From unauthorized database snooping to real-time political surveillance, the unchecked expansion of algorithmic policing demands oversight and shift-level accountability.
Consider the case of Robert Semenchuck, a twenty-two-year veteran sergeant with the Regina Police Service in Saskatchewan. For years, until he was caught in 2023, he used police databases and patrol resources to look up the private identities, home addresses, and phone numbers of women drivers who caught his eye on the road. Armed with confidential state records, he tracked down more than thirty women and pursued deceptive personal relationships with them. In late 2025 he pleaded guilty. The cost to him? In February 2026, he received a two-year conditional sentence.
Police officers misusing access to confidential databases is not a new phenomenon. Historically, however, in Canada this abuse was largely confined to improper searches on the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC) database, the national repository managed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Officers queried CPIC to check up on the young men their daughters were dating, to dig up dirt on neighbours or personal rivals, or to satisfy private curiosity. Over time, major police services, such as the Toronto Police Service, began systematically monitoring officer access to and use of CPIC. This uncovered recurring instances of unauthorized lookups entirely unrelated to legitimate policing purposes, resulting in internal discipline and public scrutiny.
But focusing solely on CPIC misuse today is like regulating telegraph lines in the age of satellite surveillance. We are living in an altogether different information environment. The modern police officer no longer relies merely on querying a static criminal record database; officers now command an interconnected suite of artificial intelligence and digital surveillance tools capable of locating, profiling, and tracking members of the public in real time.
The Modern Police Surveillance Toolkit
Todayâs police officers have at their fingertips a large array of surveillance tools, supposedly to serve a surveillance state but equally available for illegal personal purposes. Automated Licence Plate Readers (ALPRs)âmounted on cruisers and fixed street infrastructure to scan thousands of passing vehicles per hourâare only the most visible tip of a much larger technological iceberg. Across Canada and peer democracies across the world, police agencies have acquired or piloted a formidable array of intrusive capabilities, with the support and approval of the governments and their immediate governing entities, such as our police services boards. The tools at the police officers' fingertips include some or all of the following:
Facial Recognition Technology (FRT): Software such as NECâs NeoFace Reveal (deployed by Toronto Police) and controversial web-scraping platforms like Clearview AI compare photographs or video frames of unknown individuals against mugshot repositories and billions of scraped internet images to identify suspects, bystanders, or demonstrators.
AI-Assisted Video Analytics: Platforms like BriefCam ingest vast quantities of closed-circuit television, body-worn camera, and drone footage, using machine learning to index, search, and track individuals across multiple camera feeds by clothing colour, gait, vehicle profile, or movement patterns.
Cell-Site Simulators (IMSI Catchers): Portable devicesâoften known as Stingraysâmimic legitimate cellular towers, forcing every mobile phone within range to connect to them and surrender unique subscriber identifiers and real-time physical coordinates, even when no calls are being placed and GPS location services are turned off.
Algorithmic Link and Social Network Analysis: Intelligence platforms such as Palantir Gotham and IBM i2 Analyst Notebook aggregate fragmented recordsâarrest logs, traffic stops, financial filings, and social media connectionsâto map personal associations and flag individuals for heightened scrutiny.
Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) and Social Media Scraping: Automated harvesting suites continuously monitor public posts, online group memberships, event RSVPs, and protest organizing to construct intelligence dossiers on political activists and community organizations.
Predictive Policing and Mobile Forensic Extraction: Risk-scoring models forecast where offences may occur or assign threat scores to individuals, while forensic tools such as Cellebrite and GrayKey bypass device encryption to extract entire histories of messages, photos, and location logs from seized phones.
From Personal Abuse to the Surveillance State
For years, civil liberties scholars and privacy advocates have warned that uninformed and unchecked adoption of these technologies would lay the infrastructure of a full-fledged surveillance state. Today, it feels as though that future has arrived and we are living inside it.
Consider what happened in October 2026 in New Delhi to Neha Bora, president of the All India Studentsâ Association. Having breakfast in a small neighbourhood eatery during the student protests, she had taken the elementary precaution of turning off location services on her mobile phone. It made no difference. Delhi Police officers arrived in unmarked vehicles and detained her anywayâan episode civil rights observers linked directly to the capitalâs dense web of facial-recognition cameras, telecommunications tracking, and preventive detention powers. What happened in Delhi is part of a global phenomenon with policing as fearful and insecure liberal democracies turn into surveillance states.
We do not need to look halfway around the world to grasp the danger. The risk of misusing these powerful instruments goes far beyond the rogue officer indulging a personal obsession, as in Regina. We are living through an unmistakable illiberal turn across established liberal democracies. Governmentsâincreasingly unpopular, insulated from public consent, pursuing policies their publics oppose and ignoring those the publics support and fearful of organized dissentâare steadily criminalizing expressions of political disagreement and public protest. Rather than engaging citizens through democratic negotiation, states are empowering and instructing local police services to deploy intrusive surveillance to chill, disrupt, and silence opposition.
Policing has become deeply politicized, effectively captured by the executive state. In such an environment, I feel extremely perturbed by the breadth of tools at the disposal of police agencies to surveil my movements, harvest my personal data, and pinpoint my location in real time. That unease is sharpest at a moment like now when peaceful solidarity with Palestinians and protest against Zionism and genocide in Gaza are being framed routinely by political leaders and police agencies as potential acts of terrorismâand handed over to specialized Hate Crimes and Anti-Terrorism units.
Do these intrusive technologies and the opaque manner in which police agencies deploy them, genuinely serve the public interest that policing is supposed to uphold, or do they serve a state apparatus determined to monitor and deter democratic dissent? We need to think about it as the people who pay the bill for policing.
The Governance Gap: Why Existing Audits Fail
When police leadership is pressed on privacy, the standard reassurance is that existing rules and internal audits protect the public. Yet the accountability mechanisms built for legacy databases like CPIC simply do not work for modern AI and surveillance systems.
First, a CPIC search leaves a discrete, individual audit trail tied to a specific user ID and a queried name or plate. By contrast, ALPRs, cell-site simulators, and AI video analytics engage in passive, dragnet collectionâsweeping up biometric and location data on thousands of innocent people who are neither suspects nor witnesses.
Second, officers and specialized units have repeatedly adopted commercial AI tools outside formal procurement and oversight channels. In Toronto, officers used Clearview AIâs facial recognition software in dozens of investigations before senior command or the police board even knew the technology was in use. I am not aware of what effective measures the senior command or the police board took to ensure that this will never happen again or that anyone doing so will be severely dealt with.
Third, even where civilian boards have adopted formal AI policies, operational enforcement lags dangerously behind. A May 2026 report by Torontoâs Auditor General revealed persistent gaps in police IT governance, overdue technology policies, and inconsistent reviews of user access. Six months later, in November 2026, the Law Commission of Ontario issued its landmark report on artificial intelligence in the criminal justice system, warning bluntly that existing statutory frameworks fail to regulate police deployment of facial recognition, video analytics, and predictive tools.
A Duty to Regulate: What Police Boards Must Do Now
In Canada, municipal police services boards are supposed to provide civilian democratic governance over policingâto ensure that police operations respect the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and remain accountable to the communities they serve. When CPIC misuse became undeniable, boards insisted on audit trails and disciplinary consequences. Today, boards have an urgent duty to establish regulatory controls commensurate with the far more intrusive AI and surveillance technologies now in officersâ hands.
That regulation cannot consist of vague ethical principles or voluntary internal guidelines. Police boards must enforce four concrete measures:
Mandatory Shift-End Usage Reporting and Supervisory Review: Every activation or query of an AI, biometric, ALPR, OSINT, or tracking tool must be automatically logged with the officerâs badge number, timestamp, and an active criminal occurrence or warrant file number. At the end of every shift, officers should be required to account for all AI and surveillance tool usage, with supervisors obligated to review those logs, identify anomalies, and demand explanations for any query unlinked to an authorized investigation.
Hard Prohibitions on Political and Protest Surveillance: Police boards must enact binding directives prohibiting the use of facial recognition, cell-site simulators, automated social media scraping, and predictive profiling against peaceful demonstrations, political assemblies, or advocacy groups. No surveillance tool must be deployed against Charter-protected expression of dissent without prior judicial authorization meeting a strict criminal threshold.
Automated Anomaly Detection and Independent External Audits: Spot-checking logs after a scandal breaks is inadequate. Police services must deploy automated auditing rules that flag after-hours lookups, repeated queries on single individuals, or searches lacking an active case link, backed by mandatory annual inspections by provincial Information and Privacy Commissioners.
Strict Procurement Bans and Mandatory Disclosure: Boards must enforce zero-tolerance bans on unapproved software, vendor free trials, and "shadow" pilots. No AI or surveillance tool should be deployed without a prior public Privacy and Human Rights Impact Assessment, and any AI-assisted investigative step must be disclosed to defence counsel and the courts.
Technology has given law enforcement agencies unprecedented power to peer into the private lives and lawful political associations of ordinary citizens. Without rigorous shift-level accountability, strict limits on political surveillance, and active enforcement by civilian police boards, we risk normalizing a quiet transformation in which the tools of law enforcement become the instruments of an illiberal surveillance state. Police governors are at the front line and they have the statutory authorityâand the moral obligationâto draw the line before that transformation becomes irreversible.
They must exercise that authority and fulfill their moral obl