r/MathematicalLogic • • Aug 17 '25

r/MathematicalLogic returns

38 Upvotes

Hey folks, as of today this subreddit has been resurrected! As the description says, this is a place for discussion of mathematical logic, including model theory, set theory, computability theory, proof theory, type theory, etc. Posts about the foundations of mathematics and the philosophy of mathematics are also welcome, as are posts about nonclassical logics. Posts on informal logic and basic formal logic (i.e., the sorts of things that would be covered in a first course in a philosophy department) are more appropriate for r/logic and should be posted there instead.

Feel free to contribute and please let us know what you'd like out of this forum!


r/MathematicalLogic • • Mar 14 '19

Gödel's incompleteness theorems, and why we sometimes falsely use the second incompleteness theorem

28 Upvotes

Introduction

Most people here probably have heard about Gödel's incompleteness theorems, and if not then this post may be a nice introduction to these fascinating theorems. First I will give an idea of what these theorems are, and how they are proved. Then in more detail I will explain why we often technically falsely use his second incompleteness theorem.

Hopefully, this will ignite an interesting discussion about the incompleteness theorems. All questions or remarks, be it very basic of advanced, are very much welcomed!

Gödel's first incompleteness theorem

The statement of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem is roughly:

We cannot write down a system of axioms for arithmetic that is complete.

So what does that mean? A system of axioms should be clear I think. Being complete means that every possible statement can be either proved or disproved using these axioms. In other words: for any system of axioms for arithmetic we try to write down, we will be able to find some statement that we cannot prove nor disprove.

Edit: by being able to "write down" a system of axioms I will mean that it is recursive. In other words, it means that there is a computer program that, given a certain statement, is able to check whether or not that statement is part of the axioms. Essentially this means we can actually explicitly write down what the axioms are.

Gödel's first incompleteness theorem, more detailed

Let's be a bit more precise. We will work in Peano Arithmetic, abbreviated as PA. Just Google it if you want a list of its axioms (or try Wikipedia), but the precise list may not be too interesting. The important thing is that we have addition and multiplication and constants 0 and 1. Then the axioms will basically list the basic properties of those operations. For example, we have an axiom saying ∀x(x + 0 = x) and another one saying ∀x¬(x+1 = 0). Furthermore, there is an axiom scheme that says we can do proofs by induction.

Of course, the natural numbers are a very natural model for PA, and we will call this the standard model. It should also be clear that in PA, we can express every natural number. For example, we can express 3 as 1+1+1.

It is not too hard to think of a way to encode logical formulas as numbers. A silly example may be: just write down the formula using a computer, then it is just a string of 1s and 0s, which we can also interpret as a natural number. It does not really matter how we encode formulas, as long as we can do so by some computer program and as long as there is also a computer program for decoding the formulas. Similarly, computer programs themselves can be encoded as natural numbers. Again, a silly example, computer programs are ultimately also just strings of 1s and 0s that encode the instructions. I should mention here that there is actually quite some mathematical work involved in making this work, but this should give an idea.

Proofs are also finite objects, so again we can encode them as natural numbers. So now we can write a computer program, say Prf(x, y), that tells us whether or not x is a proof of y in PA. Or a bit more precise: whether x is a code for a proof of the formula that is coded by y. It is then actually possible to express this program as a logical formula in PA. So that allows us to define Th(y) as ∃xPrf(x, y), saying "there is a proof of (the formula coded by) y".

Gödel's constructed a formula G that is equivalent to ¬Th([G]), where [G] is meant to denote the code for G. So the formula G is now equivalent to the statement that G is not provable. This is what we call the Gödel sentence, and gives us his first incompleteness theorem.

In the language of PA we can construct a sentence that is neither provable, nor disprovable in PA.

Gödel's second incompleteness theorem

Then the second incompleteness theorem of Gödel uses the fact that PA can talk about provability of formulas. In particular, PA can express ¬Th([⊥]), which says "we cannot prove a contradiction". So if PA proves that ¬Th([⊥]) holds, then it proves its own consistency! However, using some clever construction with the Gödel sentence G from the first theorem we have the following statement, which is Gödel's second incompleteness theorem

PA cannot prove ¬Th([⊥]), so it cannot prove its own consistency.

We sometimes apply the second incompleteness theorem falsely

Ok, admittedly, this is a bit of a click-bait, but let's see why this is technically true. There are a lot more systems in which we can encode arithmetic, and we can therefore do the entire construction of the Gödel sentence G. The most famous example probably being ZF(C) set theory. We often quote Gödel's second incompleteness theorem to say that these systems (so, for example, set theory) cannot prove their own consistency. While that claim is true, it is technically not true that Gödel's proof of the incompleteness theorems does this for us, it is due to an improvement made by Rosser a few years later.

To understand what goes wrong, we need to sketch the proof of the first incompleteness theorem. So suppose we have done some brilliant work and actually constructed the Gödel sentence G. So PA proves that G is equivalent to ¬Th([G]). Let us see why we cannot prove or disprove G in PA.

Suppose that PA does prove G. Then there is some natural number n encoding a proof of G. So we have that Prf(n, [G]). is true in the natural numbers. Now, using some (highly nontrivial) fact about the natural numbers and PA, we have that PA actually proves Prf(1 + ..(n times).. + 1, [G]). This is because Prf is can be expressed as a particularly nice computer program. But then PA proves ∃xPrf(x, [G]) which is precisely Th([G]). On the other hand, by the choice of G we have that PA must prove ¬Th([G]). So then PA proves both Th([G]) and ¬Th([G]), which means it is inconsistent and we know that it's not (the natural numbers are a model).

So let us then suppose that PA disproves G, so PA proves ¬G. Then by choice of G we have that PA must prove Th([G]), so since the natural numbers are a model of PA we must have that Th([G]) is true in the natural numbers. Then there is an actual natural number encoding a proof for G, which means that PA proves G. Again we arrive at a contradiction.

I have made the problematic part bold: we actually need the natural numbers to be a model of PA for this argument to work. So if we are interested in an extension of PA, where the natural numbers are not a model then we can no longer apply this argument. An easy example would be the theory of PA + ¬G (why?), a more interesting example is ZF(C).

So how did Rosser fix this? I think just a sketch is best for now, because there are some technical details involved. Remember how G said "there is no proof of me". Rosser smartly uses that proofs can be coded as numbers and that numbers are ordered. So we can talk about (the code of a) proof coming before (the code of) another proof. So he constructed a similar sentence R, that says "a disproof of me occurs before any proof of me". The strength of this is that this actually says something about R being provable and ¬R being provable at the same time, using that smartly we can avoid the necessity of the natural numbers being a model of our theory.

So while technically the original statement and proof of Gödel's second incompleteness theorem is not strong enough to use it in situations where we use it nowadays, there is an improvement that does not change the idea drastically and allows us to use the theorem in those situations. So it's not unfair to keep calling it Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, but it's good to be aware that actually part of it is due to Rosser.


r/MathematicalLogic • • May 15 '19

What do you think of proving results in logic (e.g. Gödel/Tarski's theorems, soundness/completeness theorems) using more advanced but elegant/quick methods instead of traditional/lengthy methods?

16 Upvotes

For example, the proof of Lawvere's fixed-point lemma (in Category Theory) is pretty much a one-liner (thanks to the unifying conciseness of Category Theory) and has as its corollaries the theorems of Gödel (first), Tarski, Russell, Cantor, and Turing, among others.

Since it unifies all these theorems, one could argue that it is a more 'elegant/explanatory/essential' proof, as it gets to the heart of the matter of self-reference.

What then, is the point of going through tedious detail of proving those theorems in the traditional manner, given that they are not fully general, i.e., they don't 'transfer' easily to their similar brothers (as category-theoretic methods do)?

I think one could call the distinction between these two mathematical approaches as "Synthetic" vs "Analytic". Following Mike Shulman, synthetic mathematics (e.g. Euclidean geometry) has objects which are left undefined but whose behaviour are specified by axioms while analytic mathematics (e.g. Cartesian geometry) analyses its objects in terms of other objects from another theory.

In this scenario, the category-theoretic approach could be considered synthetic because as long as your domain satisfied the definition of a cartesian closed category, Lawvere's fixed-point lemma would hold. But the traditional approach would be analytic since it analyses its objects, dependent on a particular 'implementation' of logic: such-and-such format of logical formulae, such-and-such proof calculus, etc.

Now, I can't remember the book I learnt about this, but I vaguely recall of a theorem proving the soundness and completeness theorems for first-order logic in a similarly trivial and elegant manner as well. If someone knows, please share.


r/MathematicalLogic • • Sep 30 '19

Why not live in the constructible universe?

14 Upvotes

What are the reasons for not wanting to accept that V=L?

Are there certain parts of ordinary mathematics that can't be done in L or philosophical motivations for denying V=L? It seems like a nice place where a lot of questions like GCH are resolved and satisfies certain philosophical desiderata like the definability of all of its member in terms of lower-ranked members.

I have read/talked to people who have held the belief that a certain model of ZFC was the actual universe of sets and I just want to get a feel for why one would want one model over another and what must be given up if one accepts a certain model to be the actual universe of sets.

For example, V_omega+omega seems attractive since apparently you can do all of ordinary mathematics there.


r/MathematicalLogic • • Mar 12 '19

Five Stages of Accepting Constructive Mathematics - Andrej Bauer

14 Upvotes

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=21qPOReu4FI

Amazing talk by Bauer for any of you constructivist out there. Diaconescu's theorem was mind-blowing.

Diaconescu's Theorem: the full axiom of choice is sufficient to derive the law of the excluded middle, or restricted forms of it, in constructive set theory.


r/MathematicalLogic • • Sep 17 '19

Current Research Trends

13 Upvotes

What are current research trends in mathematical logic?

I'm specifically curious as to what people are researching in proof theory and reverse mathematics these days.


r/MathematicalLogic • • Jan 25 '21

In dependent type theories, what does Σ ⊣ Const ⊣ Π mean?

12 Upvotes

I am trying to make sense of a post on the Internet that talks about adjoint triples. It gives these examples:

∃ ⊣ Const ⊣ ∀
Σ ⊣ Const ⊣ Π
…
Σ Π : (A -> Type) -> Type
Const : Type -> (A -> Type)

I cannot understand what sort of functors are these.

I have a (rather shallow) understanding of what an adjoint, a dependent type and a quantifier is. I also have some experience writing formal proofs and checking them with proof assistants such as Coq. So it seems that I should be able to understand. But I suppose the exposition is too dense for me.

So, if someone could spell for me how dependent sum and dependent product may be understood as functors adjoint to what I understand is the constructor of a constant type constructor, I would very much appreciate it.


r/MathematicalLogic • • Aug 24 '19

Any advice for someone hoping to do industry work in Formal Methods/V&V.

12 Upvotes

Recently, I took a class at my university in formal methods, where we covered Hoare-logic, SAT-solving and model-checking. I found the class interesting enough that I also bought Edmond Clarke's book on model-checking and I am absolutely loving it. That said, I have little interest in getting a master's in math or c.s.

If I wanted to pursue a career in research around Formal Methods/V&V, as I noticed there is a short list of companies who are looking for experts in the field, especially in defense but also in areas like security and chip-design. Is there a short list or path that is best worth following? Certain verification languages like Coq, Verilog or TLA+? Certain topics, books, types of projects to look into? Finite model theory? Programming-language theory? Etc.

I've looked on linkedin for work in formal methods, but I haven't gotten a solid grasp on what people are after.

Would I be better off getting a master's degree if I want to work in this area?

Thank you.


r/MathematicalLogic • • Aug 20 '25

Linear Logic (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

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11 Upvotes

r/MathematicalLogic • • Oct 29 '21

a guide to countable models of ZFC and to forcing

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scottaaronson.blog
11 Upvotes

r/MathematicalLogic • • Mar 05 '21

What is Categorical Logic?

11 Upvotes

And how does it relate to first-order logic? Is it an alternative to first-order logic? Does it presume first-order logic? Is it it's own formal system with syntax, rules of inference, and semantics?

And I guess also importantly, what does it allow us to do? Why is it useful?


r/MathematicalLogic • • Sep 27 '19

Tarski Lectures Videos

11 Upvotes

Does anyone know if they record the Tarski Lectures and if there is some online repository of them? I've checked the appropriate Berkeley webpages, but all I see are the talk abstracts.


r/MathematicalLogic • • Sep 22 '19

Computerphile Videos on HoTT

11 Upvotes

I found these really helpful when I first started looking into HoTT:

  1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qT8NyyRgLDQ

  2. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SknxggwRPzU

  3. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v5a5BYZwRx8

  4. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ft8R3-kPDdk

If you have any other videos you think do a good job at communicating the motivation and ideas behind HoTT, then I invite you to share them.

Edit: Fixed duplicate link


r/MathematicalLogic • • Jul 07 '19

When is a formal system a logic?

11 Upvotes

What does it mean to be a logic? Are there formalisms to describe when a thing is a logic?


r/MathematicalLogic • • Oct 10 '25

Returning to symbolic logic some years after getting my degree - how to pick up the subject again?

10 Upvotes

tldr; Former university student of symbolic logic, looking to pick up the subject again for fun in my free time. Looking for advice on studying logic without being associated with an institution, and for recommendations on must-read works regarding both contemporary and historical aspects of symbolic logic.

Hi r/MathematicalLogic

I posted this on r/logic but then found this sub-reddit afterwards and thought it was maybe more fitting here : )

I graduated from university in 2022 spending most of my masters studying mathematical/symbolic logic on a computer science & engineering degree. I thoroughly enjoyed it and had always felt a big passion for symbolic logic. I wrote my thesis about the formalization of deductive systems in Isabelle/HOL and proving their soundness and completeness. Unfortunately I got very sick towards the end and had to abandon my hopes of starting a phd.

Anyway, fast forward to now I am back on my feet and much healthier. I ended up picking up a job in healthcare data of all places. I currently work together with a group of oncology researchers on creating a transformation on Danish healthcare data to the OMOP standard and have been part of multiple international oncology studies as a result of it. It's all very exciting but I can't help but always connect my work back to symbolic logic and often find myself daydreaming about it.

I never really considered studying logic in my spare time but the thought has been growing on me over the last year or so. I still visit my university once or twice a year for some talks on their recent results/work - I'm very grateful for still being invited even though i have done absolutely nothing logic-related for almost 3 years now. However, I don't really know if a phd is a possibility and I'm also pretty happy with my current position as is.

Therefore (sorry for this long rant) I wanted to pick up the subject again on my own : ) My starting point is Jan Łukasiewicz as a person I really admired when I was studying. I have always been interested in both the contemporary side of things but also the historical side and I felt that he really appreciated the latter. I remember having a great time reading his Elements of Mathematical Logic, so I plan on trying to gain access to his next work Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic and use that as a starting point for my studies.

However, when it comes to the current state of the art I am a bit lost as to where to begin. I know the Journal of Symbolic Logic but it doesn't seem like I can gain access to it without paying a ton since I'm no longer associated with an institution. I guess I'm looking for some sort of survey or overview into the different areas of study. Even just introductory pieces of work would probably do me good having been gone for years now.

So I was wondering, how do you guys go about studying logic on your own, not being tied to a specific institution? Or if you are, as someone with your finger on the pulse, what would you suggest to dive into? If you're also into the historical side of the things, like I am, is there any works you can recommend?

I'm sorry in advance if my question/post is too unprecise and fluffy - I guess I'm not entirely sure myself what I'm looking for, so that could be the reason : )

Appreciate any and all suggestions/advice!

kind regards

Agnes


r/MathematicalLogic • • Apr 04 '21

Resolution of Skolem's Paradox

10 Upvotes

Skolem's Paradox is the conjunction of the downward Lowenheim-Skolem theorem and Cantor's Theorem as applied to infinite sets.

Skolem went on to explain why there was no contradiction. In the context of a specific model of set theory, the term "set" does not refer to an arbitrary set, but only to a set that is actually included in the model. The definition of countability requires that a certain one-to-one correspondence, which is itself a set, must exist. Thus it is possible to recognise that a particular set u is countable, but not countable in a particular model of set theory, because there is no set in the model that gives a one-to-one correspondence between u and the natural numbers in that model.

This is from the Wikipedia article on the paradox. So is the idea that the countable model thinks u is uncountable, but there is exists some model that thinks u is countable? If so, won't the paradox be generated anew in that new model because that model will have an uncountable set (per the model), but there is always some other model that thinks its countable?

If the above is correct, then this seems to imply that no set is uncountable in an absolute sense (i.e. in all models of ZFC). Is that correct?

If there are other resolutions to the paradox, I'm interested in hearing those as well.


r/MathematicalLogic • • Sep 27 '19

Advice paper for reading group in Category/Type Theory

10 Upvotes

Hi everyone,

I will begin a reading group at my university about Category/Type Theory in its intersection with CS and I am looking for a paper to present. I am just starting with the topic so I do not have much knowledge, but I was looking for some paper on that, while being interesting, it is not too heavy and with clear connections with CS. I had some very initial ideas such as:

  • "Types as Abstract Interpretations". Patrick Cousot

  • "Compiling to Categories". Conal Elliot

  • "Direct models of the computational lambda-calculus". Carsten F uhrmann

  • "Compiling Monads". Olivier Danvy et al.

  • "Cubical Type Theory: a constructive interpretation of the univalence axiom."

But I am open to any paper in the topic that can be beautiful, interesting and easy to understand for newcomers.

Thanks!


r/MathematicalLogic • • Jun 25 '19

What Are You Working On?

10 Upvotes

This recurring thread will be for general discussion on whatever mathematical logic-related topics you have been or will be working on over the week. Not all types of mathematics are welcomed, but all levels are!


r/MathematicalLogic • • May 20 '19

A way to make the "name the biggest number game" rigorous: the transfinite busy beaver game.

10 Upvotes

Everyone knows about the game where you see who can come up with the biggest number, and I'm sure the people here also know the problems with it. The first obvious problem is the "your number + 1" issue. The second issue, that is more subtle but much harder to solve, is ensuring that definitions are unambiguous.

The solution to the first problem is easy; just limit the length of the definitions. Then if your definition is at maximum length, the opponent can not just add 1 to it, since that would go over the limit. This is similar to the busy beaver game.

The second problem is interesting. In the course of regular mathematics, mathematicians usually don't have trouble determining if a definition is good or not. However, the name the biggest number game is prone to a lot of definitions that are edge cases. Luckily, we do not just have to use our judgement; we can use meta-mathematics!

Here is the rules of the transfinite busy beaver game (in ZFC):

  1. Each player should specify a formula φ in the language of first order set theory that meets the following criteria:

    1. The number of symbols must be within some limit (say, 1000 symbols).

    2. It must be a theorem of ZFC that ∃! p ∈ ℕ. φ(p). The player is responsible for demonstrating this.

    3. In more informal competitions, the players may just describe the formula in human language instead of writing out the exact formula. Rule 1 would also be changed to accommodate this. However, the competition coordinators are responsible for ensuring that such descriptions are unambiguous, and it must be possible in principle to translate the descriptions into an abstract formula mechanically.

  2. Two formulas φ and ψ are ranked according to the following four cases:

    • ZFC proves ∀p q ∈ ℕ. (φ(p) ∧ ψ(q)) ⇒ p = q. The formulas are tied. This is called an "exact tie".

    • ZFC proves ∀p q ∈ ℕ. (φ(p) ∧ ψ(q)) ⇒ p > q. Formula φ wins.

    • ZFC proves ∀p q ∈ ℕ. (φ(p) ∧ ψ(q)) ⇒ p < q. Formula ψ wins.

    • The above statements are independent of ZFC. The formulas are tied. This is called a "formal tie". If this happens often, the competition coordinators should consider using a stronger theory for the next competition (but should not change it mid-competition).

  3. The players should determine which of the four cases above hold to determine the result. If they fail, the result of the competition is a tie. This called an "open tie".

And that's it. One important thing to note is that although ZFC needs to prove that the definition is uniquely specifies a real number, it does not need to "know" which one. For example, take BB(8000). ZFC can prove that there is an 8000th busy beaver number (since halting Turing machines with 8000 states exist, clearly). However, there is no numeral (i.e. expression of the form "1+1+...+1") such that ZFC proves that the BB(8000) is that numeral. This is not required for the game I defined above, however. If I did require it, the numbers would be "quite small", so to speak.

Here are some interesting variations:

  • Use theories of different strengths: PA, second order PA, KM, etc... Proof checking should be able to be done mechanically, however, so something like true arithmetic should not be used.

  • Use theories within theories. Although you should not used true arithmetic by itself, you could use true arithmetic within ZFC. That is, the player's choose a formula φ such that ZFC proves TA |- ∃! p. φ(p). Step 2 would be modified likewise.

  • Use nonstandard theories: Thing like ZFC + ¬Con(ZFC), or similar. Note that the definitions may no longer define standard natural numbers, so this is mostly just a fun logic game.

Since writing abstract formulas by hand would likely be difficult, a proof assistant language like Coq could be used instead, and the limit would be in terms of the Coq source code. Note that ironically you do not need to actually do the proofs in Coq, since the length of the proofs does not matter, but you could if you want to.

What do you all think?


r/MathematicalLogic • • Mar 28 '19

ELI(undergrad) the difference between propositional and predicate logic

10 Upvotes

What the title says. I have tried reading a couple of logic textbooks before. My experience has been that such books usually have a part 1 on propositional logic which they develop in great detail and only then in part 2 they go on to discuss predicate logic. But what is the actual difference?

Bonus question: Is there some awesome book on mathematical logic for self-reading/self-learning that I can read?


r/MathematicalLogic • • Sep 25 '20

Mathematical Logic vs Foundations of Math vs Philosophical Logic - Harvey Friedman

9 Upvotes

I think these descriptions are useful, especially if you're just learning about this stuff.

  • Foundations of Mathematics. Here the "practice of
    mathematics" (mathematical practice) is regarded as an object of study,
    without questioning its "correctness", "validity", etcetera.
    Mathematical practice is treated as a phenomenon to be modeled - not an
    activity to be questioned. A crude model of mathematical practice is the
    ZFC system. Finer models are given by fragments of ZFC. There have been
    startling discoveries, starting with Goedel. Advances are judged
    according to how much insight is gained about mathematical practice. The
    future is huge, as there are all sorts of aspects of mathematical
    practice that at present have not been properly modeled or only partly
    modeled - but hold promise for deeper modeling. E.g., classification,
    simplicity, naturalness.

  • Mathematical Logic. This is a branch of mathematics
    that investigates the various fundamental mathematical structures
    emanating out of Foundations of Mathematics - for their own sake. There
    is no aim to address issues in Foundations of Mathematics. A subarea of
    Mathematical Logic is clarifying: there has been some reasonably
    successful attempts to apply these investigations to problems and
    contexts in mathematics, creating a useful mathematical tool. The most
    common name for this is Applied Model Theory.

  • Philosophical Logic. This attempts to analyze and treat
    logical notions in their most rudimentary form, independently of how
    they are used in mathematics. Mathematics, like everything else, is
    something to be questioned, justified, criticized, etc. I have not
    worked in this, because I do not sense realistic prospects for
    spectacular findings - or at least, the realistic prospects are much
    higher in 1.

"Foundations of Mathematics is between mathematics and philosophy, and has a different perspective than either of the two. "


r/MathematicalLogic • • Jul 16 '20

A Cheerful Introduction to Forcing and the Continuum Hypothesis

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arxiv.org
9 Upvotes

r/MathematicalLogic • • Mar 10 '20

ESSLLI Student Session!

9 Upvotes

To students working at the intersection of Logic & Language, Language & Computation, or Logic & Computation: the 2020 ESSLLI Student Session, happening in Utrecht in August, is looking for your work! Deadline April 1, 2020Â https://www.esslli.eu/programme/student-session.html

The Student Session of the 32nd European Summer School in Logic, Language, and Information (ESSLLI) will take place in Utrecht, the Netherlands, August 3rd to 14th, 2020 (https://www.esslli.eu/). We invite submissions of original, unpublished work from students in any area at the intersection of Logic & Language, Language & Computation, or Logic & Computation. Submissions will be reviewed by several experts in the field, and accepted papers will be presented orally or as posters and selected papers will appear in the Student Session proceedings by Springer. This is an excellent opportunity to receive valuable feedback from expert readers and to present your work to a diverse audience.


r/MathematicalLogic • • Sep 10 '19

How can Category Theory serve as a Foundation for Math?

9 Upvotes

Often I see that the three main candidates for a foundation of math are ZFC, HoTT, and Category Theory.

I think most of us are familiar with how ZFC serves as a foundation. It's built on top of FOL as the deductive system with the axioms of ZFC taken to be true. I have a vague understanding of how HoTT serves as a foundation, but I am have no clue and am more interested in how Category Theory can serve as a foundation. Thus far, I've only encountered it in learning AT as a high-level framework and useful language, but not as an underlying framework like ZFC with FOL as a proof-theoretic foundation.

I know basic categorical concepts like categories, functors, and natural transformations and I'll take "you need to learn more category theory before I can give a meaningful explanation" as a valid answer.

A specific question I have: Can I do proofs in using Category Theory as my foundation like in ZFC with FOL or is just a practical foundation so to speak?