r/blueteamsec • u/digicat • Aug 06 '25
intelligence (threat actor activity) Threat actors: “Please do not use Okta FastPass”
r/blueteamsec • u/digicat • Aug 06 '25
r/blueteamsec • u/Aggressive-Clock-254 • 21d ago
Hey all, I’m a pentester and I kept ending AD engagements with the same client question: “OK, but what do we fix first?”
So I built HorusEye. It ingests AD data, maps the attack paths, and finds the choke point: the single change that breaks every route to DA.
In the demo, an ordinary user (JDOE) in HELPDESK has two routes to Domain Admin:
HELPDESK can reset a service account’s password, and that account has DCSync
HELPDESK is local admin on WEB01, where a DA is logged in
HorusEye’s answer: remove JDOE from HELPDESK. You can also compare alternative fixes (narrow group permissions instead, or cut the last hops) and lock access people need with --keep.
Every finding includes evidence, a validation command, the fix and detection event IDs. It produces one offline HTML report, and AI is optional.
r/blueteamsec • u/digicat • Jun 27 '23
r/blueteamsec • u/digicat • Oct 14 '24
r/blueteamsec • u/digicat • Sep 05 '22
r/blueteamsec • u/MartinZugec • Apr 04 '24
Hey everyone,
Just wanted to share a new tool we developed to help identify XZ backdoor vulnerability (CVE-2024-3094).
- Standalone & Portable: No additional software needed, runs on various Linux systems (written in Go)
- Two Scanning Modes: Choose between Fast Scan and Full Scan (--system)
Important Notes:
- Requires root privileges to run effectively.
- Initial testing on Fedora, Debian, but wider testing is recommended.
- Identifies vulnerable liblzma versions and searches for the backdoor's malicious code.
How to get it:
P.S. We're still under development, so feedback and testing on different distros are very welcome!
r/blueteamsec • u/digicat • Feb 01 '25
r/blueteamsec • u/digicat • Jun 29 '21
r/blueteamsec • u/digicat • Mar 15 '25
r/blueteamsec • u/digicat • Aug 10 '24
r/blueteamsec • u/digicat • Aug 08 '26
r/blueteamsec • u/Over_Function_1884 • Aug 21 '26
I’ve been working on an open-source network-flow detection project and one thing became pretty obvious fairly early: getting a classifier to produce decent scores is not really the hard part.
The harder question is what an analyst is supposed to do with thousands of individual detections.
So I kept the project going past the model itself. The current pipeline takes CICFlowMeter-compatible flows, scores them, groups related alerts into incidents, and only promotes the incidents that cross a second threshold.
On the locked future-day holdout, 79,710 flow alerts became 12,911 promoted incidents while keeping 99.93% incident recall.
I’m deliberately not calling it production-ready. The holdout is still from the same network/dataset family, and the remaining workload is higher than I’d want for a real SOC queue.
What I’m interested in now is how this kind of approach behaves outside the environment it was built around.
Repo:
https://github.com/ibondarenko1/security-anomaly-ml
If anyone here works with network-flow telemetry or ML-based IDS, I’d be interested in where you think the design will fail first in a real environment.
r/blueteamsec • u/mustu • Aug 18 '26
TL;DR: Adding an AI node to your n8n playbook won't take you to Agentic SOC.
-----
A recurring theme in my conversations is the assumption that building an AI agent for SOAR execution and building one for security investigations are the same engineering problem.
They are NOT.
A playbook agent operates inside a path defined in advance. It enriches an alert, applies triage rules, and takes an approved response action. Its actions can be constrained, failures are usually visible, and many mistakes can be reversed. Speed, consistency, and correct escalation are useful measures of performance.
An investigative AI agent must decide what the evidence means and what to examine next. The evidence may be incomplete or tampered with, and each conclusion changes the direction of the case. It therefore needs claim-level provenance and a record showing how each conclusion follows from the evidence.
Building an agentic workflow is not the same as engineering an investigation harness. You can wire up a basic playbook agent in n8n within an hour. An investigation harness has to keep evidence, case state and human decisions coherent across an open-ended case.
Please don't confuse engineering an sophisticated harness and baking years of investigative expertise into it with calling AI nodes in your SOAR playbook.
My attempt as ASCII visualization if it helps
STANDARD SOAR PLAYBOOK | INVESTIGATION PROCESS
(Deterministic Flow) | (Non-Deterministic Cyber Flow)
-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------
[ SIEM Alert ] | [ Hunt Lead / Detection ]
| | |
v | .-------->v<---------.
[ Initial Review ] | / ( Clue 1 ) \
| | | ^ | ^ \ |
v | | / | | \ |
< Determine Risk > | v / v | v v
/ \ | (Clue 2)<-->(Evidence)<-->(Forensics)
v v | ^ \ ^ | ^ |
[Isolate] [Create Ticket] | | \ | | / |
| | | | v | v / |
v v | \ ( Human Pivot / <..../
[Update] [Slack Notify] | `--- Judgment )
\ / | |
\ / | v
v v | [ Defensible ]
[ Conclusion ] | [ Conclusion ]
r/blueteamsec • u/Ok_Host1989 • Aug 02 '26
Infrastructure telemetry can tell us where an event happened. It does not always show what the application was doing at that moment.
For instance, a rise in authentication failures might suggest someone is trying to guess passwords. Application logs can show if those attempts were aimed at real accounts, caused accounts to get locked, or came from an API process that was not clear from network or device data alone.
The same is true for authorization failures, changes in permissions, actions taken by administrators, and strange API behavior. Without looking at the application level, it is easy to waste time checking activity that ends up being processes, or miss activity that doesn't set off clear alerts in the infrastructure.
In our setup, we have seen that connecting application events with authentication and device data helps cut down the time it takes to check activity.
For groups that are already gathering application logs, which application events have regularly given useful alerts or clues during investigations?
r/blueteamsec • u/digicat • Jan 06 '24
r/blueteamsec • u/digicat • Feb 16 '26
r/blueteamsec • u/apes_2gether_strong • Mar 15 '22
r/blueteamsec • u/BluePandaSec • Feb 05 '20
r/blueteamsec • u/digicat • Jan 22 '22
r/blueteamsec • u/digicat • Sep 05 '26
r/blueteamsec • u/intuentis0x0 • Sep 27 '24
r/blueteamsec • u/GimmyDatBeeR • Oct 30 '25
Hey folks,
I’m currently working as a Threat Detection Engineer, mostly focused on detection logic, SIEM engineering (custom parsers, detections rules, MITRE mapping), and threat hunting, i am currently at my 3 years mark inside a SOC and i am not satisfied neither from my salary nor the company i am currently at.
Over the past few years I’ve collected a few certs along the way:
CDSA (HTB Certified Defensive Security Analyst)
CCD (Cybersecurity Core Defender)
PJPT (Practical Junior Penetration Tester)
eCTHP (eLearnSecurity Certified Threat Hunting Professional)
SAL1 & BTL1 (SOC Analyst Level 1 / Blue Team Level 1)
I’m at a point where I’m trying to decide what direction I should push next both in terms of certifications and career path, what job roles I should realistically aim for, and what I can actually land given my current experience.
I’d love to hear from others who’ve been in this middle ground, what path helped you the most in terms of career growth & Salary progression (what kind of range would be realistic for someone at this level, say in the EU or remote roles).
Any personal experience or perspective is welcome
r/blueteamsec • u/digicat • Aug 27 '25