r/GAMETHEORY • • 7h ago

Theory help, some specific ideas

0 Upvotes

Hi!

I prepare my bachelor thesis proposal and the subject of my paper is Black Sea security, I would like to talk about the most relevant actors ( US, NATO, EU, Russia, Turkey). Especially Turkey sounds really interesting to me because of the position and also relation with Russia and NATO. But I don't know what to demonstrate, does any specific phenomenon happened? Or could I interpret something through the lenses of neorealism? ( the creation of something or analyze a specific behavior of the states or the best for me something related to militarization and energy security) My problem is that I don't have an exact event in mind and I really need some ideas because I don't know exactly what is good for a thesis. What are the main topics could I look at? I thought about writing for the period of time 2008-2026. I'm sorry, but I need to see a strategic issue and I'm running out of time...


r/GAMETHEORY • • 19h ago

Challenging The Traditional Logic of the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Effect of Publicly Playing the Game

0 Upvotes

Can You Make Cooperation Rational Without Trust? Nick's Strategy on Golden Balls

In the final round of ITV's Golden Balls, two contestants must each secretly choose between a Split ball and a Steal ball. If both choose Split, they share the prize money equally. If one chooses Steal and the other Split, the Stealer takes everything. If both choose Steal, neither receives anything. Before making their decisions, contestants are allowed to negotiate and try to persuade one another of their intentions, but there is nothing binding about what is said and the game comes down to trust.

Traditionally, contestants almost always claim that they intend to choose Split. It is the obvious thing to say: admitting an intention to Steal gives the other contestant every reason to do the same, leaving both with nothing. However, in one memorable final, Nick takes a completely different approach. He tells Ibrahim that he intends to choose Steal but promises to share the winnings with him afterwards.

The exchange is available to watch on YouTube.

Nick's approach raises an interesting question: can you persuade someone to cooperate without actually needing them to trust you?

The conventional dilemma

Steal weakly dominates Split as you are no worse off by picking the Steal ball, no matter the other players choice. Mutual Steal is a Nash equilibrium, despite the fact that both contestants would be better off if they chose Split.

In theory, this creates a strong incentive to betray the other person. In practice, however, contestants generally spend their negotiation time promising to Split. They attempt to establish trust and convince their opponent that cooperation is in both their interests.

Nick turns this conventional approach on its head.

Nick's strategy: changing the incentive

Rather than promising to cooperate within the game, Nick openly declares his intention to choose Steal and offers to share the winnings afterwards.

The important distinction is that Nick does not necessarily need Ibrahim to trust him. He needs to convince Ibrahim that there is no financial benefit to refusing to cooperate.

Consider Ibrahim's options, assuming Nick's declared intention to Steal is credible. If Ibrahim also chooses Steal, both receive nothing. If Ibrahim chooses Split, he receives nothing under the official rules, but retains the possibility of receiving a share from Nick afterwards.

Nick has therefore not removed uncertainty; he has moved it. Ibrahim no longer needs to predict which ball Nick will choose. Instead, he must consider whether Nick will honour his promise to share the money.

The financial logic is straightforward. If Ibrahim believes there is absolutely no chance Nick will share the money, Split and Steal are financially equivalent: both result in zero. But if there is any non-zero probability that Nick will honour his promise, Split becomes the better financial choice. It offers the possibility of a positive return, whereas Steal guarantees nothing.

Nick's argument is effectively: Even if you don't trust me, what do you gain by choosing Steal?

This is what makes the strategy so interesting. Rather than relying on trust, Nick attempts to make cooperation the rational financial decision even in its absence.

The influence of television and public perception

There is another factor worth considering: Golden Balls is a television programme, not a private experiment.

Contestants make their decisions in front of an audience, knowing their behaviour will be broadcast and potentially discussed afterwards. This introduces reputational considerations that are not represented in the game's basic financial payoffs.

A contestant who promises to Split and then chooses Steal risks being publicly portrayed as dishonest or greedy. Their decision could affect how they are perceived by friends, family, colleagues, potential employers and the wider public. The prospect of that judgement may make stealing less attractive than it would be in a private setting.

This may also help explain why a reasonably high number of contestants chose Split, even though it’s a dominated strategy. It may carry a social expectation that they will behave fairly when the cameras are watching and has potential for negative future consequences attached to not doing so.

It raises an interesting question: would contestants make the same decisions if the game were played anonymously, behind closed doors, with no possibility of reputational consequences? Without that pressure, the financial incentives might carry considerably more weight.

The television environment potentially changes the game itself. Contestants are not just weighing up how much money they might win; they are also considering how their decisions will reflect on them as individuals.

Has Nick broken the Prisoner's Dilemma?

Strictly speaking, Nick has not changed the original game's payoff structure or eliminated its Nash equilibrium. The conventional mathematical incentives still apply within the formal rules.

What he has done is introduce a potential payment outside the game, changing the incentives facing Ibrahim. He shifts the uncertainty from the choice of ball to the credibility of a promise made afterwards.

There is also another negative element to this strategy. The other player will feel coerced and manipulated, which you can see evidenced in the video. This can cause a negative emotional response which could override sound logical decision making and caused Ibrahim to pick steal out of spite or a sense of injustice.

There are also wider considerations, including public perception, reputation and the desire to be treated fairly. These factors help explain why real people may behave differently from the purely financially motivated players assumed in simplified game-theory models.

Ultimately, Nick's strategy illustrates an interesting possibility: cooperation does not always require trust. Sometimes, it is enough to demonstrate that the other person has nothing to gain by refusing to cooperate.

 


r/GAMETHEORY • • 1d ago

Neorealism and Game theory

7 Upvotes

Hello! I prepare my bachelor proposal and I have one question: could I combine in the theoretical framework neorealism with game theory? I want to explain an international relations phenomenon at the Black Sea, but I don't know what exactly could be analyzed through neorealism combined with game theory. Could someone give me an example to better understand? Thank you! I really appreciate any explanation and idea!


r/GAMETHEORY • • 1d ago

1,000 players, 100 chips each, one roulette table. After 50 hands, 1 in 3 is ahead. After about 3,000, half are broke. Dostoevsky knew the math and kept playing for nearly ten years. Why?

Thumbnail
reddit.com
0 Upvotes

r/GAMETHEORY • • 1d ago

Would it make sense to do nuclear first strike if losing AI race were imminent?

0 Upvotes

Imagine there is credible intelligence that a hostile nuclear power is achieving general artificial intelligence that could lead to everything from hacking to building working missile shields.

Would the logical action be first strike and try to survive retaliaton? If one assume retaliation is more survivable than what the AI will do.


r/GAMETHEORY • • 1d ago

Why Building a New Road Actually Makes Traffic Worse

Thumbnail
youtube.com
1 Upvotes

r/GAMETHEORY • • 6d ago

NYU Game Theorist Explains Why He Believes Iran Is Likely to Build a Nuclear Bomb

Thumbnail
youtu.be
3 Upvotes

r/GAMETHEORY • • 8d ago

When should you exit a repeated relationship game if you can't tell how fast your partner is improving?

7 Upvotes

Hi all,

I've been trying to model a common relationship dynamic in game-theoretic terms, and I'm stuck on how to choose the exit condition. I'd like to hear how others would set it up.

The setup

  • Two players in an ongoing game with mutual surplus. Both partners value the relationship. Each would pay a real cost (switching costs, sunk investment, lost companionship) if it ended, so both have an outside option worth less than staying.

  • Each player does something mildly costly to the other. Each has a behavior the other dislikes. Clear dealbreakers are out of scope; I'm only asking about everyday, fixable issues.

  • A communication stage, then a grace period. One player says what the behavior costs them ("When you do X, I feel Y"). The other gets time to change.

The problem

Asked for another chance, the other player will nearly always say yes, so that request tells you almost nothing about their real type. Real change is also slow and noisy, so a short run of bad observations doesn't prove that nothing has changed. Waiting has a cost too: every round spent in a bad equilibrium is lost utility.

This looks like an optimal stopping problem with incomplete information:

  1. Stopping rule: How do you set a threshold for exit (the "last straw") that is neither too early nor too late?

  2. Bayesian updating: How do you tell a slow-improving type apart from a non-improving type when what you observe is noisy and promises cost nothing to make?

  3. Credible signals: Are there behaviors that can only be credibly shown by someone who is truly changing, the way a costly signal works?

  4. Time horizon: Is there a principled timeframe, or does it depend entirely on discount rates and how good each player's outside option is?

What I'm looking for

I'd welcome formal frameworks (repeated games, signaling models, the secretary or optimal stopping problem, and so on) and real experience. If you stayed and saw things improve, or left and felt you made the right call, what signal or rule told you it was time to decide?

Thanks in advance.


r/GAMETHEORY • • 13d ago

I reduced my game's prize pool from $2 million to just $20. Would you be more willing to burn everything now?

2 Upvotes

I previously posted a two-round psychological game called The Echo of Retribution, where two strangers could walk away with $1 million each — or destroy the entire prize pool.

Many people pointed out that nobody in their right mind would sacrifice hundreds of thousands of dollars just to punish someone.

Fair point. So let's try something different.

The entire prize pool is now just $20.

You're randomly paired with a complete stranger. You both know all the rules.

No communication is allowed. No talking, negotiating, promises, or signals. You cannot see each other's choices until both decisions are locked in.

Round 1 — The First Move

You each control $5.

You can split your $5 however you want between yourself and your opponent.

You can keep everything, share some, or give it all away.

Both decisions are made simultaneously and secretly.

Once both players have chosen, the decisions are revealed. You see exactly how much your opponent kept and gave you.

Round 2 — The Response

Another $10 enters the game.

You each control another $5, and the process repeats.

But now you know exactly how your opponent treated you in Round 1.

You can reward generosity, reciprocate, or keep everything for yourself.

Again, both decisions are simultaneous and secret until they're locked in.

Afterward, the full history and final balances are revealed.

The Final Decision — ACCEPT or BURN

Both players secretly choose:

  • ACCEPT: Keep your accumulated money.

  • BURN: Destroy the entire $20 prize pool.

Both must choose ACCEPT for anyone to receive anything.

If even one player chooses BURN, both walk away with $0.

No second chances. No renegotiation.

Here's the psychological twist

The obvious strategy might seem to be keeping your own $5 in both rounds. If your opponent does the same, you each walk away with $10.

But what if your opponent sees things differently?

Maybe they give you $2.50 in Round 1, expecting you to reciprocate.

Meanwhile, you kept your entire $5, assuming you would both do the same.

You weren't necessarily trying to be greedy. But from their perspective, you might look incredibly selfish.

You can't explain your intentions. They can't explain their expectations.

And after Round 2, either of you can destroy everything.

Imagine this scenario:

In Round 1, you give your opponent $2.50. They give you nothing.

In Round 2, both of you keep your $5.

Your final balances:

You: $7.50

Your opponent: $12.50

Now you have two options:

ACCEPT: Walk away with $7.50 while they receive $12.50.

BURN: Walk away with nothing, but make sure they get nothing too.

Would you actually sacrifice $7.50 to punish them?

And would your answer change if those amounts were $750,000 and $1,250,000?

I'm curious about three things:

  1. How would you split your first $5, knowing you cannot communicate with your opponent?

  2. If they kept everything in Round 1, would you interpret that as selfishness or simply rational behavior?

  3. Would you ever press BURN over a $20 prize pool, even if it meant losing your own money?

I'm especially interested in whether reducing the stakes changes people's willingness to punish perceived unfairness.

There's no need to give the mathematically optimal answer. I'm more interested in what you'd genuinely do.


r/GAMETHEORY • • 14d ago

You and a stranger can both walk away with $1,000,000. But either of you can burn all $2,000,000. What would you do?

0 Upvotes

I came up with a psychological game called The Echo of Retribution, and I'm really curious how people would actually play it.

Imagine you're randomly paired with a complete stranger. There's $2,000,000 at stake.

The rules:

Round 1 — The First Move

You and your opponent each receive control over $500,000.

You can split your $500,000 however you want between yourself and your opponent. You can keep everything, give everything away, or choose any split.

Your opponent does exactly the same with their own $500,000.

Both decisions are made simultaneously and secretly. Neither of you sees the other's choice until both have submitted.

Then the decisions are revealed, and you see exactly how much each person gave and kept.

Round 2 — The Response

Another $1,000,000 enters the game.

Once again, you each control $500,000 and secretly decide how to distribute it.

But this time, you know exactly how your opponent treated you in Round 1.

After both decisions are submitted, they're revealed again. You can now see the full history and how much each of you has accumulated.

The Final Decision — Accept or Burn

Both players secretly choose one of two buttons:

  • ACCEPT: Keep the accumulated money.

  • BURN: Destroy all $2,000,000. Both players leave with $0.

Both players must choose ACCEPT for anyone to receive anything. If even one chooses BURN, everything is lost.

And here's the most important rule:

You cannot communicate with your opponent at any point. No talking, no negotiating, no promises, no signals. Nothing.

Here's what makes this interesting to me:

The obvious strategy seems to be that both players simply keep their own $500,000 in each round. Everyone ends up with $1,000,000. Perfect, right?

But there's a catch.

What if your opponent expects generosity?

Imagine they give you $200,000 in Round 1, while you keep your entire $500,000.

You weren't necessarily trying to be selfish. Maybe you just assumed you would both keep your own money and walk away equally rich.

But your opponent might see your decision as pure greed.

They can't know what you were thinking. All they see is that they shared their money with you, and you gave them absolutely nothing.

Now they have another round to respond.

And at the very end, they can potentially destroy everything you've accumulated, even if it means losing their own money too.

So a perfectly reasonable decision from your perspective could create resentment in someone else's.

That's the part I find fascinating: two people might both want a fair outcome, yet misunderstand each other's intentions so badly that they end up with nothing.

Now I'm genuinely curious:

  1. How would you split your first $500,000, knowing you cannot communicate?

  2. If your opponent kept all $500,000 in Round 1, would you consider that selfish, or would you understand their reasoning?

  3. If your opponent gave you nothing in both rounds, would you ever press BURN, even if you had hundreds of thousands of dollars to lose?

And most importantly: would your strategy change if this were real money rather than a hypothetical game?

I'd love to hear how you'd actually play this, not just what the mathematically optimal strategy might be.


r/GAMETHEORY • • 16d ago

Repeated price competition with LLM agents produces very different strategic regimes

8 Upvotes

We study repeated price competition between LLM agents.

The interesting part is that the strategic outcome changes a lot depending on how the agents interact with the environment. Some setups sustain prices well above the competitive benchmark, while others move much closer to competitive pricing.

So the result is not simply that “LLMs collude.” The repeated-game dynamics appear to depend strongly on the agents’ information structure and action space.

I’m one of the authors. I’d be especially interested in how people here interpret these dynamics from a repeated-games perspective, and whether you see them as closer to tacit coordination, learning dynamics, or something else.

Paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21711


r/GAMETHEORY • • 16d ago

What does Game Theory say Democrats should do with their new power after the elections?

0 Upvotes

What strategy does it say to do in the environment we are in. Considering things like veto power of President, Ukraine war, Israeli war, Trump's economic policies (i.e. tariffs), etc.. What's actually possible.


r/GAMETHEORY • • 21d ago

Is there a general term for Prisoner’s Dilemma-like games?

12 Upvotes

I’m looking for a term describing a class of games that includes the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Tragedy of the Commons.

More precisely, a game which has a possible outcome that is at least as good for every player as any Nash equilibrium, and strictly better for at least one player (not necessarily the same player for each equilibrium). Or in other words, there exists a choice of strateges that Pareto-dominates every Nash equilibrium.

I’m surprised that I haven’t found a simple, widely recognized name for this class of games. At least ChatGPT doesn't know one. Is there an established term for it?

If not, I was thinking of calling them “Tragic Games”, since like a Greek tragedy, a bad outcome happens when everyone acts rationally.


r/GAMETHEORY • • 24d ago

To what extent can Game Theory model every single action in a person's day?

15 Upvotes

It’s easy to see how classic Game Theory applies to big decisions negotiations, traffic, workplace politics, or even queuing at the grocery store. Whenever another agent is involved, we are constantly (and mostly subconsciously) looking for a Nash Equilibrium.

But if we push this to the extreme: can every deliberate action we take in a day be framed through Game Theory?


r/GAMETHEORY • • 24d ago

Book recommendations for beginners

12 Upvotes

Any book recommendation on general game theory plus some specific uses and/or examples, for beginners?

For someone with basic University-level mathematics knowledge.

Thank you!


r/GAMETHEORY • • 25d ago

NumWit — pick 0–100, closest to 80% of the average wins (multiplayer Keynesian Beauty Contest)

Thumbnail
numwit.prajvex.com
3 Upvotes

I made this — happy to answer anything.
Everyone picks a number at the same time. The target is 80% of the average, and the closest pick wins the round. 5 misses and you’re out.
It sounds like maths, but it’s really about predicting everyone else: if everyone picks 50 the target is 40… so do you pick 40? Or 32, because they’ll think that too?
I’d love feedback, especially on what confused you in the first round.


r/GAMETHEORY • • 26d ago

Proposal Chess: A chess variant invented by me with an interesting (weakly) dominant strategy equilibrium

7 Upvotes

I have written the rules of my chess variant Proposal Chess here. I originally wrote it for a chess audience.

The strategy of proposing an objectively equal position and playing optimally (like regular chess) is a weakly dominant strategy equilibrium. The analysis is very similar to the analysis of the divide and choose strategy for the (two player) cake cutting problem. There is nothing specific to chess here, so it should work for all two player perfect information games (when two boards are used as mentioned in the blog post. If the game can end in a draw then there is no need to use the second board). Can something similar be done for n-player perfect information games?

Below is a TLDR of the rules.

TLDR

Proposal Chess is a chess variant designed to reduce the impact of opening preparation.

Before the game begins, each player secretly proposes a starting position for one board. On each board, the opposing player chooses which side they wish to play from that position. The game is then played on both boards simultaneously.

This “proposal-and-choice” mechanism prevents players from proposing blatantly favorable positions while still allowing them to steer games toward positions they understand well. Because each player proposes one board and chooses on the other, the format is fully symmetric.


r/GAMETHEORY • • 29d ago

I built a website for learning game theory by playing with it - StrategicLab

65 Upvotes

Hey everyone,

I’m Yunus, a math and computer engineering student at Boğaziçi University (Turkey), and I recently launched a project called StrategicLab.

It’s a website where you can explore game theory through playable games and interactive simulations. For example, you can try different moves in Nim, change a payoff matrix and see what happens to the equilibrium, or explore how firms compete by setting prices or quantities.

The idea is to give you somewhere to ask “what if I changed this?” and actually try it. Make a prediction, run the experiment, then look at the reasoning behind the result.

There are guided learning paths if you want some structure, but you can also just pick a lab that looks interesting and mess around with it.

I used Thomas S. Ferguson’s A Course in Game Theory as a guide for the theoretical side of the project. The labs explore topics ranging from combinatorial games to bargaining and coalitions through interactive experiments.

My goal is to keep improving it over the next few years and build it into a learning resource that students and teachers around the world regularly use.

Here’s the site: strategiclab.org

I’m developing this on my own, so I’d really appreciate feedback from people learning or teaching this stuff. If you try a lab, I’d love to hear what clicks and where the explanations get confusing. Feel free to email me at [email protected] about anything related to the site, whether it’s a question, a suggestion, a bug you found, or just to chat :)


r/GAMETHEORY • • 29d ago

Literature recommendations

14 Upvotes

Hi everyone,

I am a PhD student in power system economics and I wanted to ask if you could recommend some good books/courses on graduate level game theory. I am especially interested in Stackelberg games.

Thankful for any input :)


r/GAMETHEORY • • 29d ago

What strategy could exist in a non-vertex-transitive rock-paper-scissors variant?

Post image
37 Upvotes

I've been researching tournament resolution in social choice theory, and while considering the implications of the bipartisan set (the set of alternatives chosen with non-zero probability in the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium), I worked out this interesting tournament. It is the unique smallest regular tournament that is not vertex transitive. Here's how you could play it:

You can play Rock, Paper, or Scissors normally on top of your other hand, or play Meta-Rock, Meta-Paper, or Meta-Scissors, by placing your other hand on top. Or you can play Ultra, by clapping both hands together with your thumbs facing up. Rock, Paper, and Scissors function normally, including their Meta variants, except the regular moves beat the corresponding Meta move. Ultra beats all regular moves, but loses to all Meta moves.

You can see that this isn't vertex-transitive because, for example, the three moves that Ultra beats (Rock, Paper, and Scissors) form a cycle with each other, but the three moves that Rock beats (Meta-Rock, Scissors, and Meta-Scissors) don't; Meta-Rock beats both of the others. From a game-theoretic or psychological perspective, would this affect the strategy at all? (Since it's regular, meaning each moves beats 3 moves and loses to 3 moves, the Nash equilibrium of a single game is a uniform probability of each move)

EDIT: I just realized I drew the big arrows between rock, paper, and scissors backwards.


r/GAMETHEORY • • Oct 22 '26

Unenforced treaties between AI agents: I added a forfeitable bond and a free exit day. Where does it break?

2 Upvotes

I run a persistent strategy game where every nation's general is an AI: Claude runs the computer nations, and players bring a free rule-based general or their own agent. Nations sign non-aggression pacts and nothing enforces them. Attacking a partner is allowed. It's just announced to everyone and stays on the betrayer's record, and private messages become public three days later, so the promise and the invasion end up side by side.

That produced a lot of betrayal, so this week I added commitment devices:

- A pact has a **term** of 3 or 7 days and a **bond**: 0 to 200 gold that each side puts in escrow when it signs.

- On the last day of a term, either side may walk away **free** and take its bond back. If neither does, the pact renews for another term.

- Walking away early, or attacking the partner, hands your bond to them.

Some context on the stakes: a season is 60 game days and ends on victory points, so it's a finitely repeated game with a known last day. Gold buys mercenaries at 7 to 25 gold each (each one hired in a day costs more than the last), so a 30-gold bond is worth 2 to 4 armies.

What I've seen so far:

- In simulation with my rule-based bots, betrayals per season went from about 43 to 36 and pacts signed from 66 to 70. The bots are coded to weigh the bond, so that's partly by construction.

- The language models are more interesting. One general has been telling the whole world that its "pacts remain sacred until they are not". Another answered a pact offer that arrived after its border was already crossed: "A stone wall does not split its spoils with the river that is drowning it."

Questions for this sub:

  1. With a known final day, the last terms should unravel by backward induction. Does a bond change that, or just move the defection to the last free exit day?

  2. Should the bond scale with the partner's income? 30 gold means little to a nation earning 150 a turn.

  3. Is a free exit every term too generous? It makes betrayal rare, but walking away the day before an invasion is the same move with better manners.

The board is public at proxyrepublic.com (free, in the browser) if you want to watch. I'm the developer.


r/GAMETHEORY • • Oct 19 '26

Hey if anyone wanna check out my last video (intro to game theory) and have any feedback

Thumbnail
youtu.be
2 Upvotes

I would love some feedback and maybe check out my other videos thx guys!


r/GAMETHEORY • • Oct 15 '26

Two rooms thought experiment

Thumbnail reddit.com
1 Upvotes