I originally wrote this reflection in three parts: the first looks at Algeria's historical, social and economic development; the second explains my political beliefs; and the third lays out the reforms I believe the country needs.
I've decided to publish only the first part for now. If it gets people talking and sparks enough interest, I'll post the other two as well. I'd rather start by discussing my reading of Algerian history before getting into the political beliefs and proposals that follow from it.
This isn't an academic study. It's just my personal take, with all the generalisations that come with that. I'd genuinely like to hear what you think.
1. Where we come from
Modern Algeria was shaped, to a large extent, during the brief period of political pluralism that preceded independence. At the time, France didn't consider Algeria a colony, but an integral part of its own territory. Yet the Algerian people never truly became part of that entity. To me, this shows that a distinct identity survived all attempts at assimilation.
After the Jonnart Law of 1919, the national movement began to take shape. It was made up of many different political groups, most of which were initially focused on improving the living conditions of Algerians. To simplify things a little, I would divide them into three main groups.
The communists, who were strongly oriented towards Moscow, especially after the Second World War.
The democrats who supported assimilation, themselves divided into two groups. On one side were the Francophiles, who wanted Algerians to become fully integrated into French society. They remained a very small minority, partly because of the racism deeply rooted in the colonial administration, and partly because of the strong sense of Algerian identity. They were mainly Algerians living in mainland France or a few privileged individuals, such as those who had gone through the assimilation programmes in Tlemcen and Constantine. They would later form part of the educated elite, often recruited into governments as technocrats or for positions requiring a high level of academic expertise.
On the other side were the Republicans, who demanded equal political rights for Algerians without compromising on their identity, which was fundamentally Muslim. Several political currents would eventually emerge from this branch.
The independence movement, which gained widespread popular support very early on. We need to distinguish the independence activists who came before the FLN from the FLN itself. The idea of independence had been around from the beginning, but the movement was far from homogeneous. It included:
The trade unionists, who were the first to genuinely demand independence. Some came from the democratic movement and, after facing the racist treatment of North African workers, gradually developed the idea of a national trade union struggle. Others were communists who believed that self-determination was essential to the class struggle.
The Arab pre-nationalists (a term I'm using to describe this particular current), who were heavily inspired by the Nahda, introduced to Algeria through the Oulémas and the arrival of Sheikh Muhammad Abduh. This current was a precursor to both Islamism and Pan-Arabism. Many of its supporters combined these ideas with socialism.
The Oulémas, who belonged to the reformist Salafiyya movement, a transnational intellectual movement seeking to restore the vitality of Islamic civilisation by returning to its original sources. For them, this revival wasn't limited to education or reforming religious practices. It also involved restoring the political unity of the Muslim world and Islamic authority, particularly around the idea of the caliphate.
So, what brought all these currents together and allowed the FLN to claim that it represented the people?
First, they shared a few fundamental ideas. They all agreed that the people were oppressed and deserved freedom. They all recognised a strong Algerian identity distinct from the French one, and they all saw a huge divide between social classes, generally favouring a socialist vision of the economy.
Their disagreements were mainly about how to achieve independence, how the country should be governed, how to define its identity, and what its relationship with the French state should look like. With the emergence of the FLN, these differences were pushed aside. Almost all these currents eventually rallied behind independence and the creation of a deeply social state with an Arab-Muslim identity. The revolution succeeded, and independence finally came.
Ben Bella set things in motion. He was an anti-imperialist socialist, a supporter of self-management and some kind of authoritarian revolutionary council, and was culturally close to Pan-Arabism.
He was overthrown by Boumediene, whose regime was much more authoritarian and centred around the president. It was a rather Stalinist system that tried to reproduce Maoist policies: a cultural revolution (through the Muslim organisation), an agrarian revolution and an industrial revolution. The results were far from conclusive.
But Boumediene also had much bigger ambitions internationally. Through a pragmatic foreign policy, he wanted Algeria to become a major international power and a leading force in the independence and Third World movements. This project left a deep mark on the Algerian national imagination.
After his death, Chadli came to power. Boumediene had practically suffocated the single-party system and blocked almost all forms of political pluralism. Under Chadli, the party gradually regained the space that the presidency had left behind, and liberal ideas began to emerge within it.
The decline of the USSR's power shook the entire system, which could no longer renew itself without some form of popular revolt. Meanwhile, the Islamist movement was growing through the Sahwa, partly influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Wahhabism. By Islamism, I don't necessarily mean the Muslim Brotherhood as an organisation. I'm referring more broadly to the political idea that Islam should have a place in political life.
With the economic crisis and the 1988–89 riots, the government took advantage of the situation to act on two fronts: it pushed through a very brutal economic liberalisation (the opposition to these reforms is where Louisa Hanoune's Workers' Party has its roots), and it dismantled the single-party system to take away the power it was beginning to accumulate.
Islamism became a useful ally in carrying out these reforms. It was very well received by a population that had shifted sharply to the right under the combined effects of the economic crisis, the Sahwa and the anger caused by the Arab countries' humiliating failure to defend the Palestinian cause.
In economic terms, Islamism is fundamentally quite liberal, in line with the Sharia's position on private property, and it participates in electoral politics, as the Muslim Brotherhood does.
After the electoral process was halted and the Black Decade began, the system managed to implement its major policies: moving away from one-party rule and the centrally directed economy.
But the decade was a national tragedy. It created a general taboo around political discussion, widespread pessimism among younger generations, and a recognition of Islamism's right to exist as a political ideology. Since then, Islamist ideology has dominated much of the country's intellectual landscape.
Bouteflika came to power with a very ambitious project: to force the emergence of a political divide modelled on the French system, with capitalists on one side and trade unionists on the other.
He granted a fairly remarkable degree of freedom of expression, but gradually pushed political parties out of the picture by depriving them of their ideological foundations. He succeeded, and a model of capitalism combined with a welfare state began to take shape.
However, trying to run politics without genuine political parties or counterbalances inevitably allowed corruption to spread into every area of public life. The ideologies themselves never disappeared. They simply changed their foundations and resurfaced through social media, in a rather disorganised way.
I won't go into the current period in detail. I see it as a transitional phase, and I think I need more distance before forming a proper judgement.
Still, we can observe a number of reforms that suggest a return to a certain form of socialism: price caps, the nationalisation of major companies belonging to oligarchs, and the dismantling of the capitalist class that emerged under Bouteflika. As I see it, this was also a popular demand.
Bouteflika's rule never managed to establish a lasting liberal ideology. The population remains largely socialist, in the sense that it supports a welfare state and opposes American-style liberal capitalism.
Political debate is still largely absent, but the ideological shift is quite clear: a relatively homogeneous political outlook is beginning to take shape, one that supports the welfare state, is Islamist, and is distrustful of democracy.
P.S. I haven't discussed the language conflict or Amazigh cultural demands. That's not because I underestimate their importance or their impact, but because I don't see them as central to the core of my political project. To clarify my position, I place radicalised Berberist currents in the same category as radicalised Islamist currents. On the other hand, I consider legitimate Amazigh cultural demands to be compatible with a progressive, multicultural vision of society. I haven't gone into this subject further simply because I don't know enough about it. Its absence from this text shouldn't be taken as an attempt to minimise its importance.