r/bugbounty • • Aug 11 '25

News Google just paid $250000 for one bug

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4.1k Upvotes

Google rewarded someone $250000 for a Chrome Sandbox escape security bug.

Read the full report here. https://issues.chromium.org/issues/412578726


r/bugbounty • • 16d ago Bravo

Question / Discussion 18yo , 7 months experience

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931 Upvotes

( used ai for writing this text)

My bug bounty experience since last 7 months : Platforms, lessons, methodology, and the 4 vulnerability classes that made most of my money

I started bug bounty hunting in March. I already had some background in DevOps and Security Operations, which helped me understand infrastructure and security concepts.

After spending these months hunting across different platforms, I wanted to share some observations from my personal experience. These aren't universal rules, just things I've learned along the way.

  1. My experience with different platforms

- HackerOne: Probably the best dollar-to-INR value I've experienced. It's been my most rewarding platform overall.

- Bugcrowd: Pays well too. Had a decent experience.

- Google VRP: One of the best opportunities for researchers because of their researcher grants. However, getting a response can take a very long time. I've experienced delays of around three months.

- YesWeHack: I ran into eligibility issues because I was under 18 at the time and couldn't complete the required verification.

- Intigriti: Honestly, a pretty bad experience for me. I had issues with being allowed to submit reports.

- Immunefi and HackenProof: I'm not really into crypto as a field, but these two platforms definitely interest me.

2. Some things I've learned about programs

My first experience with Microsoft wasn't particularly good.

Their approach of rewarding primarily high and critical vulnerabilities didn't really make sense to me, especially from a researcher's perspective.

One thing I'd recommend is focusing on programs that respond quickly.

Why?

A program that responds quickly, validates findings and patches issues efficiently often gives you a better research environment. It also means you can follow the development and remediation process more closely.

Another thing: diff updates.

Don't just look at the current application. Check what has changed recently. New commits, updated components, changed configurations and newly introduced functionality can give you useful research directions.

3. Don't blindly rely on cloud skills or automated tooling

This is something I feel strongly about.

Don't just rely on pre-existing cloud skills, AI-generated workflows or automated tools to do your research.

They can sometimes poison your research direction and lead you towards low-novelty findings.

Instead, use AI to understand and map the architecture of the components you're researching.

Understand:

- How the architecture works.

- How different components communicate.

- Where the trust boundaries exist.

- How the defense layers operate.

- Whether a particular request is even necessary to test your hypothesis.

Don't just send requests because a tool tells you to.

Understand WHY you're sending them.

Also, if a cloud skill, vulnerability class or attack technique is already publicly documented, there's a decent chance that the issue is already known, fixed or previously reported. It doesn't automatically mean it's a duplicate, but blindly chasing publicly known issues isn't a great use of research time.

4. The four vulnerability classes responsible for most of my income

This is probably the most interesting part of my experience.

Around 50–60% of my bounties came from XSS.

That's actually where I started as a beginner. XSS was one of the few vulnerability classes I initially understood, so naturally I spent most of my time learning and hunting for it.

But when I look at my overall bounty income, approximately 90% came from just four vulnerability classes:

  1. XSS

  2. Privilege Escalation

  3. Sandbox Escape

  4. Memory Corruption

Most of my remaining bounty income came from other findings, often related to the impact or consequences of these core vulnerability classes.

I don't know everything about every vulnerability class, and I don't think you necessarily need to.

I'd rather understand a few vulnerability classes deeply than superficially understand 30 different categories.

5. My biggest takeaways

If I had to give someone starting out a few recommendations based on my experience:

- Don't chase every program. Find programs that are active and responsive.

- Follow recent changes and diff updates.

- Understand architecture before testing.

- Use AI as a research assistant, not as a replacement for understanding.

- Don't blindly trust automated tools or public skills.

- Focus on understanding security boundaries.

- Build depth in vulnerability classes instead of constantly switching topics.


r/bugbounty • • Mar 13 '26

Article / Write-Up / Blog OP got his highest reward for exposed .git

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914 Upvotes

Exposed.git, dumped the src code, grepped credentials from config files, got access to DB and email..

Sometimes highest reward comes from little bit of efforts. Keep trying folks, it is possible


r/bugbounty • • Jul 07 '25 Hooray Wholesome Seal Heartwarming Bravo

Article / Write-Up / Blog Yay first big bounty, from google!

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636 Upvotes

Will surely post a write up on it if google permits.

Tip: open reidrects are dangerous sometimes😛


r/bugbounty • • Mar 17 '25

Article I got my first CVE 🔥

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600 Upvotes

I recently discovered and reported a 2FA bypass vulnerability, which was responsibly disclosed and acknowledged with a Hall of Fame mention. The biggest achievement? It was assigned as my first-ever CVE ID.

From learning about CVE IDs to now having one of my own, this journey has been both exciting and rewarding. This is just the beginning more vulnerabilities to find, more security to strengthen, and more milestones to achieve!

I also have one unreported vulnerability which can give me another CVE ID. 🔥


r/bugbounty • • Mar 25 '26

Article / Write-Up / Blog Maintainer ignored a critical unauthenticated RCE, then banned me when I tried to report it

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589 Upvotes

I found an unauthenticated RCE in a pretty widely used open-source project. It gives full remote code execution and in practice full shell access to any machine hosting it. This thing has around 13k GitHub stars and is apparently used by major companies like Intel, VMware, Cisco, Microsoft, IBM, Red Hat, and a lot more. So I reported it immediately because the impact is obviously massive. I tried to contact the maintainer privately first. Sent an email, got no reply. Tried Discord, got ignored there too. After that I posted in the public bug-report channel saying, that I had found a vulnerability and wanted to get in touch with the maintainer privately. I did not post the bug itself. I did not drop any technical details. I did not break any rules. It was literally just a few normal messages asking for a way to report it r, responsibly.

About 12 hours later I was banned from the server.

At that point I started reporting it to authorities and to as many affected companies as I could identify, because if the maintainer refuses to engage at all, this becomes bigger than just “open source drama”. What honestly blows my mind is that I was not even asking for a bounty. I was just trying to get a critical issue fixed before it turns into a real incident. It is actually insane how much damage one person’s ego or incompetence can cause when they sit in front (maintain) of software used this widely. If you maintain a security-relevant project and your first reaction to a responsible report is to ignore and ban the reporter, you should not be maintaining that project.

I will publish the 0day & the related project as soon as authorities responded and figured out a solution.

For those impatient, here is the short/outlined abstract version of the vuln. A publicly reachable endpoint that should never have been exposed was reachable without authentication, and its so-called request validation was just a predictable hash over attacker-controlled input with no secret involved. That means I could generate valid requests myself and make the server execute local tooling with arguments I fully controlled. The funniest part is that the software even ships a helper binary by default that becomes dangerous the moment you can feed it attacker-controlled arguments. There is a “security check” in front of it, but it is weak enough that equivalent argument variants slip through anyway, so the restriction is mostly theater. That gives an unauthenticated attacker access to built-in functionality that can be abused for file interaction and further system compromise.

idk im hurting inside rn, theres so many cool projects and bugs i reproted which were resolved in hours.. and my most critical finding is resulting into this sht shw -.-


r/bugbounty • • Jun 25 '26

Question / Discussion After months of tutorial hell and wasted effort, I finally found the holy grail for bug bounty beginners.

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557 Upvotes

I spent so much time jumping between random YouTube playlists and buying courses from udemy , and getting absolutely nothing. It always felt like something was missing it’s about too theoretical or just spraying payloads without understanding why!
I am a backend developer so i am searching in every single detail
If you’ve been failing to find a clear path in this like your uncle this is the Best decision I've made so far
Cheers


r/bugbounty • • Mar 26 '26

Article / Write-Up / Blog I got my first Apple CVE as a 18 year old

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477 Upvotes

I got my first Apple CVE as a 18 years old student.


r/bugbounty • • May 17 '25

Write-up Just got my first bounty!

462 Upvotes

just wanna share my first ug bounty ,,I finally got my first ever bounty of $1000 lol. Still can’t believe fr

So the vuln was pretty random ngl, I was manually going thru some JS files (yeah no automation, ), and after spending some hrs i found one different and sussy API endpoint, and then i check it and done some ffuf i got very intresting endpoint

When I check it on burpsuite it leakes like the whole companys registered user info like names, account id , some membership stuff, and other juicy metadata.

Reported it, it got marked high, and next thing I know — got a Dam my first bounty 😭 after spending 4-5 months i got my first bounty nad it was huge for me as a 12 class student 👽


r/bugbounty • • Oct 12 '26 Bravo Heartwarming

Article / Write-Up / Blog Google paid me $90,000 for this RCE

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453 Upvotes

r/bugbounty • • Jun 04 '25

Discussion got my first ever bountyyyyyyyy!!!

422 Upvotes

So i just got a message from my program where i submitted 2 bac and got 2 bounties, total of 1265usd.

bug explanation/tips.

first bug:- i was going through each function changing cookies to guest role and req method. i found an rename item request(PUT), i just changed it to DELETE and as guest with least privilege i could delete items.

tip : i saw that program was heavily relying on http verbs(put,patch). use OPTIONS req method and in response it'll tell you which method is allowed for this particular request.

Second bug:- i saw that guest role can't access team functionality, i tried all possible 403 bypasses,

  1. changing req method

  2. tempering with cookies/referer header.

  3. appending .json

everything i could think of.

then i remember this _method trick, if you write this on req body and do

_method=GET

sometimes it bypasses and allows you to access it. to learn more about it

🧬 Common Method Override Techniques by Framework

FrameworkMethod Override Field / ParamWhere It's Parsed FromNotes
Symfony_methodapplication/x-www-form-urlencodedBody ( )_methodBuilt-in support for
Laravel (PHP)_methodBodyVery common in Laravel Blade forms
Ruby on Rails_method?_method=DELETEBody or query string ( )Accepts both GET query and POST body
Express (Node.js)method-override with_methodX-HTTP-Method-Override, , custom headerBody, query, or headersNeeds middleware
**Flask (Python)**methodoverride with middleware_methodX-HTTP-Method-Override,Depends on configuration
Spring Boot (Java)X-HTTP-Method-OverrideHTTP HeaderNot enabled by default
ASP.NET MVCX-HTTP-Method-OverrideHTTP HeaderWorks only when routing allows
Phoenix (Elixir)_methodForm bodySimilar to Rails behavior

and that's how i got my first/second bounties. soo happy. so that i decided to write and give you some tips and share my happiness with you.

Happy hunting.


r/bugbounty • • Oct 02 '24

Made 8000$ in my first three months of bug bounty. AMA.

401 Upvotes

As title says.


r/bugbounty • • Sep 15 '25

Bug Bounty Drama High bounty, but with multiple heart attacks

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373 Upvotes

Hi BB community,

I am curious to see your opinion on how this bug was handled. I noticed multiple people complaining about triage practices, and I did have my fair share of issues in the past. This being a good example about how shady the whole process is.

Context: I found a crit in a SaaS product used by a lot of big companies, companies even from Fortune 500, companies with their own BB program as well. The vuln allowed external unauthenticated attackers to see (enumerate and view) data processed by the said SaaS product. Storyline, screenshots, PoC, video PoC, 1-click link showing how data is disclosed, it was all shared in the report. I only reported to the SaaS vendor, following their rules, and tried as much as possible not to touch the data of other companies.

As you can see in the image, the H1 triager tried to dismiss the vulnerability as Informative, and then tried to minimize the impact, all without any question or argument.

The program team oscillated a lot between acknowledging the vulnerability and trying to dismiss it. My best guess is that the engineering team realized they cannot fully fix the issue without redesigning the architecture of the product, so they tried to downplay it.

Bounty was awarded after a lot of back and forth, for "high risk", although nobody gave any reasoning for why this is not a critical. Although the bounty in itself is really big, I cannot shake the feeling that I was conned out of a fair assessment.

Three months after bug submission, 1 month after bounty payout, the vulnerability is still not fixed, no justification for "high vs crit" question, no other activity.

Now I have another very similar vulnerability that should be Critical, but I am not sure I want to submit it and go again through a dozen heart strokes, just for the bug to be downgraded in the end without justification.

Thoughts?


r/bugbounty • • Jan 29 '24

I have over $1M bounty from HackerOne. Happy to Answer any questions [AMA]

334 Upvotes

As title says, I am happy to share and learn. I have managed a couple of programs being on program side as triager. Could answer in that regard as well.

Edit - Going offline. Will answer more questions in few hours.


r/bugbounty • • Jun 28 '26

Program Feedback Got the biggest bounty in my life

271 Upvotes

I found a P1 vulnerability at one of the biggest telecommunication provider and they paid me 5000€ 🙏
That was the biggest bounty I ever recieved.


r/bugbounty • • Feb 06 '25

Write-up Accidentally uncovered my first bug - lead to $12K in 3 months

257 Upvotes

I haven't really done bug bounties, I'm not really a bug bounty person. I work in Cloud Security, I do no red team or pen tests, I generally just work within Azure making our clients more secure.

Back in November, I accidently uncovered a XSRF within Azure, which effectively compromised your Azure environment.

The first thing I did was search to see if Azure had a bug bounty, which I found. I reported it to MSRC within a day and while it did take a while to get a proper response from Microsoft it was awarded $3k as it's classified as spoofing. Personally I don't agree with the classification, but $3k is a significant amount for some to stumble upon.

I then found an incredibly similar vulnerability which I made a separate report for, which also was awarded $3k.

Since then, I've been much more dedicated to looking for bugs within Azure in my spare time and I've found multiple. All fall in with the spoofing category.

Currently I have 5 reports with MSRC, 3 of which are confirmed and being/been paid out, 1 of which in certain I'll get a payout for, and the other I have no idea.

I found these vulnerabilities because I know how Azure is supposed to work and I found something that didn't seem right, and I kept investigating.

I'm writing this post because I've been visiting this sub more recently and people talk about specific courses or exams you should take, and while I do think that is beneficial, it's important to know how things are supposed to work so you can spot things that don't seem right.

I'm going to continue to look into finding vulnerablities within Azure. I'm surprised I haven't seen more people on this sub speaking about MSRC, as payouts for Azure go up to $60k, and that's without the high impact scenarios (which cns double it).


r/bugbounty • • Mar 31 '26

Bug Bounty Drama HackerOne automation blocked my Critical 10.0, Stripe forced a weekend patch, thanked me, HackerOne marks my report a DUPLICATE of an INFORMATIVE report 12 days prior. Then a $25k 'Ghost Report' drops which coincidentally is the exact amount for a CVSS 10.0

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248 Upvotes

When the "Security Platform" Becomes the Security Risk

UPDATE [Apr 9th 2026]: Since Stripe and HackerOne have chosen to remain silent despite clear proof of a "silent patch" on a $25,000 USD vulnerability, I am moving forward.

It’s clear that Stripe and HackerOne aren't just making mistakes—they are actively colluding to "shadow-patch" vulnerabilities to avoid paying bounties owed, so I’ve launched the waitlist for HACKER2.0—a platform built to kill the "Intended Behavior" lie through automated verification and escrowed bounties.

The Clock is Ticking: I have initiated a 7-day declassification timer. If this is not resolved by the deadline, I’m releasing the full evidence of how these platforms systematically rip off the people who secure them. It will be released here:securityallround.com/HACKER2.0/countdown.html

Is there any real accountability in the bug bounty industry? Or is it just a race to see which billion-dollar company can get the most free labor?

I’m sharing this because the current crowdsourced security model is broken. Recently, I reported an issue to Meesho where an API endpoint was exposing over 2.5 million pages of vendor & shop details, user comments, and reviews. A triager first commented, "Thank you for reporting the issue. We are looking into the same as we speak." Shortly after, a second triager stepped in, called it "invalid," and marked it N/A as "Intended Behavior."

The kicker? Immediately after marking it N/A, my IP address was mysteriously blocked from accessing their site for a few days while they did who knows what on the backend.

When I disputed this handling, my Reputation Score on HackerOne was tanked. This triggered an automated block, preventing me from reporting new bugs or requesting mediation for 30 days. Every support ticket I submitted to HackerOne to review this unfair rep loss was closed immediately with zero explanation.

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During that automated muzzle period, I identified a CVSS 10.0 (Critical) vulnerability on Stripe. Because of the platform’s blind automation, I couldn't report this critical threat through official channels. I had to bypass HackerOne entirely and contact Stripe's security team directly. Stripe then had to manually intervene and email HackerOne to bypass my ban so I could submit the report.

The result? Once they saw the POC, they coordinated the fix and had it patched within 12 hours on a Sunday. Stripe Support sent me an email saying, and I quote: "I'm reaching out regarding the bug you recently reported, as my colleague is currently away. I just want to make sure everything from your last contact has been fully resolved. Our security team has confirmed that the issue is now fully resolved. We really appreciate you bringing this to our attention--it helps us keep everything running smoothly."

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The "Reward"? A few days later, the report was marked as a "Duplicate" of an "Informational" finding from 12 days prior. This is a technical impossibility. If a CVSS 10.0 Full Account Takeover was "known" for 12 days, why was it left live and exploitable until the exact moment I provided a functional POC and forced a weekend patch?

I’ve started to doubt the legitimacy of some disclosed reports. Do those researchers actually exist, or are they just a fabrication to make corporate cover-ups believable? I noticed a "Resolved" report pop up just 4 days after I first reported the CVSS 10.0 to Stripe. The payout? $25,000—exactly what a CVSS 10.0 is meant to pay as per their paytable.

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HackerOne provides zero support and zero replies. The system is designed to screw the researcher and give the business a free pass. If you don't pay a sparky for wiring your house, don't be surprised if you come home to find the wiring ripped out of the walls. You get what you pay for—and right now, these companies are getting world-class security for free.

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r/bugbounty • • Jun 01 '25

IDOR First Bounty!

239 Upvotes

IDOR Vulnerability

This was my first real bug bounty, and I wanted to share my experience.

I was testing a web app and decided to poke around the JavaScript files, especially one called main.js. Inside, I found a JavaScript function triggered when the admin clicked a "Delete Message" button. The function looked like this:

() => {
  fetch('/api/deleteMessage', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers: {
      'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'
    },
    body: `id=${m.id}`
  }).then(loadAdminMessages);
}

This immediately caught my attention. The fetch request goes to /api/deleteMessage with only the message id in the body. There was no CSRF token, and more importantly, no user-level check.

So I manually crafted a request in the browser console like this:

fetch('/api/deleteMessage', {
  method: 'POST',
  headers: {
    'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'
  },
  body: 'id=0'
});

Boom. The message got deleted. I wasn’t even logged in as an admin.

This meant any authenticated user could delete messages, including system messages, just by crafting a fetch request. That’s a classic Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR).

Path Traversal Vulnerability

While still looking through main.js, I noticed another juicy function tied to image deletion:

() => {
  fetch('/api/deleteImage', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers: {
      'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'
    },
    body: `image=${encodeURIComponent(fn)}`
  }).then(loadAdminImages);
}

When I checked the server-side deleteImageHandler, it looked like this before the fix:

func deleteImageHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
    r.ParseForm()
    img := r.FormValue("image")
    os.Remove(filepath.Join("uploads", img))
    w.Write([]byte("deleted"))
}

There was no user-level check and no filtering of ../. So I tried this fetch request:

fetch('/api/deleteImage', {
  method: 'POST',
  headers: {
    'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'
  },
  body: 'image=../main.go'
});

It worked. I was able to delete files outside the uploads directory, even core server files, just by guessing their names.

This type of vulnerability is called Path Traversal and falls under CWE-22. Combined with the lack of admin validation, this became a critical bug.

By combining these in both reports, I got $1500 Les go!

Final Thoughts

I learned to follow the fetch calls from the frontend to see how they behave server-side, and to test edge cases with parameters like ../ or id=0.

Super happy to get my first bug bounty. Just wanted to share what helped me spot this and maybe help someone else too.


r/bugbounty • • Apr 05 '22

Guys this is my recent achievement! acknowledged by Dutch government.

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232 Upvotes

r/bugbounty • • Sep 23 '25

Question / Discussion I'm a high schooler who just got my first CVE from Apple for a kernel-level ACE. AMA anything about low-level security research!

231 Upvotes

I recently completed a long-term security research project on Apple platforms, and recently was awarded a CVE.

This is my first ever CVE as a high school student so I'm super excited right now.

I've noticed most discussions here focus on web research, so I wanted to share this to hopefully spark more conversation around systems-level security. Happy to answer any questions for those looking to get into the Apple platform or just low-level security research in general!

It's a super fun area and we definitely need more people in this space!

Edit: Just clarifying that while the patch for this is already released, the CVE is still reserved so I don't think I can go into specifics about the vulnerability yet (I'll be making a writeup once I can and maybe sharing it here), this is just meant to encourage low-level security research and provide help to those who want to get into it!

Edit 2: Apple have just adjusted the exact wording they will use in the CVE disclosure (as visible on my dashboard) to not be exactly ACE anymore as it showed when I made the post, but still a serious kernel-level exploitation.


r/bugbounty • • Mar 16 '26

Research how i stopped wasting time in bug bounty (took me way too long to figure this out)

228 Upvotes

so i kept jumping between random youtube videos and blog posts for months and getting nowhere. no structure, no direction.

what finally clicked was doing things in the RIGHT ORDER. sounds obvious but nobody actually spells it out clearly.

week 1 - just setup, nothing else

  • burp suite community + foxyproxy

  • subfinder, nmap, ffuf installed

  • do 3 portswigger XSS labs. thats it.

  • dont touch a real target yet

week 2 - recon only, dont test anything

  • pick ONE program on hackerone

  • passive first: crt.sh, github dorking, google dorks

  • then active: subfinder on the domain, ffuf for directories

  • write everything down in a txt file

  • seriously dont test anything yet

week 3 - now test, but only what you found in recon

  • XSS on every input field using burp repeater

  • IDOR: make 2 test accounts, check every numeric ID

  • SQLi: single quote on every parameter, watch the response

  • nothing random

week 4 - write and submit

  • title format: [vuln type] in [feature] allows [impact]

  • paste the raw HTTP request from burp into the report

  • suggest a fix at the end (increases payout)

  • first report will probably be a dupe. thats fine. submit anyway.

one thing i wish someone told me earlier: A01 and A03 from OWASP produce more valid reports for beginners than everything else combined. start there every single time.

anyone else have stuff that helped them get their first valid report? curious what worked for others.


r/bugbounty • • Mar 27 '26

Article / Write-Up / Blog My 8 months progress as a complete beginner.

225 Upvotes

Hi Guys,

I started as a complete beginner with no prior experience in web app development or IT sector. At first I just wanted to earn some extra bucks, but during the process, I fell in love with it.

So I am sharing the achievements I have gotten in my infant journey of bug hunting so far :

I've successfully reported 1 low, 2 Mediums and 2 Highs. And out of them, I got 3 CVE IDs assigned. 2 are Mediums (CVSS 6.5 and 4.3), 1 is High (7.5).

The rest 2 were paid bugs which I found on a self hosted BBP, rewarding me 700€ combined.

I know 700€ isn't enough income haha but yeah, I've learnt a lot and I got 3 CVE IDs, for a beginner like me that does feel like a good achievement haha, even though they're just a drop in the ocean.

My biggest gain for me is that I have found a field I can be really passionate about.

I am sharing my progress because I feel like it is a good thing to spread positivity from my experiences, a small nudge to my beginner peers, telling them that if I can do it, they can as well. As long as you enjoy it and are constant around it and are willing to learn and not spray blind tools, you'll definitely reach somewhere. Don't loose hope, just enjoy while you hack, you'll find success.

I wish luck to my beginner peers and seek guidance from the experts who are always ready to guide whenever people like me post questions on this sub.

Looking forward to contribute more to the community, just starting out, hope I'll be able to contribute more.

Have a nice day!


r/bugbounty • • Mar 17 '26

Bug Bounty Drama Critical RCE in Hathor Desktop Wallet closed as "Out of Scope" by Immunefi, patched silently after weeks, zero bounty, zero credit

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220 Upvotes

**Title:** Critical RCE (up to $20k) via malicious NFT, closed as Out of Scope, only patched after months of spamming them

**Reporter:** Me

**Immunefi Report:** #65067

**What happened:**

- Found a **critical remote code execution** in Hathor Desktop Wallet v0.34.0.

- Attacker mints/airdrop a malicious NFT with SVG metadata (disguised as PDF).

- Victim just opens the **NFT List** tab → SVG script executes thanks to `nodeIntegration: true`, `contextIsolation: false`, `sandbox: false`.

- Full RCE: steal seed, force transactions, install backdoors, etc. Zero clicks needed.

This matched their own Critical severity (up to $20,000).

**Timeline:**

- Reported privately via Immunefi

- Closed as **"Out of Scope"**

- Gets banned from Immunefi, they said i had multiple accounts (i did not)

- After being insist with emails + Discord harassment, they quietly removed PDF rendering

- No bounty

- No acknowledgement

- No credit

- No "thank you"

**Fix commit** (disguised as "feat: remove pdf render"):

https://github(dot)com/HathorNetwork/hathor-wallet/commit/4cc9a349c9415588f5d3e00c29153d0ed30e6bd6

**GitHub disclosure issue** (with full details):

https://github(dot)com/HathorNetwork/hathor-wallet/issues/854

**X thread with PoC screenshots + technical breakdown:**

https://x(dot)com/SlowBearDigger/status/2033958627682205904

This case shows exactly how some projects (and Immunefi) treat whitehats: close real Critical bugs to avoid paying, only fix when you annoy them enough, then ghost you.

We whitehats deserve better.

full report here:

https://pastebin(dot)com/N4Xf7EeX


r/bugbounty • • Apr 29 '25

Discussion I found two bugs allowing unlimited ticket generation — they offered me a €25 gift card

220 Upvotes

In a ticketing platform (similar to TicketSpice), I discovered two vulnerabilities: • generate more tickets than allowed using a single invitation code • generate unlimited free tickets, without even using a valid code or making any payment.

I reported the first issue in early January, and the second 3 weeks later.

They came back with an offer: a €25 gift card.

I asked if the amount could be reconsidered : “We think the amount is fair.”

What do you think?