r/VeraCrypt • • Apr 09 '26

It's not just Veracrypt but Wireguard too

197 Upvotes

Turns out wireguard had its account ban too. It's hard to say it was an accident at this point but at least we are starting to get media coverage.

Veracrypt https://techcrunch.com/2026/04/08/veracrypt-encryption-software-windows-microsoft-lock-boot-issues/

Wireguard https://techcrunch.com/2026/04/08/wireguard-vpn-developer-cant-ship-software-updates-after-microsoft-locks-account/


r/VeraCrypt • • Apr 08 '26

Microsoft Abruptly Terminates VeraCrypt Account, Halting Windows Updates

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170 Upvotes

r/VeraCrypt • • Apr 11 '26

The recent issue with Microsoft has been resolved

127 Upvotes

For anyone who hasn’t been following this closely, the recent issue in which Mounir Idrassi, the developer of VeraCrypt, was unable to access his Microsoft Partner Center account has now been resolved. Here is his latest post about it:

https://sourceforge.net/p/veracrypt/discussion/general/thread/9620d7a4b3/?page=1#43c0


r/VeraCrypt • • May 17 '26

A security researcher says Microsoft potentially built a backdoor into BitLocker -releases an exploit to prove it

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117 Upvotes

r/VeraCrypt • • Jan 25 '26

Microsoft gave the FBI a set of BitLocker encryption keys to unlock suspects’ laptops

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114 Upvotes

If You use VeraCrypt, nobody, including the creators of VeraCrypt, can unlock your encrypted data.


r/VeraCrypt • • Nov 06 '24 Take My Silver

Urgent: Let's nominate VeraCrypt for the Proton fundraiser program.

92 Upvotes

Hi to you all,

Proton, the huge privacy company, does another round of their fundraiser program. They raise a lot of money from people paying to enter their program, add an additional $100,000 and distribute it along the program participants. VeraCrypt is an awesome nominee for this program and could really, really need the funding!

YOU CAN NOMINATE VERACRYPT FOR FUNDRAISING HERE: https://form.typeform.com/to/kRGE7inV

It's super quick to fill out, under 6 minutes.

Vera is mainly maintained by one guy - Mr. Mounir Idrassi from Paris. He invests his free time to volunteer maintaining this software, it's free, open source - and the backbone of many security concepts:

VeraCrypt is an important tool that powers encryption on millions of devices; big companies use it to secure their laptops and stationary PCs, protects journalists and activists, the privacy of many people - and using the plausible deniability, it also provides a very secure way to privately store data in a hidden manner.

Maybe, with the funding, Mr. Idrassi would be able to afford investing more time to fix bugs like the infamous context switching bug that makes VeraCrypt on NVMe SSDs slow, and Idrassi would finally getting paid well for his awesome work in maintaining VeraCrypt - after all, he protected TrueCrypt from dying.

Let's do it! The project needs the funding! :)


r/VeraCrypt • • Feb 03 '25

Police seized my laptop, this is their capability.

83 Upvotes

The State police seized and attempted brute force on my laptop.

Reason: Not CP, extremism. Not every seizure is related to CP bro.

They gave up after 2 billion attempts when the PIM is 485. (500,000 iterations)

That's extremely scary, consider that all the algorithms are tested.

I'm a moron, told the doctor my password and they did got access to my laptop and found nothing LOL.

My password is weak as FK.

TLDR: DO use 20+ character passwords, and don't tell anyone your password.

After this incident I will use 100+ character password and triple algorithms now.

Another legal case: https://thestarphoenix.com/news/local-news/police-should-have-found-more-child-porn-evidence-gryba

"After two and a half years of work, police got into the two DataLocker external hard drives"


r/VeraCrypt • • Apr 03 '26

VeraCrypt / Forums / General Discussion: Project Update

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77 Upvotes

r/VeraCrypt • • Jun 12 '26

Release VeraCrypt 1.26.29 · veracrypt/VeraCrypt

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68 Upvotes

r/VeraCrypt • • Dec 16 '24

Bad news - VeraCrypt did not make it into the Proton 2024 fundraiser.

67 Upvotes

Hello to you all, again.

As mentioned in my previous call for nominations, the Proton fundraiser 2024 is a program where many open-source projects about privacy get to receive funding by the big company Proton that focuses on building secure, end-to-end encrypted software: https://www.reddit.com/r/VeraCrypt/comments/1gl7wgx/urgent_lets_nominate_veracrypt_for_the_proton/

We all did our best trying to get VeraCrypt nominated, support the developers, most notably Mr. Idrassi, but to my great disappointment, VeraCrypt did not make it into the final selection of receivers for the 2024 fundraiser.

This should, however, not mark the end of our community's efforts. I hereby wish everyone reading this and enjoying VeraCrypt to consider leaving a donation, be it just in the value of a cup of coffee. This software keeps journalists, activists, companies and individuals of all kinds safe - anywhere, everywhere around the world, and it marks the backbone of many modern cybersecurity systems.

If there's one person I know in software development who deserves more respect and funding, it is - without any doubt - the VeraCrypt maintainer. So please, think about it. I am sure he will put the money to great use.

https://veracrypt.fr/en/Donation.html

I wish you all the best. We will try again next year, won't we? :)


More sources:


r/VeraCrypt • • Feb 05 '25

VeraCrypt v1.26.20 released!

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59 Upvotes

r/VeraCrypt • • Feb 03 '26

Veracrypt appears to be signed with the 2011 CA which will stop working June 27th 2026

55 Upvotes

From what I can tell in June everyone w/ veracrypt will have their secureboot stop working because vc signs itself from the 2011 ca and not the 2023 ca. This means w11 will complain about secure boot not being valid, and in some cases will not show a screen / ignore the boot option instead of continuing.

Can we rush a version bump for this please?

sudo sbverify --list DcsBoot.efi

results in

    signature 1
    image signature issuers:
     - /C=US/ST=Washington/L=Redmond/O=Microsoft Corporation/CN=Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011
    image signature certificates:
     - subject: /C=US/ST=Washington/L=Redmond/O=Microsoft Corporation/CN=Microsoft Windows UEFI Driver Publisher
       issuer:  /C=US/ST=Washington/L=Redmond/O=Microsoft Corporation/CN=Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011
     - subject: /C=US/ST=Washington/L=Redmond/O=Microsoft Corporation/CN=Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011
       issuer:  /C=US/ST=Washington/L=Redmond/O=Microsoft Corporation/CN=Microsoft Corporation Third Party Marketplace Root

r/VeraCrypt • • Mar 23 '25

Is TrueCrypt alive again?

49 Upvotes

Does anybody knows if the TrueCrypt project is being reactivated?

The site is on-line again, with an update on February 25, 2025 and a very curious message on the footer.

Any idea?


r/VeraCrypt • • Dec 30 '20

Security Evaluation of VeraCrypt (BSI, Dec. 2020)

49 Upvotes

In December 2020 the results of a security evaluation of VeraCrypt have been published. The evaluation was executed by the Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology (SIT) on behalf of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI). The full report can be found here.

Following the executive summary of the study:

VeraCrypt is a popular open-source tool for disk encryption available for Windows, Linux and macOS. VeraCrypt is a successor of TrueCrypt, an encryption software whose development stopped in 2014 and which is no longer maintained by its developers. VeraCrypt adopted most of TrueCrypt’s source code and to this day shows considerable similarities to TrueCrypt.

This report summarizes the results of a year-long project of Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology, Darmstadt, Germany on behalf of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Bonn, Germany. After starting off with an extensive research into the project evolution and related work, we executed a security analysis of VeraCrypt with a focus on its cryptographic mechanisms and the security of the application as a whole. During the research process we followed a security model that includes pertinent usage scenarios including the use of VeraCrypt for secure online sharing of data and the use on public systems and servers. Our research efforts included both automated and manual testing techniques, manual code and documentation review, as well as the creation and use of dedicated test tools.

We found that although VeraCrypt is a well-acknowledged software project, it appears that the project is still mostly driven by a single developer rather than a development team. The data we collected for VeraCrypt’s development history indicate that the project did not follow an elaborated software-development cycle with acknowledged best practices for software engineering, for instance, quality gates, peer reviews, and documentation of code changes. The code base still mainly consists of code from the TrueCrypt project that has been repeatedly criticized for its poor coding style as the case of differingimplementations of the random number generator for different operating systems still tellingly shows. The inherited code base has not been cleaned up, moreover, the development still follows questionable coding practices.

The basic functionality such as the parsing of container files and the interface to the kernel driver did not show security issues in any of our tests. We also did not find vulnerabilities in the cryptographic algorithms of VeraCrypt. However, VeraCrypt still uses the outdated and deprecated RIPEMD-160 hash algorithm and we found peculiarities with respect to the implementation of the random number generators and the GOST block encryption cipher. The recently integrated memory encryption has a weak rationale from a security perspective and increases the cost of related attacks by a relevant margin in very limited scenarios only.

We recommend the VeraCrypt project to switch to well-acknowledged and reliable open-source libraries for the implementation of cryptographic functions instead of proceeding to provide and use own outdatedcryptographic code in the VeraCrypt code base. We also recommend to switch to a state-of-the-art key derivation function. As a final remark, we want to stress that VeraCrypt can only protect data effectively in case of theft or loss of encrypted devices but not against any form of online attacks on a running system. Also, VeraCrypt cannot provide any protection in scenarios where an attacker can visit a target system multiple times.

In conclusion, we did not find substantial security issues in VeraCrypt. VeraCrypt in its current version does seem to protect the confidentiality of data in an encrypted volume as long as the volume is not mounted. Authenticity and integrity, however, are not protected. A mounted VeraCrypt volume is exposed to a multitude of attack vectors including vulnerabilities of the host system. Hence, any volume-access scenario exceeds the protection envelope of VeraCrypt. The development practices and the resulting code quality of VeraCrypt are a cause for concern. Therefore, we cannot recommend VeraCrypt for sensitive data andpersons or applications with high security requirements. We recommend to execute similar security assessments also for future versions of the software.


r/VeraCrypt • • Feb 20 '22

VeraCrypt v1.25.9 released!

48 Upvotes

r/VeraCrypt • • 15d ago

Release VeraCrypt 1.26.31 · veracrypt/VeraCrypt

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47 Upvotes

r/VeraCrypt • • Apr 19 '26

Certificates: Mounir posted an update on the situation

47 Upvotes

From the Veracrypt forums:

I investigated this in detail and I want to summarize the situation clearly because this issue can easily be misunderstood.

The current VeraCrypt EFI bootloader is signed through Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011. This is the Microsoft third-party UEFI CA that has historically been used for non-Microsoft EFI boot applications, including Linux shim and similar boot components.

The important distinction is between certificate expiration and revocation through DBX.

Microsoft's own guidance for UEFI submitters states that expiration of the 2011 UEFI CA does not invalidate binaries already signed with the 2011 certificate as long as the device still has that 2011 CA in its Secure Boot db:
https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/hardware-dev-center/signing-with-the-new-2023-microsoft-uefi-certificates-what-submitters-need-to-kn/4455787

Microsoft also states in the same article that, from October 20, 2025 until June 2026, each approved UEFI submission returns two signed files:

one signed with the existing 2011 UEFI CA

one signed with the new 2023 UEFI CA

The recommended Microsoft model is therefore not one universal binary and not one old bootloader plus one new bootloader. The model is:

same bootloader code, signed under the 2011 CA

same bootloader code, signed under the 2023 CA

installer detects what the firmware trusts and installs the appropriate signed file

Microsoft also explicitly says that existing 2011-signed binaries remain valid on devices that still trust the 2011 CA in db and a
Microsoft reply in that article says that there are currently no plans to revoke the 2011 UEFI CA using DBX.

So, based on the information available today, I don't expect existing VeraCrypt installations to all stop booting on June 27, 2026 solely because the 2011 UEFI CA expires. Systems that still have Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011 in their Secure Boot database should continue to trust the existing VeraCrypt bootloader unless that CA is later removed or blocked by firmware policy.

However, this is still an important compatibility and security maintenance issue:

Microsoft will stop signing new submissions with the 2011 CA after the transition period.

Some newer systems may have only the 2023 Microsoft UEFI CA and may not trust old 2011-signed VeraCrypt bootloaders.

Systems that receive the 2023 CA need VeraCrypt boot components signed with the 2023 CA.

Systems that have not yet received the 2023 CA still need VeraCrypt boot components signed with the 2011 CA.

Recovery media also has to be considered, because bootable media must match what the target firmware trusts.

This is also how other projects are handling the transition. Red Hat's Secure Boot guidance says existing systems using 2011-signed shim continue to boot, while updated shim binaries are being prepared/signed for the 2023 CA: https://developers.redhat.com/articles/2026/02/04/secure-boot-certificate-changes-2026-guidance-rhel-environments

fwupd documents the same ecosystem issue: existing machines do not simply stop booting when the certificate expires but new and updated boot media must move to the new CA: https://fwupd.github.io/libfwupdplugin/uefi-db.html

There is a separate Microsoft Secure Boot hardening process related to CVE-2023-24932 / BlackLotus. That process concerns revocation of Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011 which signs Windows Boot Manager. This is NOT the same certificate as Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011, which signs third-party UEFI applications such as VeraCrypt's EFI bootloader.

Microsoft's KB5025885 explains that applying the DBX revocation blocks Windows boot managers signed by Windows Production PCA 2011: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5025885-how-to-manage-the-windows-boot-manager-revocations-for-secure-boot-changes-associated-with-cve-2023-24932-41a975df-beb2-40c1-a3-b3ff139f832d

For VeraCrypt, this separate Windows Boot Manager issue matters because VeraCrypt keeps/uses a Windows Boot Manager path during the boot chain. Therefore, part of the work is to make sure that the backed-up Windows Boot Manager used by VeraCrypt is refreshed when needed, so that it is not an obsolete Windows Production PCA 2011-signed boot manager on systems that have already moved to the 2023 Windows boot manager.

After considering all this, I have decided to prepare a VeraCrypt 1.26.28 maintenance release focused on this Secure Boot transition.

The goal for this 1.26.28 release is:

Submit the VeraCrypt EFI bootloader components for new Microsoft signing as soon as possible.

Ship the appropriate Microsoft-signed EFI bootloader variants, following Microsoft's 2011/2023 transition model.

Install the 2023-signed VeraCrypt bootloader when the firmware trusts Microsoft UEFI CA 2023.

Install the 2011-signed VeraCrypt bootloader when the firmware still only trusts Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011.

Update/review VeraCrypt rescue media handling accordingly.

Review the Windows Boot Manager backup/chainload handling so that the separate Windows PCA2011 DBX revocation does not leave users with an old Windows boot manager behind VeraCrypt.

The new 1.26.28 release will address the immediate signing/compatibility pressure for current users, while VeraCrypt 1.27 can continue to be prepared properly with its own updated bootloader and driver changes.

For users:

Non-system encrypted volumes and containers are not affected by this UEFI CA transition. They are mounted after the operating system has booted and do not depend on the VeraCrypt EFI bootloader.

This issue concerns system encryption on UEFI systems with Secure Boot enabled.

Existing VeraCrypt system-encrypted installations are not expected to suddenly stop booting solely because the 2011 UEFI CA expires, provided the firmware still trusts that CA.

Nevertheless, users of VeraCrypt system encryption with Secure Boot should upgrade to the new 1.26.28 release once available, and regenerate rescue media after upgrading.

Users should also keep Windows and firmware updates current, because Microsoft is rolling out the 2023 Secure Boot certificates through Windows/OEM update channels.

I will keep this issue updated as the signing and release process progresses.


r/VeraCrypt • • Aug 19 '25

I’m convinced I got the password right - but the system is invalid or rejecting it?

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47 Upvotes

I don’t have any passwords on my files etc or anything. I simply just wanted people to stop logging onto my PC and put a password on.

I’ve forgotten it but I’m 90% sure I’ve put the correct password in. But it’s saying it’s an error?

Is there no way at all to remove it from my system before launch with some special keys? It’s a Dell Optiplex micro


r/VeraCrypt • • Apr 05 '26

[Windows] Given the author's current inability to sign new Veracrypt builds and the expiration of the 2011 CA, will it become difficult or impossible to use portable mode to access containers?

41 Upvotes

Right now new Windows builds cannot be signed and the 2011 CA used up to now will expire in June 2026.

Given how cumbersome (and risky) it is to boot Windows with driver signing disabled, I'd hate to be someone using full system encryption when the cert problem hits.... but what about mounting volumes (either partitions or containers)? Will that also break at some point soon because of this? Will that remain functional even if you can no longer use secureboot?


r/VeraCrypt • • Nov 24 '24

Let’s all support Veracrypt!

40 Upvotes

Imagine if Veracrypt had not taken over after Truecrypt? What if Veracrypt did not exist? We’ll depend on the free services Veracrypt provides. Year free year. Complex software carefully maintained.

It’s time to give them credit! Let’s nominate and vote for Veracrypt in the annual Proton charity:

https://proton.me/blog/lifetime-fundraiser-survey-2024


r/VeraCrypt • • Nov 30 '21

New release: VeraCrypt 1.25

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37 Upvotes

r/VeraCrypt • • 28d ago

Release VeraCrypt 1.26.30 · veracrypt/VeraCrypt

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32 Upvotes

r/VeraCrypt • • May 27 '26

VeraCrypt 1.26.28 Beta4 (Pre-release)

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32 Upvotes

r/VeraCrypt • • Apr 14 '21

[LONG POST] It seems the only benefit of Veracrypt full disk encryption is plausible deniability as the encrypted drive will appear raw, while downsides range from problems with Windows automated backups to catastrophic accidental initialization of the drive and the loss of your data. Is that right?

32 Upvotes

A LONG TL;DR: There is a split between users who encrypt their whole drives using Veracrypt or instead encrypt a volume or partition. The risks of full disk encryption seem huge concerning accidental initialization of your drive via the Windows popup that appears if you connect a FDE drive to your PC. A popup which would still appear even if you delete the drive letter in Disk Management if you connect the drive to any other computer. There are also problems with FDE and Windows backup and restore functions. I'd like to confirm my understanding of this is correct, and see if in 2021 there is anything like a near-consensus or majority/plurality opinion on the utility of FDE versus volume or partition encryption.


I'm a novice with Veracrypt and (encryption in general) and I've tried to do my due diligence in researching before posting questions (I've scanned through dozens of posts and guides on Veracrypt) but in this case I'm asking this question because opinions seem to be split on whether Full Disk Encryption is a good idea or not.

It doesn't seem like a 50-50 split but the first group says there's really no point in doing full disk encryption, since you can just encrypt a volume or partition to the full size of your hard drive, and the only potential downside is if some adversary tried to connect the drive, they'd maybe know right away that there's an encrypted partition. And they'd only instantly know this if you hadn't create a hidden encrypted volume buried somewhere. (Though if you did hide the volume there would still be a chunk of storage space buried in there that is clearly used for something).

Many other posters have chosen to encrypt their full disks (FDE), though they and many others warn that you have to be extra super careful at all times to not click the initialize button that will pop up when you connect your FDE drive to Windows, because the OS will think it's a raw drive. And if you do accidentally click yes, you've literally destroyed all the data you've been so careful to preserve.

Further, unless you do a particular tweak in Windows Disk Management, you will actually see this super dangerous data-nuke button every time you connect your drive to this PC and to any other your computer (and you'd have to do the drive letter tweak with every other drive you FDE encrypt).

The pro-FDE posters (or respondents) then say that not to worry, the Disk Management tweak is easy: you just delete the FDE-encrypted drive letter in Disk Management to get rid of the popup. I also read one poster mention changing a Registry setting called Volmgrx:

There is a way to disable this 'initialize disk' message by disabling the volmgrx service which is afaik not required unless you are dealing with dynamic/windows based raid disks. (Not affecting hardware-based raid)

Computer\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\volmgrx Change start to 4 and reboot.

I stumbled on this by my own processed NTLite image where I try and disable as much useless junk as possible.

AFAIK this is the only way to disable this message from appearing. Maybe it doesnt help you now, but for in the future.


A couple years ago I used Veracrypt to encrypt one external hard drive, and at the time, after reading through threads and seeing the Disk Management tweak, I encrypted the whole drive. This hasn't been a problem, as I got rid of the popup and only ever used this drive with one computer.

Now jump ahead to today, and I've been looking at encrypting my system drive, and a total of 5 total external hard drives (a 8 TB hard drive, two 3 TB drives, a 1 TB drive, and a 500 GB drive). This would obviously be a big project, and whatever Veracrypt decision I make would be what I'd be likely stuck with for years to come.

Initially, after reviewing the posts again, again I thought Full Disk Encryption was the way to. My thinking was:

  1. If I want to encrypt my drives, I should go all the way and encrypt the full disk so any hypothetical adversary would think the disk was raw.

  2. This initialization thing isn't a huge deal because I can do the drive letter tweak in Disk Management.

But then on further reflection I've completely switched my tune. I could be mistaken (I'm a novice at this stuff, and this is why I'm asking), but it seems like the full disk option is actually a terrible idea due to the potential of catastrophic damage due to accidental user error.

Here's my breakdown of the cons (as I understand them):

  1. If I don't do the tweak in Disk Management with one accidental click I could destroy all the data I'm doing all this work to carefully protect.

  2. I could do the drive letter tweak once and that would stop the popup entirely, but only for that drive, and only on that computer (and I'd have to do it on every drive I'm encrypting).

  3. If at any time I connect the FDE encrypted drives to a different computer I'd have to remember to do the tweak again (for all of them, on every other computer).

  4. I know that even if I 'know' I need to delete the drive letter on the drive any time I connect to a different computer, I also know that it is absolutely possible that at some point in the future, maybe when I'm stressed out or tired or in a rush I might connect the drive to another PC and accidentally click the nuke button.

  5. The fact is I'm using multiple external drives and will definitely use different computers in the future, so this risk of accidental initialization increases considerably.


So far the marks against FDE seem overwhelming. Even if the Disk Management tweak is easy to do, and even if 'smart me' knows I need to always remember to do it, I know that it is plausible that 'tired/stressed me' could possibly accidentally click the format button.

Let's say I'm behind on a project, and I've been up for 30 straight hours, and my computer crashes, and I run my precious drive to another computer and in my haste click the initialize button. Or if in a similar scenario, when in a rush, my main drive dies and so does my PC, and they won't respond to any recovery attempts, and then I remember I was smart enough to make an encrypted backup drive. And in my haste I rush that priceless backup to another computer and accidentally click the [YES] button when it annoyingly pops up.

And with further consideration of my actual threat level, this whole FDE option seems even more completely pointless. In that again, the only benefit I can discern is that initially some hypothetical adversary will steal my drive and see that it is 'apparently' raw and uninitialized, and would 'maybe' think it's empty. Yet even this completely falls apart with some analysis:

  1. If some hypothetical adversary breaks into my house, and is knowledgeable enough to steal my hard drives to extract my data for some reason, and he finds a PC and a stack of 5 hard drives which all appear 'uninitialized,' he'll obviously automatically know they aren't empty - because why the hell would any sane person have 5 empty hard drives with 15 TB storage capacity next to their computer?

  2. My threat level in reality is ridiculously low. I'm not a spy, or working in some job that really requires high security. I'm just a regular dude who wants to learn how to follow basic best practices for protecting my big pile of stuff (movies, music, etc.), so I can just do a 'good enough' job of protecting my privacy.

  3. The fact that I'm using external drives and not some RAID or server setup means these drives at some point will be mobile and linked to different computers.

  4. I've read a number of threads stating that full disk encryption absolutely threw a wrench into their process of using built-in Windows automated backup and restore methods to protect their data which is literally the whole point of all of this (i.e. protecting data). And that even though there are some niche backup methods to work around this problem with Windows, it seems like a real hassle to deal with while delivering very little gain from FDE.

Based on these factors, for me, it seems like full disk encryption isn't just some alternate option I'd have to be a bit more careful with: it seems like it would be absolutely a terrible idea that is not worth it since the horrible cons vastly outweigh the miniscule pros.

If the only real benefit to full disk encryption is that my drive will appear raw and some hypothetical adversary - who in all honesty will probably never actually target me (or even exist) - might attack me and might for 2 minutes think my drive is empty, until he checks the other drives, then FDE seems ridiculously terrible.

So I'm hoping I can get some confirmation on this. I am sorry for writing this giant wall of text, but it is confusing to see a split of opinion on this in the Veracrypt threads.

I realize this is super basic stuff, but I also imagine other novices would be confused about this when they are looking into encrypting for the first time, so they might find some benefit to this post. That is especially why I put all this in all this detail, and these hypothetical scenarios, because I'm not actually a 'tech guy', or a 'computer guy' (I've never built a computer or done coding or used Linux), but I imagine many other regular 'non-computer-guys' would wonder about the same things.

The other part of the reason I'm asking for confirmation is because I feel like I must be getting something wrong about the utility of encrypting the full disk. I feel like there must be some amazing benefit to FDE that I'm not understanding, because when I look at all the negatives, I don't really see why anyone would ever do it. So I am fully open to being corrected here.


PS: I know it's weird to put the TL;DR at the top but honestly it makes no sense to me for people to put it at the bottom. As far as I'm concerned it's a million times more useful to redditors if the TL;DR works like an abstract so at a glance they can see if the post is trash or worth reading.

I also wanted to make sure to put a detailed TL;DR at the top because I realize my post is insanely long and I didn't want anyone to waste their time.


r/VeraCrypt • • Apr 01 '20

How to break VeraCrypt containers -- by people who earn their living doing so

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31 Upvotes