r/GeoPodcasts • • Feb 01 '21

Europe Why Nations Don't Fail: Building Institutions in Romania

16 Upvotes

In the last episode of the Wealth of Nations podcast, I discussed Ukraine's spectacular economic implosion in the aftermath of independence, democracy and market reforms. However, Ukraine's experience was far from universal. Nations such as Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia successfully adapted to the political and economic transformations of the 1990s, and are now rapidly converging with western European standards of living. The nations that adapted most successfully to changing conditions benefitted from close geographic proximity to Europe, strong historic and cultural ties with developed markets, a previous history of industrialization and development, and leadership committed to fundamental reforms.

In today's podcast episode, I want to instead focus on Romania, a nation that like Ukraine, did not benefit from these initial advantages. Romania in both 1914 and 1989 was substantially poorer than Ukraine, does not have a border with a developed market, and had political leadership in the 1990s that was deeply ambivalent to reform. Understanding why Romania adopted more successfully to radical change than Ukraine is crucial to understanding under what circumstances massive political and economic reforms will result in human flourishing.

Romania and Ukraine's Different Experiences of CommunismImportant differences in the economic trajectories of Romania and Ukraine emerged early on in the days of communism. While Ukraine was incorporated into the USSR in 1919, Romania became a Communist state under soviet tutelage that imitated Stalinism from 1947 onwards. However, after Nikita Kruschev condemned Stalinist excesses in 1954, Romania's political leadership stayed loyal to Stalinist precepts. Ironically, this created a wedge between Romania and the USSR and from the 1950s onwards, Romania turned to the west as partners in trade and investment. By 1981, Romania had an external debt of $10.1 billion and had to make external payments of $3 billion a year.

The government of Romania was too proud to default on its debt, or turn to the IMF for support and instead created the fiscal space to repay this debt with harsh austerity. The Romanian dictator, Nicolae Ceaușescu, imposed some of the harshest austerity in the world. Daily blackouts became the norm even though Romania produced more electricity per capita than Spain or Italy. The government forced students to labor in the fields during "vacation" , but exported all the produce so that food calories consumption fell by 10%. Funding for education and health collapsed, and it was during this period that Romania's infamous orphanages came into existence.

By 1989, Romania successfully paid off the debt it owed to western creditors. Romania had ironically also undergone much of austerity and disconnection from Communist markets that Ukraine faced in the 1990s before communism fell. Moreover, the austerity destroyed the legitimacy of Ceaușescu's government. Protests against the expulsion of a priest in the town of Timosoara exploded into a nationwide insurrection. The government of Ceaușescu initially responded with brutal repression, with over a thousand people likely losing their lives. However, communist party elites were just as angry at the government as ordinary people, and the armed forces rapidly abandoned Ceaușescu. A coup by senior leaders overthrew the government, and Nicolae Ceaușescu and his wife were executed. The Communist party maintained its institutional integrity through all of this upheaval, and formed the Front for National Salvation (FSN) to guide Romania through the fall of Communism. Unlike in Ukraine, the Communist party partially recast itself as the Social Democratic FSN, and given the massive organizational advantages was able to dominate early years of transition.

The Political Economy of ReformThe new FSN initially followed the same path of reform as other post-Communist nations. The Romanian government engaged in mass voucher privatization, just as in Ukraine. Just as in Ukraine, these enterprises largely ended up in the hands of former managers more interested in extracting subsidies from the state, rather than in making ailing SOEs profitable. Moreover, Romania suffered a milder version of the collapse Romania saw, as the planned economy collapsed beforethe rules and institutions of a succesful market economy could be adopted. Between 1989 and 1992, GDP PPP per capita fell by 19%, causing widespread unhappiness. The FSN (which later became the PSD) government got cold feet about reform, and drastically slowed the liberalization process.

Unlike in Ukraine, the former Communists in Romania maintained organizational (if not ideological) coherence, and was wary of privatizing too fast. They did not want to create a class of oligarchs capable of financing opposition movements. While the new elite was extremely corrupt, rents were broadly distributed through society. No class of oligarchs comparable to Ukraine emerged in Romania, and only one billionaire in Romania has business roots during the period of transition. By 1996, center left administration was discredited. Unlike in Ukraine, those people representing the interests of the rising private sector needed to organize on an ideological basis beyond personal wealth accumulation. In 1996, Emil Constantinescu became the President of Romania on a platform of economic reform.

While the new government of Romania accelerated the privatization process, it also made deep institutional reforms to make it possible for capitalism to thrive. In order to gain EU membership, Romania made substantive reforms to the judiciary , strengthened anti-corruption bodies. Comprehensive efforts were made to simplify taxation, remove harmful regulations, and modernize business law. Moreover, bilateral investment treaties allowed foreign investors to demand arbitration by a neutral party if investors felt Romanian courts could not be neutral.

Although, to a certain extent, these changes had a greater effect on appearances than reality, real improvements in governance were made. By 2007, Romania was ranked 69 on the Corruption Perceptions Index, while Ukraine was ranked at 118. While Ukraine's oligarchs blocked efforts to improve the rule of law, the smaller businesses and foreign companies that dominated the Romanian business had a clear stake in good institutions. The reforms implemented by the center-right government after 1996 did not yield immediate results, and the center-left returned to power. However, as growth accelerated from 2000 onwards, reforms were maintained and strengthened, with Romania gaining EU membership in 2007.

https://wealthofnationspodcast.com/
https://media.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/s/content.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/Romania-Succesful_Transition.mp3


r/GeoPodcasts • • Jul 26 '20

Global Gone in a Puff of Smoke: The Sudden and Unexplainable Decline of COVID-19 in Pakistan

14 Upvotes

In mid-June of 2020, Pakistan appeared on the verge of public health disaster, as cases and deaths from COVID-19 soared. The number of new cases of COVID-19 detected increased from 490 on May 14th, to 6825 in June 14th, and by mid-June Pakistan was recording more than a 120 deaths a day. The response of the government seemed chaotic and unplanned. Although the provincial government of Sindh responded to the crisis with alacrity, imposing strict lockdown policies. However, the Prime Minister of the country was unwilling to impose lockdowns that would hurt the poor, and the Supreme Court severely hampered the ability to impose lockdowns, including forcing the reopening of malls. The country started reopening in early to mid May, with the mass public gatherings around Eid an especially fertile ground for COVID-19 to take root.

However, surprising nearly everyone, starting from mid-June, COVID-19 in Pakistan has lost much of its strength. The number of new cases per day of COVID-19 have declined from a peak of 6,825 to around 1,300 a day between mid-June and the end of July. The decline in deaths from COVID-19 have been most pronounced in the provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunwala, and in rural areas. Nevertheless, the number of cases and deaths from COVID-19 have been declining rapidly in Karachi as well, the epicenter of COVID-19 in Pakistan. The number of deaths have averaged around 40 a day for the last three days, a third of the death rate during the peak of COVID-19. The government of Pakistan claims that the success stems from smart policy choices by the government. After moving away from nation-wide lockdown policies in May, the government has instead pursued a policy of targeted "smart lockdowns" aimed only at those parts of the countries with the largest COVID-19 clusters, with the military playing a major role in organizing the logistics of relief.

However, I find it difficult to credit the actions of the government with the decline of COVID-19. Pakistan has a long history of having one of the worst organized public health systems in the world, and the military has shown no previous reputation for exception public health capacity. Moreover, many other countries in the developing world have taken far more robust action, without the the extraordinary results Pakistan has seen. It is possible that some combination of lower mobility to Pakistan's poverty, the fact that the average Pakistani is 15 years younger than the average American, and other epidemiology factors unknown provide some level of protection to Pakistan and other least developed countries. It is striking to me, that no country defined by the World Bank as low Income have been hit hard by COVID-19. Moreover, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Egypt have all followed the pattern of sudden and inexplicable declines in COVID-19. While at the same time, COVID-19 has surged in lower middle income countries such as Kyrghyzstan and Bolivia continue to surge unabated. COVID-19 might have hit obstacles in the poorest nations in the world, but still remains a deadly threat.

www.wealthofnationspodcast.com
https://media.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/s/content.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/Pakistan-Nawaz_Sharif.mp3


r/GeoPodcasts • • Sep 28 '17

Congratulations, /r/GeoPodcasts! You are Tiny Subreddit of the Day!

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14 Upvotes

r/GeoPodcasts • • Jan 12 '19

GeoPodcasts support the #PeoplesVote and #ExitFromBrexit campaign

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13 Upvotes

r/GeoPodcasts • • Sep 16 '21

Podcast recommendation for Soviet History

12 Upvotes

Hey, I need some podcast recommendation on the history of the USSR from Bolshevik to Gorbachev.

Thanks.


r/GeoPodcasts • • Aug 13 '20

Podcast list?

12 Upvotes

Might it be an idea to make a pinned post with all good and regular geopolitical podcasts? It might be nice to categorize them as well per region and subject.


r/GeoPodcasts • • Sep 26 '17

Thank you for creating this subreddit!!

12 Upvotes

I feel as if it were meant for me because I am only just getting into podcasts, and I have a thirst for I.R. I've already used a few suggestions, but here's what I can bring to the table:

Pod Save the World: Discusses international relations like any other, but what makes this special is it's hosted by former Obama administration staffers. One of the coolest moments was when they discussed the negotiations to reopen diplomatic ties with Cuba, and their experiences of secret talks in Canada and the Vatican.

Deep State Radio: A snark-filled take on the events of the day. Noticeably hosted mostly by women, which is unique for podcasts in my experience. The most interesting moment for me was when they discussed whether North Korea was a "rational actor."

Suggestions from r/geopodcasts that I've enjoyed so far:

Mark Leonard's World in 30 Minutes: The official podcast of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). "Europe in the German Elections" was interesting, but hard to keep up with. Familiarity with German politics should have been a prerequisite.

Previously in Europe: Haven't even finished one episode, but I like that it's somewhat of a "shootin' the breeze"-style podcast about international relations. Easy to listen to, and I enjoyed learning about the Catalonian referendum and Norwegian elections that I otherwise wouldn't have known about.

Somewhat off-topic, but I don't want to miss the chance to recommend my favorite podcast:

The Documentary by the BBC World Service: I am constantly amazed by the output of this thing alone: 15 episodes so far this month. Each come from a different corner of the world, and utilize the extensive resources of the BBC. The topics are in-depth and local, but convey implications about the broader world. Islanders offshore of Panama relocating due to rising sea levels. Life in the population-declining country of Bulgaria. Competing nationalities in the Falkland Islands. I get the feeling people who like geopolitics would also be interested in this.

Recommendations that I would like:

Everything here is U.S.- and Eurocentric. Are there any good podcasts on Southeast Asia geopolitics, or Africa, South America, Middle East, and Oceania?


r/GeoPodcasts • • Feb 28 '22

Europe Interpreting the First Few Days of the Russo-Ukrainian War

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11 Upvotes

r/GeoPodcasts • • Nov 09 '20

Asia The Bitter Roots of Modern Hatred: The Origins of Genocide in Xinjiang

11 Upvotes

In 2017, the the world first heard of horrific human rights violations against the Uighur people of Xinjiang, in the northwest quarter of China. An estimated 1.5 million people, out of a total ethnic Uyghur population of 12 million people in China, have been interned in approximately 380 "re-education" camps. The region has been turned into a police state, with people sent to prison for refusing to drink alcohol, or praying regularly. The Chinese government has made it all but impossible to buy knives and scissors, Uighur people must pass through three to four checkpoints every kilometer, half of all families are assigned a policy spy who regularly makes house-visits, and a technological panopticon of unprecedented proportions is taking place. Birth rates have fallen by one third, because of forced sterilizations and a desire to not bring up children in a prison.

Today's podcast episode is not about the ethnic cleansing taking place in Xinjiang, but rather a look at the historical circumstances that have led us to this point. In part one, I will discuss the process through which the Uighur people were incorporated into the Chinese state under the Qing dynasty. In part two, I discuss the policies of the government under Mao Zedong, especially the policy of mass Han settlement that created anger and resentment among Uighurs. Finally, in part three, I will discuss the cycle of protest and violence that led to the current human right abuses.

In 1755, the Qianlong Emperor, ruler of China ordered his army to exterminate the Dzungar people, descendants of the Mongols, in what is Xinjiang today. 600,000 Dzungars were killed by Qing forces, with the remnants succumbing to disease or fleeing soon afterwards. The violent extermination of the Dzungar people, and the incorporation of Xinjiang, was part of the broader process of Qing Dynasty expansion westwards. At this point in time, the Uyghur did not yet exist as a distinct people. However, there were large numbers of settled farmers living in the oasis towns of the Tarim Basin who spoke Turkic languages and practiced the Islamic faith. These peoples rebelled against Dzungar rule and allied with the Qing in their conquest and extermination of the Dzungar people, and rapidly expanded into northern Xinjiang that had historically few Uighur.

During the 17th and 18th century, the Qing Empire expanded rapidly westward, incorporating modern Tibet and Mongolia into the Qing state. The period also an unprecedented quadrupling of Chinese population, in part due to the adoption of new world crops. The Qing Empire encouraged mass settlement of ethnic Han westwards. Tensions with older populations, especially Hui peoples (Muslims, but ethnically similar to Han Chinese), led to some of the most brutal wars in recorded history, with over 15 million losing their lives in these conflicts. In Xinjiang a brutal three way war between ethnic Han, Hui and Uighurs led to absolute devastation.

It was during this region that Xinjiang, which translates to New Territories, was created as a province. Southern Xinjiang, the Tarim Basin, remained overwhelmingly Uighur but northern Xinjaing was populated by a mix of Uighurs, Hui, Kazakhs and ethnic Han. The military had a large garrison, settling substantial numbers of farmer soldiers in the region. While the Qing state formally annexed Xinjiang into the Chinese state, local elites wielded day to day power. Indeed, as Qing power declined and China became dominated by warlords, local governors developed a policy of deliberately isolating the region so as to keep destabilizing outside forces away from Xinjiang. However, Soviet influence and later control from China would completely transform these traditional relationships.

Xinjiang was incorporated into the Peoples Republic of China in 1949, marking a fundamental shift in the trajectory of Xinjiang. One of the most important aspects is the changing nature of ethnic identity. The Soviet model of governance put a great emphasis on defining and taxonomizing ethnicity. The settled Muslim Turkic people of oasis in Central Asia have not historically had a fixed identity. There was no clear differentiation between other settled Muslim Turks such as Uzbeks and Uighurs, and the boundaries between nomadic Turkic group such as the Kazakhs were less clearly defined. The imposition of a much harder border between the USSR and China severed many of these connections. At the same time, the Chinese state tried to co-opt the budding religious and nationalist movements of the region by taking actions such as creating patriotic religious associations.

Further strengthening the sense of ethnic Uyghur identity, and undermining Chinese attempts to win Uighur loyalty, was a massive influx of ethnic Han into Xinjiang from the 1960s to the 1980s. Between 1949 and 1980, the ethnic Han share of Xinjiang's population increased from 7% to 40%. The driving force behind the rising share of Xingiang's ethnic Han population was the Xinjiang Production and Construction corps, known in Chinese as the Bingtuan or corps. Relations between the USSR and the PRC were strained, with the two countries coming close to war on multiple occasions. The Bingtuan's purpose was to settle large numbers of veterans, working as farmers or in other professions in peacetime, but ready to mobilize in case of war. The overwhelming majority of ethnic Han settlers lived in northern Xinjiang, a region that historically had a multi-ethnic society, while the oasis of southern Xinjiang remained overwhelmingly Uyghur. Unsurprisingly, there were major tensions between ethnic Han and ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang. For example, during the cultural revolution mosques were burned, and cemeteries desecrated.

Tensions between Uyghurs and Hans have only intensified since liberalization. Xinjaingwas seen as a hardhip post, and the booming coastal cities have drawn for more ethnic Han than the distant frontier, with the ethnic Han share of the population staying constant between 1980 and 2010. However, economic disparities between Uyghur and Han have grown dramatically since the beginning of liberalization. For example, the Bingtuan currently grows massive amounts of cotton and other crops on its farm. However, the Bingtuan has privileged access to land and water, forcing many Uyghur to become sharecroppers. Moreover, while senior administrative positions in Xinjiang often go to ethnic Uyghur, there is a parallel Communist party bureaucracy where real power lies. Since the early 2000s, the central government has invested heavily through its "Western Development" scheme in Xinjiang.

However, the fruits of this investment have not been evenly distributed. For example, the National Petroleum Company has hired almost the entirety of the staff necessary for running the regions substantial oil reserves from outside the region. Moreover, there are massive differences in access to high quality formal private sector jobs. One study on phone call backs found the call back rate on identical resumes nearly double for Han than for Uyghurs, with the greatest disparities in ethnic Han owned private companies. The result of all of these factors are massive disparities between Han and Uyghur. According to 2005 mid-census data, ethnic Han incomes were nearly two and a half times ethnic Uyghur incomes. In urban areas, Uyghurs earned 30% less despite having the same level of education as Han.

Unsurprisingly, Uyghur resentment has turned into peaceful, and in some cases violent opposition. Throughout the 1990s peaceful protests against discrimination, and for autonomy and in some cases for independence became increasingly common. However, violent insurgency also emerged. Insurgents briefly took over the township of Baren in April of 1990, and Xinjiang suffered a bombing campaign by terrorists. The government used brutal tactics, including a massacre of hundreds at Ghulja to put down this incipient revolt. The government launched a strike hard campaign in 1997 that severely disrupted all organized opposition to the state, and from the late 1990s onwards opposition to Chinese domination would take the form of mobs and lone wolf terrorist attacks.

A car ramming resulted in the death of 18 police officers in the city of Kashgar just before the 2008 Olympics. In July of 2009, protests against the death of two Uyghur men at the hands of a Chinese mob in Guangdong turned into indiscriminate violence against ethnic Han in Urumqi. Knife wielding Uyghur terrorists killed 31 people in the city of Kunming, well outside Xinjiang. Many other violent incidents made Xinjiang feel increasingly insecure. However, it is important to emphasize that there was little organization behind these violent acts, and little risk of the state losing control. While some Uyghur dissidents have established contacts with radical international Islamists, it seems that connections between radicals and Uyghurs have been caused rather than hindered by government repression.

Since Xi Jinping assumed power, abuses of human rights have grown more and more common. Human rights lawyers have been imprisoned, Christian churches have faced, and censorship has grown more intense. The greatest victims of the growing willingness to opresss have been Muslims, especially Uighurs. In 2014, the government launched a new strike hard campaign in Xinjiang. In 2017, Chen Quangguo was appointed the Communist Party Secretary. He was previously noted for the harshness of his repression of Tibet. After taking command of Xinjiang, the government hired more police in one year than in the previous seven. Xi Jinping, Chen Quangguo and the Chinese Communist Party thus began constructing a monstrous apparatus of oppression in Xinjiang.

The purpose of today's podcast episode is not to discuss the current ethnic cleansing campaign in Xinjiang. However, I wanted to conclude this podcast episode with the steps currently being taken to assist the Uyghur people. The state department in some ways has been active in the issue. Sanctions have been placed on Chen Quangguo and other top officials in the crackdown. Similarly, sanctions have been placed on the Bingtuan. New regulations barring the import of goods made with forced labor in Xinjiang have been placed. There is scope for expanding sanctions, such as banning any cotton made in Xinjiang. However, I feel it is more important to make it clear to the government of China that these sanctions are first and foremost about the human rights of Uyghur people, and not about other differences with China. Moreover, I think it is essential to create a broad international coalition. For example, Japan is moving towards adopting an act similar to the Magnitsky act to sanction human rights violations in Hong Kong. Steps can be taken to encourage Japan to use these powers against those offending Uyghur human rights as well. However, much more action needs to be taken to get Muslim countries, who have overwhelmingly been silent on the issue, to take a stance against Xi Jinping's oppression of Muslims.

Ultimately, it is likely that there is little that can be done through sanctions to protect Uyghur people. We need to be willing to massively increase the number of asylum seekers and refugees we will take. However, the Trump administration has been notably harsh on asylum seekers, including Uyghurs. We need to live up to the words on the pedestal of the statue, and taken in the world's huddled masses yearning to be free.

-
Selected Sources:
China, imperial: 8. Qing or Manchu dynasty period, 1636–1911, HENRY CHOI SZE HANG
Brainwashing, Police Guards and Coercive Internment: Evidence from Chinese Government Documents about the Nature and Extent of Xinjiang’s “Vocational Training Internment Camps” , Adrian Zenz
China’s Population Expansion and Its Causes during the Qing Period, 1644–1911, Kent Deng
THE TUNGAN REBELLION: AN EXAMINATION OF THE CAUSES OF THE MUSLIM REBELLION IN MIDNINETEENTH CENTURY NORTHWEST CHINA , Lewis Oeksel
Neo Oasis: The Xinjiang Bingtuan in the Twenty-first Century, Thomas Cliff
The Kings of Xinjiang: Muslims Elites and the Qing Empire, David Brophy
Maximizing Soviet Interests in Xinjiang The USSR’s Penetration in Xinjiang from the Mid-1930s to the Early 1940s, Liao Zhang
The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land, Gardner Bovingdon
‘Old Bottle, New Wine’? Xinjiang Bingtuan and China’s ethnic frontier governance, Yuchao Zhu & Dongyan Blachford
Defining Shariʿa in China: State, Ahong, and the Postsecular Turn, Matthew S. Erie
Commanding the Economy: The Recurring Patterns of Chinese Central Government Development Planning among Uyghurs in Xinjiang, Henrik Szadewski
Ethnic discrimination in China's internet job board labor market, Margraret Mauzer-Fazio
Ethnic stratification amid China's economic transition: evidence from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region , X Wu, X Song
Charting the Course of Uyghur Unrest, Justin V Hastings

www.wealthofnationspodcast.com
https://media.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/s/content.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/China_Uighur.mp3


r/GeoPodcasts • • Jan 09 '20

We've hit 1k subscribers!

11 Upvotes

Hi all!

We've reached 1000 subscribers to GeoPodcasts! A great achievement. Thanks to you all for helping make this sub work!

:) Keep on listening!


r/GeoPodcasts • • Jul 17 '18

Welcome one, welcome all!

11 Upvotes

Hey all! I thought I'd make a new sticky after 4 whole months.

Ivan and Pjotr have been busy, I think. They gave me a call from Helsinki and I don't know why.. but they couldn't stop laughing.

Anyway, to all our old friends and new listeners!

Welcome to /r/GeoPodcasts!

We're a subreddit for all Geopolitical podcasts, aiming to provide informative discussions on the foreign policy objectives of countries around the world and general dissemination of knowledge about international relations as a study, a science and a worthwhile thing to keep in touch with!

As always.. if you have any tips for new podcasts or want to give constructive criticism you can leave your comments below.

Or whisper them into your microwave at night. Ivan is a good listener.


r/GeoPodcasts • • Oct 26 '20

Interview Yale Professor, Amy Chua: On How Group Identity and a Failure to Realize Its Importance Has Caused the Rise of Partisanship and the Failure of U.S. Foreign Policy

10 Upvotes

Find out how group identity has caused bitter partisanship in the U.S. and the failure of U.S. policies in Vietnam and other countries, from an original thinker who has received support from across the political spectrum. Learn how children as young as 4 years old identify with groups and consistently display systematic, unconscious bias toward other groups. Learn how America can move forward.

3 Takeaways features intimate conversations and insights from the world’s best thinkers, business leaders, writers, politicians, scientists and other newsmakers. Each episode ends with the 3 key takeaways the leading figure has learned over their career. Listen to this episode for more insights from Yale Professor, Amy Chua.


r/GeoPodcasts • • Jul 10 '20

Bolsonaro Fiddles as Brazilians Die: Bolsonaro's Spectacular Failure to Contain COVID-19

10 Upvotes

On July 7th, 2020 Jair Bolsonaro, president of Brazil, announced that he had tested positive for COVID-19. Jair Bolsonaro, who had long downplayed the effects of COVID-19, and has often refused to wear masks, has led one of the most disastrous attempts in the world to combat COVID-19. Bolsonaro might want COVID-19 to magically dissapear, but this grants neither Brazil nor Bolsonaro protection from disease. Brazil has so far recorded 1.8 million cases of COVID-19, and has recorded 70,000 deaths. However, Brazil has only conducted 4.5 million tests, on a per capita level lower than testing levels in Palestine or Nepal. Nearly one third of all COVID-19 tests have been positive, suggesting dramatic undercounts in the number of cases and deaths. Worse, the Brazilian government is actively hampering the accurate collection of data, with the government attempting to discontinue publishing cumulative counts of COVID-19 cases. Although the Supreme Court stopped such actions, it is likely the government is taking other steps to mask the true number of COVID cases. Nevertheless, more people have died from COVID-19 over the last week than in any other country in the world. Despite all of this, Jair Bolsonaro, has time and time again called for Brazil to re-open the economy, the cost in human life be damned.

Unsurprisingly, the failures of the government response have made Jair Bolsonaro exceedingly unpopular among ordinary people. Bolsonaro's approval ratings have fallen to 32% since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis. Bolsonaro has found himself politically isolated. An alliance of state governors of all ideological stripes have attempted to impose lockdown policies. Bolsobaro has lashed out against the supreme court because it is currently investigating Bolsonaro and his family on charges of illegally interfering with the appointment of police and holding rallies that undermined democratic values, charges that may form the base of impeachment procedings. Congress has attempted to govern in the absence of leadership from the president, and his alliance with centrist parties necessary to govern is falling apart. The shambolic governance of Brazil is epitomized by Bolsonaro's decision to fire two Ministers of Health for being too worried about COVID-19. Bolsonaro, a former captain in the Brazilian army, has decided to rely upon the military for support. One third of his cabinet have served in the military, and his current vice president is a retired general. Moreover, Bolsonaro has rallied his far right base to call for a military coup to wave aside all those standing in Bolsonaro and his desire to open the economy unconditionally. Although fears of a military coup are largely overblown, Bolsonaro's misrule is causing long lasting damage to Brazil's democratic foundations.

Brazil is currently facing an economic crisis just as severe as its political crisis. The World Bank is currently projecting the Brazilian economy to shrink by 8% in 2020, and for the economic crisis caused by COVID-19 to reduce Brazilian GDP by 10.2%. The economic crisis is coming just as Brazil is recovering from a severe recession in 2015 and 2016. Brazil is an overwhelmingly poor country, with 20% of the population surviving on less than $5.50 a day. 41% of Brazilians work in the informal sector, where it is all but impossible to work remotely, and individuals receive no income if they do not work. People will starve if they are not allowed to return to work. At the same time, Brazil is facing a fiscal crisis. Federal tax revenues have plunged 29%, while the states worst hit by COVID-19 seeing even steeper declines. At the same time, borrowing from abroad is complicated by massive capital flight. Neither the state or the national government has the ability to fund the massive social support necessary to make it feasible for ordinary Brazilians to stay home without facing extreme deprivation. As a result states, including Rio De Janeiro and Sao Paulo, have reopened their economies even as COVID-19 rages as badly as before. While many of these problems are beyond the scope of Bolsonaro's power, his unerring ability to make everything worse, means that Brazil is navigating the crisis with some of the worst leadership in the world.

https://wealthofnationspodcast.com/bolsonaro-fiddles-as-brazilians-die-bolsonaros-spectacular-failure-to-contain-covid-19/
https://media.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/s/content.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/brazil-petrobras1.mp3


r/GeoPodcasts • • Apr 30 '20

The Red Line - Geopolitical Deep Dives with guests from the CIA, Harvard, The White House, MI6, The New York Times, Chatham House and many more.

10 Upvotes

I run The Red Line (www.theredlinepodcast.com) where we do a deep dive into one big subject shaping the news here and overseas. I have no idea how I have never discovered this sub before.

We do fortnightly deep-dive into one topic shaping the news, ranging from the Libyan civil war, to the Russian hypersonic missile program to the collapse of Venezuela and many more.

The strength of the show though is from the guests, we get the biggest experts in their field in for each episode. Our experts range from Harvard, Oxford, Cambridge, Ambassadors, the CIA, MI6, The White House, Downing Street, CATO, RAND and many more.

Many times we sit down with the actual people making the decisions that affect the lives of millions, and because we're self-funded we are more than able to ask the really curly questions places like the BBC wouldn't be allowed to.

The show has been doing fairly well so far with over 150,000 streams in the first 5 months, but would love to join this community and get to know everyone here.

SPOTIFY >> https://open.spotify.com/show/22smMRbnKv1fFzqnz5Ty1L

APPLE >> https://podcasts.apple.com/au/podcast/the-red-line/id1482715810

GOOGLE >> https://podcasts.google.com/?feed=aHR0cHM6Ly9hbmNob3IuZm0vcy9mMmU4NTM4L3BvZGNhc3QvcnNz&ved=0CAAQ4aUDahcKEwiAg5ew6I_pAhUAAAAAHQAAAAAQAQ

WEBSITE >> www.theredlinepodcast.com


r/GeoPodcasts • • Mar 31 '20

Asia Emptying the Ocean With a Spoon: India’s Fight Against COVID-19

10 Upvotes

Although India is currently not a Coronavirus hotspot, the nightmare scenario for the rapidly expanding Covid-19 pandemic is for it to spread into the slums and villages of India. India is woefully underprepared for the pandemic. India has approximately .55 hospital beds per 1,000 people and 3.2 critical care beds per 100,000 people, compared to 2.9 hospital beds per 1,000 in the United States and 32 critical care beds per 100,000. India has approximately 20,000 ventilators in public hospitals, while the cost of a spending one day in an ICU with a ventilator is about 4 times the monthly salary for the average person. Although India is younger than most nations that have been hit by COVID-19 so far, there are nonetheless approximately 62 million people above the age of 65, while India suffers from high rates of malnutrition due to poverty, diabetes due to genetics and lung problems due to pollution that will make the Coronavirus especially deadly to many.

The risk for explosive growth of Coronavirus is especially severe in India’s teeming slums. Urban India has some of the highest levels of population density in the world. 13 of the 30 densest cities in the world are located in India. Dharavi has a population density of 870,000 people per square mile and the average Mumbai resident has less personal space than the average prisoner in the United States, making social distancing incredibly difficult. Worryingly, diseases such as Tuberculosis, which have the same propagation mechanism as the Coronavirus, are common. India sees 199 cases of Tuberculosis per 100,000 people, one of the highest in the world. So far, the Coronavirus has not had a large number of Coronavirus cases. There as of the writing of this article 1,251 cases of the Coronavirus resulting 32 deaths. Coronavirus cases are still concentrated in wealthier regions more connected to the world, but there is every reason to expect the disease to grow rapidly.

The Indian government has taken strong action to protect the people of India. Health policy is largely instituted at the state level in India, and state governments have been active in enforcing social distancing and quarantine laws. The Indian government has imposed bans on the export of key medicines, allowing the Indian government to build up stockpiles, while seriously damaging global pharmaceutical supply chains while hindering the international effort to contain the Coronavirus. The most dramatic action taken by the central government is a 21 day quarantine imposed on all Indians on March 24th. These actions are problematic in part because the Modi administration has worrying authoritarian tendencies, exacerbated by the authority the current emergency has allowed the government to grab. Moreover, the 21 day lockdown has hit many of the poorest hardest, many of whom will face hunger because they are not allowed to work. The most hardest hit are the at least 45 million migrant workers who originate from the poorest regions of the country, who are walking to their home villages, likely carrying the Coronavirus all across India. It is unclear if such harsh measures will halt the spread of the Coronavirus, and whether such measures are the best way to ensure the health and security of India.

www.wealthofnationspodcast.com
https://media.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/s/content.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/India_-_Dharavi.mp3


r/GeoPodcasts • • Jun 10 '19

MENA No Turkish Delight: What Does a Redo of Istanbul’s Election Mean For Turkey?

10 Upvotes

On March 27th, 1994 Recep Tayyip Erdogan took office as the mayor of Istanbul, launching a career that would eventually make him president of the country. Ever since then, Istanbul has been governed by parties that Erdogan associated himself with. Since 2004, Erdogan’s AK (Justice and Development) Party has ruled Istanbul. On March 31st, 2019, Binali Yildrim, former Prime Minster and candidate for the ruling AK Party, lost to a little known local politician named Ekrem İmamoğlu by the narrowest of margins. However, President Erdogan chose to order a rerun of the election, claiming massive fraud without even the flimsiest of evidence. The decision plunged Turkey into a political crisis that has only deepened the economic crisis it is mired in. In today’s podcast episode, I will be discussing the transformation of Turkey and Istanbul in the decade that preceded the current crisis, the structural economic weaknesses that has trapped the Turkish economy in cycles of boom and bust, and how Presidenet Erdogan’s autocratic and erratic behavior is only compounding these issues.

In 2002, the year in which the AK Party first won national elections, as the Turkish economy was stuck in a deep recession. Turkey’s economy had shrank by 6% in the preceding year, and the IMF was demandingharsh austerity to unlock much needed finance. The new AK Party continued to austerity program, slashing budgets and privatizing state owned companies. As painful as the reforms were, they ultimately proved successful. GDP growth regularly averaged over 7% aside from during the Great Recession. Istanbul was transformed during this period, as luxury high rises proliferated in what were once historic districts. The government has announced a series of massive mega-projects. Istanbul is constructing a 45 km canal that will allow ships to bypass the straits of the Bosporus, and a new airport that will be the largest in the world occupying more land than Manhattan is under construction. However, despite all this progress, there was a sense that the concerns of ordinary Istanbul citizens were being ignored in the mad rush to become a global city. Ekrem İmamoğlu was able to run a vigorous based upon local issues, promising a more people centered approach to development and in his brief term as mayor, İmamoğlu found evidence of systematic corruption.

As important as local issues are to understanding the AK Party’s shock defeat in the mayoral election, the dire state of the Turkish economy are just as important. Turkey has long suffered from cycles of boom and bust, going through five sharp recessions since 1980. The root problem behind Turkey’s macroeconomic instability is the perennially low savings rate. As Turkey’s economy boomed during the 2000s, Turkish corporations could not find sufficient financing from local savings, and were forced to borrow from abroad. I By 2018, foreign currency denominated corporate debt stood at 35% of GDP. While this debt was essential for fueling economic growth, the fact the debt is denominated in non-Lira currency poses a severe threat to the Turkish economy. In recent months, the combination of Trump’s trade war and rising interest rates in the US have unsettled financial markets, sending unstable currencies, such as those of Pakistan, Argentina and Turkey into tailspin. The Turkish Lira has gone from 4.49 to the Euro to 6.62 to the Euro. As a result, interest payments have gone up by 50%, even as domestic sales are denominated in Lira. Waves of Turkish corporations have defaulted on their debt, plunging the Turkish economy on a contraction of 3% in 2019.

Turkey’s economic ills cannot entirely be placed on the global financial context. Erdogan’s government was initially praised for it’s relaxed repression of Kurds, weakened the political prerogatives of the military, and loosened state enforced secularism. However, his regime has become far more dictatorial in recent years, especially after a failed coup attempt in 2016. After the coup, the government made a mass purge. The government detained 160,000, purged 130,000 civil servants from office, and closed scores of media outlets. Erdogan also pushed a constitution that effectively centralized all power in the presidency, and has made campaigning difficult for the opposition to operate. As Erdogan has centralized decision making in his hands, he has let his worst instincts dominate economic policy making. Erdogan has appointed more yes-men and cronies to power, including makinghis son-in-law the finance minister. Erdogan has refused to raise interest rates, in part out of a populist desire to boost his short term popularity, but also out of genuine beliefs that interest rates are evil. The political turmoil caused by Erdogan’s decision to redo elections in Istanbul has plunged the country deeper into political crisis, sending the Lira falling even further.

The AK pary’s ascension to power 2002 at first seemed to mark a major transformation of Turkey. However, over time Turkey fell into old patterns of boom and bust and non-democratic government. It is clear that if the new elections in Istanbul are free and fair, Ekrem İmamoğlu will by an even larger margin. Erdogan’s government, even when far from democratic, has always relied upon broad public support and a veneer of democratic legitimacy. Cancelling Istanbul’s election erases this veneer, even though the mayor of Istanbul isn’t in a real position to challenge the president. The latest decision making has made Erdogan’s erratic behavior more clear, and senior members of the AK Party are threatening to leave and form their own party. Ironically, it seems Erdogan’s attempts to centralize power in his hands has had only the opposite effect.

Selected Sources:
Growth and economic crises in Turkey: leaving behind a turbulent past? , Mihai Macovei
THE 2000-2001 FINANCIAL CRISIS IN TURKEY , Fatih Ozatay, Guven Sak
Turkey: Selected Issues, IMF
Varieties of Populism in a Changing Global Context The Divergent Paths of Erdoğan and Kirchnerismo , S. Erdem Aytaç and Ziya Öniş

https://wealthofnationspodcast.com/no-turkish-delight-what-does-a-redo-of-istanbuls-election-mean-for-turkey/
https://media.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/s/content.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/Turkey-Istanbul_Election_Results.mp3


r/GeoPodcasts • • Jul 26 '22

Bellingcat Monitoring Podcast - Episode 1: Women on the Far Right

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9 Upvotes

r/GeoPodcasts • • May 27 '21

‎Today, Explained: Why Belarus hijacked a plane

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9 Upvotes

r/GeoPodcasts • • Mar 16 '21

Asia Will Everything Be OK? : Ethnic Insurgency, Military Dictatorship and Mass Protest In Myanmar

9 Upvotes

On February 1st, 2021 the military of Myanmar, called the Tatmadaw, launched a coup against the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi on paper thin claims of massive voter fraud. The people of Myanmar have decisively rejected the coup, with protests organizing almost immediately after the coup, with hundreds of thousands of people of all ethnicities regularly gathering to demand the Tatmadaw return to the barracks. The military has cracked down, with at least 18 people (note more people have died since I wrote this) killed by the armed forced on February 27th. The situation is rapidly changing on the ground, and todays podcast episode aims to give a historical background to Myanmar's conflicts rather than an analysis of the current situation. I will discuss Myanmar's long running ethnic conflict, the overwhelming force and power of the Tatmadaw, and the rise of a more liberal society in the last decade.

Ethnic Insurgencies in Myanmar

From the late 17th century, the Konbaung Dynasty rapidly expanded a state based around the Irrawady delta and the Bamar people, forming the basis of the modern state of Myanmar. However, this state building project was interrupted by the British Empire, which in a series of wars conquered and absorbed Myanmar into the British Raj. The new state created by the British marginalized the once dominant Bamar majority, who make up roughly 62% of modern Myanmar's population. Vast numbers of Chinese and Indian immigrants flooded into Myanmar, with these minorities dominating the cities, business and government. Moreover, the armed forces were dominated by ethnic minorities such as the Chin, Kachin and especially the Karen. Unsurprisingly, the Japanese invasion of Myanmar during World War II was initially seen as an opportunity to end not just British imperialism, but an opportunity to assert the rights of the Bamar majority as well. Japanese brutality caused even the Bamar to revolt. As World War II ended, a pan-ethnic movement led by Aung San, father of Aung San Suu Kyi and the founding father of Myanmar, took power and established a fragile democracy in the country.

Myanmar broke into war almost immediately after independence. The Kuomitang invaded Myanmar hoping to create a base of operation to retake China in the north of Myanmar, a communist insurgency calling for revolution emerged in the countryside, and the Karens attempted to violently carve out an independent state. The military, which became in increasingly Bamar institution after independence, launched a coup to restore order. However, the situation became only more violent after the coup, as other ethnic groups such as the Chin, Kachin and Shan joined the Karen in revolt. Armed groups with tens of thousands soldiers grabbed large swathes of territories in the mountaineous interior of the country. The armed forces responded with scorched earth tactics, making regular use of forced labor, destruction of villages, and civilian massacres. While the Rohingya genocide is the best known abuse of human rights committed by the Tatmadaw, it was part of a broader pattern of extreme brutality.

A complex political economy emerged in the border regions of Myanmar. From 1989 onwards, a new military regime took a more pragmatic approach to the insurgents. The government began signing truces with various insurgent groups, in order to concentrate its strength on others. Both the Tatmadaw and the ethnic insurgents engaged in illegal logging of teak, mining of jade. The Kokang and Wa states in the Shan State of Myanmar emerged as the most important source of heroin in the world in the 1980s. These same regions have become important hubs of the production of crystal meth, not just for Myanmar but for the broader region of southeast Asia. Ethnic insurgencies continue to run in Myanmar. Since 2009, the Arakan Army, representing the Buddhist majority in the Rakhine state where the Rohingya genocide occurred, has created an army of nearly 10,000 increasingly capable of taking the Tatmadaw head on. While many ethnic insurgents have been incorporated as semi-autonomous border guards, it is unlikely ethnic insurgency will end any time soon.

The Tatmadaw
The Tatmadaw has been the dominant political and economic force in Myanmar since Ne Win's military coup in 1962. The Tatmadaw imposed a xenophobic dictatorship cutting off contact with the outside world. The Tatmadaw expelled vast numbers of Indian and Chinese people, many of whom born and raised in the country and expropriated their businesses. Moroever, the Tatmadaw nationalized all private businesses, launching what they called the Burmese Way to Socialism. However, the Tatmadaw did not have the capacity to manage Myanmar's economy. Even as other nations in south east Asia such as Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia saw spectacular economic growth, GDP per capita in Myanmar stagnated between 1962 and 1988. In 1988, the Tatmadaw's mismanagement reached an extreme when the government invalidated almost all currency, wiping out the savings of millions, because the government wanted a currency divisible by nine for astrological reasons.

A massive popular protest briefly unseated the Tatmadaw, but in 1989 the military reasserted its power. While the armed forces remained as brutal as ever, the Tatmadaw took a much more pragmatic approach to ethnic insurgents (as I discussed above) and the economy. From 1989, the military has allowed a partial liberalization, allowing economic growth the accelerate markedly from the early 1990s onwards. The Tatmadaw has profited mightily from these trends. Two of Myanmar's ten largest conglomerates are owned by the Tatmadaw, including UMEHL, one of the two largest conglomerates in the country.

These military businesses benefit from preferential treatment, with military linked companies gaining access to protected teak forests and foreign companies forced to partner with military companies when investing in Myanmar. Even businesses not directly connected to the military require connections to the ruling Junta to thrive with two of Myanmar's 10 largest conglomerates controlled by the sons of or married into elite military families. The Tatmadaw is so determined to stay in power in part because it wants to protect its control of private wealth, while at the same time the businesses the Tatmadaw controls gives it a level of independence from any civilian oversight.

The Rise of a Fragile Liberalism
During 8888 uprising in 1988, massive protests mobilizing millions were able to force long time dictator Ne Win from power. Aung San Suu Kyi emerged as a leader, and her National League for Democracy was able to win an overwhelming majority in 1990. Although the military rejected the 1990 election results with extreme brutality, it also lost interest in running Myanmar. The military did not want to be in charge of irrigation of the Irrawaday, or traffic in Yangon and from the 2000s onwards began a slow process of letting an elected civilian government manage day to day governance, with the Tatmadaw controlling foreign affairs and security.

The legitimacy of the Tatmadaw was further tarnished by a series of massive policy failures. In 2007, a government petrol price hike caused snowballs that protested into the Saffron Revolution. Supported by the powerful Burmese monkhood, mass protests were only put down with government repression. In 2008 Cyclone Nargis killed over 140,000 people, but the Tatmadaw refused all international assistance. In 2011, massive protests forced the government to back down on the construction of a $3.6 billion China backed dam. The Tatmadaw felt pressured into transitioning to a civilian government led by former generals in 2010, and genuine multiparty elections in 2015.

Aung San Suu Kyi was released in 2010, and allowed to run in the 2015 elections. Her National League For Democracy again won an overwhelming victory, winning more than 80% of seats contestable. Myanmar's democracy from the beginning was deeply flawed. Most importantly, Myanmar's democratic leaders proved incapable of stopping the Rohingya genocide and actively defended it in to the world. Moreover, Aung San Suu Kyi proved to be more than willing to imprison journalists and critics. Most importantly, the Tatmadaw controls a quarter of all seats in the legislature and there is no effective civilian control of the military.

Despite the fragility of Myanmar's liberalization, massive real change has occurred. Myanmar has consistently been one of the fastest growing economies in the world, driven in particular by its ready made garment industry. Between 2019 and 2015 garment exports increased more than 6-fold from $900 million to $6 billion. Moreover, garments are largely by medium sized businesses either owned by international investors or local entrepreneurs with few ties to the big conglomerates. While still desperately poor by developed country standards, Yangon and Mandalay have seen rapid growth. Smartphones and internet are becoming widespread, giving people access to information beyond government censorship.

Conclusion
After another overwhelming victory for Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, the NLD increasingly began discussing the structural limits to its power. The military responded with a coup based upon spurious charges of vote rigging, charging Aaung San Suu Kyi with illegally owning walkie-talkies. While some ethnic minority leaders initially saw opportunity in the coup, the overwhelming majority of people of all ethnic groups are backing the protests. Millions of protestors have flooded the streets, and strikes by civil servants and white collar professionals have given the pro-democracy real leverage. In particular, walkouts at the Myanmar Economic Bank has made it difficult for the government to pay civil servants. Nevertheless, the Tatmadaw has a long history of violence, and scores of protestors have already lost their lives. It is unclear what it will take to finally remove the Tatmadaw from power.

Select Sources:
The Fall of the Burmese Kingdom in 1885: Review and Reconsideration, Ernest C.T Chew
Indian and Chinese Immigrant Communities: Comparative Perspectives, Renaud Egretau
Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces Since 1948, Mung Aung Myoe
The idea of freedom in Burma and the political thought of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi , J Silverstein
Even paranoids have enemies: Cyclone Nargis and Myanmar's fears of invasion, A Selth
Under the Iron Thumb: Forced Labor in Myanmar. Anil Raj
PROFILING NON-STATE ARMED INSURGENT GROUPS OF MYANMAR, Tripathi Anurag
Overshadowed by kala India­‑Burma Relations, Michael Lubina
"The Burmese Way to Socialism" , Fred R Von Der Mehden
Business conglomerates in the context of Myanmar's economic reform , A Min, T Kudo
The 1990 Elections in Myanmar: Broken Promises or a Failure of Communication? Derek Tonkin
Burma in Transition: On the Path to Democracy, David Faehnle
Burma’s Military Blocks Constitutional Amendments, Congressional Research Service

www.wealthofnationspodcast.com

https://media.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/s/content.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/Myanmar-History.mp3


r/GeoPodcasts • • Feb 21 '21

Episode 37 - The Geopolitics of Rare Earths by The Red Line

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9 Upvotes

r/GeoPodcasts • • May 04 '20

Deep dive into the Geopolitics of North Korea

9 Upvotes

Myself and my team just finished an hour-long deep-dive show into the Geopolitics of North Korea, its foreign policy and what it means for the region. We also take a look into the likely outcomes of war, and where their nuclear program is up to at the moment.

For this episode we have
ERIC GOMEZ >>> CATO Institutes director of Defence Policy Studies and East Asia expert
JACOB BOGEL >>> Founder of AccessDPRK. The worlds most detailed open-source map of the DPRK
SOO KIM >> RAND Corporation, CIA and the Department of Homeland Securities North Korea expert.

One of the main focuses of the piece is about how important the nuclear program is to the Kim family, and how it completely changes the balance of power in the peninsula. We also go into what China, Russia, South Korea and the US are all hoping to gain from North Korea, and wether they are likely to achieve it. We even sat down with Eric and gamed out what a war between the North and South would actually look like, and the results were pretty surprising.

Its designed to be a crash course on everything you would need to know about the situation, and we learned a lot making it.

We also decided to leave in some of the more controversial points, such as the NKs missile count, submarine programs and US nuclear response plan.

The show is really starting to pick up and this sub was a huge help in gathering guests and info so I thought I would share it here to say thanks.

Would love your input and feedback as well.

SPOTIFY >> https://open.spotify.com/episode/02Ik5B5L12H3SmExCmWxNR?si=psdr9RxTTdKvMpgnE25I4A

APPLE >> https://podcasts.apple.com/au/podcast/episode-16-the-geopolitics-of-north-korea/id1482715810?i=1000473453022

GOOGLE >> https://podcasts.google.com/?feed=aHR0cHM6Ly9hbmNob3IuZm0vcy9mMmU4NTM4L3BvZGNhc3QvcnNz&episode=NmUxZjA0MzItNDk5Zi00MDMyLWI1ZmYtZDk5MDRkY2U0NTg5&ved=0CAcQ38oDahcKEwiYmsbMiZrpAhUAAAAAHQAAAAAQBQ

WEBSITE >> www.theredlinepodcast.com


r/GeoPodcasts • • Mar 22 '20

Asia Never Again, Again: The Rohingya Genocide in Myanmar

9 Upvotes

On December 9th 1948, United Nations unanimously adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, promising that never again would the world allow any community to be destroyed in whole or in part because of their race, religion, or ethnic group. It is a promise the world has failed to keep time and time again, with genocides occurring everywhere from Yugoslavia to Darfur. Genocide reared its ugly head again when a series of massacres perpetrated by the military of Myanmar in 2016 and 2017 killed over 24,000 people and forced more than 700,000 people to flee their homes. What makes the genocide of the Rohingya so tragic is that Myanmar seemed on the path to greater respect for human rights, holding the freest elections in the country’s history in 2015. Today, I will be exploring the historic roots of the Rohingya genocide, how the process of democratization made ethnic peace harder to maintain, and the current entanglement of the Rohingya people in the politics of the region.

The Rohingya people in Myanmar are so vulnerable in part because many do not see the Rohingya as people at all. The Rohingya peoples origin stems primarily from two major popular movements. During the 16th century, the Indian Ocean (similar to the Atlantic world) saw a major expansion of slavery from the 16th century. Portuguese and Arakanese pirates enslaved large numbers of people from the densely populated lower Gangetic plain and sold them to the kingdom of Mrauk U, where they formed the seed of the Rohingya population. A second, and likely larger, wave of migration began after British wars of colonization, as the British encouraged peasants from what is today Bangladesh to repopulate the region. While conflict between Rohingya and Rakhine Buddhist communities had been everpresent, the situation became markedly worse after the 1962 coup. In particular, in 1982 the military regime changed the citizenship law to declare anyone from an ethnic group that could not trace its ethnic origins in Myanmar to before the era of British colonization was no longer a citizen. The Rohingya were, as a result, subject to severe human rights abuses. The NaSaKa, the border police, regularly confiscated Rohingya property, and used Rohingya as forced labor in infrastructure projects. Rohingya could not travel as they pleased, or marry as they desired without permission from local authorities. It was a deeply dehumanizing situation, an unsurprisingly, many Rohingya were among the most enthusiastic about the return to democratic rule.

However, the human rights situation of the Rohingya worsened after the onset of democratization. In many cases, the process of democratization actually worsened the position of the Rohingya. The Rakhine state has always been one of the poorest regions in Myanmar, with a GDP per capita 25% less than the national average, and a poverty rate of 78%. The Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (RNDP) emerged among the Theravada Buddhist majority to demand better economic inclusion for their constituents. The USDP, the political party representing the interests of the Tatmadaw, the Myanmarese military, responded by offering large numbers of temporary registrations to Rohingya, and insinuating legal equality would be possible if the USDP won a sufficient share of the vote. Demagogues from the RNDP countered by demagoging about fears Muslim demographic dominance, despite the fact that the Muslim share of the country has not changed in the last 41 years. Moreover, although the governments decision to partially free the press, it made it gave hateful voices a loudspeaker. In particular, radical members of the Buddhist monkhood, led by Ashin Wirathu preached a message of hate towards the countries Muslim minorities.

The kindling collected so far turned into a conflagration when riots erupted in 2012 after the alleged rape of a Rakhine Buddhist woman. Over 100,000 Rohingya were forced into squalid internally displaced person camps, creating the perfect conditions for the rise the ARSA (Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army). ARSA launched a series of attacks against border posts in 2016, and the Tatmadaw decided it was time for a final solution to the Rohingya problem. A series of clearance operations were launched later in the year, that were nothing more than an excuse to launch brutal violence against civilian population. 24,000 people, and forced over 900,000 to flee their homes. Although Bangladesh initially had immense sympathy to Rohingya refugees, the welcome has worn out. For example, the government of Bangladesh has shut off cell phone access to refugees, and is trying to force refugees onto an island that could sink to the ocean floor at any moment. Both the international community and the government of Bangladesh want Rohingya to return to Myanmar but the situation remains too unsettled.

The local Rakhine Buddhist majority has risen against the central government, and the few Rohingya remaining face both the Tatmadaw and the rebel Arakan Army. Aung San Suu Kyi, the State Counsellor (equivalent to Prime Minister) does not have any effective control over the security services. Worse, her defence of the military’s action, make it appear she has no fundamental problem with the military committing genocide. The international community has had a mixed response. Japan, the primary destination for Myanmar’s booming garment exports. has been notably silent. The US has placed targeted sanctions on senior leadership in the Tatmadaw. The EU is considering removing trade concessions to garment exports from Myanmar. Worse, China is actively shielding Myanmar from international isolation, and has emerged as the country’s largest trade and investment partner. A top UN court has ordered Myanmar to protect its Rohingya, but there does not appear to be either the capacity or desire to bring to Rohingya justice.

Selected Sources:
Satisfying the” want for labouring people”: European slave trading in the Indian Ocean, 1500-1850, RB Allen
Rohingya and national identities in Burma , CS Galache
Myanmar The Rohingya Minority: Fundamental Rights Denied , Amnesty International
BUDDHISM, VIOLENCE AND THE STATE IN BURMA (MYANMAR) AND SRI LANKA , Julian Schober

www.wealthofnationspodcast.com
https://media.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/s/content.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/Myanmar-Rohingya.mp3


r/GeoPodcasts • • Dec 04 '19

Interview GEORGE BUSH, BARACK OBAMA, AND THE CIA TORTURE COVER-UP

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9 Upvotes

r/GeoPodcasts • • May 03 '19

Europe Deutsche Welle - Inside Europe: Another push for Scottish independence, and more

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9 Upvotes

r/GeoPodcasts • • Apr 23 '19

Snarky Deep State Radio - Remember the Part of the Mueller Report that Was About Being Attacked by a Foreign Enemy?

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9 Upvotes