r/Objectivism • u/RyanBleazard • 2d ago
Refuting the Objectivist Epistemology: We Are Not Born Tabula Rasa
Are we born tabula rasa (as blank slates)? Objectivists often tell me that by tabula rasa, Ayn Rand simply meant we are born with no innate ideas, e.g. a map of the world. But beyond the fact that this is basically uncontroversial, and does not imply blank slate psychology--it is not actually what Ayn Rand meant.
This is her stated premise (from The Virtue of Selfishness):
Man is born with an emotional mechanism, just as he is born with a cognitive mechanism; but, at birth, both are “tabula rasa.” It is man’s cognitive faculty, his mind, that determines the content of both. Man’s emotional mechanism is like an electronic computer, which his mind has to program—and the programming consists of the values his mind chooses.
Whilst I do take some issue with the idea that our cognitive mechanism is born “blank,” it is especially the premise that our emotional mechanism is born tabula rasa that I take particular issue with and what I will be challenging in this post.
According to Rand, you can program—her word—your emotions. You can make emotions behave as you want and control which life events will end up making you happy, sad, infuriated, full of pride, etc. Rand doesn’t say you can control your response to your natural emotions. She is saying you control the initial emotion itself.
She writes:
Man has no choice to feel that something is good for him or evil, but what he will consider good or evil, what will give him joy or pain, what he will love or hate, desire or fear, depends on his standard of value. (The Virtue of Selfishness, 31, emphasis original).
Consequently, Rand admonishes people for finding enjoyment in activities that are not intimately tied to productive achievement in service of your objective survival. This includes the "mindless kicks" of "driving hotrod cars", family picnics, certain music, certain paint colours, and much more.
The work of Nathaniel Brandon before their split, which I think Rand endorsed, is also judgmental of many other forms of happiness. These include a theoretical man who takes pleasure in working only in the “routine and familiar”, men who want to hang around with friends who “have no standards whatever and with whom, therefore, he feels free to be himself”. For recreation, he approves of parties--but only as a reward for achievement (or engaging in interesting conversation and the like). He admonishes any other form of party as likely to involve acting like a “noisy fool.” He derides quiet forms of pleasure, including ladies’ parties, “coffee klatches,” and “vegetative kinds of vacation” as examples of people who seek the boring. He concludes that one should seek a “demanding pleasure"--not pleasure for pleasure’s sake, but one intimately tied to cognitive functioning and achievement.
In short, in my view, Objectivism makes sweeping statements about human nature that properly belong in the realm of science, not philosophy. In evaluating her position on emotions and psychology, Rand doesn't cite any empirical evidence to substantiate them. (This failure marks one way in which her work here reads as polemical advocacy rather than scholarly investigation and criticism).
In neuropsychology, e"motions" are motivational states (in contrast to feelings) (Barkley et al., 2012). For instance, when you feel the heat of a fire, that is a feeling, but what drives you to draw your hand back quickly is the emotion. (It can be hard to differentiate a "feeling" from an "emotion" when we observe them superficially, but the distinguishing feature is that emotions are motive states that drive action).
Thus, the reason why I see Objectivism as wrong here is because many characteristics of our psychology are substantially biologically influenced, emerge early in development, and are an integral part of who and what we are as individuals. We vary in our values, including what we find brings us enjoyment, and in our susceptibility to specific behaviours. We know this from extensive studies of twins, families, neuroimaging, and molecular genetics: our emotional mechanisms are not born blank. For the most part, what elicits our emotions, what we find "enjoyable", our motivational drives and what will make us feel a certain way etc. is down to our unique personality type, prewired largely by genetics.
Neuroscientists agree that the human brain has preset, hardwired emotions at birth. This view of emotion exists in stark contrast to the blank slate theory, according to which human behaviour is learned and innate and emotional drivers do not exist. Emotions have a purpose and work to do; they are meant to pack a punch and to move us in a way that aids survival and growth (MacNamara, 2016).
To concretise this, consider how some people you may know differ in their personalities. For example, with one of my closest friends, I don’t experience his personality and character as primarily the result of his consciously chosen beliefs and convictions. There is a particularly unique way he encounters the world that seems to come naturally to him. For example, he is introverted and socially reticent, but not because he has decided that socialising is bad, he just doesn’t have the spontaneous drive to put himself forward socially as others do. I know him as a particular person who responds to things in particular ways, what kinds of jokes are likely to make him laugh, when he is likely to become animated about something, the things he can become intensely interested in and the things that barely register for him. I know that he can be reserved with people while being extremely comfortable and affectionate with others. Etc. These are part of the person I have actually come to know, as opposed to abstract conclusions that he has reached about how he wants to behave. This is because innate emotions and other genetic predispositions have helped determine the kind of experiences he seeks out and enjoys, the things he becomes good at, the interests he develops, the friends he seeks out, and eventually the sort of character he has.
By contrast, I have another friend who is more extroverted, finds a lot of the stuff my other friend enjoys (reading, writing, etc). boring, preferring more social activities. This creates a division of labour, i.e. they have naturally selected into different careers based in part on their innate emotional drives.
Thrill-seeking personalities find genuine enjoyment in driving race cars. Introverted thinkers may enjoy coffee get-togethers. Space cadets like “vegetative kinds of vacation.” All of this plays a role in human life, and it's important information, because it helps determine whether you feel comfortable in your own skin or not.
That said, there is a distinction between primary and secondary emotions. Primary emotions are innate, but we can, through executive functioning, consciously create new, secondary emotions (de-novo) to motivate us to persist towards goals in the absence of immediate rewards, and in response to our conscious value-judgements. In that context, Rand would be partially correct that our emotions are responses to our conscious, cognitive judgements.
I also would agree that emotions, by themselves, do not establish value, since objectivity does not mean that whatever someone happens to enjoy is necessarily good for them (that would be subjectivism). But it also does not mean judging against a predetermined ideal of what everyone ought to enjoy or pursue, as if it had intrinsic value (this is the error Ayn Rand makes). An objective account of value must consider how a pursuit relates to the individual's particular nature, needs, and requirements for living including what will bring them genuine happiness, in the long-term. So this would require distinguishing pathological traits from adaptive or at least harmless aspects of an individual’s psychology, including where egosyntonia is apparent. Yet, at the same, human beings have requirements for living that are relational to their individual nature. This must account for their unique neurobiology.q
The other problem is that Rand seems to alternate between two definitions of reason, or rationality. Under Objectivism, reason is not just a way to "understand the external world". It is also defined in another way, in which reason is understood as the mind (cognition) over the heart (emotions). She tends to demote emotions as mere "whims", as stuff that is not inherently reliable that should be controlled and regulated by the cognitive mind. This promotes a moral bias against emotions. Yet emotions often are very valuable (even if primitive) signals about your actions.
Politically, the manifestation of tabula rasa in Objectivism appears to be an inversion of the Marxist conception of the blank slate that, once men have "accepted" or been "conditioned" to altruism, they will automatically be motivated to act according to the principle “from each according to his ability, to each according to his need.” In the Objectivist version, once men have "accepted" the ethical code and standard of value set forth by Rand's Objectivist ethics, their emotions will automatically serve and motivate them to act by that code, in accord with their rational, long-term self interest.
The irony is that ethical egoism can only be seen as valid once the blank slate premises are abandoned! When we apply selfish gene theory to neuropsychology, it becomes clear that we have evolved innate, self-interested rather than altruistic motives. Even when cooperating with others, the motive behind such action is principally self-interested, just over the longer term. But these motives are innate and cannot be altered by adopting a different ethical code. So while you can exercise free will and force yourself to act against your perceived self-interest, you cannot make such actions actually motivating or enjoyable. This explains why collectivist societies could not motivate people to “serve the greater good” and "renounce the self-interested pursuit of profit", despite people believing it was morally right to do so. Yet, according to Objectivism, anyone can “program” their emotions to behave in any way they want--if you set yourself to accept altruism as a standard of value, then you'll enjoy it. Thus, on Objectivist premises, opposing collectivism on the grounds of human nature becomes impossible!