persons in Sierra causing injury to U.S. persons with a nexus to that state?

• Whether the process of withholding public funds can actually be unconstitutional as prior restraint if improperly predicated, as this Court has qualified, or in absolute as in Sierra?

• Separately, whether the Banime Court appointment of a foreign judge in an appellate proceeding contrary to state law (or alternatively overturning of binding precedent in a trial proceeding by the majority to the dismay of the minority judge) and disregard of state laws on recusal by the presiding judge, significantly violated state and federal due process, ultimately harming the litigants and state legislative and executive balance of power?

Arguments

See full RPPS filing attached.

Standing and Venue; Certification and Remedy Sought

I certify that this writ for certiorari involves federal questions unrelated to appellate jurisdiction. Where state law controls, petitioner argues significant nexuses to federal due process deficits and misreading of supreme law. Petitioner does not assert a direct appeal by writ due to RPPS tolling.

To the best of my knowledge, this is an accurate representation of the trial and/or appellate issues in Sierra which affect the procedural and substantive rights of U.S. citizens and entities in Sierra, including but not limited to amend. I, V, IV, and Articles I s. 8 and II, as well the the core matter of the Communications and Public Broadcasting Act under the Supremacy Clause.

Additionally, a final order has been issued by the Western judiciary. While RPPS 2019 permits a rehearing request, the federal questions at hand are ripe for review in this venue and not in the state, which petitioner argues suffered a series of reversible and lasting errors regardless. The jurisdiction is therefore valid in federal court and petitioner prays for relief under RPPS jurisdiction.

The remedy sought is declaratory under Sierra and federal law for rights pursuant to my employment; declaratory for whether Sierra properly applied federal law; and litigation costs for civil rights injury as a animated cartoon producer in Sierra.

CONCLUSION

THEREFORE, petitioner, barred attorney before the Court, submits this writ for review and seeks declaratory relief for the constitutional issues raised pursuant to the Supremacy Clause in part, and damages pursuant to the Civil Rights Act s. 1983 for procedural and substantive harm and commercial interference by Sierran executive and judicial actors under color of law.

Respectfully submitted,

Carib, Esq.

The New York Civil Liberties Union

Carib Cannibal Foundation

Bureau Pictures, Inc., Counsel

Application for Writ of Mandamus (In re: Nationalist Rebuke Act II)

BirackObama, former LNDOJDAG, on behalf of the ADA 🦷

v.

J. u/Cardwitch, in their official capacity for denying Amicus ADA, and J. u/High-Priest-of-Helix, Presiding Judge In re: NRA Dismissal

Pursuant to the All Writs Act, MRCP II: see e.g., Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).*

Reversal and remand with instructions does not take a case back to square one. The State of Lincoln has unilaterally dismissed In re: Lincoln Nationalist Rebuke Act on the basis of a “want of prosecution” by an appellant, after this Court issued a remand with two limited issue instructions. Further, the State has denied Amicus intending to assist the State.

The State of Lincoln has subverted a hierarchical order of the United States Supreme Court and, in effect, ultimately upheld the challenged law and vacated ruling it supported. The Lincoln Supreme Court has frustrated this judicial process by dismissing the action unilaterally, issuing rules on the fly, without any party asking for summary judgment or adversarial request for dismissal, or any dispositive finding of fact or law for the parties and this Court.

The State of Lincoln must work with the plaintiff and any amicus. It should be coerced by writ of mandamus to comply with federal authority and issue a “decision not inconsistent” with this Court’s holding.

An appellate mandate by remand under Model Procedure puts the parties back in the position they would have been in had the first trial never completed. Because it does not restart the case at the filing of the petition, most of the State’s work is already done. It can and should make a decision on the two issues this Court asked.

The pleadings can be closed of course; the court should be able to have the case set for trial quickly. The discovery is done. Motions from the first trial and appeal can narrow the issues further, even newly isolated issues. Further amicus briefs can be invited to aid the State in complying with this Court order.

The Lincoln Court’s role is ministerial: limited to obeying the Supreme Court’s order to vacate and remand with limited instructions for a decision.

The Lincoln judge has chosen instead to investigate the appellant; dismiss submitted briefings by the American Disbarred Association; and create new rulemaking authority to avoid the federal holding on collateral matters for “wasting... prosecution[s] time” in a civil appeal without a prosecutor at all.

The State of Lincoln has no discretion to alter or modify this Court’s order in any way, shape, or form except to appeal directly to the Supreme Court. The only failure it could perform is to ignore the Order, which it has. Compliance with the mandate may be enforced by filing a motion for mandamus in the appellate jurisdiction over the trial or lower appeal.

The Lincoln Court has not alleged that it cannot decide this Court’s mandate. Instead, it dismissed the action because of a short arbitrary deadline for rebriefings only by the appellant. The Court did not self-help in the Lincoln Bar, actively seek amicus or replace a party, or find the appellant abandoned the action or settled—it decided there was a a “want of prosecution.”

The “want” is this Court’s order to decide the two issues.

It is the role of the Lincoln Court to find compliance with federal law by using its extensive discretionary power to resolve its own failure to abide by the superior order before dismissing an action. Otherwise, it has frustrated the course of by protecting its vacated opinion, quieted amicus, and penalized the successful appellant for rightfully avoiding recognizing a threat to dismiss the United States Supreme Court’s ruling.

Therefore, the plaintiff requests the Court order the trial court to issue some dispositive finding regarding the remand with limited instruction on the two speech issues so that gun owners, gun reformists, counterterrorism agents, and all Americans can understand their constitutional rights in that State.

Respectfully submitted,

BirackObama, Esq.

American Disbarred Association — Semi-Appellate Division

NYCLU v. Acting Attorney General /u/comped, Secretary of the Treasury /u/ToastInRussian et al.

COMPLAINT FOR EMERGENCY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

This is an action under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, for injunctive and other appropriate relief, seeking the immediate processing and release of agency records requested by Plaintiff New York Civil Liberties Union (“NYCLU”), and its news media partners, from Defendants U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Office of the Deputy and Acting Attorney General (“OAAG”) /u/comped, and Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) Secretary /u/ToastInRussian, Office of the Secretary. The Department of Health and Human Services is without a permanent secretary but is named as a co-defendant.

NYCLU is committed to ensuring that the American government acts in compliance with the Constitution and laws, including its public disclosure obligations. The NYCLU is also committed to principles of transparency and accountability in government, and seeks to ensure that the American public is informed about the conduct of its government in matters that affect civil liberties and human rights.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On and after June 1, OAAG confirmed the existence of sweeping investigations by DOJ stakeholders while proceeding to invite the press to address questions to his office.

At the press conference, OAAG /u/comped announced concurrent investigations between the DOJ Criminal and Antitrust Divisions; Office of Inspector General; and FBI. OAAG acknowledged initiating an investigation with the Treasury Department Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigative Division; Inspector General for Tax Administration; and Office of Financial and Terrorism Intelligence, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, all overseen by Secretary /u/ToastInRussian. The AAG noted a joint investigation by the the Education Department (HHS office vacant).

OAAG announced independent prosecutorial referrals from the quasi-judicial Securities and Exchange Commission and the quasi-legislative Federal Communications Commission. It was implied in comments that the DOJ Antitrust finding was a referral by the quasi-judicial Federal Trade Commission. The AAG further announced ongoing communications with state attorneys general to cooperate on these matters.

OAAG proceeded to reveal specific investigative targets, including multiple private corporate entities affecting a significant share of the international consumer technology, business information technology, networking, and education testing markets. Several corporations represent the largest market capitalization in the world, and are of significant public import to the media and public.

One 501(c)4 not-for-profit corporation was identified by the AAG by business identifiable information, its tax Employer Identification Number. Similar to a personal Social Security Number, an EIN is not considered private by the government. In conjunction with other information identifiable to the owner of the EIN, however, it is private data not to be disclosed, according to DOJ investigative partner the Treasury Department Tax Inspector General for Tax Administration (which anticipated over $11.4bn in fraud using EINs from 2013 to 2017). When asked by the press why the EIN was provided, AAG /u/comped stated the EIN itself was not private and refrained from further questioning.

The AAG stated a further investigation into all U.S. common carriers regulated by the FCC. In addition, OAAG announced that some, all, or future targets were “matters referred by the White House.” Two subsequently named targets were private citizens, Leo Shell, and United States Representative /u/Ibney00.

When invited press asked follow-up questions on the investigation into major corporate targets affecting global markets, private and public figures, and the security practice of identifying 501(c)4 entities by Employer Identification Number at the conference, the AAG replied with a Glomar Response, typically used by agencies refraining from confirming or denying activities, rather than refusing inquiries after disclosure (and subject to DOJ Office of Privacy regulations based on case law):

The Department of Justice does not discuss ongoing investigations. — Deputy and Acting Attorney General /u/comped, after identifying investigative targets with particularity.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs submitted a Request for the release of acknowledged records relating to the OAAG at and after the conference. The Request was submitted through the OAAG to all partner agencies mentioned in the press conference revealing the recent extensive investigative operations of DOJ.

Although three weeks have elapsed since the request was submitted, none of the defendant agencies has released any record in response to the requests. Nor has any defendant-agency provided Plaintiffs with a processing or expediting schedule based on news media status or public interest disclosure.

Plaintiff now asks this Court to order the Defendants immediately to process all records responsive to the Request for immediate release and to enjoin the Defendants from charging the Plaintiffs excessive expediting fees or otherwise hindering amended Requests during the delay.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has both subject matter jurisdiction of the FOIA claim and personal jurisdiction over the parties pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), (a)(6)(E)(iii). This Court also has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706.

Venue lies under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).

Defendant DOJ is a Department of the Executive Branch of the United States government and is an agency within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1). The OAAG is a component of the DOJ.

Defendant Treasury is a Department of the Executive Branch of the United States government and is an agency within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1). The Office of the Secretary is a component of the Treasury.

THE REQUEST

On and after June 1, 2019, NYCLU and affiliate American Civil Liberties Union press partners submitted Requests for records relating to the acknowledged investigations at the press conference.

The Requests at the time and since touch on subjects of public import and seek a variety of unanswered inquiries from the conference due to the belated Glomar Response. Questions unanswered but acknowledged by OAAG point to the particular reasoning and status of several investigations into identified targets and individuals; federal referrals and charging authorities accepted by DOJ offices; impacts on civil liberties of targets identified; agencies or non-prosecutorial entities which may be involved in monitoring or initiating this series of investigations, including non-deliberative records on White House personnel identified by OAAG; how the results of the investigations are being assessed and by whom across several independent agencies; whether congressional leaders including Senate Majority Leader /u/PrelateZeratul and Speaker /u/Shitmemery are aware a representative is a named target and if oversight is being employed; and how the unconfirmed role of the Acting Attorney General may impact the permanency of his work at DOJ and the work of his prior office at the Defense Department, among others.

Plaintiff-press agencies seek expedited processing of the Request on the grounds that there is a “compelling need” under FOIA for these records because the existence of the information requested has been publicly disclosed by OAAG.

Plaintiffs also seek expedited processing on the grounds that the records sought relate to a “breaking news story of general public interest.” 22 C.F.R. § 171.12(b)(2)(i); 32 C.F.R. § 286.4(d)(3)(ii)(A); see also 28 C.F.R. § 16.5(d)(1)(iv) (providing for expedited processing in relation to a “matter of widespread and exceptional media interest in which there exist possible questions about the government’s integrity which affect public confidence”); 32 C.F.R. § 1900.34(c)(2) (providing for expedited processing when “the information is relevant to a subject of public urgency concerning an actual or alleged Federal government activity”).

Plaintiff also seeks a judicially-imposed waiver of search and review processing on the grounds that the NYCLU qualifies as a “representative of the news media” and that the records are not sought for commercial use. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii); see also 22 C.F.R. §§ 171.11(o), 171.15(c); 28 C.F.R. § 16.11(b)(6), (c), (d)(1); 32 C.F.R. § 286.28(e)(7); 32 C.F.R. §§ 1900.02(h)(3), 1900.13(i)(2).

THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST

Since June 1, no records or clarification have been produced by any named agency due to the OAAG’s invocation of the Glomar Response. Nor has the unclear DOJ joint management structure with Treasury, FTC, FCC, and SEC provided any legitimate basis for withholding responsive records already acknowledged by DOJ. The OAAG has responded only by refusing to confirm or deny whether any responsive records exist, although AAG /u/comped himself previously confirmed the records existed during the announcement conference.

CAUSES OF ACTION

Defendants’ failure to make a reasonable effort to respond for records sought by the Requesters violates the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3), and Defendants’ corresponding regulations.

Defendants’ failure to promptly make available the records sought by the Request violates the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A), and Defendants’ corresponding regulations.

The failure of Defendants DOJ and Treasury to grant Plaintiffs’ expedited processing violates the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E), and Defendants’ corresponding regulations.

REQUESTED RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and ACLU news media affiliates respectfully request that this Court:

• Order Defendants immediately to process all records responsive to the Request on and since June 1;

• Enjoin Defendants from hindering Plaintiffs by way of search, review, or duplication fees for the processing of the Request, and amended Requests;

• Award Plaintiffs their costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in this action; and

• Grant such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

caribofthedead, esq.

The New York Civil Liberties Union

Justice Beat Media Partners:

American Civil Liberties Union

The Atlantic Magazine, Investigative Reporting Team

Hookers Adult Video Network, CEO /u/deepfriedhookers

Voice of America—Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Director Car Cannibal

Vox Populi, CEO /u/bandic00t_

May it please the court, I, the petitioner, /u/sviridovt on behalf of the Americans for Religious Freedoms Foundation hereby petition this Court to find Western State Bill 011 in violation of the establishment clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

In Everson v. Board of Education, Justice Hugo L. Black created the Establishment Clause test to be used for seeing if a government entity has violated the First Amendment. A second point that Justice Black mentioned was that the government “Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions nor prefer one religion over another”. Western State Bill 011 clearly violates this clause by clearly excluding secular organizations from the law, not only that however, but when using the definition which the law provides leaves out the vast majority of religions and almost exclusively limits this program to Christian Faiths. It does this by restricting the program to faiths that are over 200 years old, with proof of monastic traditions which is left very vague and leaves out almost all but Christian faiths.

Furthermore, Justice Black has stated that the government “Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion”, this bill clearly violates this clause by giving a clear incentive to be religious. Because these religious institutions will not face the same problems that the State prison system faces (such as overcrowding, lack of funding etc.) because of their ability to choose how many prisoners to intake and the procedures for these prisoners, which means that conditions in these religious institutions are bound to be better than in State prisons, this I believe creates an incentive for prisoners to join the program despite any personal objections to faith in question. This further violates Justice Black’s fourth point, “No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance”. The abovementioned difference in conditions further violates this point by punishing those who do not adhere to faith, or more specifically faith which is over 200 years old and has a clear monastic tradition, or as mentioned in previous paragraph, Christianity.

Apart from punishing in accordance to the Establishment Clause test, this law further goes against the Supreme Court case Lee v. Weisman, a case against prayers in high school graduations. In that court case, the Court found that “The school district’s supervision and control of a high school graduation ceremony places subtle and indirect public and peer pressure on attending students”. Furthermore the court has said that “at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise”. In Lee v. Weisman the court said that because of the importance of high school graduation for students, and their inability to freely leave the event if they feel uncomfortable the policy was found unconstitutional. Being that the case was based on the importance of event attendance, this case therefore is a more egregious violation the First Amendment since prisoners are physically not allowed to leave, and choosing to not partake in this program physically separate religious from the non-religious in the State prison system.

In conclusion, I ask that the court finds Western Bill 011 in violation of the Establishment clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by giving different treatment to religious and non-religious prisoners and in the process punishing those who do not adhere to the very narrow definition of religion that the Western State defined.

Honorable Justices, I /u/superepicunicornturd, write this before you today requesting an emergency injunction in regards to the recent order made by the executive branch in regards to budget appropriations for the TSA.

The constitutionality of the order presents itself in Section III(e) of the order, which states the following:

Funds currently allocated to the Transportation Security Administration for the purposes of full-body scanners shall instead be used to procure, operate, and provide training for the use of metal detectors, luggage scanners, and explosive-detecting canines.

The provision above, I hope the court will see, oversteps the power delegated to the president in that: The president is diverting funds appropriated for specific use by Congress. It is of blatant violation of separation of powers as it gives the president the authority to modify the text of law that was passed by congress. Usurping the power and authority delegated to congress is unlawful and ignores what the founders wanted while also establishing a dangerous precedent. The president in this case circumventing procedure established in the Presentment clause and ignoring the powers delegated to the office by the Constitution.

In the majority opinion of the court in the case Clinton v. New York, Justice Stevens astutely pointed out that allowing the president to amend, nullify parts of the law would,

"authorize the President to create a different law – one whose text was not voted on by either House of Congress or Presented to the President for signature."

While the president has the authority execute law, he/she does not have the power to execute the law in a way that both houses of Congress had not previously approved of. For it is this, that I ask this honorable court to prevent this order from being executed pending further review from the court and to allow the administration to respond.

COMES THE PETITIONER, /u/animus_hacker

on behalf of the Plaintiff, American Eagle Outfitters, Inc. ("Plaintiff"), a Northeast State Corporation, for their claims against the Classical Liberal Party ("Defendant") for Federal Trademark Infringement, and Federal Trademark Dilution, alleging as follows:

Plaintiff files this action against the Defendant for trademark infringement and trademark dilution under the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (the "Lanham Act"). This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the Federal trademark infringement and trademark dilution claims pursuant to U.S. Const. art. III § 1, notwithstanding 15 U.S.C. § 1121(a), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a), owing to the lack of federal district courts.

The Plaintiff is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Northeast State, with its principal place of business in Pittsburgh, Northeast State. American Eagle Outfitters was founded in 1977 by two brothers who were the third generation owners of the family menswear business. Seeking to diversify their brand, they started American Eagle Outfitters to sell leisure apparel and footwear, as well as men's and women's accessories, emphasizing merchandise related to outdoor sports, such as hiking and climbing. By 1994 when the company was publicly listed on the NASDAQ exchange, there were 167 American Eagle stores in multiple countries. Today the company boasts over 1000 retail locations.

American Eagle Outfitters is the worldwide owner of the trademark "American Eagle Outfitters" as well as various related trademarks such as the "Flying Eagle" design, pictured here. The Plaintiff has long been manufacturing and selling in interestate commerce high quality goods under this mark. Through longstanding use, advertising, and multiple registrations with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the Plaintiff has achieved a high degree of consumer recognition for this and other trademarks.

The Plaintiff has continuously used the "Flying Eagle" design for years in connection with the sale and promotion of its goods, and the "Flying Eagle" mark is highly recognized by the public as identifying the Plaintiff's business and products.

In February of 2016 the Defendant organized as a clique of independents, and on February 8th was given official recognition as an independent grouping. Shortly thereafter the Defendant began representing and identifying themselves publicly (including, but not limited to, their user flair on a number of subreddits) by the use of an eagle logo that is a blatant mirroring of the Plaintiff's "Flying Eagle" mark. This mirroring is a minor alteration of the trademark that remains substantially similar to the original.

Neither the Defendant as an organization, nor any of its designated agents or assigns, are authorized by the Plaintiff to use the "Flying Eagle" mark.

The registrations embodying the "Flying Eagle" mark are in full force and effect, and the Plaintiff has authorized manufacturers and vendors to sell merchandise bearing the mark. The Defendant's use of the "Flying Eagle" mark in connection with their actions, statements, political literature, etc., constitutes false representation that the same are sponsored, authorized, or affiliated with the Plaintiff. The Defendant's use of the mark is highly likely to lead to consumer confusion, and is in blatant disregard of the Plaintiff's right to control their trademarks. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's willfull and unlawful conduct, the Plaintiff has been injured and will continue to suffer injury to their business and reputation unless the Defendant is restrained by this Court from infringing their trademarks.

The "Flying Eagle" mark is a strong and distinctive mark that has been in use for many years, and has achieved widespread public recognition, and is thus "famous" for the purposes of the Lanham Act. The actions undertaken by the Plaintiff as outlined above have diluted and continue to dilute the unique and distinctive nature of the "Flying Eagle" mark.

These actions violate the Lanham Act, have injured, and, unless immediately restrained, will continue to injure the Plaintiff, causing damage to the Plaintiff in an amount to be determined at trial, and have caused irreparable injury to the goodwill and reputation associated with the Plaintiff's brand. Evidence is offered here, showing that the Defendant's use of the "Flying Eagle" mark has opened the Plaintiff up to ridicule. The Defendant took these actions knowingly, deliberately, and with wanton disregard for their dilution of the Plaintiff's trademarks, and their conduct is willful and egregious.

The Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law to compensate them fully for the damages that have been caused and which will continue to be caused by the Defendant's unlawful acts unless they are enjoined by this Court.

In light of the foregoing, the Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendant from using the "Flying Eagle" mark or any of the Plaintiff's other trademarks, and to recover all damages, including attorney fees, that the Plaintiff has sustained and will sustain, and all gains, profits, and advantages obtained by the Defendant as a result of their infringing acts alleged above, in an amount not yet known.

The Plaintiff respectfully requests judgment against the Defendant, and for temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief restraining and enjoining the Defendant, their officers, agents, employees, and attorneys, and all those persons in active concert or participation with them from advertising, marketing, or otherwise promoting themselves with the Plaintiff's trademark, or any other mark confusingly similar thereto, and from engaging in any other activity that will dilute the distinctiveness of the Plaintiff's trademarks.

The Plaintiff likewise requests an accounting of the Defendant's gains and profits from their wrongful acts, including but not limited to donations, and the award of such profits to the Plaintiff along with all damages sustained by the Plaintiff as a result of the Defendant's wrongful acts, and any other such compensatory damages the Court determines to be fair and appropriate under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Finally, the Plaintiff requests applicable interest, costs, disbursements, and attorney fees (ibid, receivable via the Petitioner's account with Model Vegas), and the awarding of statutory damages (supra at § 1117(c)), and any other such relief as may be just and proper.

Honorable Justices, I write this to today to formally petition by asking for a writ of centorari. It is in my full opinion that a law passed and signed violates the constitution of the United States. The legislation in question is Bill 017: The Federal Accountability Internal Revenue Act (hence forth referred to as the FAIR Act) specifically Article I that states the following:

Federal employees who owe federal taxes and are more than a year past due will be ineligible for federal government employment.  

The due process clause of the 14th amendment prevents a State from depriving a person of, "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" The FAIR Act is in blatant violation as such it does not provide a medium for the current employees of the government to appeal their ineligibility.  

It is the case Goss v. Lopez 419 U.S. 565 (1975), that this honorable court has ruled previously, that suspensions without a hearing violates the due process clause of the constitution.

Therefore, I hope the court will find that Article I of the FAIR Act is in violation of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause and thus unconstitutional. Thank You.

To the Honorable Justices of this Court, the petitioner, /u/theSolomonCaine, respectfully submits this petition for a writ of certiorari to review the constitutionality of B.046 of the Northeast State, known as the Stopping Abuse and Indoctrination of Children Act of 2015.

The following questions have been raised for review by the Court:

1. Whether Section 3 of Public Law B.046 infringes upon the First Amendment by preventing parents from using true and objective religious principles to raise their children, prohibited by this Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

2. Whether the conditions imposed upon the Northeast State under Public Law B.046 are ambiguous and overly vague so as to render them unconstitutional.

Motion for Emergency Injunction or Stay Pending Appeal

Model New York Civil Liberties Union (MNYCLU)

v.

Sierra Governor /u/ZeroOverZero,

Sierra Secretary of Transportation /u/Barbarossa3141,

U.S. Secretary of Defense /u/comped,

U.S. Attorneys General /u/SHOCKULAR and /u/IamATinman.

Questions Presented

• Whether a signed compact between a U.S. state and a foreign state ordering that local and foreign law enforcement agencies “shall share” data with the foreign state (and reverse) is valid without executive or congressional assent, such as ratified mutual legal assistance treaties between the states administered by the federal government?

• Whether state law enforcement agencies that “shall share” data with an agency-party or foreign state-party on request without procedures given, in particular requests for Sierra Department of Motor Vehicles biometric data since 2011, or generally unregulated sharing of private data without due process, is unconstitutional under the DREAM Act of 2019 (as originally passed by Senator Mika3740 and Speaker Gunnz, President /u/Ninjjadragon’s Executive Order 003.2 (“Right to Privacy Order”), and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as also authorized for review in part by the Civil Rights Act of 2018?

• Whether Deputy Director of the National Security Agency /u/comped and Attorneys General and Directors of National Intelligence /u/SHOCKULAR and /u/IamATinman violated constitutional Article II powers in failing to cease and refrain from handling mass data collected by transferring hundreds of millions of records with Sierra authorities in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 2018, DREAM Act and Executive Order 003?

Sierra Procedural Background

Sierra Executive Order No. 12 creates a Sierra-North American Union of regional and national governments including Sierra state, the Federal Government of Mexico and several Mexican states, and the Federal Government of Canada and several provinces proximate to the Pacific Ocean. The Union participants, including Sierra, have been appointed representation by means of a President, a Board of Directors, and Committees.

While many of the authorities in the Order require affirmative actions to execute according to the Sierra Court, Section E requires that that Union participants shall cooperate on matters of security and policing. In particular, the Union in subsection II.1 “shall share police and security information in order to improve law enforcement efforts at the border and in apprehending criminals.” Also under this section on security and policing, participants “shall share emergency resources and funds in cases of severe natural disasters.” A committee on security, and a subcommittee on emergency management, are created for representation.

In subsection II, “members shall have their respective environmental protection and regulation agencies collaborate, share information, and resources on fighting climate change and other important matters.” This presumably covers law enforcement agencies including the Sierra Fish and Wildlife Service.

Tangentially but not being presently challenged, in Subsection IV, it is mandated by the governor that “Scientific research conducted by the Sierra government or public universities shall be made available to universities and agencies within the Union.” This presumably includes federally-funded and classified research programs in Sierra state universities.

The Order makes a final note in Subsection VI that “the Union is only intended to provide cooperation between participants and does not create any legally binding rights or obligations, nor is any part of this order meant to supersede or interfere with federal law.” The Supreme Court of Sierra determined that this vague section without officially tying two or more members of the Union, in addition to the lack of traditional “indicia” of interstate compacts under Virginia v. Tennessee and U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, was as a result not a true Compact without “specific action”. As such it would not previously be open to challenge without some action contravening congressional or other authority. Petitioner believes this order is narrow but is satisfied by the recent actions of Sierra.

Current Controversy

The Order does not simply create an affirmative action between the parties of the Union. Rather, the sections above additionally create a unilateral duty of agencies and institutions within Sierra to provide criminal and intelligence information to foreign states: Law enforcement officers and staff as merely part of the gubernatorial Union and the Committees “shall share police and security information in order to improve law enforcement efforts at the border and in apprehending criminals”, “shall share emergency resources and funds in cases of severe natural disasters”, and “shall have their respective environmental protection and regulation agencies collaborate, share information, and resources on fighting climate change and other important matters.”

Political involvement by the executive and legislature in state and local law enforcement discretion at a fine discretionary level is virtually nonexistent. Enforcement decisions used for interagency data sharing, including at the federal level, are usually delegated to the agency legal officers and prosecutors at the departmental level based on individual factors under guidance, rather than “shall share” orders. Police reform of abuse of constitutional rights since the 1970s has instead targeted increasing local decisionmaking using resources tied to funding and sensible goals, rather than across the board orders by decree to reduce crime.

In immigration enforcement, for example, the competing interests of the State Department, Department of Homeland Security, and state leaders result in restricting discretion of local officers conducting federal and state information sharing and requests for data, increasing the risk of constitutional abuse. This may partially explain why states including Sierra are in a trend since 2014 to mandate collection of anonymized enforcement data such as traffic stop suspects for later policy review, while restricting state access to mass private data collection such as cell phone copying and body camera recognition, to simultaneously increase public safety while reducing due process violations at the sub-state level.

Petitioner Harm and Ongoing Error by Defendants

The constitutional error of this Order and urgent harm is clear to petitioner, representing New Yorkers’ violated privacy interests by ongoing Sierra and federal programs:

Drivers License Photo Data

In 2018-19, it became known that since 2011 the state of Sierra has provided officials at the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Immigration and Customs Enforcement nearly unrestricted access to hundreds of millions of data from and photos of drivers license holders, including undocumented migrants who have the privilege by Sierra law to maintain a license. These migrants who choose to earn a Sierra license and transit through New York, as well as use identification for Port of New York and New Jersey airports and rail, and New York housing and banking applications in Atlantic Commonwealth requiring state identification.

Sierra executive agents and local police did not require a warrant, in many instances contravening other regulations by sending photos for immigration and criminal analysis by email asks by other agencies. This unrestricted access by Sierra employees was and is in opposition to local (San Francisco), state (Arizona, California, Washington, and Utah), federal (House Oversight Committee) findings or regulations. Furthermore, these actions were either ignored or encouraged by Sierra executive leaders including Sierra Governor Jay Inslee despite the restrictions passed by state legislators and signed by the Sierra governor, including at least one successful Sierra court action against a motel chain that used Sierra databases to share immigrant data to ICE nationally.

The instant Sierra order by Governor /u/ZeroOverZero101 to agencies, including Transportation Secretary Barbarossa and the Attorney General, removes whatever ineffective Executive restrictions on Union parties’ access to this protected biometric data existed previously without warrant or due process required by the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment.

Federal Preemption and Law Enforcement Restrictions

Separately, the federal DREAM Act Section 6 (M: passed in previous canon legislation as well in the spreadsheet) restricts the form and functional sharing of this exact type of biometric data. It explicitly penalizes those who share biometric data outside established procedures:

”[It is prohibited to] permit anyone other than an officer or employee of the United States Government or, in the case of applications filed under this Act with a designated entity, that designated entity, to examine [biometric data in] applications filed under this Act... The [U.S.] Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide the information furnished under this section, and any other information derived from such furnished information, to: a Federal, State, tribal, or local law enforcement agency, intelligence agency, national security agency, component of the Department of Homeland Security, court, or grand jury in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution, a background check conducted pursuant to section 103 of the Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act (18 U.S.C. 922), or national security purposes, if such information is requested by such entity or consistent with an information sharing agreement or mechanism... Fraud in application process or criminal conduct... released for immigration enforcement, law enforcement, or national security purposes [and] whoever knowingly uses, publishes, or permits information to be examined in violation of this section shall be fined...]” (emphasis added)

Although the definition of “mass data collection” varies, it is known that the DOJ Federal Bureau of Investigation as recently as under FBI Directors and Directors of National Intelligence /u/SHOCKULAR and /u/IamATinman was ordered by the President to cease the type of “mass collection of data collection” here, and separately suspends the Department of Defense PRISM program administered by interagency partner, Director of the National Security Agency /u/comped (FBI audit of FISA Section 215 authorizing surveillance of records of “any entity”). This partnership applies to efforts targeting U.S. persons within the United States (FISC order) and has been disclosed to be a source of information used in domestic criminal trials of U.S. persons (source). These practices of unrestricted data collection, liable to abuse according to the NSA Inspector General, were to end, at the latest, in January 2019 by executive order of President /u/Ninjaadragon. However, the federal intelligence agency license data sharing program with Sierra is ongoing, in states like Sierran Utah resulting in more records given to the FBI than drivers in the state, for crimes as varied as “suspicious person” to using a Uruguayan passport for a Vancouver, Sierra rental application.

Citizens in but not limited to New York represented by NYCLU are subject to the whims of the Governor of Sierra in ordering his agents unilaterally “shall share” biometric information across all law enforcement, safety, environmental protection, and disaster law enforcement officials in the Compact. That includes hundreds of millions of license biometric records, many times by simple email of Sierra employees “wanting to play NCIS” in one email message, to the FBI and federal officials for other uses.

International

The “shall share” agreement is also contrary to international practice. License, immigration, and criminal information is shared by agreement between the U.S. and Canada for instance. Because national and local law enforcement agencies have different standards of legal process and definitions, the United States ratifies Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties to develop standards for investigative decisions, requiring the joint decision of the Departments of State and Justice.

For example, the U.S. and Afghanistan have signed a treaty by Secretary of State /u/notthedarkweb under President /u/GuiltyAir ratified by the Senate explaining the proper collection of evidence for prosecution and extradition. Likewise, Sierra Union participants including the U.S., Mexico, and Canada maintain treaties on the procedure to compel physical, documentary, and testimonial evidence. Likewise, federal agencies including U.S. Customs and Border Protection are authorized to maintain bilateral agreements by highly planned strategy with Union nations on data sharing and enforcement.

Even with careful planning, data abuses remain. As one example, the national Canadian police call service shared for years mental health records with U.S. DHS by mere request. Despite Canada maintaining a dedicated privacy commissioner office that eventually inspected and ceased the practice, CBP and ICE justified the prevention of entry of those named in the mental health records due to a section in the Immigration and Naturalization Act requiring agencies to prevent access to dangerous individuals: notably a paraplegic Canadian woman injured after a purposeful fall from a bridge, who was refused entry into Sierra due to public safety concerns.

The Sierra North America Union was not subject to extensive planning or public comment by stakeholders unlike the CBP strategy or treaties. Yet its “shall share” provisions would trade far more biometric and other private data with foreign nations by rescinding individual standardized police guidance on how local and state authorities should respond to informal or improper requests by international security agencies, just as it has in the past decade with U.S. agencies. Furthermore, it directly interferes with the constitutional and congressional authority delegated to the Secretaries of State and Attorney General.

This important procedural hurdle was tested as recently as July 2019 in Dixie Governor /u/blockdenied’s request to prosecute a Turkish citizen stemming from the Special Counsel investigation.

Prayer for Relief

Petitioner as the civil liberties advocate for New York victims of these wrongs respectfully requests that the Court immediately stay Sierra Executive Order 12. Petitioner also requests that the Court stay any existing mass data collection and motor vehicle information sharing DOJ and DOD programs violating Executive Order 003, the DREAM Act, and the U.S. Constitution. NYCLU asks for this emergency stay to remain until arguments appealing the order of the State Court of Sierra conclude and damages are assessed as authorized by the Civil Rights Act.

Respectfully submitted,

caribofthedead, Esq.

Model New York Civil Liberties Union

Good morning,

The Court has updated the rules on Criminal Procedure within the Court, to make the process clearer and less cumbersome. The most significant change is that Grand Juries are now simulated, and will not actually take place. The new rules are designed to streamline a complicated process.

Please note that, as before, only designated prosecutors may bring criminal charges.

The Sim is not well suited to criminal cases, but while they continue to be a popular action among members, the Court will continue to facilitate that process.

Thank you,

RestrepoMU,

Associate Justice

Let's look back at some memorable moments and interesting insights from last year.

Your top 9 posts:

• "Announcement from the Court in No. 21-06: In re Executive Order 13998: Safer Terminations Of Pregnancies" by u/dewey-cheatem

• "Happy Cakeday, r/modelSupCourt! Today you're 7" by u/AutoModerator

• "In re: Executive Order 13995" by u/hurricaneoflies

• "In re. Executive Order 13998: Safer Terminations Of Pregnancies" by u/lily-irl

• "In Re: Gregor on Ticket" by u/Adith_MUSG

• "Petition for Rehearing in Case No. 21-07" by u/ModelAinin

• "Opinion in In Re: Executive Order 13995" by u/SHOCKULAR

• "In re HurricaneofLies" by u/ModelAinin

• "Announcement from the Court in No. 20-05: Misogynists United v. United States" by u/dewey-cheatem

Hello to the Supreme Court. I am here today to file a court case against /u/RangerHeart0 who has decided to extend his executive powers to reorganize the executive branch at his command.

He has recently decided to merge departments without the oversight of Congress and in addition has failed to notify them of this. Some cabinet departments seem to not even be covered. I look to the Department of Veteran Affairs and Department of Education in particular.

He is in clear violation of of Separation of Powers. I ask that the Supreme Court look at this as a clear violation of Article 1 Section 8 as Congress has the authority to create any bills that they deem necessary and proper. This is also a clear violation of precedent. In 2002 the Department of Homeland Security was created and passed by Congress in the Homeland Security Act. In addition, every other cabinet reorganization has gone through Congress first before being created, merged, or done away with. Thank you.

• DidNotKnowThatLolz, Representative of the South Atlantic District

EDIT: I have withdrawn this case.

Your honours,

Today, now comes /u/Comped, representing the Petitioner, the Presidential Administration of /u/GuiltyAir, respectfully and urgently submitting this request for preliminary injunction in case 19-01, In re: Subpoenas of the House Committee on Government Oversight, Infrastructure, and the Interior.. The petitioner has recently been informed that the Committee is going forward with its hearings, without a result on the legal issue currently pending before this Court. Previous conversations with the Committee and others revealed that they were willing to wait until the Court had rendered a verdict, but this has recently changed. They informed the Secretary of Defense that the hearing was going to happen on Monday, assuming he could attend. This is a clear matter of estoppel - until they decided to go forward with the hearing, with the nature of the subpoenas that lead to that hearing still under legal review, we were under the impression they were waiting for the case to be resolved. In simple language, they went back on their word, and now we need to have an injunction against any testimony to be gained from these subpoenas. Forcing the Secretaries to have their testimony compelled under the subpoenas, and then determining that the subpoenas were incorrect under the law as we have stated in the trial, would be a grave miscarriage of justice. No harm would come to the Committee for waiting until the Court has rendered its verdict for them to have their hearing. Denying the Petitioner their proper legal process, is indeed a harm that cannot be remedied. Therefor, I ask the Court for injunctive relief against any hearing or testimony compelled by the subpoenas in question, until the Court has resolved this matter.

Respectfully submitted,

/u/Comped, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and member of the Bar of this Court in Good Standing.

May it please the Court,

I am the junior United States Senator from Western State and Chairman of the Senate Standing Committee on the Judiciary, Oversight and Local Government. I certify that I am a member of the Supreme Court Bar Association in good standing.

Due to the emergency nature of this situation I ask for the Court’s indulgence of this motion’s brevity.

The House and Senate composed of all parties have in the past prepared litigation in protection of essential Congressional powers. As the Chairman of the Senate committee responsible for oversight and local government and having drafted and passed a correctly-applied interstate model compact in Congress, this interstate compact is within the Committee’s legislative jurisdiction. As a representative of all Westerners including those in California, which maintains an approximate two million undocumented immigrants in total, I am obligated to protect the rights of any Westerner affected by this legislation. Our borders with Mexico and Canada are a major thruway for all immigrant types, and Western maintains a health and safety interest in these people including those caught in the Dixie-Atlantic Commonwealth compact criteria. Finally the United States Congress, not the States, is solely responsible for the uniform naturalization and immigration laws of the United States in this action. This compact was not part of the delegated powers of the legislature to the executive branch.

This motion for an emergency, temporary restraining (TRO) order is intended to immediately but temporarily restrict the political leadership of the States of the Atlantic Commonwealth (“Northeast”) and Dixie (“Southern”) from executing an unapproved interstate compact issued this evening.

Although further facts are being ascertained by congressional personnel in pursuit of a longer injunctive relief, at this time the following details are clear:

• This self-described interstate compact is an agreement between two or more States.

• This agreement, described as binding or not, imposes obligations and benefits for each affected state and is in effect a binding compact.

• This agreement was not reviewed by Congress.

• U.S. Const. Art. I s. 10 reads as follows: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”

• The Compact Clause demands that Congress have an opportunity to review, amend, and approve this compact, or be afforded the opportunity to make a model compact, to be validly proposed for execution by the States.

• This agreement separately allows these States to make significant alterations to U.S. immigration laws, which jeopardizes matters on foreign affairs and national security, and violates the principles of federalism and the supremacy of Congress in this field.

Therefore, due to the stakes of this agreement on the powers of Congress and the rights of immigrants including Westerners who face state-administered deportation from Dixie to the Atlantic Commonwealth, we ask the Court to issue a TRO affording further analysis of this situation by Congress and the U.S. Department of Justice.

Respectfully submitted,

Hon. U.S. Sen. u/CaribCannibal Chairman, United States Senate Standing Committee on the Judiciary, Oversight, and Local Government

May it please the Court. I am /u/SgtNicholasAngel, Speaker of the US House of Representatives and I (edit: along with /u/ElliottC99 as a co-petitioner) am hereby petitioning the Court to review moderator actions taken with regard to JR017.

Background

I submitted JR017 on or about August 11, 2015. It was published for debate on August 25, 2015. It went to the House floor on September 2. It passed the House by a vote of 20-9 on September 6 and was sent to the Senate. Initially, it was reported to have passed the Senate by a vote of 4-2, with one member abstaining and one member not voting. After "moderator investigation" reported by Deputy Clerk /u/ElliottC99, the Resolution was said to have failed because it did not receive 2/3s of the vote.

Argument

The debate centers around whether or not the Resolution received the requisite number of votes (2/3s). The moderators' argument, from my understanding, is that only having 6/8 votes meets that requirement. However, per the rule that passed the House and Senate around the time of the B072 (quoted at length below; not linked because it goes to the US House subreddit),

the final passage or failure of a bill or amendment shall be determined by the majority of either yea or nay votes.

Thus meaning abstentions and no-votes should not count toward the denominator when calculating 2/3s and that 4 yea votes and 2 nay votes should constitute 2/3s. The rule does not mention Resolutions, but it should be clear that the rule is meant to apply to all types of proposed legislation.

I humbly ask the Court to review the moderator decision that determined that JR017 did not pass.

Below is the entire rule:

Petition for a Rules Change on the House and Senate Floors

Preamble: As currently tabulated, abstaining votes are effectively counted as votes against whatever provision is in question. If abstentions are simply counted as nay votes, then why should we even have to option to abstain at all? This petition seeks to rectify the matter by redefining how abstentions are counted in order to more accurately reflect the opinions of the House and Senate.

Section 1: The final passage or failure of a bill or amendment shall be determined by the majority of either yea or nay votes. Abstentions shall not be counted at all towards the final tabulation of majority.

Section 2: Abstentions shall not be counted towards the tabulation of majority, but will still be counted as active votes and shall contribute towards the establishment of quorum on any given vote. Yea votes and nay votes will also continue to act as active votes and contribute towards quorum as well.

Section 3: This rules change shall take effect immediately upon its passage

It is essential to the proper administration of [...] justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country. The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated.

Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).

The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court of the Model United States form the backbone of every non-criminal proceeding before this Court. In order to ensure competent representation and the orderly conduct of court business, we imposed certain requirements upon the qualifications of attorneys appearing as counsel to others (Rule 6), and prescribed minimum standards of decorum for any person before this Court (Rule 7).

/u/CaribCannibal participated as counsel for the Petitioner in the oral arguments in case 17–06 (Horizon Lines v. Bigg-Boss) despite not being a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court. Opposing counsel admonished a violation of Rule 6(c) (requiring those acting as counsel to another to be rostered members of the Supreme Court Bar), and moved to strike the arguments in question from the record. We granted the motion, and the comments were removed accordingly.

This Order to Show Cause is not issued, however, solely for acting as counsel when not authorized to do so by the rules of this Court. We do not tolerate personal attacks on opposing counsel or other persons before the Court (Rule 7(d)(iii)), and see no reason to start to do so now. The comments that were later struck as a violation of Rule 6 included remarks denigrating the Attorney General as "Attorney Non-Temporal", and alleging that "[t]he Attorney General is grasping at straws in an attempt to besmirch Plaintiffs' dedicated representation of our harmed clients." Such comments have no place in a courtroom—if at all, they are reserved for the battle of public opinion outside of the courts.

The kind of advocacy [...] shown by the record has no place in the administration of justice, and should neither be permitted nor rewarded.

United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985).

While striking unauthorized arguments from the record may sufficiently remedy minor violations of Rule 6, the repeated violation of our Rules of Practice and Procedure and of the decorum required from all parties before this Court demands (and allows for) a more severe reaction. Rule 8 allows the Court to impose sanctions on any person who "knowingly violates the Rules of this Court" (Rule 8(a)), including "any more than two violations of the rules" even by those not represented by qualified counsel (Rule 8(b)).

THEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of this Court, /u/CaribCannibal is hereby ORDERED to appear before this Court by Sunday, August 13, 2017 and show cause, if any, why he should not be sanctioned under Rule 8 for his repeated violations of Rules 6 and 7 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure.

This thread shall serve as the official trial record for Sandra O'Connor. Preliminary hearings and pleas were taken previously.

No amicus briefs will be allowed during this trial.

Standing
Petitioners /u/testojunkie and /u/ecr01 are residents of the Great Lakes and the Atlantic Commonwealth, respectively. By bringing this constitutional challenge of federal statute, Petitioners have standing in accordance with Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court of the Model United States 1(b)(i), as residents of any state have standing when bringing a challenge to the constitutionality of federal law in this court.
Background
In 1994, Congress enacted the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103—322, 108 Stat. 1796, containing, in relevant part, the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994. Tit. VI. This section authorized, and provided the necessary conditions for, the imposition of the death penalty for violation of federal statute. See 18 USC §§3591—3599 (“Act”). The sections as amended by the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 were further amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104—132, 110 Stat. 1214, in order “[t]o deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, [and] provide for an effective death penalty”. Id., at 110.
Question Presented
Whether the imposition of the death penalty is constitutional in light of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “inflict[ing]” “cruel and unusual punishments”.
Argument
This court has held that the command of the Eighth Amendment requires “judge[ment] not by the standards that prevailed … when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather by those that currently prevail” since “’[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man … [t]he Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 US 304, 311 (2002) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 US 86, 100—101 (1958)) (emphasis added). Whether evolution is required for analysis of Eighth Amendment claims is settled law; the problem that faces us, then, is “the pace of that evolution [a]s a matter for continuing debate”. Roper v. Simmons, 543 US 551, 587 (Stevens, J., concurring). Since the Act prescribes the death penalty “by the law of the State in which the sentence is imposed”, Act §3596(a), an analysis of the constitutionality of the state death sentence laws is in order—both in regards to whether they are “cruel and unusual” in order to succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim. Amdt. VIII (emphasis added). In determining whether a given punishment is cruel and unusual, Furman v. Georgia, 408 US 232 (1972), provides four principles to address. First, and primarily, that the punishment cannot “be degrading to human dignity”; second, a punishment conducted “in wholly arbitrary fashion”; third, “clearly and totally rejected throughout society”; and fourth, one that is “patently unnecessary”. Id., at 281 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). If a punishment meets any one of these principles, but particularly the first, then it should be considered cruel and unusual.

State Execution Laws

Only in the Great Lakes is the death penalty prohibited by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-1(a) (“the death penalty is abolished and a sentence to death may not be imposed”). The death penalty is de facto abolished in the Atlantic Commonwealth for the violation of state crimes due to the manner by which the death sentence statutes coerced jurors, People v. LaValle, 3 N.Y.3d 88 (2004), but it is not abolished for the use of the federal death penalty because its method remained intact—that of lethal injection. 2013 New York Consolidated Laws COR 22-B §658 (“[t]he punishment of death shall be inflicted by lethal injection”). In the remaining states, the death penalty is authorized by state law, and can be so used in the execution of the Act. See, Cal. Pen. Code §3604(a) (“[t]he punishment of death shall be inflicted by the administration of a lethal gas or by an intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quantity sufficient to cause death”); Florida Statutes Tit. XLVII, §922.105(1) (“[a] death sentence shall be executed by lethal injection, unless the person sentenced to death affirmatively elects to be executed by electrocution”); Va. Code Ann. §53.1-233 (the sentence of death is imposed “by electrocution or by continuous intravenous injection of a substance or combination of substances sufficient to cause death”); Tex. Code of Crim. Pro. §43.14(a) (“a convict … shall be executed … by intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quantity sufficient to cause death and until such convict is dead”).

Human Dignity

“[M]an regarded as a person … possesses, in other words, a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself and all other rational beings in the world”, Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 41 (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publ’g Co., Inc. 3d ed. 1993) (1795), “consist[ing] in an affirmative, rationally grounded recognition of and regard for a status that all human beings have by virtue of their inherent dignity”. Alan Gewirth, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, Constituion of Rights 10, 12 (1992). “Human dignity refers to the minimum dignity which belongs to every human being qua human. It does not admit of any degrees. It is equal for all humans. It cannot be gained or lost.” Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, Notre Dame L.Rev. Vol. 86(1) 183, 197 (citing Herbert Spielberg, Human Dignity: A Challenge to Contemporary Philosophy, Human Dignity 39, 56 (1970)) (internal citations deleted). Indeed, “[h]uman dignity has long been understood in this country to be innate. When the Framers proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence that ‘all men are created equal’ and ‘endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,’ they referred to a vision of mankind in which all humans are … of inherent worth. That vision is the foundation upon which this Nation was built.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
In determining whether the death penalty stands as a “degrad[ation] to human dignity”, all that is necessary is the evaluation of whether the administration of the sentence carries with it the disrespect of human life. Disrespect does not entail punishment; rather, the manner by which punishment is doled out to those who have committed wrongs. The laws of Commonwealth of Chesapeake, Dixie, the Atlantic Commonwealth, Sacagawea, and the Western State, all vaguely prescribe the manner by which executions shall take place, using language describing lethal injection, but not the way in which lethal injection will be executed—including which, if any, drugs will be used, other than saying that the execution will include substances which are lethal in high amounts. Western state, alone, allows the use of lethal gas in administering the sentence of death. Dixie, the Chesapeake Commonwealth and the Atlantic Commonwealth allow for the use of electrocution in administering the sentence of death. In each case, the risk of a botched execution or suffering during the sentence of death are relatively high.

Electrocution. John Louis Evans was executed by electrocution on April 22, 1983. The Affidavit of Russell F. Canan (June 22, 1983), in Glass v. Louisiana, 471 US 1080 (1985), describes the failure of the execution:

At 8:30 p.m. the first jolt of 1900 volts of electricity passed through Mr. Evans' body. It lasted thirty seconds. Sparks and flames erupted from the electrode tied to Mr. Evans' left leg. His body slammed against the straps holding him in the electric chair and his fist clenched permanently. The electrode apparently burst from the strap holding it in place. A large puff of greyish smoke and sparks poured out from under the hood that covered Mr. Evans' face. An overpowering stench of burnt flesh and clothing began pervading the witness room. Two doctors examined Mr. Evans and declared that he was not dead. The electrode on the left leg was refastened. At 8:30 p.m. [sic] Mr. Evans was administered a second thirty second jolt of electricity. The stench of burning flesh was nauseating. More smoke emanated from his leg and head. Again, the doctors examined Mr. Evans. The doctors reported that his heart was still beating, and that he was still alive. … At 8:40 p.m., a third charge of electricity, thirty seconds in duration, was passed through Mr. Evans' body. At 8:44, the doctors pronounced him dead. The execution of John Evans took fourteen minutes. (emphasis added)

On December 12, 1984, Alpha Otis Stephens was executed by electrocution. The first charge failed to kill him; his chest remained rising; his heart, beating; his conscience, languishing. On the next charge, which took six minutes to complete, Stephens took 23 breaths, and the prison said that he was just "not a good conductor" of electricity. Editorial, New York Times 22, Dec. 17, 1984. On August 22, 1991, Derick Lynn Peterson was executed by electrocution. After being electrocuted, physicians inspected his neck for a heartbeat, and announced that “[h]e has not expired”. Four minutes later, the same statement was made by physicians. This suggests that Peterson had undergone a great deal of suffering in an attempt to execute him; the manner of electrocution was not instantaneous, but rather, forced him to live longer than necessary in the pain that electrocution brings. Karen Haywood, Two Jolts Needed to Complete Execution 1, THE FREE-LANCE STAR (Fredericksburg, Vir.) (1991).

Lethal Injection. On February 22, 2018, Doyle Lee Hamm was scheduled for execution. Mark J. S. Heath, M.D., interviewed him after the execution was called off for being a failed attempt at an execution, and did an assessment of his person.

The doctor advanced a needle into Mr. Hamm’s groin. Mr. Hamm felt multiple needle insertions, and with each insertion he felt multiple probing advance withdrawal movements. It is not clear whether local anesthetic was administered. Mr. Hamm felt the needle penetrating deep into his groin and pelvis. Mr. Hamm stated that this probing was extremely painful. … Mr. Hamm began to hope that the doctor would succeed in obtaining IV access so that Mr. Hamm could “get it over with” because he preferred to die rather than to continue to experience the ongoing severe pain. … At one point a large amount of blood began to accumulate in the region of Mr. Hamm’s groin. The blood soaked a pad or drape, and another one was applied. …Approximately one hour after he returned to the holding cell Mr. Hamm urinated and had gross hematuria. He described the urine as being bright red. … He has never previously noticed gross hematuria, including on the day prior to the execution. … Assessment: 1 – large right inguinal hematoma from multiple failed femoral vein access attempts. This is typical of post-arterial puncture hemorrhage, but could possibly be caused by an unusually large leak from the femoral vein. The sudden bleeding that occurred during the procedure is more consistent with arterial puncture. 2 – gross hematuria is from penetration of a ureter, the bladder, the prostate gland, or the urethra. Bladder penetration is a rare but reported complication of femoral cannulation. The extent of the lower abdominal pain may be related to bladder or other visceral injury. (Hamm v. Dunn, 2:17-cv-02083-KOB, “Notice of Submission of Expert Report of Dr. Mark Heath re: Examination of Petitioner Doyle Hamm on February 25, 2018”, Appendix A (2018) (emphasis added))

On April 29, 2014, Clayton Lockett received his execution in Oklahoma by lethal injection by the drug midazolam. “Mr. Lockett began to writhe and gasp after he had already been declared unconscious, and called out, ‘Oh, man,’ according to witnesses. He later died in the death chamber of a heart attack.” Timothy Williams, Oklahoma Turns to Gas for Executions Amid Turmoil Over Lethal Injection, New York Times (2018). Similarly, on July 23, 2014, Joseph R. Wood was injected with midazolam as well, in addition to hydromorphone. After being injected, he gasped in intense suffering for one hour and forty minutes before being declared dead, according to his defense attorneys and witnesses to the execution. Erik Eckholm, Arizona Takes Nearly 2 Hours to Execute Inmate, New York Times (2014).

Botched executions exist beyond just particular stories expressed in the media. A quantitative analysis found that between 1980 and 2010, the rate of botched executions was “8.53 percent”. Greg Miller, America’s Long and Gruesome History of Botched Executions, WIRED (2014). Such a high margin of error for the application of the death penalty—even the electric chair, which has been considered as necessarily “result[ing] in instantaneous, and consequently in painless, death”, In re Kemmler, 136 US 436, 443 (1890)—is necessarily contrary to human dignity because it sets aside common decency in favor of retribution. A risk of error, just in the application of the death penalty, to say nothing of false convictions, of 8.53 percent risks every individual who is placed into a death chamber for intense, immeasurable suffering and pain until they die—or, as in the case of Doyle Hamm, the State stops trying to execute the inmate.
If human dignity is that which concerns itself with “inherent worth”, Obergefell, supra (Thomas, J., dissenting), or that of an “exact[ing] respect”, Kant, supra, then the massive misapplication of the death penalty fundamentally runs afoul of such a concept. The amount of potential suffering by the application of the death penalty, both by state statute and the Act, culminates into a dehumanizing condition. Even if only a select minority of candidates for execution have their death dates botched, the risk placed upon all others cannot be reconciled with any attitude of “regard for a status that all human beings have by virtue of their inherent dignity”, Gewirth, supra.

Wrongful conviction. Human dignity is also degraded by the death penalty due to its irrevocable nature and the natural error of man’s judgement. There are numerous examples of likely innocent people being executed based on faulty judgement or evidence in capital cases. “See, e.g., Liebman, Fatal Injustice; Carlos DeLuna’s Execution Shows That a Faster, Cheaper Death Penalty is a Dangerous Idea, L. A. Times, June 1, 2012, p. A19 (describing results of a 4-year investigation, later published as The Wrong Carlos: Anatomy of a Wrongful Execution (2014), that led its authors to conclude that Carlos DeLuna, sentenced to death and executed in 1989, six years after his arrest in Texas for stabbing a single mother to death in a convenience store, was innocent); Grann, Trial By Fire: Did Texas Execute An Innocent Man? The New Yorker, Sept. 7, 2009, p. 42 (describing evidence that Cameron Todd Willingham was convicted, and ultimately executed in 2004, for the apparently motiveless murder of his three children as the result of invalid scientific analysis of the scene of the house fire that killed his children). See also, e.g., Press Release: Gov. Ritter Grants Posthumous Pardon in Case Dating Back to 1930s, Jan. 7, 2011, p. 1 (Colorado Governor granted full and unconditional posthumous pardon to Joe Arridy, a man with an IQ of 46 who was executed in 1936, because, according to the Governor, “an overwhelming body ofevidence indicates the 23-year-old Arridy was innocent, including false and coerced confessions, the likelihood that Arridy was not in Pueblo at the time of the killing, and an admission of guilt by someone else”); R. Warden, Wilkie Collins’s The Dead Alive: The Novel, the Case, and Wrongful Convictions 157–158 (2005) (in 1987, Nebraska Governor Bob Kerrey pardoned William Jackson Marion, who had been executed a century earlier for the murder of John Cameron, a man who later turned up alive; the alleged victim, Cameron, had gone to Mexico to avoid a shotgun wedding)”. Glossip v. Gross, 576 US ___ (Breyer, J., dissenting) (2015).
In the criminal justice system, the US takes for granted that human judgement is generally aligned with the truth. And in the majority of cases, that is true. And if that proposition is inaccurate, then sentencing and punishment are reversible and, in many cases, can be settled in civil court for restitution. But for the death penalty, the price to pay is a large one, and since 1980, the US has seen innumerable cases in which a truly innocent person has had to pay the price with their life. And even if they were not executed, the imposition of the death penalty—sentencing someone to death, even if that sentence was not carried out—is still a large issue. By 2015, the number of exonerations since 2002 had “risen to 115”, Glossip v. Gross, supra, (Breyer, J., dissenting), and that number is almost assuredly higher today than it was then. This runs contrary to any appeal to human decency, dignity or character, since death is the greatest denominator: the very essence of humanity is cut off at the moment of death, and if death was improvidently forced upon someone, then the human dignity they had in life—and, ultimately, in death—was squashed. Therefore, the Act is unconstitutional because it needlessly degrades human dignity.

Arbitrary Fashion

In determining whether the Act allows for a punishment to be carried out “in wholly arbitrary fashion”, Furman, supra, one need not look further than the various state laws which authorize the use of the sentence of death. The manner by which death is prescribed varies heavily by state—and, as a result, the fashion by which the punishment for a capital case is executed is arbitrary, resulting down to wherever “the court shall designate”. Act §3596(a). In Western, an inmate may be executed by the use of a toxic gas; in the Atlantic Commonwealth, execution by the injection of some lethal drugs; in Sacagawea, execution by the injection of some unknown lethal substance; in Dixie, execution by the electric chair. See, ante.
Since the manner by which one’s life will end is based merely upon the whim of a particular judge, geography, and where the crime happened to be committed, the Act violates Furman’s holding that the arbitrary enactment of a punishment is cruel and unusual, and stands, therefore, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. However, the violation is not just concerned with the Eighth Amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment: the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is also implicated. Since the manner and fashion of an execution can vary so widely between individuals, including even when the fashion is 'lethal injection', since such an injection can cover a wide variety of substances used, the "equal protection of the laws" is abridged by the states carrying out the sentence of death. Amdt. XIV.

Patently Unnecessary

"[I]f the death penalty does not fulfill the goals of deterrence or retribution, it is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering and hence an unconstitutional punishment." Glossip v. Gross, supra (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Atkins, 536 US, at 319 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 US 782, 798 (1982))) (internal citation omitted). If there is no longer any penological purpose that is met by the imposition of the death penalty—including at least two elements of "rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribution", Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 US 407, 420 (2008)—then it is patently unnecessary. Indeed, the court need not only look at one element of rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribution, because "[i]t is the last of these ... that most often can contradict the law’s own ends", ibid., so a more holistic approach to determining the penological purposes of the sentence of death is necessary.

Rehabilitation. The sentence of death is one of finality. Just as life without parole "forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal", Graham v. Florida, 560 US 48, 74 (2010), so too does the death penalty. The entire notion of rehabilitation is necessarily that which can allow for a reformation of the inmate to become a more productive member of society in the future; the death penalty is the elimination of such a standard. If rehabilitation is not the ultimate goal of a punishment, then the punishment is not one of redress, but rather revenge or a deterring factor; not one that serves a legitimate purpose in the improvement of society by its own right. Deterrence, although ineffective for reasons stated below, can serve toward the ultimate goal of rehabilitation: that of improving society. When these two ideals are not present, then there is no penological purpose other than revenge in the punishment, and is therefore patently unnecessary.

Deterrence. The question of whether the death penalty is a successful deterrent is a qualified one. The question is not whether a punishment for crime deters crime, indeed it does, but the question is whether the sentence of death is necessarily a better deterrent than alternative sentences (for example, life without parole). In 2012, the American National Academy of Sciences National Review Council conducted a comprehensive review of research in the area of the death penalty over 34 years found that "research to date on the effect of capital punishment on homicide is not informative about whether capital punishment decreases, increases, or has no effect on homicide rates". ANASNRC, Deterrence and the Death Penalty, 2 (2012). Indeed, there may even be an argument that because the sentence of death is so brutal, that the rate of homicide within a society which imposes the sentence may increase. "Evidence in support of a brutalization effect is mostly the work of sociologists, but it is notable that in her latter work Shepherd also concluded that brutalization effects may be present." ANASNRC, supra, at 11.
Until there is proof that the death penalty works as a strong deterrent—strong enough to overcome its moral and ethical issues—the only rational conclusion is that the death penalty is not a deterrent. The burden of proof lies with those who impose the death penalty to prove that it serves a meaningful penological purpose: until that proof has been presented—and ANASNRC indicates that it never will be, because it is not possible to find a trend in the application of the death penalty—one must assume that it does not. The risk is too high to assume, based merely on presumption, that the death penalty serves as a deterrent.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners respectfully submit this petition for a writ of certioriari to answer the fundamental question at issue in this case: whether a sentence of death, as authorized in the Act, violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. The death penalty disrupts inviolable human dignity on a whim, both by its irrevocable nature, and the risk for error in carrying it out; its fashion and application in law is wholly arbitrary and violates the Equal Protection Clause against wanton, random punishment; and it, beyond a reasonable doubt, serves no legitimate penological purpose other than to inflict revenge and suffering.

On November 3, 2019, /u/birackobama (aka Carib Cannibal), filed a putative petition for certiorari, "Bureau Pictures et al. v. SR Governor /u/Zairn et al [sic] in re: Exec. Order 22 -- Banime."

In that petition, which lacks any merit whatever, /u/birackobama made numerous misrepresentations of fact and law. Furthermore, /u/birackobama wrongfully besmirched Movant's reputation.

For example, /u/birackobama made the following inaccurate and defamatory statements:

• That Movant and fellow jurists "disregard[ed] state laws on recusal"

• That Movant and fellow jurists engaged in "unethical behavior" because /u/IAmATinman did not recuse himself due to his "advocacy of a national animation ban as a Justice Department employee." In reality, /u/IAmATinman engaged in no such advocacy.

• That Movant had "no valid cause" not to recuse himself due to participation in "nearly-identical litigation" in a different state. In reality, Movant has never publicly expressed an opinion on the subject of "Banime" apart from the decision below. The complained-of "nearly-identical litigation" is in fact not identical at all: Movant filed legal challenges to polygamy statutes and served as an attorney defending a pornography executive order--neither which have nothing to do with the legal issues presented in the instant case.

• That Movant somehow engaged in misconduct by overturning wrongly-decided precedent in a lengthy decision explaining the basis for overturning that precedent.

In light of the aforementioned defamatory and patently false statements, Movant requests that this Court impose sanctions on /u/birackobama.

After much deliberation and writing, the Court has reached a decision regarding the challenge to the Nationalist Rebuke Act.

No. 20-07

Comes No. 20-07, a challenge to the Nationalist Rebuke Act which classified the National Rifle Association as a Domestic Terrorist Organization and discourages both the State of Lincoln and other jurisdictions from associating with them.

Abstract for the Majority

Associate Justice Ibney wrote the majority in which IAmATinman, C.J., and Bsddc and Reagan0, JJ., joined.

1. The Lower court failed to consider whether the Resolution created a chilling effect and whether or not to apply chilling effect analysis.

2. Legislative resolutions may have chilling effect analysis applied to them if the actions amount to coercion or threats.

3. If chilling effect analysis is applicable to a government's actions, the action must be examined under Strict Scrutiny.

4. We thus vacate and remand the case to the lower court for a decision not inconsistent with this ruling.

Abstract in Concurrence

Associate Justice RestrepoMU wrote an opinion concurring in judgment only, in which JJEagleHawk and CuriositySMBC, JJ., joined.

1. Declaring a group a terrorist organization attaches a "badge of infamy" to the group, with potentially serious consequences.

2. While highly unusual for the Court to acknowledge absent a relevant brief, the gravity of the potential consequences demands attention.

3. The State Legislature afforded the NRA no due process when they declared them terrorists.

Full Opinion

The Opinion and concurrence were read aloud by their authors at the conclusion of the courts final session before their break for the Federal Elections.

/u/ibney00,

Associate Justice