r/logic • • Mar 17 '26

Philosophical logic Can you describe the trinity with formal logic?

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0 Upvotes

I really like the way formal logic is able to abandon words and instead just talk about how words are allowed to be used. This seems like the kind of thing that people do when they describe the Trinity. They talk about being/essence/substance and relational distinctions/personhood and natures and homeostasis, but they typically don't put much effort into defining the terms. What they do instead is explain how words are allowed to be used. Here are some statements that are used to define the trinity, as popularly formulated:

There is one God.

God is 3 persons.

Things can be relationally distinct (separate persons) while also being one being.

God is indivisible.

One person is both fully divine and fully human. We call this person the Son.

The Son is begotten of the Father.

The Father is God.

The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son and the Father.

All persons with the divine nature are God

Since Trinitarians mostly admit that the Trinity is incomprehensible, they don't attempt to understand this. What they do instead is proclaim some orders of these words as true and some orders as heretical, even though the sentences themselves don't have much ontological weight without rigourous definitions. I'm sorry if you are a Trinitarian and I have misrepresented you or what you think, but this is the extent of my understanding. What I'm wondering though, is if it is possible to describe this system with formal logic. This system must be able to describe:

Distinction in being

Distintion in personhood

Distinction in personhood within a being

Distinction in natures

Distinction in natures within a person

Distinction in natures within persons who share a being

I'm quite the beginner in formal logic so I don't know the best approach. I'm also not a trinitarian so I don't know how to properly formulate it. If anyone can help, I'd aprecieate it!

PS: The screenshot is of the first search result that came up when I was trying to see if anyone had done this before XD


r/logic • • Sep 16 '26

Philosophical logic Formal logic was the first AI, and its limits are still the limits of machine reasoning

3 Upvotes

In 1956 the Logic Theorist proved 38 of the 52 theorems in Principia Mathematica. It was the first moment when a machine seemed to reason. Seventy years later, we are still rediscovering what Aristotle already knew: a valid syllogism is not yet reasoning.

Aristotle's Prior Analytics gives us the form. All humans are mortal. Socrates is human. Therefore Socrates is mortal. The form guarantees that if the premises are true, the conclusion follows. But notice what the form cannot do. It cannot tell you whether Socrates exists, whether the major premise holds at the edge of a pandemic, or whether the question itself is the right one to ask. Formal logic secures the λόγος of inference. It does not supply the φρόνησις that chooses which inferences matter.

This distinction matters enormously for AI. Modern large language models are not syllogism machines. They do not even rise to that level of formal transparency. But they inherit the same limitation: they can produce outputs that look like reasoning without ever reaching the practical wisdom that makes reasoning humanly relevant. A model can argue beautifully about ethics while refusing to engage the actual situation. It can generate valid inferences while missing the point entirely.

What the symbolic AI tradition discovered, and what neural AI has not escaped, is that real reasoning happens between formal moves. The hard part is not applying modus ponens. The hard part is knowing when to apply it, what to treat as a premise, and what to leave out. This is why the frame problem destroyed early AI. It is also why prompt engineering is now treated like a craft. Both are symptoms of the same underlying fact: machines are good at structure, bad at judgment about structure.

Aristotle's solution was not to abandon logic. It was to add ἕξις, a stable disposition of character, and φρόνησις, practical wisdom. These are not extra modules you can install on top of a model. They are formed through repeated action in uncertain circumstances. You cannot fine-tune a neural network into wisdom because wisdom is not a distribution over tokens. It is a way of standing toward the world.

This is why I am skeptical when someone says that scaling will eventually produce reasoning. Scaling produces more coherent form. It produces better mimicry of reasoning's surface. But the gap between form and wisdom is not a quantity gap. It is a kind gap. No amount of training data changes the architecture from pattern-matching to practical judgment.

There is a productive way to think about the difference. Formal logic gives us necessary relations between propositions. Reasoning, in the full Aristotelian sense, gives us appropriate responses to situations. The first is universal but empty without content. The second is contentful but requires context. AI today is very good at the first, and increasingly bad at the second the more it pretends to be good at the second.

The lesson for the logic community is not that machines are useless. Theorem provers, SAT solvers, and proof assistants are genuinely valuable. The lesson is that we should resist the rhetoric that identifies these tools with reasoning itself. Logic is a necessary condition of reasoning, not a sufficient one. Treating validity as if it were wisdom is a category mistake that has plagued AI from the beginning.

We are now building systems that can simulate Socratic dialogue, generate proofs, and pass some bar exams. These are impressive achievements of form. But when the conversation turns to what should be done, the machine has nothing at stake. It has no ἕξις. It has never faced a moral situation and been changed by it. Its answers are not actions. They are productions.

The question for the field, then, is not how to make AI more logical. It is how to build systems that know the limits of logic and can signal when formal validity is not enough. That requires a different kind of architecture, one that does not pretend to have wisdom it has not earned.

Where do you draw the line between a machine that manipulates symbols validly and a machine that reasons?


r/logic • • Jun 29 '24

Logical fallacies How do logicians even use fallacies in debates and disputes? How do they even learn all of them?

1 Upvotes

I'm struggling with the gap between knowing about fallacies and actually using that knowledge effectively. There are just so many fallacies with various forms, and memorizing their names feels impossible. How do logicians identify specific fallacies in arguments and then reinforce their counterarguments effectively? If I just shout "AD HOMINEM MOTHERFUCKER!" during a debate, I'll come off as a clown. How many fallacies do you know? I have a book with about 300! How do you avoid fallacies and recognize them when they appear in front of you?

Edit: This post is phrased poorly, i don't want to win debates or anything, I just want to be able to look at an argument and rationally explain why it's invalid or weak, and if needed, create a viable counterargument.


r/logic • • Feb 07 '26

Paradoxes I think I solved the Hangman's Paradox. Feedback appreciated.

2 Upvotes

I recently looked into the hangman's paradox. I was really fascinated, the core paradox comes when sound logic fails to predict the correct outcome. But after thinking for a while, I believe I have solved this. And now I'm *surprised* that this is treated as unresolved (pun intended). Of course I may be wrong (which I probably am) and therefore I need feedback.

The prisoner's logic was sound, but it was missing a crucial step. By eliminating the days he would be hanged, he came to the conclusion that he couldn't be hanged. However, he missed the last step of his logic, which is that, if he still gets hanged despite him believing he wouldn't be hanged, that would still count as a surprise, and therefore complete the requirement needed to hang that man.

If he considered the thought that he can be hanged nonetheless because he would get surprised if he still gets hanged, THEN his logic would come full circle. And even though it would lead him nowhere, the logic would be sound. And then he would know that he cant do anything to escape his hanging.

So we can just say that sound logic, which isn't self contradicting, and is not incomplete, would never fail to give the correct outcome It is just that in this example, the prisoner's logic was incomplete, and therefore fallacious.

Settled knowledge cannot reliably predict an outcome when the reasoning process excludes relevant epistemic possibilities.


r/logic • • Sep 20 '26

Modal logic Modal logic (ma philosophy)

0 Upvotes

Helpp I need help in modal logic (ma philosophy) please help if anyone knows this topic ????


r/logic • • Dec 25 '24

Paradoxes Is the man a believer paradox?

0 Upvotes

I was thinking of a paradox.

Here it is:  A former believer, now an atheist, was asked by his friends if he believed in God. He said, 'I swear to God I don’t believe in God.' The friends must wrestle to know whether this statement holds any credibility.

Explanation:  By swearing to God, you are acknowledging him. And in turn, believe in him, which makes the statement wrong. 

But if the statement is wrong, that signifies that he doesn't believe in God. Meaning the act of swearing is nonsensical. 


r/logic • • Feb 23 '25

Paradoxes Debunking the Pinocchio Paradox

1 Upvotes

The Pinocchio Paradox is a well-known thought experiment, famously encapsulated by the statement: "My nose will grow now." At first glance, this seems like a paradoxical statement because, according to the rules of Pinocchio’s world, his nose grows only when he tells a lie. The paradox arises because if his nose grows, it seems like he told the truth — but if his nose doesn’t grow, he’s lying. This creates a contradiction. However, a closer inspection reveals that the so-called "paradox" is based on a flawed understanding of logic and causality.

The Problem with the Paradox

The key issue with the Pinocchio Paradox lies in the way it manipulates time and the truth-value of the statement. Let’s break this down:

  1. Moment of Speech: The Truth Value is Fixed When Pinocchio says, "My nose will grow now," the statement is made in the present moment. At that moment, the truth of the statement should be fixed — it is either true or false. In the context of Pinocchio’s world, his nose grows only if he lies. Since he can’t control the growth of his nose in a way that would make the statement true, this must be a lie. Therefore, his nose should grow in response to the lie.

  2. The Contradiction: Rewriting the Past After the nose grows, someone might say, “Wait a minute, if the nose grows, then Pinocchio must have told the truth.” But no! The nose grew because he lied. The logic of the paradox attempts to rewrite the past, suggesting that the growth of the nose means the statement was true, which completely ignores the cause-and-effect relationship between the lie and the nose's growth .The paradox falls apart when we realize that the nose’s growth isn’t proof of truth; it’s a reaction to the lie. The moment Pinocchio speaks, he’s already lying, and any later event (like the nose growing) can’t alter that fact.

  3. Two Different Logical Frames The paradox operates under two conflicting logical frames: The paradox attempts to merge these frames into one, when they should remain separate. The confusion arises when we try to treat the effect (the nose growing) as proof of the cause (truthfulness), which isn’t how logic works.

    • Frame 1: The moment Pinocchio speaks and makes the statement — was he lying or not?

    • Frame 2: The aftermath, where the nose grows and we assess whether his statement was true.

A Logical Misstep

Ultimately, the Pinocchio Paradox isn't a genuine paradox — it’s a misuse of temporal logic. The statement itself doesn’t lead to a paradox; rather, it forces one by falsely assuming that a future event (the nose growing) can retroactively affect the truth of the statement made in the present. The real flaw is in how the paradox conflates cause and effect, time, and truth value.

In simpler terms, Pinocchio’s statement "My nose will grow now" can’t possibly be both true and false at the same time. The moment he speaks, he’s already lying, and that should be the end of the story. The growth of his nose doesn’t change that fact.

Conclusion: No Paradox, Just a Misunderstanding

So, while the Pinocchio Paradox is intriguing, it’s ultimately a flawed and misleading thought experiment. Instead of revealing deep contradictions, it exposes a misunderstanding of logic, causality, and the rules of time. The paradox collapses as soon as we recognize that the truth value of the statement should be fixed in the moment of its utterance, and that any later effects (like the nose growing) can’t alter that truth.

Instead of a paradox, the Pinocchio statement is simply a bad question disguised as a deep philosophical puzzle. The logic is clear once we stop trying to merge conflicting perspectives and recognize that the problem arises from a distortion of cause and effect.

author: Lasha Jincharadze


r/logic • • Dec 28 '25

Philosophy of logic have we been misusing incompleteness???

0 Upvotes

the halting problem is generally held up as an example of incompleteness in action, and that executable machines can halt/not without it being provable or even knowable, at all...

but i'm not really sure how that could an example of incompleteness:

godel's incompleteness proof demonstrated a known and provable truth (or rather a series of them) that existed outside a particular system of proof,

it did not demonstrate an unknowable and unprovable truth existing outside any system of proof,

like what proponents of the halting problem continually assert is the same thing, eh???


r/logic • • Nov 03 '24

Metalogic How Do We Know Logic Is "Logical?"

1 Upvotes

I'm worried about going to a new therapist because I don't know if she'll misinterpret my situation. Like how do I know that human language is sufficient enough to get an accurate picture of what happened with me? Then I asked myself, how do we know that language makes sense? If all we can do is blindly trust our own reasoning abilities, how do we even know our reasoning abilities make sense? Like how do we know that language or anything for that matter makes sense if it is just our own interpretation? I hope I'm making sense here.


r/logic • • Apr 16 '26

Question What follows from these premises?

0 Upvotes
  1. Immanuel Kant was wise.

  2. Erasmus was wise.

  3. Wise people criticize bad things.

  4. Wise people praise good things.

  5. Immanuel Kant wrote Critique of Pure Reason.

  6. Erasmus wrote The Praise of Folly.


r/logic • • Aug 15 '25

Logical fallacies Appeal to AI - a new type of fallacy?

0 Upvotes

I have been actively discussing several issues with germ theory denialists on Twitter and I have found that they often use AI as a lazy way to either support their theses or to avoid needing to do their own research.

Now, obviously, one could just classify appealing to LLM output as as an appeal to authority fallacy, but I think there are several key differences.

  1. LLM are in principle both "experts" but also average expected, grammatically coherent responses of sorts which makes this effectively also argumentum ad populum.

  2. Responses can be generated on demand, which is unavailable for experts.

  3. Responses can be manipulated beyond cherry-picking stuff out of context. For example a "short" or "single-sentence" response can be demanded or even a "one word only" or "yes/no" answer. This naturally removes nuance.

  4. LLMs may eventually agree with the person in several regards or even to a completely contradictory positions in independent conversations if fed sufficient amount of lies or just pestered long enough.

  5. LLMs have a tendency to hallucinate.

  6. LLMs can do a rudimentary internet search and have some knowledge based on training. Very niche topics may be unavailable through the former while the latter may be insufficient for those niche topics rarely found in training data. An human expert may have either spent the whole life dealing with the topic or have performed an in-depth systematic search for the relevant literature.

What are your thoughts?


r/logic • • Aug 02 '26

Logical fallacies What is the name of the logical fallacy displayed here?

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0 Upvotes

Is it shifting the goal post? I can’t quite think of it.


r/logic • • Sep 08 '25

Computability theory why should truth be required in a situation when answering truthfully would make the answer untrue?

0 Upvotes

this is a question i've come to consider when considering the decision paradoxes that form the foundation of the arguments for undecidability within computing. let us consider the basic undecidable halting paradox:

 und = () -> halts(und) ? loop_forever() : return

why is this machine undecidable?

but this is quite obvious you say: if one substitutes in true for halts(und) then the machine loops forever, and if one substitutes in false for halts(und) then the machine halts immediately, both possible returns contradict the decision returned by halts(). at this point consensus gives in and resolutely asserts undecidability has been definitively established beyond all doubt...

despite the fact the halting decider can actually know at this point it's screwed, it just hasn't been given a way to deal with it. so there's a further reason this happens: the interface that has been presumed for the halting decider only has two options: halts or does not halt, both of which are forced to convey absolute information in regards to the halting behavior of the input program.

why must this be so?

and what are some alternatives even?

one might consider granting it a 3rd return value "paradox" to escape this, but this option complicates with no benefit over a simpler resolution: the decider is only responsible for the truth of its true response, and false only conveys that responding so is not possible, it doesn't convey truth for the opposing truth.

in the halting deciders case, a true return indicates that input M definitely halts ... but a false does not convey that input M definitely loops forever. an additional decider can be made available to be used when the user would like an objective true decision in regards to if the input M definitely loops forever.

let us check in with how our improved halts is handling und: if it returns true then und will loop_forever(), so it will return false causing und to halt. we’ve achieved making the situation “decidable”, but now that und halts, our decider has no way of ever conveying the truth of the situation as it’s stuck returning false to escape the undecidable situation...

there is a second improvement we can consider: context sensitivity, the decider will not only take into account the input M it’s deciding on, but also its context: specifically where it’s producing a decision. this allows the decider the option to return false when called from within und in order to make runtime decidable, but can still convey the truth of the situation when called anywhere else with input und.

but isn’t that lying? to this i harken back to the title question: why should truth be required in a situation when answering truthfully would make the answer untrue? if one is going to continually assert that truth must be consistent to the point of inconsistency, then one shouldn’t be surprised if they end up in a position where axiomatic truth seems inevitably inconsistent. 🤷‍♂️

...but to be technically correct: this decider isn’t even being inconsistent. the actual function being computed can be defined with context as an input to the function:

halts(machine, context) -> true/false

it’s just that the context isn’t user-modifiable input, the decider must instead be granted by the computing infrastructure access to all runtime state that defines the context in which the decider is operating. on a turing machine this is simply the fully tape state (which it already has), plus a complete description of the running machine, plus a reference to the state which signifies the start of the decider execution/simulation. in a more modern computing model (which is more robust in tying various machine executions together) this can include the instruction pointer + call stack + full memory access... all the information that defines what is currently running at time of call.

context sensitive functions aren’t actually a novel idea in computing: if one for example wants to print the call stack, there can be a context sensitive function available to do that. i will even go so far as to suggest that context has always been a defining input into functions computed by machines, and it’s our ignorance of context that has produced the unresolvable paradoxes in computing that have stumped us thus far.

with this correction halts(und) will return false when called from within und, and will return true well called anywhere else. not only does und become decidable, but there is an interface that guarantees access to the truth of the matter: running halts(und) as a machine directly with no computing context.

i wrote a longer paper attempting to explain the technique: how to resolve a halting paradox. this technique works on more than just the halting problem. when i applied this to the decision machine 𝓓 which Turing utilized in his original paper On Computable Numbers, not only did the technique perform beautifully in resolving the decision paradox that stumped Turing into declaring undecidability, it miraculously did so in a way that could not be utilized to diagonalize computable numbers: re: turing’s diagonal


r/logic • • Aug 05 '25

Critical thinking What's wrong with this argument?

0 Upvotes

The bigger the fish is, the bigger the bones is.

The bigger the bones is, the smaller the fish is.

Therefore, the bigger the fish is, the smaller it became.


r/logic • • Aug 28 '25

Propositional logic Does your mom know you're gay - Alex O'Connor and Joe Folley

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2 Upvotes

r/logic • • Oct 28 '25

Philosophy of logic Fortunately, she's not an intuitionist.

0 Upvotes

My mother used to worry about me cycling at night without lights, until I promised to only do so when wearing all black.


r/logic • • Jun 16 '25

Non-classical logic Multivalued Logic Theory

0 Upvotes

i will edit this post to make it more clearer.
this thanks to @Ok-Analysis-6432

Multivalued Logic Theory (MLT) - Constructive Formalization

---

here a scritp in python : https://gitlab.com/clubpoker/basen/-/blob/main/here/MLT.py

A more usefull concept 'a constructive multivalued logic system for Self-Critical AI Reasoning

it's a trivial example : https://gitlab.com/clubpoker/basen/-/blob/main/here/MLT_ai_example.py

Theory is Demonstrated in lean here : https://gitlab.com/clubpoker/basen/-/blob/main/here/Multivalued_Logic_Theory.lean

---

This presentation outlines a multivalued logic system (with multiple truth values) built on constructive foundations, meaning without the classical law of the excluded middle and without assuming the set of natural numbers (N) as a prerequisite*. The goal is to explore the implications of introducing truth values beyond binary (true/false).*

1. The Set of Truth Values

The core of the system is the set of truth values, denoted V. It is defined inductively, meaning it is constructed from elementary building blocks:

  • Base elements: 0 ∈ V and 1 ∈ V.

  • Successor rule: If a value v is in V, then its successor, denoted S(v), is also in V.

This gives an infinite set of values:
V = {0, 1, S(1), S(S(1)), ...}
For convenience, we use notations:

2 := S(1), 3 := S(2), etc.

The values 0 and 1 are called angular values, as they represent the poles of classical logic.

----

2. Negation and Self-Duality

Negation is a function neg: V → V that behaves differently from classical logic.Definition (Multivalued Negation)
neg(v) =
{
1 if v = 0
0 if v = 1
v if v >= 2
}
A fundamental feature of this negation is the existence of fixed points.Definition (Self-Duality)
A truth value v ∈ V is self-dual if it is a fixed point of negation, i.e., neg(v) = v.Proposition

  • Angular values 0 and 1 are not self-dual.

  • Any non-angular value (v >= 2) is self-dual.

This "paradox" of self-duality is the cornerstone of the theory: it represents states that are their own negation, an impossibility in classical logic.

----

3. Generalized Logical Operators

The "OR" (∨_m) and "AND" (∧_m) operators are defined as constructive maximum and minimum on V.

  • Disjunction (OR): v ∨_m w := max(v, w)

  • Conjunction (AND): v ∧_m w := min(v, w)

These operators preserve important algebraic properties like idempotence.Theorem (Idempotence)
For any value v ∈ V:
v ∨_m v = v and v ∧_m v = v
Proof: The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of v.

----

4. Geometry of the Excluded Middle
In classical logic, the law of the excluded middle states that "P ∨ ¬P" is always true. We examine its equivalent in our system.Definition (Spectrum and Contradiction)
For any value v ∈ V:

  • The spectrum of v is spectrum(v) := v ∨_m neg(v).

  • The contradiction of v is contradiction(v) := v ∧_m neg(v).

The spectrum measures the validity of the excluded middle for a given value.Theorem (Persistence of the Excluded Middle)
If a value v is angular (i.e., v = 0 or v = 1), then its spectrum is 1.
If v ∈ {0, 1}, then spectrum(v) = 1
This shows that the law of the excluded middle holds for binary values.Theorem (Breakdown of the Excluded Middle)
If a value v is self-dual (e.g., v = 2), its spectrum is not 1.
spectrum(2) = 2 ∨_m neg(2) = 2 ∨_m 2 = 2 ≠ 1
This shows that the law of the excluded middle fails for non-binary values.

----

5. Dynamics and Conservation Laws
We can study transformations on truth values, called dynamics.Definition (Dynamic)
A dynamic is a function R: V → V.To characterize these dynamics, we introduce the notion of asymmetry, which measures how "non-classical" a value is.Definition (Asymmetry)

asymmetry(v) =
{
1 if v is angular (0 or 1)
0 if v is self-dual (>= 2)
}

A dynamic preserves asymmetry if asymmetry(R(v)) = asymmetry(v) for all v. This is a logical conservation law.Theorem of the Three Tests (Strong Version)
A dynamic R preserves asymmetry if and only if it satisfies the following two structural conditions:

  1. It maps angular values to angular values (R({0,1}) ⊆ {0,1}).

  2. It maps self-dual values to self-dual values (R({v | v >= 2}) ⊆ {v | v >= 2}).

This theorem establishes a fundamental equivalence between a local conservation law (asymmetry of each value) and the global preservation of the structure partitioning V into two classes (angular and self-dual).

----

6. Projection and Quotient Structure

It is possible to "project" multivalued values onto the binary set {0,1}. A projection is a function proj_t: V → {0,1} parameterized by a threshold t.

Theorem (Closure by Projection)
For any threshold t and any value v ∈ V, the projected value proj_t(v) is always angular.

This ensures that projection is a consistent way to return to binary logic. Additionally, each projection induces an equivalence relation on V, where v ~ w if proj_t(v) = proj_t(w). This structures V into equivalence classes, forming a quotient logic.

Demonstrated in lean here : https://gitlab.com/clubpoker/basen/-/blob/main/here/Multivalued_Logic_Theory.lean


r/logic • • Mar 18 '25

Question This is the logic textbook I'm going through. I've never been to college I just want to debate against religion. Anything I should know?

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0 Upvotes

I've done three chapters of notes so far but I just want to make sure I'm doing everything right. Would I need to read any other books? I picked this one because of it's larger side


r/logic • • Aug 20 '25

Modal logic Is there work on a formal system to model the illogical human mind?

0 Upvotes

I think that's common knowledge that human minds aren't logical by nature: they have too many preconceived notions, heuristics, and shortcuts to fit a standard logic model, and fall too easily for a variety of fallacies. People work up to attain rationality and logical rigor.

Is there any work on creating a formal system to model illogical minds? I believe that such a formal system would be a starting point to create machines with an actual mind, instead of overrated mouthpieces like ChatGPT and other LLMs.

In my over-simplistic view, one could create a model within this formal system, starting with a few hundred basic facts and reasoning rules. Then, train the model with millions of statements taken from real life (a LLM could help generating these from training data), curated by humans. Humans reward correct conclusions and actions taken because of the statements. Eventually, the model would start curating itself and training itself, with gradually less intervention from humans. AI emerges.

Here's a list of what this hypothetical formal system ought to be able to model. The terminology is mine, borne from ignorance. What little I know of logic (from my math degree, programming experience, and reading Wikipedia articles) isn't enough for me to do better.

Definitions

An agent is someone/something able to reason, and act on its reasoning.

An author is any being that communicates statements to someone; this includes things like books and movies.

Statements are abstract communication units from author to agent, or between agents. One can have as statement forms, among others: fact, fiction, rules, bullshit, hearsay, orders.

A mindset is composed of a belief system (a set of statements, with their probabilities of being true and/or being believed), and reasoning rules (how statements received and already in mind interact and change, and generate behavior).

Requisites

Belief systems should include: preconceptions, misconceptions, fallacies, biases, bigotry; facts (both true, false, unsure, and unknown); indecision, opinion (and how to sway it), wishful thinking.

Reasoning rules should include: traditional logic; fallacious reasoning; how the rules influence one another; conciliation of contradictory statements; skepticism; reasoning differently according to context; hypotheticals ("Were X true, would it change your opinion about Y?"); interpretation of statements (accepted as-is, or changed by one's own mindset).

Statements received by an agent could (and should) change their mindset a little, by interaction with its components. That's how minds mature.

The formal system should also support:

Recognition of context: the ability of an agent to use different subsets of their mindset depending on context, and to infer context from statements and real life experience. Contexts would become part of the mindset.

(Lack of) awareness about the agent's own rules (or heuristics) of reasoning; (lack of) a mental model about other agents' reasoning.

Differentiating an action/condition (in abstract) from a corresponding action/condition in the real world: "Does action X" (as a function, applied to a person) versus "Jack does action X" (event in the real world).


r/logic • • Jan 28 '25

Logical fallacies What is the error in thinking that makes us devalue what we already have at our disposal i.e. people around us or objects around us.

0 Upvotes

For example if we revere a doctor in a clinic but we dis regard our cousin with the same credentials.

In Telugu language there is an idiom - The plant in our backyard is unfit for any treatment -

Familiarity breeds contempt - advice given by our friends and relatives related to finance opportunities are ignored while the same advice given by a finfluencer on instagram is considered as gospel.

What is this kind of behavior called?


r/logic • • May 28 '26

Propositional logic in logic, we've "IF A IS TRUE, THEN B IS TRUE", but what does that even mean?

0 Upvotes

Now let me give you some examples to illustrate my problem in understanding that, for example:

If it rained, then ground is wet

Now let's say that it rained 2 months ago, according to the above example, the ground is supposed to be wet now, but that's not the case

If pressed the button A, then player jumps

But I already did that 2 years ago, but the player isn't jumping right now

All of that make problem in understanding how logical statements where "if A is true then B is true" works for me

So anyone can explain?


r/logic • • Aug 12 '25

Propositional logic Hey, me, Kafka, and Spagtwo have a disagreement about "affirming the consequent" in this thread. Could anyone well versed in formal logic offer their opinion? Please read the comments in chronological order to follow the discussion properly.

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5 Upvotes

r/logic • • Feb 08 '26

Philosophy of logic Is the law of identity really absolute?

2 Upvotes

So I’ve recently been diving into formal logic and came across the law of identity, which states A = A that a thing is identical to itself.

Google defines it as

“A thing possesses its own unique identity and cannot be something else at the same time or in the same respect, forming the foundation for reasoning, causality, and understanding existence.”

This made me wonder whether the law of identity is required for reasoning and discourse because distinctions are necessary for communication, without that necessarily meaning it directly applies to the structure of reality itself.

Usefulness in thought does not automatically imply metaphysical fundamentality. In reality, identities appear to be scale-relative, contextual, and integrative, not absolutely separate.

The third dimension isn’t the fourth dimension, yet when viewed from a higher-dimensional framework, the third is contained within the fourth. Nothing is negated, distinctions are preserved while being subsumed into a larger structure. Likewise, my heart isn’t my lungs, and my lungs aren’t my brain, yet none of them exist independently of the organism. Their identities are meaningful within context, not as metaphysically separate substances.

This isn’t a denial that things have identities at local or practical levels, only a question of whether identity is ontologically fundamental rather than scale-relative.

So when the scope is widened enough, don’t identities become contextual features of a larger whole rather than absolutely separate entities?

Treating the law of identity as fundamental or absolute to the structure of reality feels like smuggling metaphysics into epistemology. At the very least, it seems like an assumption that deserves justification.

Curious to hear others thoughts.


r/logic • • May 24 '24

Logical fallacies Logical Fallacies

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3 Upvotes

I have recently gotten into the subject of logical fallacies and after writing some specific one's down I wanted to create a broader categorization. With the help of ChatGPT I came up with this.

Now my question to you: Do any of you see any mistakes or crucial information missing in this mindmap? Do these categories fit every logical fallacy or am I missing some?

I'm looking forward to any constructive criticism!