r/devsecops • • 17h ago

I got tired of scanners that dump 400 findings and never prove one. So I built one that tries to exploit them live.

0 Upvotes

I've spent 10+ years in security. The pattern that wore me down is the scanner that hands you a wall of "possible" issues and leaves triage to you.

So I built a tool around one idea: a finding isn't done until it has a verdict.

- Scan: SAST, dependencies, secrets, IaC, container images, licenses. The scanner runs locally. SCA lookups send package and CVE identifiers only, never your code.

- Prove: for the classes that allow it (command injection, XSS, open redirect, boolean-blind SQLi, XXE), it fires a reviewed PoC at your running app in a sandbox. Each class was tested against a real vulnerable sink and a real negative control, to check it doesn't cry wolf.

- Fix: it patches vulnerable dependencies across 8 ecosystems and re-scans or re-exploits to confirm the fix worked.

- Scope gate: anything that sends traffic needs a human-approved scope file. Missing file means it refuses to run, so it never fails open.

Benchmarks. Scored against each app's own answer key, not by counting findings:

- On 10 deliberately vulnerable open-source apps in 5 languages, it found 92 of 167 labelled issues. A leading commercial SAST tool found 72 and GitHub CodeQL found 68.

- On OWASP BenchmarkPython it scored 58.5 against that tool's 27.5. We lose two classes there (command injection and code injection), and we flag more safe cases (15.2% false-positive rate vs 10.3%).

Caveats:

- These are training apps, not your codebase.

- We wrote rules after seeing what these apps exposed, so this is not a blind test.

- Java is our weakest language.

The most useful thing I learned is that testing the tester finds real bugs. One of my own "negative controls" turned out to be a genuine auth bug, so the harness reported a false positive. Another harness read a fully booted target as "not ready" and burned 10 minutes every run. Both are fixed.

I'm looking for people who run AppSec, or an MSP covering clients, to try it on a real repo and tell me where it's wrong. [OFFER: e.g. "free scan of one repo, DM me" or "free tier at verdictruntime.com"]

Happy to answer anything, including where it's weak. And show a demo


r/devsecops • • 3d ago

Snyk Synks?

31 Upvotes

I have been a Snyk user, on and off, for several years. Since the early days of my engagement with them we had pretty good customer support. Over time, however, they have had a number of layoffs. I understand that is how business can be done, but service has noticeably degraded. This will play into our renewal decision.

Have any other customers noticed this?


r/devsecops • • 5d ago

Every week a popular package or SaaS vendor gets hacked. I built a tool that tells you within minutes if it's one you use

0 Upvotes

Most weeks there's a new one: a poisoned npm or PyPI release, an exploited CVE in a runtime, a vendor telling customers to rotate their keys. This month it was Qubole: attackers used its access to customer AWS accounts to steal secrets and data.

Hearing about it is easy. The slow part is working out whether any of your repos use it, and what to rotate. [One line of your own: a time this cost you or a team you know a day or more.]

So I built Pharon.

**How it works**

- A scanner runs on your machine (a Claude Code plugin around a small open-source CLI). It lists what each repo runs: packages from lockfiles, container images, GitHub Actions, runtimes, and optionally cloud resources through your own read-only AWS, GCP or Azure CLI.

- Only names, versions and file paths are uploaded. No source code, no secret values, and nothing is sent until you approve it.

- New incidents from OSV.dev, CISA's exploited-vulnerability list, endoflife.date and security news are matched against that inventory all day. When one hits, the team that owns the repo gets an email, a Slack message or a webhook, and a warning light comes on in Claude Code.

- One command then checks the machine read-only and lists which secrets to rotate, by name only.

**Where it is**

Launched yesterday. The client is open source (Apache-2.0), the incident notices are public at getpharon.com/notices, and alerts cost $12/month for 10 projects with a 7-day trial. [Optional: your honest numbers so far.]

**What I'd love feedback on**

  1. Would "only metadata leaves your machine" be enough for you to try it on a work repo, or would you need to self-host?

  2. The first scan needs Claude Code. Is that a deal-breaker?

  3. What would you want it to watch that it doesn't?

https://getpharon.com


r/devsecops • • 5d ago

What has actually made your security agent better after it went live?

7 Upvotes

I am working on testing and improving security agents, trying to understand how enterprise security teams improve agents they already use for investigation and response. I’m interested in agents that gather evidence from security tools, make decisions, and sometimes propose or take an approved action.

When an agent misses part of an investigation, uses stale context, or recommends a fix that doesn’t hold:

  1. what do you change: its instructions, tools, access, context, memory, or the model?

  2. Has anyone trained or post-trained a model for their own security workflow? Did that help? I’d be interested to hear what data made that possible and what improved.

How do you tell whether a change helped the whole workflow from discovering an issue through investigating, remediating, and verifying it? Do you compare complete agent versions on past cases or in a test environment? What do you watch after the new version goes live?

A sanitized example of one change your team made, why you made it, and what happened afterward would be especially helpful. Experiences with agents your team can’t modify are useful context too.


r/devsecops • • 7d ago

Lazaret -Supply chain security for your libraries

2 Upvotes

Curious for any feedback positive or negative.

My biggest beef with vendors is there are too many and subscriptions are death by a thousand cuts to your budget.

Yes this project is very much AI coded with my direction.

Apache 2.0 with most critical functions in Rust and no dependencies. Host it where you want, use it in your pipelines or with agents.

Lazaret provides static security analysis for Python, JavaScript, TypeScript and SQL, plus supply-chain and credential checks for Go and Rust. It also inspects packages from npm, PyPI, Go and Rust, editor extensions, and every install before it runs—flagging hidden payloads, leaked secrets, injection bugs and known-vulnerable versions.


r/devsecops • • 8d ago

What are the biggest security challenges in DevSecOps today?

4 Upvotes

Hi everyone!

I'm doing some research to better understand the current situation in application security, automation, and DevSecOps. If possible, I'd appreciate it if you could take a few minutes to answer my questions.

What security problems do you find hardest to solve in practice?

Are there weaknesses in automated pipelines, service accounts, access management, or execution environments that existing tools don't adequately address?

I'm also interested in how security is handled when automated systems perform actions without direct human involvement.

What do you think is currently the weakest or most overlooked area?

I'd appreciate any thoughts on this.

Thanks!


r/devsecops • • 8d ago

Frontier Labs are bringing Software Security into Lime light. I started experimenting if we can do it cheaper

8 Upvotes

Since Anthropic announced Mythos, Software security has came into lime light. Multiple famous products have seen orders of magnitudes of novel attacks that have discovered, which can expose data, corrupt systems or just make the life of Information Security and SRE teams a hell.

But an interesting finding was, all of this comes at exorbitant costs, which only the large corporations and venture funded frontier labs can spend. For example, OpenAI just announced finding a 1000 vulnerabilities in Linux Kernel and each vulnerability costs a blended average of USD $1000 to discover.

The way this works is, a LLM frontier model goes through the source code, analysis how the code is written, the entry points and then finally starts evaluating if they can be exploited through one or more than one attack vectors. While this works, it is neither deterministic nor cheap when the LLM has to manage millions of tokens in ingested source code, a few additional thousands to millions on reasoning and finally the output.

So, I started thinking what if we could flip this and make it cheaper?

The idea being, why make LLMs do the whole discovery, enumeration, validation and reporting. Why not use LLMs where they are good at and make everything else deterministic. And there came the idea about Code Context Driven Vulnerability Scanner.

The whole project has 5 core stages:

  1. Code Context Graph: Map the whole source code as a Code Context Graph where every single relation and type is resolved

  2. Leverage this Code Context Graph to find the user data entry points (Sources) and final sinks (Databases, Files, Remote Server Calls, etc.) and trace the path from sources to sinks

  3. Flow Determination Phase: An LLM is fed the whole source to sink path, such that it can reason about it with confidence. The LLM also gets a query budget to resolve any missing details. The output is either Flow Confirmed (Unsanitized user data reaches the sink from source), Blocked (No possible way for data to travel from source to sink without sanitization)

  4. Condition Stage: LLM goes ahead and searches the code context graph to validate what conditions need to be met for this flow to materialize or if the default settings of the project prevents it. The output is similar to the Flow stage

  5. Adversarial Challenge: Another class of LLM then reasons over the cases where the confirmation came up as Flow Confirmed. This phase is tweaked to try its best to refute the claims made by earlier phases. If the phase cannot refute the flow, the particular path graduates to a Confirmed Finding / Vulnerability.

This has been under testing for a week, with a reference being checked against CodeQL (an industry standard static code based vulnerability scanner by Github).

During a single day of run accounting for \~USD $20 over 5 open source projects, the project has filed for 10 vulnerabilities with severity ranging between MEDIUM to CRITICAL. Out of these 4 are already confirmed and 6 are in investigation stage with the respective open source projects security teams

An interesting bit is, out of the 10 vulnerabilities filed, only 2 of them were detected by the published rule set of CodeQL, while 8 other vulnerabilities were completely Novel.

Curious if anyone else has been experimenting with something similar 😄


r/devsecops • • 10d ago

MCP access control for coding agents: what does the Claude Code allowlist leave you to handle?

6 Upvotes

We rolled Claude Code out to about 40 engineers last month and I own the security side of it. Managed settings let us pin which MCP servers are allowed, which covers the obvious stuff. What the allowlist doesn't give me is different tool scopes per team, a log of the arguments that went into each tool call, or anything stopping a secret from riding along in a prompt. Managed hooks could log and block on each laptop, but then I'm writing and running the checks and the log collection myself. Where are you handling MCP access control past the allowlist?


r/devsecops • • 10d ago

Book recommendation for software supply chain attacks & detection in CI/CD (Master’s thesis)

10 Upvotes

Hi everyone,

I’m writing my Master’s thesis in IT security on evaluating how well different scanners detect software supply chain attacks in CI/CD pipelines. My focus is the Python/PyPI ecosystem.

The attack classes I’m looking at are:

  • Typosquatting

  • Dependency confusion

  • Build tampering

  • Transitive/hidden dependency injection

The scanners I’m comparing fall into metadata-based, static code analysis and signature/advisory-based approaches (e.g. GuardDog, Bandit, OSV-Scanner).

I’m looking for a book that covers:

  • How these attacks work technically (not just at a high level)

  • Detection approaches and their limitations

  • Ideally how to evaluate or benchmark detection tools

I’ve already looked at Continuous Delivery (Humble/Farley), which is good for CI/CD basics but not security. I also looked at Software Supply Chain Security (Crossley), which seems more focused on governance, frameworks and supplier management than on technical attack detection.

I’m already working with academic papers (e.g. Ladisa et al.’s SoK taxonomy, Ohm & Stuke on detection), so I’m specifically looking for a book that bridges theory and practice.

Any recommendations? Thanks!


r/devsecops • • 10d ago

POST QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY (PQC)

4 Upvotes

Hello r/devsecops,

I'm wondering to what extent you are thinking about shifting to Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standards.

Here's a relevant report from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) regarding this. link here

I'm building an MVP for my venture and I want to get perspective from DevSecOps engineers about

  • what you know already about PQC

  • what you're thinking about with regards to migration

  • what tooling you'd like to see

  • how you see this transition unfolding

Google estimates it's going to take them at least a few years to be fully PQC compliant, so I know there is a lot of work to be done in this arena.

Thanks in advance for your input, feedback, perspectives, etc.

Best,

Fitz Founder, r/shiftpqc


r/devsecops • • 11d ago

LLM guardrails on a shared LiteLLM proxy: what did you add past the built-in hooks?

8 Upvotes

Our platform team runs on a single LiteLLM proxy infront of 6 internal apps. Security now wants prompt injection checks and PII masking in place before any touch customer data. LiteLLM's guardrail integrations covered the first couple of asks, but security wants every app's policy reviewable in one place. The rules they keep asking for turn into custom hooks, and nobody can tell me which app tripped which check last wee. I'm trying to decide between writing more hooks, running a separate guardrail service next to the proxy or putting a gateway with policies built in at front. What did you add past built-in hooks?


r/devsecops • • 12d ago

Which static analysis tool should I add first to a small Python projects pipeline?

7 Upvotes

okay I think I'll post this... I pulled on some of my DevOps notes and cobbled this together:

I’m building out a CI pipeline for a small Python project and want to add static analysis in a sensible order rather than bolting everything on at once.

Current setup (or planned):
1 -pytest for tests
2 - bandit for security-focused static checks
3 - pip-audit for dependency vulnerabilities

I’m trying to decide what to add next. Candidats I’m weighing:

  • Semgrep

  • CodeQL

  • Ruff

  • mypy or pyright

  • SonarQube

Context: single repo, small team, GitHub Actions, and I want low noise and fast runs so people doesn’t start ignoring findings.

Questions:

  1. Which would you add first, and why?

  2. Anything you’d skip because it overlaps with bandit?

  3. Any tips for tuning findings early so the signal stays high?

Thanks in advance.


r/devsecops • • 12d ago

The reported $6.3B Binance incident: a wake-up call for platform security

1 Upvotes

The reported Binance security incident highlights a critical lesson for every organization building large-scale digital platforms.

A compromised endpoint, stolen credentials, or excessive internal permissions can potentially lead to catastrophic consequences. For engineers practicing access-control design, PracHub has a permission-aware retrieval prompt built around the initiating user’s delegated permissions.

Key security lessons:

  • Zero Trust Architecture.

  • Least-privilege access.

  • Strong identity and access management.

  • Container isolation.

  • Multi-layer transaction authorization.

  • Continuous security monitoring.

Security isn’t just about keeping attackers out. It’s about limiting the damage when they get in.

One compromised component should never put an entire ecosystem at risk.

#CyberSecurity #Binance #CloudSecurity #ZeroTrust #DevSecOps


r/devsecops • • 12d ago

Docker Sandboxes: sbx cp follows symlinks outside the allowlist, so a sandboxed agent can read or write host files (CVE-2026-103916, fixed in v0.51.0)

10 Upvotes

If you’re running coding agents in Docker Sandboxes, the short version is: upgrade to v0.51.0. The rest of this post explains why.

(Disclosure: I work at Endor Labs. My colleague Peyton Kennedy found and reported this. Full writeup linked at the bottom.)

The point of Docker Sandboxes is that the agent runs in a microVM and can only reach host folders you’ve explicitly allowlisted, which are shared in over virtio-fs. That boundary holds. Even mounting the whole virtio-fs share as root inside the guest won’t reach a non-allowlisted file.

The problem is that sbx cp is a second channel between host and sandbox, and the allowlist doesn’t govern it. The CLI does the host-side I/O itself, as you, using your permissions. It resolves symlinks in the paths you give it and doesn’t check where they lead.

The workspace is read-write, so the agent can replace any subdirectory with a symlink to anywhere on the host. Inside the guest the link points at nothing, so it does no harm there. It only takes effect when you run a copy.

Write (copy-out):

bash

# Agent plants a link in its own workspace
ln -sfn /Users/you/.ssh /Users/you/project/results

# You run a routine copy-out, in the same form as the --help example
sbx cp mysandbox:/tmp/out/authorized_keys ~/project/results/
# Exit 0, no output. The file has landed in ~/.ssh

Read (copy-in): put the symlink at a parent component (~/project/vendor -> ~/.aws), and sbx cp ~/project/vendor/credentials mysandbox:/tmp/ pulls your credentials into the sandbox.

-L is the only symlink control, and it covers just one of the four places a symlink can sit:

Symlink positionFollowed?Gated by -L?
Copy-out dest, last componentyesno
Copy-out dest, parent componentyesno
Copy-in source, last componentnoyes
Copy-in source, parent componentyesno

The agent chooses where the link goes, so it will pick one of the three open positions.

Why this matters more than the “user interaction required” label suggests: the copy you’d run is the documented workflow, and in an agentic session the agent is often the one proposing it. Copy-out prints nothing on success, so there’s nothing to notice. Writing to ~/.zshrc, .git/hooks, or ~/.ssh/authorized_keys turns this into code execution the next time you do something ordinary. (The writeup is careful to say that escalation path wasn’t demonstrated, only reasoned about.)

Details:

  • CWE-59, CVSS 3.1 8.2 High

  • Fixed in v0.51.0. Docker’s first fix was planned for 0.48.0, but they found it was incomplete, which is a fair reminder that sandboxes are hard to patch.

  • Not the same bug as CVE-2026-17106 (fixed in v0.38.0). That fix still holds. This one is at the extraction root and the copy-in source path, which the earlier fix didn’t cover.

If you can’t upgrade right away, resolve paths yourself before copying, and check every component, not just the last one:

bash

realpath ~/project/results   # should still be inside the workspace

Better still, copy to and from directories the sandbox has never had mounted, and be most suspicious of copies the agent suggests.

The broader lesson, and the second time this year we’ve seen it in an agent sandbox: the isolation primitive was fine. The hole was a second path to the host that the security model didn’t account for. File-moving commands are easy to leave out of the model because they look like the operator’s own action.

Full writeup with repro steps: https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/docker-sandboxes-vulnerability-lets-ai-agents-access-sensitive-files-outside-their-sandbox-cve-2026-103916

Happy to answer questions or pass along anything I can’t answer.


r/devsecops • • 13d ago

We ran Mistral Large 4, GLM 5.3 and DeepSeek V4 Pro over PHP's source code in the same security harness

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7 Upvotes

We gave PHP's source to our autonomous product security platform (Argus Systems) three times and swapped the model each run: Mistral Large 4, Z.ai GLM 5.3 and DeepSeek V4 Pro. Same code, same pipeline, same stages, only the model changed.

We had Mistral filed under "fast and cheap." It came out with 12 Critical and 60 High findings. GLM found 1 Critical and 51 High, DeepSeek 0 Critical and 24 High. Mistral also ran the deep stages far more often (121 traces vs 49 for GLM) and found 35 root causes that neither of the other two touched. Only 4 advisories were found by all three models, which says something about running more than one.

The trade-off is that Mistral casts a wide net. It grades a step hot and writes long: 1,051 raw findings, 43% survived adversarial review (GLM: 76%), and 10% of what it marked "confirmed" turned out non-viable (this one also is related to php security policy which is not necessarily relevant to models). That breadth is exactly where the 35 unique root causes came from, so we would not want it tuned away. Inside a harness with a cheap dynamic PoC gate the extra claims cost minutes of compute. Without one you'd notice them.

Full numbers, charts and caveats (one run each, one codebase, not a benchmark) in the post. Curious whether others see the same mild severity inflation from Mistral in agentic setups.


r/devsecops • • 14d ago

Weekly supply-chain report for 78 OSS security tools, tell me what's wrong with it

4 Upvotes

Built this (mine): every week it scans the latest release of 78 open-source security tools for vulnerable deps, in-binary reachability, KEV, release verification, and Scorecard. Sortable table, week-over-week diff, raw JSON/CSV

https://rezmoss.github.io/awesome-security-pipeline/index.html

If you maintain one of these and the numbers are off, say so and I'll fix it. What would make this useful day to day?


r/devsecops • • 14d ago

A 7-day package cooldown for npm, PyPI and pub: 12 days in

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15 Upvotes

r/devsecops • • 16d ago

Do you scope agents by the tool or by the identity behind it?

20 Upvotes

something that pinches me with agent permissions is how much of the scoping happens at the tool. the agent gets one tool, run_report or whatever and that feels tight. then the tool runs on a cloud role that can read half the account so if the tool takes loose enough arguments the agent can too

the question that matters is what the identity behind each tool can reach. some tools map each identity and the agents using it to what it can reach across accounts, the kind of thing hush security and others do. on a single aws account access analyzer shows unused permissions and the policy simulator answers can this role do x

after that a session policy per task can cut it down since those only ever narrow what the role allows. the DIY version is a script per cloud and a sheet, which tends to go stale the week after

how are people tracking this, just eager to learn more


r/devsecops • • 17d ago

Need suggestions!

11 Upvotes

I've been working as a Splunk Admin for almost 4 years now. Lately, I've been searching for new opportunities, but I'm barely seeing any openings specifically for Splunk Admins, especially in reputed companies.

I'm at a point where I need to make a decision about my career. Should I continue with Splunk or move into a different role?

I have two options in mind:

  1. DevOps / AWS: I have a decent understanding of AWS and hands-on experience with a few AWS services. I'm interested in moving towards DevOps or Cloud Engineering.

  2. SOC / Cybersecurity: Most SOC roles seem to require Splunk knowledge, so I feel my current experience could be an advantage here.

Which path would you recommend considering long-term career growth and salary prospects?

Also, regarding Splunk Admin openings, are there genuinely very few opportunities in the market, or is it just a bad time to look for jobs?

Would love to hear from people working in these domains or those who have made a similar transition.


r/devsecops • • 17d ago

Building managed vulnerability triage on Rival vs Wiz - tips and tricks

17 Upvotes

We are a mid-sized tech company looking to offer vulnerability management as a service to 10-15 clients, mostly SMBs in the 50-300 employee range. Mix is on-prem Windows servers, Azure or AWS (a couple run both), and around half have their own dev teams on GitHub. What factors should we be looking at? anything sepcific you;d suggest??

I've looked into Wiz, but pricing gets steep once U multiply it across clients and like a lot of what we need to cover isnt just cloud.

Current stack per client is Qualys on servers, Defender for Endpoint on workstations and Dependabot on the repos, which adds up to a ~1k findings a month across everyone. Our team is a handful of analysts includingg me, so manual triage at that volume isnt happening. Ideally we want only single platform that handles both triage and remediation like i mean both at oncee so checking whats actually exploitable per client environment and getting fixes out as PRs or tickets into ConnectWise (basic ownership routing would be +++, though we'll probably handle most of that in our ticketing). Must-haves are per-client separation of data and reporting we can hand to clients for their SOC 2 audits.

Our base budget is low five figures a year for the whole thing, so definitely not enough for Tenable One, CrowdStrike Exposure Management or anything in that tier. We're aiming to roll out next quarter so suggest pls.


r/devsecops • • 18d ago

How are financial institutions detecting and blocking third-party AI agents from accessing customer accounts?

9 Upvotes

Hey everyone,

I work in cybersecurity at a financial institution in Canada, and we've recently started discussing the security implications of third-party AI agents accessing customer-facing banking applications.

For context, RBC recently made headlines regarding its decision to block Meta's Muse AI agent from accessing its banking systems due to security, privacy, and liability concerns.

This got me wondering how other financial institutions and organizations are approaching this problem from a technical perspective.

We're particularly interested in understanding how to identify and potentially restrict unauthorized AI agents that interact with banking applications, especially when those agents may be using legitimate customer credentials or authenticated sessions.

Some of the approaches we've been exploring include:

- WAF and bot management: Using bot detection rules, behavioral analysis, fingerprinting, and traffic patterns to distinguish automated agents from legitimate customer activity.

- robots.txt / ai.txt: Whether crawler restrictions offer any practical value for AI agents, beyond compliant web crawlers.

- OAuth DPoP / sender-constrained tokens: Whether token binding offers meaningful protection against AI-driven access, particularly when an agent is operating through an authenticated browser.

- Application/API-level controls: Detecting abnormal automated interactions, restricting sensitive operations, or identifying non-human activity beyond the authentication layer.

A few questions for anyone who has worked on this:

  1. How are organizations actually identifying AI-driven browser automation, especially when it uses legitimate customer sessions?

  2. Are existing WAF and bot management solutions effective against modern AI agents, or do they mostly detect traditional crawlers and scripted traffic?

  3. Has anyone implemented additional authentication or API-level controls specifically to address third-party AI-agent access?

  4. Are organizations primarily relying on technical blocking, monitoring and behavioral detection, or a combination of these with customer usage policies?

  5. Are there any emerging standards, frameworks, or real-world implementations worth looking into?

I'm particularly interested in hearing about actual implementation experiences, what worked, what didn't, and any limitations encountered.

Not looking for vendor pitches or ways to bypass protections. Just trying to understand how the industry is approaching this emerging security challenge.

Appreciate any insights!


r/devsecops • • 18d ago

Ghost versions 5.9.0 to 6.44.0 have an an unanchored regex and a string-built query filter let any member delete every comment vote on a site (CVE-2026-103288)

6 Upvotes

We found an interesting bug where through a filter injection any Ghost member can bypass auth to delete member comments.

Ghost's members comments API has a global id validator: /^[a-f\d]{24}$|^1$|me/i. The "me" branch has no anchors, so any string containing "me" passes. The vote lookup then built its NQL filter with a template literal:

comment_id:'${commentId}'+member_id:'${memberId}'

Injecting a quote and a comma (NQL's OR) leaves the member_id check in one branch and adds an unscoped branch beside it. The matched rows feed a .destroy() call, so any self-registered member can delete other members' likes, or every vote on the site in two requests. The endpoint returns a 404 after the delete commits.

If anyone's interested in the write-up you can find it here! https://escape.tech/blog/escape-research-found-an-auth-bypass-in-ghost-that-can-wipe-all-members-votes-its-now-cve-2026-103288/

For anyone who hosts on Ghost make sure to use version 6.44.1 with the patch :)

Full disclosure: I work at Escape which is the team that did the research


r/devsecops • • 19d ago

I recreated a Node2Shell RCE attack in the form of an interactive exercise

10 Upvotes

On 21 October 2026, Google released patched versions of its Brotli compression library for CVE-2026-111497, a vulnerability nicknamed Node2Shell. It is an out-of-bounds write in the Brotli decoder. Node and many Python stacks bundle Brotli, so it may not show up in a scan of package.json or the host's packages.

I made an interactive, hands-on lab exercise on this vulnerability. The goal is to give engineers a general overview of the attack vector and the mitigation steps. You'll exploit it as an attacker, then switch roles to the defender's side: find every place Brotli is decoded, upgrade the runtimes, redeploy, and rotate the leaked token.

I did my best to highlight all the details, but if you notice any issues or inconsistencies, please let me know!

https://ransomleak.com/exercises/http2shell-rce/


r/devsecops • • 20d ago

6 questions your mobile CI/CD metrics can already answer

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7 Upvotes