r/AtomicPorn • • Aug 22 '17

An mushroom cloud billows above Hiroshima city following the explosion of the first atomic bomb to be used in warfare [2996 x 2089]

Post image
215 Upvotes

14 comments sorted by

10

u/DontCallMeSurely Aug 22 '17

It's so fucked to think that nukes were used on civilians at some point. Fucking politics...

20

u/RyanSmith Aug 22 '17

It is a shame it came to that. It's pretty ridiculous that the Japanese didn't quit after the first firebombing raid since it was obvious to everyone that more were on their way.

It's amazing to me that there was still the will to fight after hundreds of bombers came over your capital burning 643 acres of it, killing over 100,000, and displacing over a million people while knowing that your enemy had the capability to do it again and again over every city in your country and you were helpless to stop it.

13

u/PC509 Aug 22 '17

I think that will to fight is part of the reason they did it. They would have that will to fight until the end. The atomic bombs dropped kind of killed that will. If that could be done with a single bomb, there was no fighting back. There was no way to fight something of that magnitude. Those bombs pretty much said "It's over". Sad it came to that, but I think that it was necessary. It was either that, or continue firebombing and killing a lot more than those atomic bombs did...

10

u/RyanSmith Aug 22 '17

Absolutely. As terrible as dropping the bombs were, from the perspective of the time, and even with hindsight, I'm of the opinion that it was undeniably the correct decision.

Not only did it put an immediate end to the war in the Pacific, I also believe it played a large part in stopping a further war in Eastern Europe between the Western Allies and the Soviets. There were factions on both sides gunning to go at each other, but the bomb pretty much made it so no one wanted to get involved in that. It at least changed the calculus of the Soviets who may have wanted to roll their much larger tank army further west.

It's also probable that the bomb would have gotten used in a conflict sooner or later anyway, so better to get the horrors of its effects into the public mind while it was still in its infancy rather than when it could have caused a lot more damage.

At any rate, I'm glad it wasn't me who had to make the decision.

4

u/restricteddata Expert Aug 22 '17

It's not clear the atomic bombs actually did cause the Japanese high command to surrender. There is significant evidence that the Soviet declaration of war against Japan was the "event" that caused the change of thought, not the atomic bombs (and certainly not Nagasaki, which seems to have not affected anything that was not already in motion). Disentangling the two events is difficult as they happened so close in time, but it's clear that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria did hit the Japanese high command like a ton of bricks; they did not believe they could fight against a US and Soviet invasion simultaneously.

Separately, there are essentially no other events in history where killing a huge number of civilians created the will to surrender in the national leaders. If the atomic bomb did this, it is, literally, the one example of this happening. In all other cases, killing civilians tend to harden the resolution to fight on, not lessen it.

4

u/banjaxe Aug 22 '17

It's not clear the atomic bombs actually did cause the Japanese high command to surrender.

Richard Rhodes seems to agree with that. And also with the idea that Russia getting involved in Manchuria was one of the main reasons we dropped both bombs. We didn't want Japan being partitioned, like what happened in Germany. Seems the idea was to limit the power of the post-war USSR.

2

u/restricteddata Expert Aug 23 '17

And also with the idea that Russia getting involved in Manchuria was one of the main reasons we dropped both bombs.

The first bomb was dropped according to a very well-planned strategy that had a lot of "aims" (including ending the war, if it might contribute to that).

The second bomb was dropped because it was ready — it was not part of any particular big strategy.

The end of the war on the US side was very complex and there were a lot of different motivations/goals/ideas/etc. — it doesn't add up to any simple explanation for why it was done. Historians tend to see the dropping of the first bomb as "overdetermined" — so much in its favor, so little against it, from the US point of view.

But that's a separate issue from what its effect was or wasn't on the Japanese high command.

1

u/RyanSmith Aug 23 '17

They wanted to get second bomb off as soon as possible after the first one to give the Japanese the impression that they had a whole bunch of them ready to use if they didn't surrender.

This is a great read between General Hull and Colonel Seaman about whether to drop new bombs as soon as they were ready or save them up for the invasion

2

u/restricteddata Expert Aug 23 '17

It's important to focus on who the "they" is in your statement. "They" is not the President — he wasn't consulted on the use of multiple bombs. It was not part of a high-level strategy of any sort. Groves wanted to use multiple bombs as soon as possible and thought they might need to drop upwards of five or so; Truman was not briefed on that sort of thing, either, and neither was even the Secretary of War. There were interesting civilian-military divisions at the time that meant that a lot of what we would today consider strategic/political decisions were being made at lower levels. There is no contemporary evidence that anyone on the US side thought that the Japanese would need multiple atomic bombs to think the US had more than one of them; that is an after-the-fact justification. Groves seemed eager to use them, just because he had them. (There are other speculations as to motivations of his — dropping one HEU bomb and one Pu bomb helped justified pursuing both paths, perhaps.)

1

u/RyanSmith Aug 23 '17

There is no contemporary evidence that anyone on the US side thought that the Japanese would need multiple atomic bombs to think the US had more than one of them

I was reading a book the other day where the had interviews with people like Paul Tibbits and Charles Sweeney along with other people based on Tinian involved in the project that really wanted to get the second bomb off as soon as possible. I assume those were post-dropping, but there does seem to be a sense that they wanted to get the second one off as soon as possible to give the impression they had more. I'll have to look more into that.

1

u/restricteddata Expert Aug 23 '17

There are lots of post-factor rationalizations for it, but the records at the time indicated that they had an extra bomb, they had a blank check to use it, and so they did. From Tibbits' perspective, they saw their role as dropping bombs on Japan and as long as they were authorized to do it, they were going to keep doing it. That is separate from a top-level strategy (e.g. Truman, Stimson, even Groves) that believed that two bombs would equal surrender.

Michael Gordin (Five Days in August) argues that this is indicative of a pre-VJ-day view of the bomb by the people on Tinian — just another weapon. Only once it became a "war-winning weapon" (to the surprise of everyone) did people re-write their story about why you had to have two, why the way they did it was the best and only way to do it, etc. Gordin's bigger point is that we misread a lot more "strategy" into the bombings than was there at the time, because the bomb was not entirely "special" (and requiring complex political justifications) until it became the "war-winning weapon" (and thus until it won the war). I might have some caveats on that (some of the justifications at the high political levels started up around August 8/9th because that was when the first casualty reports came back from Tokyo, and suddenly the mass killing of noncombatants had to be justified in a very acute way, and so you start to see language about the bombs being used to "save lives" for the first time), but I think the essential point about over-reading strategic thinking is valid.

0

u/[deleted] Aug 23 '17

[deleted]

2

u/restricteddata Expert Aug 23 '17

It wasn't that the Emperor would live, it was that the Emperor system would survive and that he would not be prosecuted for war crimes. The latter is a relatively easy thing to agree to, the former is a tricky one. The US could have clarified that, say, the Emperor would have not been prosecuted for crimes, and that the system would (in some form) be allowed to continue. There were those on the US side at the highest levels calling for that (even Churchill thought that was a good policy) at Potsdam, but Truman and Byrnes rejected it (they wanted to give the Japanese no conditions whatsoever).

Even after the bombs, and the Soviet invasion, the Japanese said, "we surrender unconditionally, except the Emperor gets to stay." The US rejected this, and it wasn't until a failed coup in Japan, and the Emperor himself overruling everyone, that they accepted unconditional surrender. And, as you note, in the end the Emperor was allowed to stay in a ceremonial role.

2

u/Samzonit Aug 24 '17

I think that its even more amazing that they had to drop the second bomb until Japan finally surrendered...

22

u/SergeantSeymourbutts Aug 22 '17

Now this a picture I've never seen before from that event. Nice find.