r/hegel • • Feb 08 '24

Communism as a derivative of Hegal

0 Upvotes

My simple argument is that the Master/Slave dialect that Hegel posited is pretty much a simplified version of Marx's position of relationship between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. But of course if people learned about communism through Hegel instead of Hegel to Marx, people would revolutionize much quicker if they saw themselves as Slaves to the Masters rather than working class and capitalist.


r/hegel • • Mar 18 '25

The Case For European Rearmament — Against The Left’s ‘Beautiful Soul’

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https://lastreviotheory.medium.com/the-case-for-european-rearmament-against-the-lefts-beautiful-soul-55380d9f3528

This essay uses Hegel's concept of the beautiful soul to criticize the left's passive and idealistic pacifist stance. It continues by using Zizek's analysis of authority to reveal NATO's inherent contradictions and ends with a call for a European army.


r/hegel • • Sep 01 '25

Idealist Teleology in Hegel We Must Reject

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Hegel saith: “The spirit is reconciled and united with its concept, in which it had developed from a state of nature, by a process of internal division, to be reborn as subjectivity. All this is the a priori structure of history to which empirical reality must correspond.” Lectures on the Philosophy of World History p.131, trans. H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press 1975

Carefully reading through these lectures it’s clear that Hegel believes there’s an idealist realm, something like an Invisible Hand of Reason guiding the course of history. This must be rejected. Hegel can still be read just fine without replicating his idealist error.

This deterministic idealism, which is eschatologically optimistic for Hegel, is exceedingly dangerous, because it leaves Hegel arguing that the atrocities of history are necessary, the end justifies the means. It weakens one’s ability to criticize the movements of history. It actually distorts our true view of history, framing it within a kind of secular teleology.

However, there is still enough in the text to reject this idealist view, and more accurately, seek to interpret Hegel through a naturalistic lens of history. This means nothing is guaranteed, just the opposite, rationality in history is desperately fragile and we should do everything we can to protect it and promote it.


r/hegel • • Nov 28 '25

Reading Hegel Wrong

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Yes, there is such a thing, and it’s not what the average Hegelian thinks it is, it’s the opposite of the Hegelian’s devotion.

The right way to read Hegel is critically. He was a genius, but so were many other thinkers of history. Hegel, like all great thinkers, was limited by his time. He existed before Darwin’s theory of Evolution and Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity. Hegel’s thought is limited because of this and many other things. But this doesn’t mean it lacks value. It’s truly amazing how relevant Hegel’s thought is in so many domains, peering through confusions.

But too many Hegel readers don’t know how to read him critically. Is it possible for Hegel to be wrong? (Insanely, there are people in a cult of Hegel who answer this in the negative). Yes, it is possible, and Hegel was wrong about many things. (I am not going to give an exposition of these things in this space, this post is meant to encourage people to read Hegel critically, as he should be read— and you can do that without the details of my critical polemic).

The tragedy is that those who can’t read Hegel critically, those who are engaged in defending a kind of Hegelian orthodoxy, are wasting their lives and energy. Hegel readers have high comprehension capacity, we need it applied to things that are relevant, not esoteric defenses of metaphysical, ontological theologies. (A critical reading of Hegel has more value).

Some here will, no doubt, be offended by my words, feeling wounded, attacked— if this is you, you are part of the cult of Hegel. Only religion displays this kind of insecure, psychological disposition toward critique.

I have wrestled with life-long Hegelians, I have seen their wounds and cognitive dissonance as the towers of Hegel’s philosophy begin to crack. They can’t accept it, what comes next is incredibly revealing: all that thorough rationalism is cast to the wind and the Hegelian retreats into mysticism.

This ought not to be, but the fact that Hegel’s philosophy can turn thinkers into functioning like religious devotees, is indeed a mark against it. It manifests a danger, the emotive dulling of the critical spirit. Indeed, this Critical Spirit is actually higher than Hegel’s World Spirit!


r/hegel • • Feb 06 '26

Hegel's Science of Logic maps the categorial structure of reality — and modern physics keeps confirming it

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I've been working through the Science of Logic category by category — not interpreting, not commenting, but spelling out the actual movement Hegel demonstrates. What I keep finding is that the categorial structures aren't metaphorical when applied to physics. They're structural.

Here's one example: the Doctrine of Essence, Chapter on Ground, and how it maps onto the atom.

Absolute Ground:

Form and Essence: the four fundamental forces are the form in which essence (matter/energy) determines itself. The forces aren't something other than matter — they're the way matter relates to itself. Form and Matter: fermions as matter, bosons as form. Neither exists without the other — no force without particles to carry it, no particles without forces to bind them. Form and Content: vertices — the concrete content is formed matter, the meeting point of force and particle. The vertex is the unity of form and matter.

Determinate Ground:

Formal ground (tautological): "Why does the strong force bind? Because it's strong." Explains nothing — Hegel's point exactly. Real ground (different content): confinement — color charge neutrality as the real ground of hadron formation. A different content than what is grounded. Complete ground: color charge, asymptotic freedom, and energy scale together. Only all three ground why protons and neutrons exist and not free quarks.

Condition:

Ground presupposes condition, condition presupposes ground. Protons, neutrons, electrons must be available — manifold of Dasein. But also: electrostatic attraction, quantum mechanical stability (discrete spectrum). Without these conditions no atom, but the conditions are nothing without the ground. When all conditions are complete: the thing passes into Existence.

Existence = the Atom. First thing with properties. Atomic number, mass, ionization energy, spectral lines — these are properties that the atom has. No quark has properties in this full sense. No free gluon exists as a thing. The categorial boundary that Hegel draws — Existence as the first self-standing entity with properties — is exactly where physics draws it too.

And the key sentence from the Logic: in Ground, the opposition is "as much sublated as preserved." The subatomic determinations haven't disappeared in the atom — nucleus and shell are in it, protons and neutrons are in it, the forces operate in it. But they no longer appear as independent. They are moments of the existing thing.

Why this isn't analogy

Hegel knew nothing about quarks, confinement, or the Pauli principle. He developed the structure purely from thinking. Not because he was prophetic, but because the categories actually are the structure of reality — not a subjective addition, but the thing itself. Physics discovers empirically what the Logic demonstrates categorially. That's not a coincidence. That's the point.

I'm working on spelling out the entire Logic this way — every chapter, the full movement, with the corresponding structures from physics, biology, and social theory. Happy to discuss.


r/hegel • • Oct 24 '25

Are you capable of reading Hegel critically?

5 Upvotes

This might seem like a question that everyone would answer in the affirmative, but this has not been my experience with Hegelians. The defensiveness and insecurity at trying to defend Hegel often reaches the status of religion.

However, if we cannot read Hegel critically then we cannot read him as we should, which is to say, we cannot read him in a way that advances insight from Hegel, as opposed to stagnating on his insight.

I have gained a great deal from reading Hegel, but I have gained far more from reading him critically.

I am presently engaged in major Hegelian projects that seek to expand Hegelian studies in the world. I lead with this because many will be apt to think me an enemy of Hegel. (In one sense this is true, but I am, strangely, also involved in striving to redeem Hegelian philosophy from the dogmatism Hegel essentially confined it to).

In Hegelian philosophy, the one who opposes his philosophy is truly essential to his philosophy. This is consistent with his dialectic. (Though it isn’t, for reasons of inconsistency and special pleading).

I prefer disciplined autodidacts over trained academics, at least when it comes to covering critical ground. I am thinking about starting a critical Hegel reading group, but Hegelian dogmatists would not be happy here. There is much in Hegel that does not survive, much that is moth-eaten.

But I assure you, a critical reading of the master, even if it knocks him entirely off his philosophical stool, is far more rewarding than merely copying out his prose.

It has been my experience that Hegel readers have a hard time reading him critically.


r/hegel • • Dec 18 '25

Hegel's "refutation" of Kant misunderstands Kant

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The main criticism Hegel has for Kant is that he starts off with the assumption that starts with a concrete determination of the understanding, i.e. a presupposition which leaves the ensuing proof destitute of necessity. Houlgate summarises the criticism as follows:  “Before presenting his speculative logic, therefore, what Hegel can say is this: Kant’s restriction of the categories to experience rests on his uncritical adherence to the standpoint of understanding.” The criticism rests solely upon a misunderstanding of what a transcendental deduction is, which leads Hegel to perniciously characterize it as circular. Whatever we start with in philosophy, it must be either something mediated or something immediate; if it is mediated, it is unjustified and in need of proof, if it is immediate, it is a brute given that is not justified; the difference between the two standpoints is simply a matter of belief and not truth. The problem of a skeptical aporia occurring in the critique of pure reason is avoided if one starts with the following:

A. Any judgment to be necessarily true requires a justification.

Or the principium rationis sufficiendi cognoscendi. All skeptical claims about an assertion being arbitrary, unproven and lacking necessity se the following syllogism:

All judgements without a justification are not necessarily true.

X is a judgement without a justification.

X is not necessarily true.

We find that when substituting PSR for X, it results in a conclusion that claims the falsity of the PSR while simultaneously affirming it as true in the major premise, thus eliminating the conclusion. If it is true and without a justification, then it cannot be a judgement; the contradictory conclusions is grounded upon the falsity of the minor premise, thus the PSR cannot be a judgement and ‘apply to itself.’ However, in saying this, it should not be misunderstood that the argument assumes the PSR doesn’t apply to itself; rather, it is the opposite.

The next objection is that this argument only shows that if one asks for justification, that it presupposes the validity of the principle of sufficient ground, but doesn’t “demonstrate it as valid” and so is “subjectively certain.” The source of this confusion is due to a lack of clarity regarding the concept of knowledge. All judgements are items of knowledge, but it in no way follows that all items of knowledge are judgements in the same way all cats are mammals, but not all mammals are cats. An alleged item of “knowledge” which is merely subjectively certain can only be a judgement which requires a justification to be true, it is mediate knowledge i.e. dependent on another judgement for its truth. An item of objectively valid knowledge that is not a judgement does not require a justification to be true and is immediate knowledge. What the transcendental deduction does is demonstrate that an item of knowledge is immediate knowledge and the a priori condition for the possibility of experience. To make it clear consider the axiom of parallels in geometry:

B.  For any straight line through a point in a plane, there is only one other straight line in that plane and through that point which does not cut the given line.

This is a statement from the Euclidean system of geometry,  the statement A becomes the object of the statement B’ in the geometrical critique:

B’. B is unprovable.

The PSR (denoted A) in the transcendental deduction of the (logical) principle of sufficient ground becomes the object of the statement A’:

A': A is the condition for there being justifiably true judgments at all, without which, there are only beliefs and A recapitulates some item of immediate knowledge

The statement A’  is proved by the following: without the requirement for a justification for a judgement to be true, there would be assertions that are true without justification and these are beliefs. Without the requirement for a justification for a judgement to be true, there would only be beliefs, thus the PSR is immediately true and prior to all cognition of mediately true judgements as the condition of its possibility. There is no circularity in Kant’s philosophy, for it takes immediate knowledge as its object, which by definition possesses universal validity and necessity.  With the ancient skeptical aporia solved, the only remaining attack is to show that the PSR itself has contraries and the choice between them is merely belief and not truth.

The skeptic can have a “contrary” position by not accepting any valid criteria  for knowledge at all, by positing an arbitrary criteria that excludes the PSR or limiting the PSR to a subset of judgements.  In the first case it is a rejection based upon no justification at all and is thus merely belief.  In relation to the second and third, any purported contrary that stipulates a criterion that excludes the PSR either for all judgements or a subset, would be relegated to the domain of belief. For by negating the requirement for a justification to be true, it holds that a judgement is true without justification which is precisely what belief is. Just as the second, the subset sophism also utilizes an equivocation for the word true in order to create the illusion of contraries. The claim states “some subset of judgements are true without justification”,  if the word true means “following from justification” then it is contradictory as it states: “some judgements are true as in following from a justification  without justification.”

The traditional skeptical aporia is a real relation between two contraries, and a choice between starting with either something mediate and thus in need of proof or something mediate which is assumed to be true, is a choice between two unjustified positions, which is a matter of belief. The dilemma exists solely upon the presupposition that being true is being proven which entails that without a justification it is only believed to be true.

 


r/hegel • • Jul 19 '25

Explaining Absolute Spirit with a Bedroom Analogy

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1 Upvotes

"The true is the whole. But the whole is only what is realized through its development. Of the absolute it cannot be said that it is, but that it is essentially a result."

Thinking about that phrase from Hegel, I imagined a simple analogy: a bedroom.

The truth manifests itself in our environment—objects such as furniture, shoes, headphones, etc. They are things that we see, analyze, contemplate... but many times only as a result, as finished products.

Take for example a bedroom. Seeing it, my thoughts capture what it is now: its form, its function. But I rarely think about his training process.

For a bedroom to exist, there were first materials: wood, nails, tools. Then someone collected them, cut them, sanded them, put them together. That process took time, work, decisions, failures in between. It is a path, a development.

If you don't know that process, you only see “a bedroom” and nothing more. But Hegel would tell us that the truth of that object is not only in its final form, but in the movement that made it possible.

Thus, the Absolute—like the bedroom—is not a fixed entity that simply “is.” It is the result of his own career. It cannot be understood without considering its development.

Perhaps understanding what is true is precisely that: recognizing the whole not as a sum of parts, but as a becoming that reaches itself. What do you think?


r/hegel • • Jan 17 '23

Both Fascist and Marxist ideology draw roots from Hegelian philosophy, and both led to totalitarian regimes

2 Upvotes

Is there something inherently statist or totalitarian about Hegel’s ideas?

I wouldn’t know, because Hegel is so hard to understand that I don’t very much grasp his concepts at all.

Can you ELI5 this?


r/hegel • • Sep 08 '23

Why do you even bother?

4 Upvotes

His work is so dense, if you are not an academic...why r u even bothering?


r/hegel • • Jul 04 '25

Shouldn’t Hegelians be allergic to Marxism, if anything, in that it is basically thesis-antithesis-synthesis?

1 Upvotes

In a nutshell, T-A-S is regarded wrong because (1) it presumes an outer force (2) and a final solution — as against which contradictions remain immanent in Hegelian dialectics

But how is this not literally Marxism?

For one thing, idealism is an external opposition to materialism for them, which is a false binary as Hegel already explicated in detail; then on a practical level, bourgeoisie is an external enemy to proletariat, which thereby not only obfuscates the common existential absurdity that all subjects share immanently, but also renders blind of any antagonism emergent within proletariat themselves.

This is what happens when you neglect philosophy as a mere “bourgeois obsession” and don’t see how crucial its legacy on transcendental reflection is in making up your very own prerequisite: why are Hegelians (as in scholars) seemingly silent, if not complicit, on the absence of self-relating negativity in Marxian discourse?


r/hegel • • Jan 19 '25

Is Hegel Chad or Cringe?

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r/hegel • • Dec 28 '25

Hegel’s “A Priori” Problem

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Hegel seems to believe in some kind of Rational Force directing and guiding history. We know this because he speaks about it as though it cannot fail, and that’s a problem.

Now, some want to argue that he didn’t take this position. (That would be great, then they agree, reason can fail in history, and is nothing more than the culture of man transmitting to man.) So when Hegel says, “All this is the a priori structure of history to which empirical reality must correspond,” we have a problem.

Reality does not need to correspond to man’s progress in reason. Where is Hegel getting this from if he doesn’t believe in some kind of mysterious Rational Force guiding history from the shadows?

The other problem with Hegel’s view of reason in history, is Hegel’s affirmation of the actions and laws of the state as a manifestation of World Spirit’s legitimate development. But imagine, for example, offering this narrative in North Korea.

Source: Lectures on the Philosophy of World History p.131, Translated by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press 1975


r/hegel • • May 09 '26

The Logical Trinity

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r/hegel • • Mar 28 '20

Why Hegel knew there would be days like these

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r/hegel • • Jun 02 '23

Everything ≠ nothing... So what is nothing? ... and what contains (if anything) everything and nothing..? Something? So nothing doesn't exist?

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r/hegel • • Jun 28 '26

"My consequences have no actions." How is that even a Hegelian idea?

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r/hegel • • Apr 17 '26

Hegel Knew Better — But Do Hegelians?

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First of all, we need every Hegelian to know better!

What the hell am I talking about?

Hegel’s grasp of logic was antithetical to the modern formations of logic. Any Hegelians that are walking the path of formal logic as ontology, have already betrayed Hegel’s superior grasp of logic. Any Hegelians that subject Hegel to the metaphysical pronouncements of formal logic (which have nothing to do with formal logic) have already erred in their comprehension of Hegel.

Hegel would not have gone along with the subversion of philosophy to modern mathematics and logic. (That’s not to say he would in any way reject them, but he knew their place, and that place was not, and is not, a place above Reason).

We need every Hegelian to see this and understand this. We are at war, and have been at war, with the ontological and metaphysical lies pronounced by these formalists. (Pronouncements they have no business even making). We can talk this way, but they cannot, because their formalism cannot produce it!

All Hegelians are in the same boat when it comes to modern knowledge. The waves are massive and towering, and it requires all hands on deck to keep the ship afloat.

For example, people often think that dialectic needs to be formalized (this is used as an objection against it): this is pure ignorance. That would only deplete the superior power of dialectic in relation to the formal sciences.

“But how can that be?”

I will say much more on this in the future. But know this: this path of recovering Reason, is the necessary future of Hegelian philosophy.


r/hegel • • May 15 '25

The Fault of the Hegelian Religion

2 Upvotes

What indeed is the Hegelian Religion? It’s not a revised form of Christianity, though there are those who believe that’s precisely what it is.

No, the Hegelian Religion is an attempt to hold onto Platonism. (Hegel himself is not exactly a Platonist, he’s a Neo-Platonist, not in the sense of Plotinus, but in the sense of embracing Absolute Forms).

But it’s exceedingly important to note that if Hegel were alive today, he very likely would not be a Hegelian, he would be a Neo-Hegelian, or Post-Hegelian. Because of this, most people engaged with Hegel’s philosophy are holding onto a past that Hegel himself would have transcended. (This only wouldn’t be the case if Hegel himself wasn’t serious about the progression of world spirit).

I suppose it is possible to argue that Hegel was just a dogmatist, but this is exceedingly problematic and leaves Hegel’s philosophy in a state of shattered disrepair.

The worst in Hegel appeals to those aching to cling to idealism. Of course, the world spirit has moved on from this particular form of idealism. That’s not to say that there are no idealists in the world, only that they’re fighting a losing battle— most especially if they are trying to adopt Hegel’s idealism as their sword and shield. (All are idealists to some degree, but none can literally be Hegelian idealists).

The Hegel that Hegel himself would no longer be, embarked on an ambitious and worthy project: an Objective Logic. But the Hegel of today would know better, his rationalist path would rightly be tempered with evidence.

The Hegelian Religion is a religion of a very specific idealist philosophy, it is the delusion that Hegel obtained to the substance of God in the form of his logic. (“This realm is truth as it is without veil and in its own absolute nature. It can therefore be said that this content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind.”)^ This religion makes people irrational, it prevents them from being able to flow with the development of world spirit— in trying to be Hegelian, it makes them unHegelian, it locks them into a dogmatism that Hegel himself would have likely rejected.

From The Science of Logic, Introduction, translated by A. V. Miller


r/hegel • • May 09 '25

Hegel Quotes

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I'vr been writing a paper for myself concerning my research around Idealism and I've been writing about Hegel as of recent. I like to place quotes within the paper to support my work but I'm having some difficulty finding good straight to the point quotes. I'm looking specifically for quotes surrounding the topics of Epistemology and Rationality. With Epistemology specifically I'm looking for the stages of knowing and what exactly they entail as well as what can be known vs can't. With Rationality I'm just looking for some general ideas he has and its relation to knowledge and reality. My quotes are coming out of Phenomenology of Spirit—the only Hegel work I own at the moment so any quotes from there would be nice. If you have good quotes from other works though, those are appreciated too. A section number would be nice too for citation purposes.


r/hegel • • Oct 03 '23

you hegelians out there with a passing interest in nietzsche - what do you reckon on this

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r/hegel • • Mar 15 '26

What are the fundamental relations between PoS and SOL?

3 Upvotes

Hi i have read PoS before. Now i am starting SOL and i am looking at how the two connect fundamentally and how they complete the system of Absolute Idealism.
So in a nutshell the Absolute Knowing is the complete union of subject and it's substance, the universal and particular in a singular, the point where consciouness attain the certainity of it's truth, the beautiful soul is finally expressed in philosophy and science as objective concept, all those logical and historical forms of the spirit are suprassumed as the atemporal form of Pure Knowing.

That is what gives rise to the Pure Being that starts SOL.
From the stand point of Absolute Knowing as especulative mode it is possible to investigate the pure thinking in itself since the figurations of the experience of consciouness has brought this absolute thinking into light it is possible to figure it's modes of happening too, following it until the Absolute Idea that is the concept of logic.

I would be glad if you could say more, or correct me, about the fundamental origins, objectives, identity and differences and so on of these two most complex master pieces from Hegel.

I asked AI to make this mental map of the crucial general concepts of Absolute Idealism.
Edit: since the mental map i made with AI was wrong i changed it for the original from this video:
Hegelianism: What Is Absolute Idealism?


r/hegel • • Nov 24 '25

I don't think there is anything dialectical about marx

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Before someone comments that Marx has kept Hegel on his feet or that Marx is actually a materialist and Hegel is actually an idealist thing, please read the entire post first.

Marx says he has taken the dialectical method out of Hegel and put it into material context. Of which Kapital is taken as a prime example, and many Marxists say that the structure of Kapital is proof of that; it moves from abstract catagories of Commodity to the concrete ones in kapital part three. But this is only superficially 'dialectical'. Hegel is very clear that his 'method' cannot be arbitrarily applied to any catagories for the result. The method of science of Logic is not external to the content which it deals with, to quote him:

Method may appear at first as the mere manner peculiar to the process of cognition, and as a matter of fact it has the nature of such. But the peculiar manner, as method, is not merely a modality of being determined in and for itself; it is a modality of cognition, and as such is posited as determined by the Notion and as form, in so far as the form is the soul of all objectivity and all otherwise determined content has its truth in the form alone.

If the content again is assumed as given to the method and of a peculiar nature of its own, then in such a determination method, as with the logical element in general, is a merely external form. Against this however we can appeal not only to the fundamental Notion of the science of logic; its entire course, in which all possible shapes of a given content and of objects came up for consideration, has demonstrated their transition and untruth; also that not merely was it impossible for a given object to be the foundation to which the absolute form stood in a merely external and contingent relationship but that, on the contrary, the absolute form has proved itself to be the absolute foundation and ultimate truth. From this course the method has emerged as the self-knowing Notion that has itself, as the absolute, both subjective and objective, for its subject matter, consequently as the pure correspondence of the Notion and its reality, as a concrete that is the Notion itself.

[...] The absolute method, on the contrary, does not behave like external reflection but takes the determinate element from its own subject matter, since it is itself that subject matter's immanent principle and soul. This is what Plato demanded of cognition, that it should consider things in and for themselves, that is, should consider them partly in their universality, but also that it should not stray away from them catching at circumstances, examples and comparisons, but should keep before it solely the things themselves and bring before consciousness what is immanent in them.

You cannot extract a free standing method from the Science of Logic without at the same time taking with you the entire development of the Logic itself. The text does not contain a detachable procedure that can be transplanted into some foreign material. It contains a genuine conceptual organism that generates its own further determinations out of its own inner necessity. When Hegel begins with immediate being, that category genuinely and necessarily transforms itself into nothing and then into becoming, for the content of the thought is unstable, self cancelling and compelled to advance by the pressures internal to it. This is what Hegel means by a concept that determines itself.

The concept of the commodity, by contrast, has no comparable inner necessity that forces it to metamorphose into use value and exchange value in the manner of a logical deduction. Marx’s analysis may well be accurate and materially insightful, but it is not dialectical in the strict Hegelian sense, nor is it an immanent critique of the sort Hegel envisioned. The commodity does not, by virtue of its own conceptual structure, require that it unfold into those further determinations. You can describe those determinations as empirically or socially real, but they do not arise out of the self movement of a pure category. Hegel’s categories, as he has talked in Phenomenology and the Logic, possess an inherent self determination. That was the conclusion of the Phenomenology, where thought discovers that the criterion of truth must be generated within thought itself rather than imposed from outside; concepts self determine themselves. The Science of Logic is simply the exposition of this discovery in its pure form, where the categories demonstrate their own necessity by transforming themselves. This is why Hegel cannot supply anyone with a neutral method that can be exported and applied anywhere. The method is identical with the movement of the concept itself, and the concept exists only within the Logic’s internal development.

Regarding history, for Hegel, towards the end of logic, the concept turns out to be inherently teleological, and it's teleology is its own self determination (which he terms as the Idea). Hegel can show how there is an apriori necessity for there to be something like humanity, and for that humanity to develop and actualise self determination in empirical world, but in general he cannot show apriori that there is certain pattern to history. Only after humanity has actualised self determination can Hegel just recount how it's course in empirical world as history has been played out. Hegel has no pattern that history follows like Marx (or more fittingly Marxists do) does but for 'ideas'. It is true that he focuses more on what Marx calls superstructure, but there are discussions about, for example, Roman class structure in philosophy of History.

Marx does take Hegelian terms and concepts here and there, but he is not doing the 'Hegelian method' but for the material world. He may even be right but he is not doing an immanent critique. There is nothing particularly Hegelian about his work (aside from few terms and concepts here and there), and can pretty much be understood without any Hegel or 'Hegelian method'.