r/CyberNews • u/Cheerful2_Dogman210x • 38m ago
Exclusive: Highly classified US national security communications network goes down, sources say
r/CyberNews • u/Cheerful2_Dogman210x • 38m ago
r/CyberNews • u/AzureBlog • 44m ago
Quick summary for anyone who missed it:
On 16 November an attacker exploited a flaw in Optimizely Web (an A/B testing tool) and added code to customers' "Project JavaScript" field. Optimizely's own CDN then served it to every page on 178 organisations' sites for most of the day, including Zoom, BBC, CNN, HSBC, Equifax, Salesforce, GitLab and IKEA.
The payload:
\- swapped crypto wallet addresses on the page and clipboard
\- skimmed card number, expiry and CVV from sites' own payment forms (hosted payment iframes were out of reach)
\- grabbed non-HttpOnly cookies and html2canvas screenshots
\- served the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits to older iOS versions
About $7,040 in crypto hit the attacker's wallets. The number of cards taken is unknown.
The CSP findings are the bit I think most web teams should look at:
\- 68 affected sites had no CSP at all
\- 50 had a CSP that let the payload run and send data out
\- 17 let it run but blocked the data leaving, thanks to connect-src
\- 24 (15%) blocked it completely
Allow-listing cdn.optimizely.com did nothing, because that's where the malware came from. 'unsafe-eval' let an inline fallback copy run at HSBC even though the attacker's domain was blocked. A tight connect-src was the setting that actually stopped the theft.
Curious how others handle this. Do you run CSP in enforce mode with vendors like Optimizely or tag managers, or have you given up and gone report-only?
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r/CyberNews • u/TheJourneyConnects • 1d ago
What a small TryHackMe lab taught me about authentication, authorization, IDOR and the little things we overlook in web security.
I recently started spending more time on TryHackMe, trying to move beyond understanding cybersecurity concepts in theory and actually seeing how they work in practice.
And one of the rooms I explored was called Neighbour.

A fairly simple room. Nothing too intimidating. Just a website, a login page, and a challenge to find another user’s secret.
At first, I thought this would be about figuring out a password.
Well, it turned out to be about something much more interesting.
How does a website know which information I’m actually allowed to see?
When I opened the vulnerable web application, I was greeted by a familiar login screen.
Username. Password. Login button.
Nothing unusual.
Except for a small message underneath:
Don’t have an account? Use the guest account! (Ctrl+U)
Now, if you’re just visiting a website normally, you might completely overlook something like this.
But this was a cybersecurity lab, and I got curious.
So, I pressed Ctrl + U.
That opened the HTML source code of the page.
And somewhere near the bottom, I noticed a developer comment containing the guest credentials.
guest:guest
Username and password, sitting right there inside the HTML.
For a moment, I found that fascinating.
Because the credentials weren’t visibly displayed on the website itself. They were tucked away in the source code.
But here’s the thing.
Just because something isn’t displayed on a webpage doesn’t mean it isn’t accessible to the person using it.
The browser receives HTML from the server to render the page. Anything included in that HTML, including comments, can be inspected.
This was my first lesson from the room. A developer might consider a comment harmless. Perhaps it was left temporarily during development or testing. But once that comment is delivered to a user’s browser, it is no longer private.
And if it contains credentials, internal details, or sensitive information, that becomes a security concern.
Such a tiny detail. Yet potentially such an unnecessary exposure.
I tried the guest credentials. Interestingly, my first attempt returned an Invalid username or password message.
Not exactly the smooth start I was expecting. :)
But while exploring further, I opened the guest profile page.
And this time, the application displayed:
Hi, guest. Welcome to our site. Try not to peep your neighbor’s profile.
Quite a welcoming message, isn’t it?
What caught my attention, however, was not just the text.
It was the URL.
/profile.php?user=guest
I started looking at it more carefully.
What exactly was this URL telling the application?
The /profile.php part identified the profile page.
And user=guest was a query parameter indicating which user's profile was being requested.
In simple words, the browser was asking the application to display the profile associated with guest.
That’s when another question came to mind.
If the application uses a value in the URL to decide whose profile to display, what prevents someone from changing that value?
And more importantly, what happens after they change it? This is where the concept of IDOR started making much more sense to me.
IDOR stands for Insecure Direct Object Reference. I had come across this term while studying cybersecurity.
The definition was familiar: a vulnerability where an application fails to properly restrict access to resources referenced through user-controlled identifiers.
But definitions are one thing.
Seeing where the problem could actually occur in a real application is another.
Imagine two users, Alice and Bob, using the same website.
Alice opens her profile:
/profile.php?user=alice
Bob has his own profile:
/profile.php?user=bob
Now imagine Alice changing the URL parameter from alice to bob.
Changing the parameter itself isn’t a security vulnerability. URLs are user-controlled, and applications commonly use parameters to identify resources.
The important question is what the server does with that request.
If Bob’s profile contains private information, the application should check whether Alice has permission to view it.
But what if the server simply reads user=bob, retrieves Bob's information, and returns it without checking Alice's permissions?
That’s an IDOR vulnerability.
A user might successfully log in, but that doesn’t mean they should be able to access another user’s private information. And this is where IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference) becomes important. The problem isn’t that someone can modify a URL. It’s when the server returns information without verifying whether that person is authorized to access it.
That verification must happen on the server, for every protected resource, not just at login.
What started with a simple HTML comment exposing credentials eventually led me to think about something much bigger: how applications make decisions about trust.
This lab reminded me that recognizing a possible weakness and proving a vulnerability are two different things. But both begin with asking the right questions.
Who is requesting the information? What are they allowed to see? And where is that permission actually being checked?
I think that’s what I’m beginning to appreciate about cybersecurity. Sometimes the smallest observations make you question how an entire system works.
And perhaps that’s the most valuable lesson I took away:
Security isn’t just about keeping the wrong people out. It’s equally about ensuring that the right people cannot access what was never meant for them.
Because being trusted to enter a system should never mean being trusted with everything inside it.
Thanks for stopping by! Here’s to more curiosity, more discoveries, and hopefully fewer vulnerable websites. 🙌
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r/CyberNews • u/NMBRD • 2d ago
I’ve spent the last weeks going through the public reporting on the October 11–12 refrigeration attacks in France (≈700 supermarkets, cold rooms driven to 50°C overnight) and the November wave across Europe. Putting a few observations here because I think the lessons get lost in the attribution headlines.
1. No novel technique was needed. The controllers were reachable from the internet. Many were legacy models Danfoss no longer updates (one EOL since 2021, another phased out in 2016). In the Netherlands, the systems hit still used default passwords. CERT-FR called internet exposure of these devices plainly “against good practice”.
2. The warning came first. Claroty Team82 published research on these controllers on August 9, two months before the attack, including a date-derived login code. A fix existed. Two days after the attack, at least 4,500 control pages were still online. The gap between disclosure and remediation in OT is still measured in months to never.
3. The payload was an order, not an exploit. “Set to 50, defrost, don’t stop.” Same order, different outcomes: in Estonia a freezer warmed a few degrees and was fixed in about ten minutes; at France’s blood service the alarms worked and no blood products were lost. Where alarms had been switched off, freezers built for −18°C reached 50. Monitoring and alarm integrity were the real control here, not the perimeter.
4. Attribution matters less than you’d think. France now points to an IRGC-linked group. Fine. But the next actor will find the same exposed devices. If your threat model depends on who, rather than what’s reachable, you’re defending against the wrong thing.
Takeaways if you have any facility/building/refrigeration controllers in scope: get them off the open internet, change defaults, replace what no longer gets updates, and verify your alarms actually reach a human.
I made an ~8 min explainer of the whole timeline for a small channel I run: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9YZ8V45eoys
r/CyberNews • u/AlAmine • 2d ago